Category: Philosophy

Posted on

Francisco Suárez, on the just cause 

Francisco Suárez is the greatest exponent of 16th-century scholastic philosophy in Spain. He was born in Granada in 1548 and died in Lisbon in 1617. He was a philosopher, theologian, and jurist. He was Jesuit (1564) and he studied in Salamanca and taught theology in Segovia (1571), Valladolid (1576), and Rome (1580). He was Professor of Theology at the Universities of Alcalá (1585) and Salamanca (1593), and in 1597 he went to Coimbra, where he had to take another doctorate in Theology to be able to teach. His works include Metaphysical Disputations/ Disputaciones metafísicas, which was very successful in his time, based on classical and scholastic authors.

This will be followed by a discussion of Francisco Suárez’s just cause theory of war, as reflected in his essay War, Intervention, International Peace/Guerra, intervención, paz internacional, in the style of Estrategia Minerva Blog. 

What are the just titles of war according to natural reason?

“No war can be just unless there is a legitimate and necessary cause. The conclusion is certain and evident. Now this just cause and sufficient reason for war is a grave injury already consummated which can neither be avenged nor otherwise redressed” (Francisco Suárez, Guerra, intervención, paz internacional, IV.1).

Bobbio recalls that the positions that tend to justify all wars are called warmongering; those that tend not to justify any are included in active pacifism and the intermediate ones that approve some and condemn others are just war theories. Precisely, Suárez’s approach is to specify the assumptions under which a war would be just.  

Bobbio affirms two fundamental principles: “the certainty of the criteria for judgement and the impartiality of the judge”.  He concludes that neither of these two principles is respected in the declaration and conduct of a war (Norberto Bobbio, El problema de la guerra y las vías de la paz).

Francisco Suárez’s doctrine of war is that it is only just as an ultima ratio, when other means of compensation, redress, or restoration are not available in cases of of grave injury. It is interesting to think that Clausewitz, the great theorist of strategy, said that “war is a mere continuation of politics by other means”. Strategy and negotiation must be elements that minimise the negative consequences of war. In other words, war, as a bad outcome, can help the parties to move strategically to avoid it.

“Not just any cause is sufficient to justify war, but only that cause which is grave and proportionate to the damage of war. It would be against natural reason to inflict very serious damage for a slight injury. Nor can the judge punish all kinds of offences, but only those which offend against the general peace and the good of the State” (Francisco Suárez, Guerra, intervención, paz internacional, IV.2).

It is associated with prudence, and a principle of justice, that the just cause of war must be serious and proportionate to its damage. However, this is not always the case.  

“Various kinds of injury are the cause of just war; these may be grouped into three chapters. First, when the prince seizes the property of another and refuses to restore it. Second, when without reasonable cause he denies the common rights of peoples, such as the right of transit on public roads and international trade. Thirdly, a grave injury to reputation or honour. These injuries are also sufficient cause for war when they are inflicted on the sovereign himself or on his subjects, for the prince is the guardian of the State and of the citizens” (Francisco Suárez, Guerra, intervención, paz internacional, IV.3).

Translated into more contemporary language, the first scenario would be that of territorial disputes between two States over a particular territory, where issues such as sovereignty, territorial integrity, etc. are mixed. This is a classic source of conflict, which can be handled diplomatically, although it sometimes ends in war.

The second scenario would be a serious violation of human rights, here there would be questions such as whether the issue of interference in internal affairs, whether democracy can be exported or universal jurisdiction of human rights. It could be argued that there are universal, regional and state systems to protect human rights, with many mechanisms for conflict resolution, although in the end a defensive war to protect human rights may be justified.

The third case of serious injury to reputation or honour would not currently be grounds for just cause for war, as there are other mechanisms for protection.  Instead, social networks have popularised the cancel culture, where people are denigrated for their actions or opinions considered politically incorrect.

“The war of the people against their sovereign is not intrinsically evil, even if it is aggressive; the other conditions of just war must, however, be fulfilled for it to be honest. This conclusion is only reached if the prince is a tyrant. It can happen in two ways: first, if the prince is a tyrant in terms of his dominion and power; second, if he is a tyrant only in terms of the way he rules.” (Francisco Suárez, Guerra, intervención, paz internacional, VIII.2).

This distinction of Suárez would be a precedent for the notions established by Max Weber as legitimacy in origin and legitimacy in exercise when dealing with the analysis of power. These words on the conditions of just war against the tyrant follow the medieval tradition of justifying tyrannicide, but give broader coverage by including this struggle within the types of just war.

In the first place, the tyrant is, Suárez clarifies, the one “who obtains the government of a State against the Law, especially if he rules it without justice and according to his will”. Secondly, the tyrant is he “who abuses his power, superiority or force in any concept or matter, or who simply imposes that power and superiority to an extraordinary degree”.

Just war would be a mechanism for protection against the abuse of power. Is war the best mechanism for that purpose? Constitutionalism had that very aim, which looks to counterbalance the different powers. However, there are conceptions of the separation of powers in democratic societies about who should have the last word on the most controversial issues and about whether all issues can be put to a vote. 

As Foucault put it, “politics is the continuation of war by other means”. The growing political polarisation is worrying. Carl Schmitt argued that politics is about benefiting your friends and prejudicing your enemies. This is known as the friend/enemy dialectic. Considering political adversaries as enemies is the first step to strong polarisation, civil conflict, and disunity. Let us hope that politics will find the best means and strategies for a better future and few, if any, just cause for war.

Posted on

Montaigne, on barbarism

Michel Eyquem, Monsieur de Montaigne, was born in Périgueux, France, in 1533 and died in Bordeaux, France, in 1592. He was a writer whose fundamental works are the Essays (1580 and 1588). Before writing them, he travelled and obtained material for his work. The essays deal with various topics such as religion, politics and philosophy. Their approach seeks to fight against prejudices and dogmatisms and to encourage open minds and intellectual lucidity. These essays can be seen as an invitation for dialogue, critique and thinking.

The following are some excerpts, which we have translated, from Montaigne’s Essays with comments in the style of the Minerva Strategy Blog.

“I would excuse our people for having no other standard or rule of perfection than their own habits and customs; for it is a general vice not only of the vulgar, but of almost all men, to confine their gaze to the sphere in which they were born”(Cap. XLIX ”De las costumbres antiguas” en Montaigne, Ensayos).

This is linked to the strength of localisms, which give an unusual moral weight to the place of one’s birth. Specifically, this passage from Montaigne alludes to ethnocentrism, which William Graham Sumner defines in his book Folkways (1906) as “is the technical name for this view of things in which one’s own group is the center of everything, and all others are scaled and rated with reference to it “.

Ethnocentrism conceives that the values of the group set the standard of what is human and outside the group, differences occur as stigmas. Procrustean bed versus heterodoxy by combining the identity/alterity binomial.

“There is nothing barbarous or savage in that nation, according to what I have been told, but that everyone considers barbarous what does not belong to his own customs. Indeed, we seem to have no other view of truth and reason than the model and idea of the opinions and usages of the country in which we are. There is always the perfect religion, the perfect government, the perfect and finished practice of everything” (Cap. XXXI “De los caníbales” en Montaigne, Ensayos).

What is interesting here is to distinguish between critical morality – rational or justified morality – and social morality – the moral values of the majority of society – on the one hand, and the debate between scepticism/relativism versus universalism on the other. It may be argued that Montaigne’s scathing critique of customs, opinions and usages goes against relativism and favours some version of universalist critical morality compatible with a moderate vital scepticism, which is often attributed to the author of the Essays.  

“I consider that there is greater barbarism in eating a living man than in eating the dead, in tearing a still sentient body with tortures and torments, roasting it little by little, giving it to dogs and pigs to bite and tear to pieces (something we have not only read about, but also seen recently, not among old enemies but among neighbours and fellow citizens and, what is worse, under the pretext of piety and religion), than roasting and eating it after death” (Cap. XXXI “De los caníbales” en Montaigne, Ensayos).

In classical Antiquity, the Greeks claimed that they were civilised and their neighbours were barbarians. Thus began a dichotomy that has subsequently had various applications. For example, it played a role in the Valladolid Controversy between Bartolomé de las Casas and Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda. 

In this case, Montaigne asks who is more barbaric, the cannibalistic indigenous peoples he encountered on his travels in Latin America or the Europeans who burned human beings alive in the public square once condemned by the Inquisition. Here it becomes difficult to establish gradualisms or weightings to barbarism.

“We may well call them barbarians, if we consider the rules of reason, but not if we consider ourselves, who surpass them in every kind of barbarism” (Cap. XXXI “De los caníbales” en Montaigne, Ensayos).

In his work on barbarism, Francisco Fernández Buey highlights how historical events in the 20th century in the West have made the notion of barbarism highly topical. He mentions the extermination camps in Nazi Germany such as Auschwitz, the repression of the Stalinist Gulag and the atomic bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

However, this 20th century barbarism incorporates two qualitatively more repulsive and malignant features: “the number of murders without compassion, in a merciless manner, and the coldness and even asepsis with which the acts of barbarism were carried out” (Francisco Fernández Buey, La barbarie. De ellos y de los nuestros).

“Miracles depend on our ignorance of nature, and not on nature’s being; habit dulls the sight of our judgment. Barbarians do not astonish us any more than we astonish them, nor with any more reason: which all would admit if they knew how, after going over these examples, to look at their own and compare them sincerely” (cap. XXIII “De la costumbre y de cómo no se cambia fácilmente una ley recibida” en Montaigne, Ensayos).

Us and the Others, identity and otherness, group dynamics, lead to characterising those who are different as inferior and deviant – with a stigma – and members of the group as normal individuals. The paradox is that, from outside the group, from another group, its members can also be labelled as different, deviant and inferior – with a stigma. It makes sense: moderation, common sense. Keep values such as human rights and the Golden Rule of Humanity in mind on a daily basis.

In the above essay on barbarism, Fernández Buey reflects that “the violence and cruelty of others is always fanaticism and fundamentalism; the violence and cruelty of our own is the explicable passion that always drags human beings along” (Francisco Fernández Buey, La barbarie. De ellos y de los nuestros).

A suggestive contemporary reading of Montaigne can be a clear appeal against sectarianism and polarisation. Traveling, reflecting, fighting prejudice, understanding differences, appreciating human beings, and aiming for an ethical horizon.

Posted on

Domingo de Soto, on Justice and Law

Domingo de Soto was born in Segovia in 1495 and died in Salamanca in 1560. He was a Dominican monk, theologian, jurist, and professor of Theology and Philosophy at the University of Salamanca. He was educated at the University of Alcala and furthered his studies at the University of Paris. He took part in the Council of Trent. He was a royal confessor to Emperor Charles V.  He was a member of the School of Salamanca, along with Francisco de Vitoria, among others. He played a role in the Valladolid controversy between Bartolomé de las Casas and Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda. 

Excerpts from Domingo de Soto’s work Treaty on Justice and Law (Tratado de la Justicia y el Derecho) will be discussed below, in the style of the Minerva Strategy

The aim of the legislator is to make subjects good, which is based on the primary human end of happiness. 

” This conclusion can easily be deduced from the decision of the above question. For the objective of the law is the common good, of which our beatitude consists: so that nothing achieves it except by the exercise of the virtues, which make good those who have them; all the more so when (as the Philosopher says) the happiness of this world is in the practice of the virtues; therefore it is the effect of the law to make men diligent and honest” (Domingo de Soto, Tratado de la Justicia y el Derecho, C. 2º art. 1).

Virtues are habits and moral dispositions linked to a model of excellence associated with a practice. If one acts virtuously -repeating these habits-, one becomes virtuous. This is an ethic that shapes character. And here, there would be two approaches. The first would argue that it is not the government’s task to impose models of the good life, highlighting the famous distinction between theories of justice -public ethics- and conceptions of the good -private ethics-. The second has several versions, the classical Aristotelian one -which inspires Domingo de Soto- and a more up-to-date version, which would make the State’s promotion of virtues compatible with respect for individual autonomy and pluralism of values along the lines defended by Joseph Raz in Morality of freedom.

“We conclude that the law makes men good, and this reasoning only draws from the fact that it makes them good subjects, which is less. Aristotle distinguishes the good citizen from the good man. A citizen is called good if he is a good subject, that is, obedient to the command of the law, but the good man has something more of honesty. For, since civil law permits many things with impunity, one can obey the law and yet be evil, namely, a miser, a fornicator, and so on, as we criticised before. Therefore, it is not enough for the law to make good subjects for it to make men simply good” (Domingo de Soto, Tratado de la Justicia y el Derecho, Ch. 2, art. 1).

If the argument of exclusion of ideals and State neutrality is usually defended from the liberal perspective, can civic virtues be imposed by the State? It seems that the republic of egoists/atomists is insufficient for cementing society, and the education of these civic values plays a prominent role. However, some authors, such as Sandel, have excelled in justifying the role of civic virtues in cementing democratic societies. Others argue in favour of State neutrality.

“Even if human reason could be a certain rule of our actions, the republic would be much better governed by the living voice of men than by written laws. Therefore, being a judge (as Aristotle says), animated justice would more easily and congruently shake him than deaf and dumb law. For actions being concerned with the use of particular things, human law cannot provide for everything, and consider all the singular circumstances, as the judge would do with his prudence” (Domingo de Soto, Tratado de la Justicia y el Derecho, C. 5ª, art. 1).

The Aristotelian influence is followed here in a particularist dystopia, a triumph of topicality, the living voice of men instead of written laws. The world of law is perfectible, but it has unquestionable qualities. It is a characteristic of the Rule of Law,  which can be summarised with the government by laws, not by men. It was a significant advance from the Ancien Regime. The legal system is made up of general and abstract laws. There is a great doctrinal debate about whether norms, be they rules or principles, must have an open or closed antecedent. Or, on the other hand, whether, in the face of circumstances that are not contemplated, they are defeasible conditionals. It is then when the judge, as an expert and from his experience, must consider the situation as one more piece of the Rule of Law. 

“If a good man better governs the republic than a good law. And he affirms that the law governs better than man. Aristotle also repeats this in another work. Namely, finding one or a few wise legislators is easier than many judges. A few are enough to make laws in a century, but many more are needed to pass judgement. On the other hand, laws are given after a long time of thought, and judgements are resolved very briefly. Therefore, it is easier to err in the latter than in the former” (Domingo de Soto, Tratado de la Justicia y el Derecho, C. 5ª, art. 1).

In this case, Domingo de Soto has a presumption that the legislators’ tasks are prudent and well thought out in the face of the errors of multiple judges. This could be a general approach; however, in the current legal-philosophical field, there has been an interpretative turn -Alexy, Dworkin- where the key question is what are the solutions for hard cases, and tools are provided to answer this question correctly. Ferrajoli, in his work Wild Powers. The Crisis of Constitutional Democracy (Poderes salvajes. La crisis de la democracia constitucional) argued why judges must sometimes defend the rule of law against executive meddling. 

“The law should be written in general, that is, it should not command: If such and such a person kills, or for such a reason, or with such a circumstance, let him be punished, but in general: Everyone who kills. These accidental circumstances cannot be included in the law but must be weighed by prudence afterwards. Indeed, just as in speculative matters, as Plato commanded, one must stop at the species, for there is no science but experience about the singular, which is passing, so in practice, there can be no law about the particular, which happens by chance, but only prudence” (Domingo de Soto, Tratado de la Justicia y el Derecho, C. 6ª art. 1).

Laws should be general, and prudence, i.e. the virtues, should be applied to particular circumstances because science is not possible. The renewed interest in Virtue Jurisprudence arises precisely from the question of the role of virtues, such as temperance, fortitude, humility or honesty, in the work of those charged with applying the law. We hope that justice will consist of implementing certain habits associated with models of excellence when deciding judicial cases. This would bring us closer to the ideal that those who apply justice are virtuous judges. 

.

Posted on

Golden Rule of Humanity

There have been some attempts to find the moral norms that are repeated across societies, such as the minimum common denominator of human morality. It is remarkable to note how principles are repeated throughout religions and moral codes. One such attempt was the Declaration for a World Ethic, adopted by the World Parliament of Religions and agreed upon in Chicago in 1993.

The Golden Rule of Humanity is one of the central principles on which this Declaration is based and has two forms. A positive one states that do unto others as you would have done unto you. This deserves some thought. Some see it as a further application of the logical principle of consistency—a way of being consistent with others and yourself. However, things are often more complex.

In a way, the Golden Rule is based on a future expectation that others will act in the same way as you, which is linked to the spirit of reciprocity. However, it is an expectation that does not have to be fulfilled. The other party should realise that you are following the Golden Rule. In other words, you are someone with an expectation of reciprocity.

The Golden Rule has a negative formulation that states do not do unto others what you would not want done unto you. This implies not doing harm if you do not want to be harmed. In this case, the future expectation is that others will not harm you somehow because you have not harmed them. It seems that social cooperation is based on this kind of expectation. However, someone may not reciprocate and not meet these expectations.

Therefore, some advocate that in the face of the good intentions of the Golden Rule, a Silver Rule should be upheld, which states that you treat others as others treat you. This rule is based strictly on reciprocity, not expectations. It is Axelrod‘s solution to the Prisoner’s Dilemma from TIT for TAT. Or known as an ‘eye for an eye’. The explanation is that someone who used the Golden Rule in the prisoner’s dilemma would get good results initially but would be exploited by someone who opted for betrayal. The TIT for TAT rule rewards or punishes based on the specific behaviour of others.

The conclusion is that, although they are linked, the Silver Rule is the reverse of the Golden Rule. The Golden Rule is based on a reciprocity of expectations, and the Silver Rule is based on a reciprocity of actions. The Golden Rule is based on the future, and the Silver Rule is based on the past.

It is often said that the Golden Rule is also a commitment to empathy, to ‘putting oneself in the other shoes’. This is a highly relevant ethical principle. However, on closer examination, the Golden Rule would be based on the false assumption that we all have the same tastes and needs.

If I have a vegetarian friend and I love meat, the way to treat him as I would like to be treated would be to prepare a big meat feast for him. But he won’t like it, he won’t appreciate it, and he will even get upset. This Golden Rule seems to be agent-centred, where the agent determines what is right. However, while it may be appropriate at times, it does not always work, so some advocate for a Platinum Rule.

The Platinum Rule states you should treat others as they would like to be treated. This rule holds that we should act towards others based on their interests or tastes, for example, my vegetarian friend would have a wonderful salad.

The problem with the Platinum Rule is that the tastes and interests of others are also particular, which can sometimes lead to paradoxical situations, such as whether someone is an addict or a masochist. This Rule is more demanding than the Golden Rule and the Silver Rule. It is an altruistic view that can become heroic.

The key is reciprocity. If my vegetarian friend wants to thank me for the salad, the Golden Rule leads him to prepare a gazpacho and the Platinum Rule to cook a sirloin steak. That is why it is essential to inform each other and to be able to clarify the terms of reciprocity.

The Golden Rule is a moral principle reflected in many of humanity’s religious and secular texts. It is a good principle for judging moral actions and is based on expectations, the future, and the spirit of reciprocity. The main criticism is that the agent is shown as the criterion of moral correctness.

Posted on

Virtuous ethical model

The last model I will discuss is the virtuous ethical model, which comprises a few principles. First, to know the right action in a situation, one must think how a virtuous person would act. Second, a virtuous person is one who possesses virtues. Third, virtues are habits or dispositions that forge the character of human beings and show the excellence of a specific practice.

There is confusion about the language of virtues in the religious and ethical approaches. The virtues of the Christian religion are faith, hope, and charity. However, the approach to virtue ethics predates Christianity and is identified with the work of Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, which considers prudence, courage, justice, and temperance as virtues.

The educational component in virtue ethics is relevant. One becomes virtuous by acting virtuously. Or, to put it another way, one’s character becomes virtuous by repeating virtuous habits. This is why this model is so essential in education and why virtues, in general terms, can be learned.

But what is a virtue? This ethical model is more flexible than the deontological model. The virtuous ethical model is more contextualist and pluralist. Everyone can find their own models of excellence -virtues- and try to act following them. Nevertheless, not everything can be a virtue; it is not a relativistic approach. Some behaviours are closer to vices than virtues and, although there is a contextualist component, some clear cases cannot be virtues. Evil, murder or envy can never be considered virtues.

What are the virtues of a strategist? From what we have seen so far, virtues are learned by behaving virtuously, and there is a contextual element where everyone finds their own models of excellence, but with some limits. Aristotle claimed there to be at least three exciting perspectives on virtues: a) The law of the ‘middle ground’; b) The importance of experience; c) The virtue of prudence as practical wisdom. These will now be applied to the strategist perspective. 

A virtue is the middle ground between two extremes or vices, one by defect and the other by excess. This is basically what the law of the ‘middle ground’ holds. It is a call for moderation in various actions. The analysis that can be made is that given specific objectives, one should determine which actions are virtuous -within the middle ground- and which are excessive -by default or excess-.

The virtue ethics approach places great importance on experience. By learning to be virtuous, we learn the virtues of strategy. The best way to learn from the right foundations is through experience. In practice, everyone finds their models of excellence, which allows us to see that virtues depend on context. Experience also allows us to assess whether we are really dealing with a virtue or an excess.

Of all the virtues, Aristotle highlights prudence, which he considers to be synonymous of practical wisdom. He refers to the word phronesis as the central virtue of human beings. For strategists, prudence is also a central virtue. Prudence means constantly weighing up all alternatives, considering the various opportunity costs, promoting impartial testing methods, using third parties or experts and, above all, thinking through -and not rushing into- different transactions.

From the virtuous ethical model, we can conclude that the virtues of the strategist can be learned, that one becomes virtuous by acting virtuously, that experience teaches us the way, that a balance must be made to find virtues and excesses. The virtues are in moderation and, finally, that the central virtue for strategists is prudence, which is practical wisdom. The path to virtue is an apprenticeship towards excellence based on experience and prudence. Do we dare to walk it?

Posted on

Juan de Mariana, on tyranny

Juan de Mariana was a prominent theologian, historian, philologist and political philosopher Spanish Jesuit. He was born in Talavera de la Reina (Toledo) in 1536 and died in Toledo in 1624. He studied at various European universities, most notably the University of Alcalá, where he also taught. He became famous with his work “Historia General de España“.

In Political Philosophy, his work Del Rey y de la institución real, of which Rogelio Fernández Delgado, on the website of the Spanish Royal Academy of History, points out that “not only it is considered to be the most notable and daring work of political literature written in Spain, but it has even been compared to El Quijote, in the sense that what Cervantes’ book represents for literature, Juan de Mariana’s work represents for Political Theory.”

The analysis in this post, in the style of Estrategia Minerva, will focus on this work of Political Philosophy by Juan de Mariana, on his characterisation of tyranny and on the controversial question of tyrannicide. This would be the flip side of the question of what virtues a good ruler should have, a classic topic.

Juan de Mariana starts from the famous typology of forms of government, formulated by Aristotle, where monarchy is the government of one in favour of the common good and tyranny, for one’s own benefit, and compares them as follows:

“Even if he starts with good intentions, he falls into all kinds of vices, especially greed, ferocity and avarice. It is proper for a good king to defend innocence, to repress wickedness, to save those in danger, to procure for the republic happiness and every kind of good; But not the tyrannus, who makes his greatest power consist in being able to indulge unrestrainedly in his passions, who thinks no wickedness unseemly, who commits all manner of crimes, destroys the estates of the mighty, violates chastity, kills the good, and comes to the end of his life without there being a single vile deed to which he has not given himself up. He is, moreover, the king who is humble, approachable, accessible, a friend to live under the same right  as his fellow-citizens; and the tyrant, distrustful, medicious, a friend to terrify by the apparatus of his force and his fortune, by the severity of his customs, by the cruelty of the judgments passed by his bloody tribunals”(Juan de Mariana, Del Rey y la institución real, cap. V).

The tyrant commits vile deeds, evils and crimes and falls into greed, ferocity and avarice. A good king defends innocence, happiness, stands against evil and danger, is humble, approachable, and seeks to be governed by the same rules as his fellow citizens.

Although there are certain anachronisms, it is worth considering whether some of today’s rulers fall more under this tyrannical profile or that of the kindly king.

Specifically, on the polemic of tyrannicide, Juan de Mariana states that “not because the citizens cannot gather together should they lack the natural ardour to overthrow serfdom, to avenge the manifest and intolerable evils of the prince, or to repress the attempts that tend to the ruin of the people, such as that of upsetting the religions of the homeland and calling to the kingdom our enemies. I can never believe that he was wrong who, seconding public desires, has in such circumstances made an attempt on the life of his prince”(Juan de Mariana, Del Rey y la institución real, cap. VI).

In this paragraph, tyrannicide is justified. There is a tradition in the History of Ideas in this sense, but here it is made explicit. It can be argued that the murder of a person cannot be the solution to political problems, which have other, more civilised channels and do not require such sacrifices of human life. What also underlies here is the notion of raison d’état, defended by Machiavelli, where illegal or immoral actions would be justified if the state is in danger.  

It is relevant because Thomas Aquinas refers to the fight against tyranny, from more moderate premises and assuming the principle of the lesser evil. Thus, he states: “the tyrannical regime is not just, since it is not ordered to the common good, but to the particular good of the one who holds power, as Aristotle proves in Politics. Hence, the disturbance of this regime does not have the character of sedition, unless the regime of the tyrant is altered in such a disorderly way that the tyrannised multitude suffers greater detriment than with the tyrannical regime” (Tomás de Aquino, Suma Teológica II-II, c. 43).

Juan de Mariana insists on the lawfulness of the right of resistance to illegitimate authority, in these terms: “but when there is no more hope, when the sanctity of religion and the health of the kingdom are already endangered, who will be so lacking in reason as not to confess that it is lawful to shake tyranny with the force of law, with the laws, with arms?” (Juan de Mariana, Del Rey y la institución real, cap. VI).

This connects with ideas of the Enlightenment thinkers, where power is based on a covenant and if one party – the ruler – does not comply with it, the other party – the people – has the right to resist that ruler and his rules. In Locke‘s formulation, the legitimacy of power is based on the tacit consent of the people. These theories of the Social Contract are conditional, the agreement must be fulfilled to achieve legitimacy. Otherwise, it would be justified to react to the injustice of tyranny.

On the duty of the ruler to obey the law, Juan de Mariana states “let the prince finally know that the sacrosanct laws on which public health rests will only be stable if he himself sanctions them by his example. He must lead such a life that he never allows himself or anyone else to have more power than the laws, for since they contain what is lawful, it is indispensable that he who violates them should depart from probity and justice, which is granted to no one, least of all to the king, who must use all his power to sanction equity and to vindicate crime, always having in both things his understanding and his care” (Juan de Mariana, Del Rey y la institución real, cap. IX).

The ruler must comply with the laws he promotes. Later, this is considered one of the key principles on which the Rule of Law is based. Beyond the merely legal sphere, the current demands of accountability require those in power exemplarity—they are references or role models for society—and coherence—harmony between public statements and private behaviours-.

Posted on

Machiavelic ethical model

There is a new approach that is called the Machiavelic ethical model, which is an extreme and particular version of the consequentialist ethical model. It is inspired by the work of Niccolò Machiavelli . It is curious how a term Machiavellianism has emerged from a thinker that the Spanish Royal Academy of Language defined as “a way of proceeding with cunning, duplicity and perfidy”. Machiavelli has not had much good press, but the Machiavelic ethical method is more common than it seems.

Machiavelli’s best-known motto is the end justifies the means but this attribution is not entirely accurate because the phrase does not appear in any of his works. However, in The Prince , he states:”(…) and in the actions of all men, and especially of princes, which it is not prudent to challenge, one judges by the result. For that reason, let a prince have the credit of conquering and holding his state, the means will always be considered honest”. (Machiavelli, The Prince, XVIII).

The Machiavelic ethical model affirms, as a fundamental rule, the desire for success and the ends chosen are more important than the means. However, that does not mean that behaviour must automatically be immoral. The Prince is a treatise on human nature, from which we can learn that the prince if he wants to achieve success, must be duplicitous and cover his tracks.

This may involve an apparent adherence to values, but ultimately being pragmatic. In one of the best-known passages, Machiavelli asks “in what way a prince must keep his word” and offers an answer that is in his line: “a wise lord cannot, nor ought be to, keep faith when such observance may be turned against him, and when the reasons that caused him to pledge it exist no longer. If men were entirely good this precept would not hold, but because they are bad, and will not keep faith with you, you are not bound to observe it with them. Nor will there ever be waiting to a prince legitimate reasons to excuse nonobservance” (Machiavelli, The Prince, XVIII).

From the deontological ethical model, it could be argued that promises should always be kept and the truth always told. If we analyse the scenario according to Machiavelli, there are three circumstances that make it advisable not to keep a promise: a) The consequences of the promise have changed over time; b) The reasons for the promise no longer exist; c) The other person will not keep their word with you. The second reason is the strongest and could be invoked if the reasons for the promise really no longer exist. The first should have been adequately foreseen and for the third, many people will honour their promises.

There are several interpretations of Machiavelli. The Machiavelic version of Machiavelli sees Machiavelli as a diabolical, immoral, anti-Christian author who justifies any action to achieve his goals. The republican version of Machiavelli states that he was a patriot, that he wanted to defend the State above all and that he considered that the Prince should have civil and political virtues and not religious ones.

For this reason, some consider him to be the founder of Political Science, because he considers that politics has its own rules distinct from ethics and religion.

From a strategic point of view, Machiavelli offers interesting readings, doubts and reflections. For example, we find this interesting advice for strategists: “It is necessary to be a fox to discover the snares and a lion to terrify the wolves” (Machiavelli,The Prince, XVIII). But perhaps the key element in strategy is how to act in the face of someone Machiavelic.The first and most difficult task will be to identify him because, as Aranguren states, “the first thing to do is to identify him.  a self-confessed Machiavellianism would be annulled as such: to be effective it has to be hypocritical and pay tribute to virtue” (Aranguren, José Luis, Ética y Política)

The strategist must be vigilant and, for example, establish mechanisms for impartial verification of the different operations. Someone seeking success, feigning conformity, does not keep their word. Strategies must be developed to prevent such situations. Machiavelli points out that if we learn from the qualities of the fox and the lion, we can get closer to success.

Posted on

Consequentialist ethical model

The consequentialist ethical model, which considers that ethics’ objective is to achieve the best consequences, opposes the deontological ethical model. There are several types of consequentialist ethics, the best-known of which is utilitarianism. It famously formulates that ethics should seek the greatest happiness for the greatest number.

Utilitarianism affirms that a variable must be maximised, whether happiness, utility, pleasure or well-being. It appeared in the Anglo-Saxon context at the time of industrialisation, where there was great optimism in applying the methods of the pure sciences to the Social Sciences. Utilitarianism assumes that ethics can be reduced to a variable, and its maximisation, and that this variable can be known. This is gauged using a mechanism similar to a happiness machine, which measures how happy people are.

This may sound strange, but to an economist, this sounds familiar. The model of man on which traditional economic theory is based states that rationality is the maximisation of a variable. That model is known as homo economicus. This view adopts utilitarianism and, in general, the consequentialist approach as its undisputed premise.

Is strategy not to correctly match means and ends? Anticipating the consequences of our actions is part of any strategy. However, the question is whether consequences can be the only decision-making criterion. Let’s imagine a case where we have a terrorist in custody; who knows where a bomb is going to explode in a central place in two hours. The consequentialist question would be: is it morally justified to torture this terrorist to prevent the bomb from exploding? I have asked my students many times about this textbook ethical scenario. The answers are divided between more deontological or consequentialist students.

Since the happiness machine does not exist, economists inspired by utilitarianism sometimes tend to consider money as the variable to be maximised. This approach can be contrasted with a more robust ethical view that affirms that human goods are plural and complex. Michael Sandel offers an example of this argument in his book What Money Cannot Buy, where he gives examples of the moral limits of the market. Relationships of friendship and love are never, or should never be, reduced to monetary terms. But beyond that, is it morally justified to sell a kidney? To be a surrogate? Can everything be bought and sold? Is it justifiable to pollute in exchange for money? Is it lawful to buy residency or nationality?

This phenomenon alluded to by Sandel is technically called weak-sense incommensurability and means that values cannot be reduced to a single variable. In general, the cases allude to reducing everything to monetary terms. Values are more plural, and human beings are more complex.

Perhaps a more complete evaluation of the ends should be made from the strategy point of view. Creating a plan to maximise one variable may cause one to lose sight of other goods involved. Agreement may arise precisely because the parties have different interests. But those interests need to be explored.

Anticipating the consequences of actions is a matter of prudence. Strategy seeks victory, but this does not always come from maximising a single variable. Life is more plural and complex.

Posted on

Bartolomé de las Casas, apology for peace

Bartolomé de las Casas (1484-1566) was a Spanish Dominican friar, writer and missionary known for defending the rights of the indigenous peoples of America during the Spanish colonisation period. He had a somewhat self-taught education, oriented towards Theology, Philosophy and Law. He went to the Indies in 1502, ten years after the discovery of America, in La Española, Santo Domingo. He was ordained a priest in 1512 and was the first to do so in the New World. He later became bishop of Chiapas, Mexico.

The controversy with Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda (1550) on the status of indigenous people and the lawfulness of war is famous. Las Casas was a pioneer in thinking about human rights and social justice. In this controversy, Bartolomé de las Casas provides some arguments for abstaining from war and on equality, which will be discussed below in the style of Estrategia Minerva.

“In the first place, because, between two evils, if one cannot be avoided, the lesser should be chosen, according to right reason”(Bartolomé de las Casas, Apología, cap. 40).

A distinction must be made between the doctrine of the lesser evil and the doctrine of the double effect. According to the former, the option that produces the worst consequences must be avoided at all cost. According to the second, when a given action is performed, there are unintended negative consequences in addition to the intended ones, which are positive. Applying the double effect assumes that the good produced by this action is greater than the evil.  

The relationship between the lesser evil and rationality is fundamental. Rationality provides the tools and analytical framework necessary to apply the lesser evil principle effectively.

“In the second place, it is manifest that more innocent people will perish in this way than those we are trying to free. Moreover, by a very strict negative precept, we are forbidden in any case to kill the innocent” (Bartolomé de las Casas, Apología, cap. 40).

Innocent people, in this context, are those who do not actively participate in combat. If self-defence is usually justified under just war theories, it does not extend to innocent people.

“Third, because in war, the innocent cannot be distinguished from the guilty”(Bartolomé de las Casas, Apología, cap. 40).

War is defined in one of its meanings by the Spanish Royal Academy as “armed struggle between two or more nations or between sides of the same nation”. They are usually brutal, violent situations that involve suffering and pain, damage and victims on both sides. Las Casas’ reflection is along the lines of recalling that, in these situations of armed conflict, the nuances and differences are difficult to define, especially between combatants and innocent people. The consequences in personal and material terms are often terrible.

In the final part of his work Apología, Bartholomé de las Casas argues: “the Indians are our brothers for whom Christ gave his life. Why do we persecute them without having deserved such a thing with inhuman cruelty?”(Bartolomé de las Casas, Apología, cap. 63).

Facing his opponent, Ginés de Sepúlveda, in the Valladolid Controversy, Bartholomew de las Casas maintains that the indigenous are brothers of the Europeans. This, far from being an improvised principle in the face of the new situation, is at the core of Christianity. In the Epistle to the Galatians, St. Paul writes: “There is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither slave nor free, nor is there male nor female; for you are all one in Christ Jesus” (Galatians 3:28). This message of equality was a novelty in Antiquity and continues to be so today and had as its antecedent the Stoics.

The best-known work of Bartolomé de las Casas is “Brevísima relación de la destrucción de las Indias/A Very Brief Recital of the Destruction of the Indies “, published in 1552. This book had a significant impact in Europe and helped to generate a debate on the human rights of indigenous people. It is an invitation to consider otherness and rethink one’s assumptions. To be authentic, we must start with the assumption of differences, starting from the equality of human beings.

“If this is done, I am convinced that they will embrace the evangelical doctrine, for they are neither fools nor barbarians, but of innate sincerity, simple, modest, meek and, finally, such that I am sure that there are no other people more disposed of than they to embrace the Gospel, which once received by them, it is admirable with what piety, ardour, faith and charity they fulfil the precepts of Christ and venerate the sacraments; For they are docile and ingenious, and in skill and natural endowments they surpass many people of the known world (…)” (Bartolomé de las Casas, Apología, cap. 63).

Underlying Las Casas’ message is the notion of equal human dignity, the basis of human rights. A common criticism of this author is that he did not extend this concept to black people. His views need to be appropriately contextualised historically and not read from the postmodernism of some views.

Mestizaje/Mixed-race and syncretism could be vindicated from the approach close to Bartolomé de las Casas. Racists of all stripes are afraid of mixing, and what has characterised the most genuine view of Latin American history is precisely mestizaje, which is something to celebrate. Syncretism, as a fusion of cultures and/or religions, is also something positive to learn from. It can enhance the best energies of society, but as is often the case in identity politics, it can be approached in a divisive and exclusionary manner. In the face of this risk, Bartolomé de las Casas launched a universal message of equal human dignity and fraternity as the engine of social progress.

Posted on

Deontological ethical model

Before delving into more strategic content, I will dedicate a series of posts to various ethical models. These models are used to judge our actions and can also inspire multiple strategies. The first ethical model is the deontological model.

First, it is necessary to clarify its meaning to avoid confusion. There are two meanings for the term ‘deontology’. The first has to do with professional ethics, which is related to the set of values and rules that regulate the practice of a profession and that are sometimes set out in a code of ethics, as in the case of doctors, lawyers, journalists, etc… The second is related to an ethical approach that is based on duties.  

I will explain this second meaning in this post. The deontological ethical model, based on duties, often contrasts with the consequentialist ethical model, which is based on consequences. More precisely, the deontological model is based on the individual’s duty to act according to the correct principle or value.

The paradigm of the deontological ethical model is the philosophy of Immanuel Kant and is usually exemplified in the formulations of the categorical imperative. Thus, it is stated, “behave in such a way that your maxim of action becomes a universal law”. This seems an essential moral principle, but some argue it is empty. With sufficient skill, the universal law can be turned into unacceptable claims. Let’s see how this mechanism works. If someone wants to use hate language against minorities, it seems that this could not be universalised. However, if someone advocated positive discrimination policies, could they be universalised? Some might argue that it does not make hate speech but that the principle of universalisation is the freedom of expression of people with their own pride.

Behind the categorical imperative lies the Golden Rule of Humanity, which has strategic significance and holds “treat others as you would like to be treated yourself”. It is a rule based on reciprocity, but unlike the an eye for an eye, it is not a rule of response to an attack but anticipates a cooperative attitude, which implies putting oneself in the other person’s shoes. Some studies indicate that this long-term cooperative attitude is the one that yields the best results.

Another formulation of the categorical imperative is to “always treat every human being as an end in himself, never as a means”. This shows how the deontological ethical model is a maximal ethics. Others connect this view with the notion of human dignity. From the perspective of strategy, it could be said that this is a commendable statement of principles, but that human relations move between cooperation and competition. The strategy should enhance the cooperative elements and diminish the competitive aspects to achieve specific objectives.

This ethical deontological model is legalistic, rigorist, not based on experience, rational, and universally applicable. Two maxims defended by this model are of particular strategic importance. The first is that promises must always be kept. In the U.S., some journalists go to prison for not revealing their sources in court. Their promise of confidentiality is stronger than the legal duty to testify. Keeping promises is a good ethical principle, and society relies heavily on the expectation that promises will be kept. Objections may come from the Machiavellian ethical model, where keeping one’s word is not always the best solution. The deontological model holds that commitments should always be honoured, regardless of the circumstances. The strategy should prevent being exploited by those who claim commitments and then do not want to fulfil them.

The other maxim of the ethical deontological model with strategic interest is that the truth must always be told. First, a distinction should be made between not telling the whole truth and lying. Second, the strategic use of threats assumes they must be credible to be effective. The ethical deontological model holds that the truth must always be told, even if it harms the speaker. In such cases, the best strategy is silence. Or as Wittgenstein said “what cannot be spoken about, it is better to remain silent about”.

The deontological ethical model is a morally demanding proposal; it could be described as rigorist. It is based on universally valid principles not based on experience. It can function as a mechanism to make commitments and threats solid and credible. However, the strategy learns from experience. Thus, there may be special situations where exceptions to the general principles can be made, provided they are adequately justified.

Principles and values are guides for action that occasionally mark the limits where one should not go. The ethics of duties should allow for a flexible application, not an absolute one. Arguably, this flexibility reflects the spirit of Kant, but it is closer to life.