Category: Philosophy

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Francisco de Quevedo, advice on politics and government

Oscar Pérez de la Fuente

Carlos III University of Madrid

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3708-846X

Abstract

The text presents Francisco de Quevedo (1580–1645) as a central figure of the Spanish Baroque and notes that, in addition to his literary fame, he had a lesser-known political side. Drawing on passages from The Politics of God and the Government of Christ, it highlights advice on the exercise of power and the virtues of a ruler. Quevedo warns against the ambitious minister who considers himself equal to or superior to the king: envy and greed turn him into a disloyal servant and a potential tyrant, which is why responsibility must be exercised with integrity and loyalty. He also maintains that reigning is a demanding task: public life requires constant work and rejects idleness, an analogy which the author links to the academic vocation understood as total dedication. A key idea is ‘obedience’ as the king’s foremost virtue, understood not as humiliation but as submission to reason, piety and the law; he who obeys these criteria governs better than he who commands without limits. The example of Alfonso of Aragon illustrates patience and a willingness not to demand obedience when what is ordered is unjust, which connects with classical debates on the authority, validity and justice of rules.

Keywords: Philosophy, loyalty, obedience, idleness

Francisco de Quevedo y Villegas was born in Madrid in 1580 and died in Villanueva de los Infantes, Ciudad Real, Spain, in 1645. He distinguished himself as a nobleman, politician and one of the most significant writers of the Baroque period in Spain. He studied Theology at the University of Valladolid, where he became a poet of great renown and wrote in opposition to his contemporary, Luis de Góngora. He cultivated all literary genres, but stood out chiefly for his great mastery of language, including his highly ironic style.
Francisco de Quevedo’s political side is largely unknown to the public.

Below, we will discuss excerpts from his work Política de Dios y gobierno de Cristo, sacada de la Sagrada Escritura para acierto del Rey y reino en sus acciones (1986)/ God’s policy and Christ’s rule, drawn from Holy Scripture to guide the King and the kingdom in their actions in the style of the Minerva Strategy Blog.

“No servant, nor minister of the King, is one who displays such grandeur that he is not merely equal to his king, but superior to him; such a man covets the crown; he is a rival for power; a tyrant, raised on the breast of favour, and nourished and grown by the arrogance of ignorance and greed” (Quevedo, 1986, 55). 

Envy is a poor guide. In this case, the minister is eager to take the crown and acts with duplicity and disloyalty. Each day has enough trouble of its own, and it is good to know how to fulfil one’s responsibilities at every moment, with diligence, integrity and loyalty. Positions are a learning experience for the future.

It is often said in Spanish, “Do not serve those who have served.” This phrase is attributed to Antonio Cánovas del Castillo and implies a certain notion of elitism, whereby only those of the same standing should be able to hold positions of influence. In my view, it is precisely because one has served that one can set a good example of how to treat a subordinate.

“Reigning is a task; that the duties of a ruler demand more sweat than the plough, and sweat drawn from the very veins; that the crown is a burdensome weight, which wearies the shoulders of the soul before it does the body’s strength; that palaces, for the idle prince, are tombs of a dead life, and for the one who attends to them, a scaffold of a living death—this is affirmed by the glorious memories of those enlightened princes who did not tarnish their legacies, counting among their crowned years not a single hour without labour.” (Quevedo, 1986, 144-154).

Those who devote themselves to public life should spend their days working, not idling away. This reminds me of a story I heard at the University of Oxford about the scholarship profession being viewed as a kind of priesthood, where academic life demands calling/vocation and total dedication, which is reflected in the personal and formative influence on students that goes beyond simply delivering lectures. Once again, the question arises as to what virtues those in government should have, and what virtues professors should have.

“The foremost virtue of a king is obedience; for, being well aware of the value of temperance and moderation, it enables him to rule with gentleness whilst exercising supreme power. Obedience is no humiliation for monarchs, who, as men of great spirit, recognise their subjection to reason, piety and the Law. He who obeys these rules, rules well, and he who rules without having obeyed them torments rather than governs” (Quevedo, 1986, 162-163). 

This is a reflection on Political Philosophy that challenges the notion of unlimited power. It sounds paradoxical to advise the king —the sovereign— on the virtue of obedience, but Quevedo makes it seem reasonable. First, by appealing to temperance and moderation, virtues already highlighted by Aristotle, and, second, by setting reason, piety and the laws as a guide.

That those in power obey the Law is a fundamental principle of the Rule of Law. It is desirable that they act rationally, as it would be hard to accept being ruled by someone like Nero. It would be commendable if they were compassionate, as the plight of the most vulnerable would be taken into account.

“The great and magnanimous King Alfonso of Aragon (whom all nations rightly call the Wise) possessed such learned and unyielding patience that he not only tolerated being defied—as was seen in the case of the soldier who insolently stopped him in public in Naples— but, not content merely to forgive them, he rewarded those who spoke ill of him; nor did he permit others to be spoken of in his presence, as happened with those who remarked on Nicolo Pichinino’s low birth. Not only did he not object to them disobeying him, but he commanded all his advisers not to obey him in matters where he ordered contrary to reason; and to the ministers who were subject to these superiors, he commanded that they should not obey them in matters that were not just” (Quevedo, 1986, 195-196). 

This reminds me of the Euthyphro dilemma, which Plato first raised. There is a version involving God, which would ask: “Is the good good because God commands it, or does God command it because it is good?”

There is another way of framing this dilemma in terms of the concept of sovereignty, which might be: “A rule is valid because the sovereign authority enacts it —Hobbes, Austin—, or the authority enacts it because it is just —Thomas Aquinas—.”

King Alfonso of Aragon urged people not to obey him in matters that were neither reasonable nor just. It would seem, then, that obedience may involve further considerations beyond mere legal validity. Entire libraries are devoted to debating these issues, which are of interest to the Philosophy of Law. This dilemma is typically addressed from either a formalist or a material perspective.

References

Quevedo y Villegas, Franciso de (1986), Política de Dios y gobierno de Cristo sacad de la Sagrada Escritura para acierto de rey y reino en sus acciones, Swan, Real Sitio de Lorenzo del Escorial. 

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Diego de Saavedra Fajardo, Political enterprises (II)

Oscar Pérez de la Fuente

Carlos III University of Madrid

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3708-846X

Abstract

The text presents Diego de Saavedra Fajardo (1584–1648) as a diplomat and political thinker, and discusses passages from Volume II of Empresas políticas, a work intended to provide guidance on the exercise of power. Drawing on various quotations, it discusses classic issues in public ethics. Firstly, it warns of the danger that those in office may be motivated by a desire for profit: unlike market logic, accountability, transparency, budgetary rigour and the management of conflicts of interest must take precedence in public administration. Secondly, the political responsibility of the ruler is emphasised: even if he delegates to capable ministers, he cannot wash his hands of affairs, and must resign when he loses confidence or when he fails in his duty of oversight or in the selection of subordinates (culpa in vigilando and culpa in eligendo). The text also places Saavedra within an elitist tradition that is wary of the fickleness of the ‘common people’, linking this to contemporary critiques of videocracy and social media, and raises the risk of a more sophisticated form of digital demagoguery. Finally, a strategic guideline is proposed: prudence in deliberation, skill in execution and perseverance in conclusion, combining Machiavellian pragmatism and Aristotelian moderation.

Keywords: technological demagoguery, resignation or dismissal, elitism, prudence, legal liability, political accountability

Diego de Saavedra Fajardo was a Spanish political writer, literary critic, poet, philosopher, and jurist, who was born in Algezares in 1584 and died in Madrid in 1648. I recently dedicated a post to his essay Empresas políticas/Political enterprises, a monumental work comprising four volumes and 100 enterprises, as the subtitle suggests. These books bring together the advice of a diplomat by profession on how to exercise political power effectively. 

Below, excerpts from volume II of the book by Diego de Saavedra Fajardo, Empresas políticas o Idea de un príncipe político cristiano representada en cien empresas/Political Enterprises or Idea of a Christian political prince represented in hundred enterprises, will be discussed in the style of Minerva Strategy Blog.

“Those who are very keen on aggrandising themselves and amassing their fortune are dangerous in positions of power. Although some seek merit and glory, and these are always worthy ministers, many consider it safer to build their fortunes on riches, and not to keep the reward and satisfaction of their services in the hands of the prince, who is almost always ungrateful to those who deserve it most” (Saavedra Fajardo, 1958, 15). 

The pursuit of profit is often cited as the driving force behind the private sector. Adam Smith’s invisible hand and Mandeville’s fable of the bees, with varying degrees of intensity and nuance, argue that private vices such as greed, luxury, the pursuit of profit and envy lead to positive public consequences such as wealth, efficiency and free competition. However, as Saavedra Fajardo contends in this passage, it is not appropriate for the pursuit of profit to be the goal of those with responsibilities in the public sector. Politics is legitimised in such a way that those in power are accountable, which must be characterised by transparency, rigour in public budget, and adequate management of conflicts of interest. 

“But even when necessity compels the prince to do so, he must not live carelessly and detached from affairs, even if he has very capable and loyal ministers. For the body of the States is like natural beings who, lacking the inner warmth of the soul, no remedies or efforts are sufficient to maintain or sustain them so that they do not decay. The prince is the soul of his republic, and for it to live, he must in some way attend to its members and organs” (Saavedra Fajardo, 1958, 54).  

With due regard for contextual differences, in these lines, Saavedra Fajardo alludes, in an incipient way, to the notion of political responsibility. In legal responsibility, if someone commits a crime and is convicted by a judge, they must then serve a sentence, which may consist of imprisonment, a fine or barred from exercising political rights. In political responsibility, if someone has a public position and has committed acts that warrant serious reproach that lead to the loss of the trust of the person who appointed them, they must resign. Resignation or dismissal is the sanction for political responsibility. In addition, the ruler is politically responsible if he has not properly supervised his subordinates –culpa in vigilando– or if he appointed someone and was negligent in not realising how manifestly unsuitable his candidate was for the position –culpa in eligendo-. It is noteworthy that the responsibility of those in power goes beyond merely not committing crimes and, in serious cases, if political responsibility is exercised, the best course of action is to leave public office.

“The strings of this harp of the kingdom are the people. Their nature is monstrous in every way and uneven, fickle and varied. They are governed by appearances without going deeper. They consult rumours. It is poor in means and counsel, unable to distinguish the false from the true; always inclined towards the worst. At any given moment, it is dressed in two contrary affections. But it is led more by them than by reason, more by impetus than by prudence, more by shadows than by truth” (Saavedra Fajardo, 1958,  122-123). 

There has been an elitist tradition in the History of Ideas since Plato. Sartori expressed some misgivings in Homo Videns about videocracy and how the criterion for choosing candidates in political parties was to look for actors or sports stars because they were already famous, because they appeared on television. Umberto Eco criticised social media because it had given a voice to the uninformed who previously hardly anyone listened to. In the digital age, the key is whether the manipulation of people by demagogues becomes even more sophisticated, camouflaged by technological advances.

“Three things are required in resolutions: prudence to deliberate them, skill to arrange them, and perseverance to complete them. All the work and enthusiasm in their principles would be in vain if we were to overlook (as often happens) the ends. With both anchors, it is necessary that prudence secure them” (Saavedra Fajardo, 1958, 140).

This seems like an interesting approach to establishing a strategy. Two sources of inspiration can be identified: Machiavelli and Aristotle. On the one hand, Saavedra Fajardo’s words reveal pragmatism and a matching of means to ends, sometimes referred to as efficiency, which aligns with some of Machiavelli’s writings. On the other hand, there is an emphasis on prudence, which Aristotle considered the virtue of virtues, focusing on practical rationality and aiming at the ends of human beings, happiness or human flourishing. Virtues, according to the Aristotelian perspective, arise as a middle ground between vices, one by default and the other by excess. An appeal to moderation as a guide for human life. 

References

Saavedra Fajardo, Diego de (1958), Empresas políticas o Idea de un príncipe político cristiano representada en cien empresas, vol. III, Madrid: Espasa Calpe, edición y notas de Vicente García de Diego.

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Abraham Lincoln, ambition and recognition of leadership

Oscar Pérez de la Fuente

Carlos III University of Madrid

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3708-846X

Abstract

The Minerva Strategy blog series on political leadership begins with Abraham Lincoln (1809–1865), a lawyer and the 16th President of the United States, remembered for his role in the abolition of slavery. Drawing on a chapter dedicated to him by Doris Kearns Goodwin in Leadership in Turbulent Times, the text analyses aspects of his leadership linked to ambition, character and the defence of principles. In a political context marked by aggression and confrontation, Lincoln stood out for responding with irony and good humour, defusing tensions and demonstrating that manner matters in politics too. His rejection of opportunism is highlighted: he preferred to lose office rather than betray his principles for personal gain. On the issue of slavery, he emerges as a leader with non-negotiable values, regarding it as unjust and contrary to human dignity—a lesson that remains relevant in the face of new forms of exploitation. Lincoln also warned against the excessive ambition of charismatic leaders with authoritarian tendencies, which are incompatible with democracy and the rule of law. As an antidote, he advocated renewing respect for the Constitution and investing in civic education: an informed and literate populace, including digital literacy, is key to preserving free institutions and resisting the drift towards authoritarianism.

Palabras clave: democracy, authoritarian drift, education, honesty, leadership, politics

This post starts a series on the Minerva Strategy Blog dedicated to political leadership. The first subject of analysis will be Abraham Lincoln, who was born in Hodgenville, United States, in 1809 and died in Washington in 1865. An American lawyer and politician, he was the 16th President of the United States (1861-1865). Always remembered as the president who abolished slavery, Abraham Lincoln is one of the most admired figures in American history.

On ambition and recognition of leadership, Doris Kearns Goodwin dedicates a chapter to Abraham Lincoln in her book Leadership in Turbulent Times: Lessons from the Presidents (2018). Below, I will discuss excerpts from this chapter in the style of the Minerva Strategy Blog.

“How Lincoln responded to attacks directed against him and his party reveals much about his temperament and the character of his developing leadership. Such was the law of politics in the antebellum era that discussions and debate between Whigs and Democrats regularly attracted the fanatic attraction of hundreds of people. Opponents attacked each other in fiery, abusive language, much of the delight of raucous audiences, inciting an atmosphere that could burst into fistfights, even, on occasion, guns being drawn. While Lincoln was as thin-skinned and prickly as most politicians, his retorts were generally full of such good-humoured raillery that members of both parties could not help but laugh and relax on the pleasure of the entertaining and well-told stories” (Goodwin, 2018, 16). 

In everything, a distinction can be made between content and form. The terms used by Aristotle for these concepts were substance and accident. In many cases, form is very important, even more so than content. For some, politics is tension and polarisation, while a sense of humour and good manners are always welcome. Lincoln was a leader who used irony as a political weapon, while today some persons use rumours, insults or violence. 

“I desire to live, and I desire place and distinction; but I would rather die now than, like the gentleman, live to see the day I would change my politics for an office worth 3000 dollars a year, and then feel compelled to erect a lightning-rod to protect guilty conscience from an offended God” (Goodwin, 2018, 16).

This quote refers to someone who changed political parties due to a new, very lucrative position. Lincoln defended honesty and consistency with one’s own ideals in the face of political opportunism. Therefore, we live in times when politicians feel discredited by the behaviour of some who find private benefits in politics. In the end, it all boils down to one of the great philosophical questions: What is the meaning of life? What is politics?

“By the disproportionate vote of 77 to 6 the Assembly resolved that “we highly disapproved the formation of abolition societies” and hold “sacred” the “right of property in slaves”. Lincoln was among the things who voted no. Registering a formal protest, he proclaimed that “the institution of slavery is found on both injustice and bad politics.” he had always believed, and he later said, that ”if slavery is not wrong, nothing is wrong”.  Lincoln’s protest stopped well short of abolitionism (Goodwin, 2018, 17).  

The notion of slavery is contrary to equal human dignity, which is at the core of human rights. However, slavery, which turns human beings into property, has been existed until unusually recent times. Even today, there are cases of forced labour and human trafficking. Lincoln’s leadership lesson is that there are values that cannot be compromised; they are non-negotiable and, on these occasions, it is good to hold fast to one’s convictions.

“While the ambition of the hallowed framers had been ‘inseparable linked’ with building up a constitutional government allowing the people to govern themselves, he feared that in the chaos of the moblike behaviour, men of the likes of ‘an Alexander, a Caesar, or a Napoleon’ would likely seek distinction by boldly setting themselves ‘to the task of pulling down’. Such men of ‘towering’ egos, in whom ambition is divorced from the people’s best interests, were not men to lead a democracy; they were despots” (Goodwin, 2018, 19).  

There is a risk of drifting towards authoritarianism in different countries. Some analysts will argue that democracy is mutating. However, we must be wary of “men with excessive egos”. The rule of law emerged as a reaction to the power of the absolutist king. Locke’s approach emphasises the separation of powers, limited power and the right of resistance if the Social Contract is not fulfilled. Charismatic leaders who accumulate power are a risk to political pluralism, alternance, checks and balances, and the vitality of a democracy of quality. 

“To counter the troublesome ambition of such men, Lincoln called upon his fellow Americans to renew the framers’ values and to embrace the Constitution and its laws. ‘Let reverence for the laws be breathed by every American mother,’ taught in every school, and preached in every pulpit. The great bulwark argument against a potential dictator is an informed people ‘attached to the government and the laws’. This argument takes Lincoln back to his first statement to the people of Sangamon County when he spoke of education as the cornerstone of democracy. Why is education so central? Because, as he said then, every citizen must be able to read history to “appreciate the value of our free institutions” (Goodwin, 2018, 19). 

Emphasis is placed on the role of public education as a prerequisite for democracy and as a form of defence against “a potential dictator”. It is worth considering that education and digital literacy are becoming elements that should be included among the virtues that citizens should cultivate. To make autonomous decisions, it is necessary to be well informed, among other conditions. To appreciate free institutions, education for citizenship is beneficial, as in the early days of democracy, the Sophists stood up to demagogues and authoritarian threats. 

References

Goodwin, Doris Kearns (2018), Leadership in Turbulent Times: Lessons from the Presidents, UK: Penguin Books.

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Thomas More, Utopia

Oscar Pérez de la Fuente

Carlos III University of Madrid

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3708-846X

Resumen

This text presents an annotated reading of Thomas More’s Utopia (1516), combining historical contextualisation with a philosophical and moral analysis of several significant passages. After situating More as a jurist and statesman executed for his opposition to Henry VIII’s break with Rome, the utopian ideal is explored as a critique of private vices and social inequalities: the prohibition of idleness, the absence of opportunities for corruption, and the equitable distribution of goods are presented as institutional conditions for preventing poverty and begging. Drawing on selected quotations, the relationship between happiness, pleasure and virtue is discussed, linking More’s proposal to the Aristotelian tradition of eudaimonia and emphasising the centrality of temperance and prudence. The commentary also addresses the tension between self-interest and the common good through various formulations of reciprocity (the Silver, Gold and Platinum Rules), and examines examples where form and moral substance are at odds, such as the wedding ceremony or the mockery of disability. Overall, the paper proposes understanding Utopia as a laboratory of norms and values for reflecting on social justice, the limits of humour and inclusive coexistence.

Palabras clave: Utopia, Golden Rule, honesty, humor

Sir Thomas More (1478-1535),  who was executed in July 1535 for his resistance to supporting the separation of the Church of England from the Catholic Church of Rome, was a jurist, intellectual, statesman and Lord Chancellor of Henry VIII of England, who ruled from 1509 to 1547. A highly principled man of deep values, More disagreed with the monarch’s divorce from his first wife, Catherine of Aragon (1485-1536), and especially with the promotion of Henry as head of the Church of England in place of the pope. Before his foray into politics, Thomas More was a renowned writer and scholar, and his most recognisable work today is Utopia, which presents a philosophical description of an ideal society set on an island.

Below, some passages from Thomas More’s Utopia (2000) will be discussed in the style of the Minerva Strategy Blog.

“There are no taverns, no ale-houses, nor stews among them, nor any other occasions of corrupting each other, of getting into corners, or forming themselves into parties; all men live in full view, so that all are obliged both to perform their ordinary task and to employ themselves well in their spare hours; and it is certain that a people thus ordered must live in great abundance of all things, and these being equally distributed among them, no man can want or be obliged to beg” (More, 2000).

It is significant that Thomas More’s utopian society discards private vices: alcohol, prostitution, gossip, the underworld, and rather, citizens focus on honest work. This means that goods should be distributed equally, without great inequalities or the tale of the lazy grasshopper and the hard-working ant.

“Yet they do not place happiness in all sorts of pleasures, but only in those that in themselves are good and honest. There is a party among them who place happiness in bare virtue; others think that our natures are conducted by virtue to happiness, as that which is the chief good of man. They define virtue thus—that it is a living according to Nature” (More, 2000).

Aristotle argues that the purpose of human beings is eudaimonia, a Greek term usually translated as happiness, human flourishing, or good life. This concept is linked to the exercise of virtues such as prudence or temperance. However, there are different conceptions of happiness and pleasure, which some positions unify. What Thomas More says here is that only good and honest pleasure leads to happiness. His life is an example of honesty and courage in dying for what he believed in, against his personal well-being. 

““They think it is an evidence of true wisdom for a man to pursue his own advantage as far as the laws allow it, they account it piety to prefer the public good to one’s private concerns, but they think it unjust for a man to seek for pleasure by snatching another man’s pleasures from him; and, on the contrary, they think it a sign of a gentle and good soul for a man to dispense with his own advantage for the good of others, and that by this means a good man finds as much pleasure one way as he parts with another; for as he may expect the like from others when he may come to need it, so, if that should fail him, yet the sense of a good action, and the reflections that he makes on the love and gratitude of those whom he has so obliged, gives the mind more pleasure than the body could have found in that from which it had restrained itself” (More, 2000).

There are several levels of possible strategic interactions between human beings: a) Silver Rule: Reciprocate the response obtained from the other party. It is the biblical ‘an eye for an eye’ or TITforTAT strategy; b) Golden Rule as reciprocity expectation: Treat others as you would like to be treated, with the expectation that they will do the same to you in the future; c) Golden Rule as unlimited altruism: Treat others as you would like to be treated, as part of your philosophy, without expecting anything in return. It is known as love your enemy; d) Platinum Rule: Treat others as others would like to be treated. Here the aim is to go against the particularism of the Golden Rule, which can have its variants of reciprocity and unlimited altruism. 

What is interesting here is that More speaks, in relation to good deeds, of reciprocity of benefits and of conscience as two indicators of the moral rightness of an action. Which of the rules analysed was he referring to?

“Yet they do not place happiness in all sorts of pleasures, but only in those that in themselves are good and honest. There is a party among them who place happiness in bare virtue; others think that our natures are conducted by virtue to happiness, as that which is the chief good of man. They define virtue thus—that it is a living according to Nature” (More, 2000).

Choosing the person with whom to share one’s life requires prudence and a proper assessment of several factors. Foremost among these are the character traits with which to deal with everyday conflicts. As Thomas More warns, it is somewhat inept that part of the nuptial ritual is to briefly show the future spouse naked.  Once again, the relevance between the substance and the form of a relationship, between what is important and what is superficial, is fundamental. 

“There was a Jester standing by, that counterfeited the fool so naturally that he seemed to be really one; the jests which he offered were so cold and dull that we laughed more at him than at them, yet sometimes he said, as it were by chance, things that were not unpleasant, so as to justify the old proverb, ‘That he who throws the dice often, will sometimes have a lucky hit.’ When one of the company had said that I had taken care of the thieves, and the Cardinal had taken care of the vagabonds, so that there remained nothing but that some public provision might be made for the poor whom sickness or old age had disabled from labour” (More, 2000).

The limits of humour in the age of political correctness have become controversial. Laughing at the ignorance or foolishness of the public can be an easy resource. One might expect humour to have a healthy function of social criticism, rather than a reinforcement of prejudices and stereotypes that are already ingrained. In the case posed by Thomas More, making humour about people with disabilities because of their condition is not justified as humour that is compatible with human rights, intelligent humour that makes us think, or humour that invites us to consider values for a more open, plural, and inclusive society, where there is room for everyone. 

References

More, Thomas (2000), Utopia, The Project Gutemberg, Morely, Henry (ed.),  available:

https://www.gutenberg.org/files/2130/2130-h/2130-h.htm (last visit: 17-5-26).

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Tommaso Campanella, The City of the Sun

Oscar Pérez de la Fuente

Carlos III University of Madrid

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3708-846X

Abstract

This text provides a contextual introduction and a critical commentary on Tommaso Campanella’s The City of the Sun(1602). After situating the author (1568–1639) within the context of criticism of Scholastic Aristotelianism and noting the episode of the 1599 uprising and his prolonged imprisonment, significant excerpts from the work are presented to discuss its utopian and communitarian proposal. The first theme is the defence of collective labour and the community of goods, set against private property, which Aristotle justifies on the grounds of generosity and the reduction of conflict. The second theme addresses one of the most controversial passages: the community of women oriented towards procreation, in dialogue with the Platonic discussion of the family and the Aristotelian critique of the dissolution of parental responsibilities. The third strand deals with hospitality and the process of integrating foreigners, interpreted as a precursor to Kantian hospitality and as a point of comparison with contemporary debates on immigration and citizenship. Finally, institutional aspects (magistrates, the council, the lottery) and the legal aspiration for few, brief and clear laws are examined, linking them to current issues of legitimacy, decision-making and biases (including algorithmic ones). Taken together, the utopia functions as a critical mirror of the present.

Keywords: utopia, communism, platonism

Tommaso Campanella (Stilo, Italy, 1568-Paris, 1639). Italian philosopher. In 1586, he entered a Dominican convent, where he studied Philosophy. With the impact of the works of Telesius’ naturalistic philosophy, Campanella became one of the critics of Aristotle’s ideas, as the scholastics presented it at the time.

In 1599, he led a rural insurrection with the aim of establishing a theocratic republic, for which he was subjected to several ecclesiastical trials and sentenced to life imprisonment, from which he was finally released in 1634 by the Pope Urban VIII. Campanella was imprisoned for 27 years, during which time he wrote his famous work The City of the Sun, in which he expressed his desire for a utopian communist regime. Campanella’s communist ideals were strongly influenced by Plato.

Below is a commentary of excerpts from Tomasso Campanella’s The City of the Sun (2001) in the style of the Minerva Blog Strategy.

Advantages of collective work

“They say, moreover, that grinding poverty renders men worthless, cunning, sulky, thievish, insidious, vagabonds, liars, false witnesses, etc.; and that wealth makes them insolent, proud, ignorant, traitors, assumers of what they know not, deceivers, boasters, wanting in affection, slanderers, etc. But with them all the rich and poor together make up the community. They are rich because they want nothing, poor because they possess nothing; and consequently they are not slaves to circumstances, but circumstances serve them” (Campanella, 2001).

In the Platonic conception of society, guardians should not own “land, houses, and currency” (Plato, 2012, 120-121, 416d)  because these evils are greater. Against this approach, Aristotle, in his work Politics, defends private property based on several arguments. The first is generosity, since “doing a kindness and giving some help to friends, or guests, or comrades, and such kindness and help become possible only when property is privately owned” (Aristotle, 2009,  47-48, 1263b40).  He also argues that greater conflicts derive from common property and that, if it were really a good solution, it would not have gone so unnoticed.

Discussion about the community of women 

“Love is foremost in attending to the charge of the race. He sees that men and women are so joined together, that they bring forth the best offspring. Indeed, they laugh at us who exhibit a studious care for our breed of horses and dogs, but neglect the breeding of human beings” (Campanella, 2001). 

This is one of the most controversial points of Plato’s approach: how he (does not) conceive of the family. For example, he asserts that the children of guardians are to be raised and educated by the State and has an ambivalent position on the status of women. From other assumptions, Aristotle defends the family and criticises the Platonic approach since “every citizen will have a thousand sons; they will not be the sons of each citizen individually: any son whatever will be equally the son of any father whatever. The result will be that all will equally neglect them” (Aristóteles, 2009, 42, 1261b32).

Hospitality

“To strangers they are kind and polite; they keep them for three days at the public expense; after they have first washed their feet, they show them their city and its customs, and they honor them with a seat at the Council and public table, and there are men whose duty it is to take care of and guard the guests. But if strangers should wish to become citizens of their State, they try them first for a month on a farm, and for another month in the city, then they decide concerning them, and admit them with certain ceremonies and oaths”(Campanella, 2001).  

This is a precedent for the notion of hospitality that Kant invoked centuries later. Nowadays, it seems that elementary notions that are at the foundation of human rights are questioned and become target issues of political debate, locally and globally. One such issue of relevance is how societies welcome/integrate/accommodate their immigrants. Here we see how in the 16th-century utopia, Campanella provided an inclusive mechanism for acquiring citizenship. Does it still sound like utopia today?

Again, with more details on the election of magistrates, the government, and the Council.

“They do not use lots unless when they are altogether doubtful how to decide. The eight magistrates under Hoh, Power, Wisdom, and Love are changed according to the wish of the people, but the first four are never changed, unless they, taking counsel with themselves, give up the dignity of one to another, whom among them they know to be wiser, more renowned, and more nearly perfect. And then they are obedient and honorable, since they yield willingly to the wiser man and are taught by him. This, however, rarely happens” (Campanella, 2001).

Leaving the most difficult choices to the randomness of a lottery does not seem the most appropriate. Although current trends advocate leaving some decisions to AI algorithms, which are biased, stereotyped, and not necessarily neutral in terms of human rights.

It is commendably “utopian,” in this City of the Sun, that top leaders decide themselves when to leave office and “willingly retire to those who are wiser than they are and learn from them.” It seems to be a carbon copy of the present times…

Laws and judgement 

“They have but few laws, and these short and plain, and written upon a flat table and hanging to the doors of the temple, that is between the columns” (Campanella, 2001).

 The utopia in the legal world is that laws should be few, short, and plain. This would help to bring law and judicial decisions closer to non-experts. The great thing about the legal method is that it makes it possible to deal with various strategies of the parties in a process and to justify the final decision by means of legal arguments. Law is conceived as an interpretative activity, where the power of conviction of each party becomes relevant.

The City of the Sun, by Tommaso Campanella, aims to criticise its present and future through utopian rhetoric, based on ideas that cannot be found anywhere, yet their power of conviction is the horizon that we can focus on (or not) when you look in front of the mirror. 

References

Aristotle (2009), Politics, Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, trans. Ernest Barker.

Campanella, Tomaso (2001), The City of the Sun, The Project Gutemberg, available:

https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/2816/pg2816-images.html (last visit: 17-5-26).

Plato (2012), Republic, London, New York: Penguin Books, trans. Christhopher Rowe.

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Francisco Suárez, on the just cause 

Oscar Pérez de la Fuente

Carlos III University of Madrid

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3708-846X

Abstract

This paper presents an interpretation of Francisco Suárez’s theory of just war and its relevance to understanding contemporary conflicts. Following a brief biographical and intellectual overview of the author, the text reconstructs the core of his argument: no war can be deemed just without a legitimate cause that is necessary and based on a grave wrong already committed which cannot be redressed by other means. From there, it examines the principle of proportionality—the cause must be grave and proportionate to the foreseeable damages of war—and distinguishes three classical just causes of war: the unjust appropriation of property or territories, the denial of common rights under the ius gentium(transit and trade), and grave injury to honour. The analysis translates these scenarios into contemporary terms (territorial disputes, the protection of human rights and the limits of reputation as a cause for war) and discusses the role of war as a last resort in the face of institutional and diplomatic alternatives. Finally, it addresses the possibility of armed resistance against a tyrant, linking it to debates on the legitimacy of origin and exercise, and concludes with a warning about political polarisation and the need for strategies to prevent the escalation of conflict.

Keywords: just war, proportionality, diplomacy, tyrannicide

Francisco Suárez is the greatest exponent of 16th-century scholastic philosophy in Spain. He was born in Granada in 1548 and died in Lisbon in 1617. He was a philosopher, theologian, and jurist. He was Jesuit (1564) and he studied in Salamanca and taught theology in Segovia (1571), Valladolid (1576), and Rome (1580). He was Professor of Theology at the Universities of Alcalá (1585) and Salamanca (1593), and in 1597 he went to Coimbra, where he had to take another doctorate in Theology to be able to teach. His works include Metaphysical Disputations/ Disputaciones metafísicas, which was very successful in his time, based on classical and scholastic authors.

This will be followed by a discussion of Francisco Suárez’s just cause theory of war, as reflected in his essay War, Intervention, International Peace/Guerra, intervención, paz internacional (1956), in the style of Estrategia Minerva Blog. 

What are the just titles of war according to natural reason?

“No war can be just unless there is a legitimate and necessary cause. The conclusion is certain and evident. Now this just cause and sufficient reason for war is a grave injury already consummated which can neither be avenged nor otherwise redressed” (Suárez, 1956, 75).

Bobbio recalls that the positions that tend to justify all wars are called warmongering; those that tend not to justify any are included in active pacifism and the intermediate ones that approve some and condemn others are just war theories. Precisely, Suárez’s approach is to specify the assumptions under which a war would be just.  

Bobbio affirms two fundamental principles: “the certainty of the criteria for judgement and the impartiality of the judge”.  He concludes that neither of these two principles is respected in the declaration and conduct of a war (Bobbio, 1999, 52).

Francisco Suárez’s doctrine of war is that it is only just as an ultima ratio, when other means of compensation, redress, or restoration are not available in cases of of grave injury. It is interesting to think that Clausewitz, the great theorist of strategy, said that “war is a mere continuation of politics by other means”. Strategy and negotiation must be elements that minimise the negative consequences of war. In other words, war, as a bad outcome, can help the parties to move strategically to avoid it.

“Not just any cause is sufficient to justify war, but only that cause which is grave and proportionate to the damage of war. It would be against natural reason to inflict very serious damage for a slight injury. Nor can the judge punish all kinds of offences, but only those which offend against the general peace and the good of the State” (Suárez, 1965, 76).

It is associated with prudence, and a principle of justice, that the just cause of war must be serious and proportionate to its damage. However, this is not always the case.  

“Various kinds of injury are the cause of just war; these may be grouped into three chapters. First, when the prince seizes the property of another and refuses to restore it. Second, when without reasonable cause he denies the common rights of peoples, such as the right of transit on public roads and international trade. Thirdly, a grave injury to reputation or honour. These injuries are also sufficient cause for war when they are inflicted on the sovereign himself or on his subjects, for the prince is the guardian of the State and of the citizens” (Suárez, 1956, 77). .

Translated into more contemporary language, the first scenario would be that of territorial disputes between two States over a particular territory, where issues such as sovereignty, territorial integrity, etc. are mixed. This is a classic source of conflict, which can be handled diplomatically, although it sometimes ends in war.

The second scenario would be a serious violation of human rights, here there would be questions such as whether the issue of interference in internal affairs, whether democracy can be exported or universal jurisdiction of human rights. It could be argued that there are universal, regional and state systems to protect human rights, with many mechanisms for conflict resolution, although in the end a defensive war to protect human rights may be justified.

The third case of serious injury to reputation or honour would not currently be grounds for just cause for war, as there are other mechanisms for protection.  Instead, social networks have popularised the cancel culture, where people are denigrated for their actions or opinions considered politically incorrect.

“The war of the people against their sovereign is not intrinsically evil, even if it is aggressive; the other conditions of just war must, however, be fulfilled for it to be honest. This conclusion is only reached if the prince is a tyrant. It can happen in two ways: first, if the prince is a tyrant in terms of his dominion and power; second, if he is a tyrant only in terms of the way he rules.” (Suárez, 1956, 126).

This distinction of Suárez would be a precedent for the notions established by Max Weber as legitimacy in origin and legitimacy in exercise when dealing with the analysis of power. These words on the conditions of just war against the tyrant follow the medieval tradition of justifying tyrannicide, but give broader coverage by including this struggle within the types of just war.

In the first place, the tyrant is, Suárez clarifies, the one “who obtains the government of a State against the Law, especially if he rules it without justice and according to his will”. Secondly, the tyrant is he “who abuses his power, superiority or force in any concept or matter, or who simply imposes that power and superiority to an extraordinary degree”.

Just war would be a mechanism for protection against the abuse of power. Is war the best mechanism for that purpose? Constitutionalism had that very aim, which looks to counterbalance the different powers. However, there are conceptions of the separation of powers in democratic societies about who should have the last word on the most controversial issues and about whether all issues can be put to a vote. 

As Foucault put it, “politics is the continuation of war by other means”. The growing political polarisation is worrying. Carl Schmitt argued that politics is about benefiting your friends and prejudicing your enemies. This is known as the friend/enemy dialectic. Considering political adversaries as enemies is the first step to strong polarisation, civil conflict, and disunity. Let us hope that politics will find the best means and strategies for a better future and few, if any, just cause for war.

References

Bobbio, Norberto (1999), El problema de la guerra y las vías de la paz, Barcelona: Altaya, trad. Jorge Binaghi.

Suárez, Francisco (1956), Guerra, intervención y paz internacional, Madrid: Espasa Calpe.

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Montaigne, on barbarism

Oscar Pérez de la Fuente

Carlos III University of Madrid

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3708-846X

Abstract

This text offers an annotated reading of passages from Michel de Montaigne’s Essays focusing on the notion of ‘barbarism’ and its philosophical and political-moral implications. Drawing on passages concerning customs, ethnocentrism and the comparison between “our own people” and “the others”, the commentary highlights Montaigne’s critique of localist prejudice and the uncritical identification of truth, reason and the customs of one’s own country. The analysis distinguishes between social morality and critical morality, and situates the discussion within the debate between relativism and universalism, suggesting that Montaigne’s irony and vital scepticism do not lead to strong relativism, but rather to a call for evaluation criteria more demanding than mere tradition. The text also revisits the author’s provocative inversion—the possibility that the West might exceed in barbarity those it calls barbarians—and connects it with modern historical examples (Auschwitz, the Gulag, Hiroshima and Nagasaki) to demonstrate the concept’s contemporary relevance. Overall, it proposes reading Montaigne as an invitation to moderation, to a comparative examination of one’s own practices, and to an ethical horizon of coexistence in the face of sectarianism and polarisation.

Keywords: barbarism, ethnocentrism, against dogmatism, against prejudice

Michel Eyquem, Monsieur de Montaigne, was born in Périgueux, France, in 1533 and died in Bordeaux, France, in 1592. He was a writer whose fundamental works are the Essays (1580 and 1588). Before writing them, he travelled and obtained material for his work. The essays deal with various topics such as religion, politics and philosophy. Their approach seeks to fight against prejudices and dogmatisms and to encourage open minds and intellectual lucidity. These essays can be seen as an invitation for dialogue, critique and thinking.

The following are some excerpts, which we have translated, from Montaigne’s Essays with comments in the style of the Minerva Strategy Blog.

“I would excuse our people for having no other standard or rule of perfection than their own habits and customs; for it is a general vice not only of the vulgar, but of almost all men, to confine their gaze to the sphere in which they were born” (Montaigne, 2003, 317 chap. XLIX ”De las costumbres antiguas” ).

This is linked to the strength of localisms, which give an unusual moral weight to the place of one’s birth. Specifically, this passage from Montaigne alludes to ethnocentrism, which William Graham Sumner defines in his book Folkways (2008) as “is the technical name for this view of things in which one’s own group is the center of everything, and all others are scaled and rated with reference to it “.

Ethnocentrism conceives that the values of the group set the standard of what is human and outside the group, differences occur as stigmas. Procrustean bed versus heterodoxy by combining the identity/alterity binomial.

“There is nothing barbarous or savage in that nation, according to what I have been told, but that everyone considers barbarous what does not belong to his own customs. Indeed, we seem to have no other view of truth and reason than the model and idea of the opinions and usages of the country in which we are. There is always the perfect religion, the perfect government, the perfect and finished practice of everything” (Montaigne, 2003, 233, chap. XXXI “De los caníbales”). 

What is interesting here is to distinguish between critical morality – rational or justified morality – and social morality – the moral values of the majority of society – on the one hand, and the debate between scepticism/relativism versus universalism on the other. It may be argued that Montaigne’s scathing critique of customs, opinions and usages goes against relativism and favours some version of universalist critical morality compatible with a moderate vital scepticism, which is often attributed to the author of the Essays.  

“I consider that there is greater barbarism in eating a living man than in eating the dead, in tearing a still sentient body with tortures and torments, roasting it little by little, giving it to dogs and pigs to bite and tear to pieces (something we have not only read about, but also seen recently, not among old enemies but among neighbours and fellow citizens and, what is worse, under the pretext of piety and religion), than roasting and eating it after death” (Montaigne, 2003, 237, cap. XXXI “De los caníbales”).

In classical Antiquity, the Greeks claimed that they were civilised and their neighbours were barbarians. Thus began a dichotomy that has subsequently had various applications. For example, it played a role in the Valladolid Controversy between Bartolomé de las Casas and Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda. 

In this case, Montaigne asks who is more barbaric, the cannibalistic indigenous peoples he encountered on his travels in Latin America or the Europeans who burned human beings alive in the public square once condemned by the Inquisition. Here it becomes difficult to establish gradualisms or weightings to barbarism.

“We may well call them barbarians, if we consider the rules of reason, but not if we consider ourselves, who surpass them in every kind of barbarism” Montaigne, 2003, 237-238, cap. XXXI “De los caníbales”). 

In his work on barbarism, Francisco Fernández Buey highlights how historical events in the 20th century in the West have made the notion of barbarism highly topical. He mentions the extermination camps in Nazi Germany such as Auschwitz, the repression of the Stalinist Gulag and the atomic bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

However, this 20th century barbarism incorporates two qualitatively more repulsive and malignant features: “the number of murders without compassion, in a merciless manner, and the coldness and even asepsis with which the acts of barbarism were carried out” (Fernández Buey, 1995, 159). 

“Miracles depend on our ignorance of nature, and not on nature’s being; habit dulls the sight of our judgment. Barbarians do not astonish us any more than we astonish them, nor with any more reason: which all would admit if they knew how, after going over these examples, to look at their own and compare them sincerely” (Montaigne, 2003, 152, cap. XXIII “De la costumbre y de cómo no se cambia fácilmente una ley recibida”).

Us and the Others, identity and otherness, group dynamics, lead to characterising those who are different as inferior and deviant – with a stigma – and members of the group as normal individuals. The paradox is that, from outside the group, from another group, its members can also be labelled as different, deviant and inferior – with a stigma. It makes sense: moderation, common sense. Keep values such as human rights and the Golden Rule of Humanity in mind on a daily basis.

In the above essay on barbarism, Fernández Buey reflects that “the violence and cruelty of others is always fanaticism and fundamentalism; the violence and cruelty of our own is the explicable passion that always drags human beings along” (Fernández Buey, 1995, 187).

A suggestive contemporary reading of Montaigne can be a clear appeal against sectarianism and polarisation. Traveling, reflecting, fighting prejudice, understanding differences, appreciating human beings, and aiming for an ethical horizon.

References

Fernández Buey, Francisco (1995), La barbarie. De ellos y de los nuestros, Barcelona: Paidós.

Montaigne, Michel de (2003), Ensayos completos, Madrid: Cátedra, trad. Almudena Montojo.

Summer, William Graham (2008), Folkways. A Study of the Sociological Importance of Usages, Manners, Customs, Mores, and Morals, The Project Gutemberg. Available:

https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/24253 (last visit 17-5-26).

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Domingo de Soto, on Justice and Law

Oscar Pérez de la Fuente

Carlos III University of Madrid

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3708-846X

Abstract

This paper presents a critical reading of passages from the Treatise on Justice and Law by Domingo de Soto (1495–1560), a leading figure of the School of Salamanca, with the aim of linking his theses on law, virtue and judgement to contemporary debates in the philosophy of law. Building on Soto’s idea that the primary effect of law is to ‘make subjects good’ through the practice of virtues, the paper analyses the tension between (i) state neutrality regarding conceptions of the good life, associated with liberal traditions, and (ii) the defence of civic virtues as a condition for democratic cohesion. Secondly, the paper examines his preference for judicial prudence and ‘animated justice’ over ‘deaf and dumb’ law, situating this against the modern ideal of the rule of law and current discussions on rules and principles, difficult cases and normative defeatability. Finally, this perspective is linked to the renewed interest in virtue jurisprudence, which proposes evaluating legal decisions by considering habits of excellence (temperance, fortitude, honesty) in those who apply the law. The text adopts a short commentary format, inspired by the Minerva Strategy, aimed at clarifying issues and contrasting positions.

Keywords: State neutrality, civic virtues, legal interpretation, Virtue Jurisprudence.

Domingo de Soto was born in Segovia in 1495 and died in Salamanca in 1560. He was a Dominican monk, theologian, jurist, and professor of Theology and Philosophy at the University of Salamanca. He was educated at the University of Alcala and furthered his studies at the University of Paris. He took part in the Council of Trent. He was a royal confessor to Emperor Charles V.  He was a member of the School of Salamanca, along with Francisco de Vitoria, among others. He played a role in the Valladolid controversy between Bartolomé de las Casas and Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda. 

Excerpts from Domingo de Soto’s work Treaty on Justice and Law (Tratado de la Justicia y el Derecho) (1922) will be discussed below, in the style of the Minerva Strategy

The aim of the legislator is to make subjects good, which is based on the primary human end of happiness. 

” This conclusion can easily be deduced from the decision of the above question. For the objective of the law is the common good, of which our beatitude consists: so that nothing achieves it except by the exercise of the virtues, which make good those who have them; all the more so when (as the Philosopher says) the happiness of this world is in the practice of the virtues; therefore it is the effect of the law to make men diligent and honest” (Soto, 1922, 44).

Virtues are habits and moral dispositions linked to a model of excellence associated with a practice. If one acts virtuously -repeating these habits-, one becomes virtuous. This is an ethic that shapes character. And here, there would be two approaches. The first would argue that it is not the government’s task to impose models of the good life, highlighting the famous distinction between theories of justice -public ethics- and conceptions of the good -private ethics-. The second has several versions, the classical Aristotelian one -which inspires Domingo de Soto- and a more up-to-date version, which would make the State’s promotion of virtues compatible with respect for individual autonomy and pluralism of values along the lines defended by Joseph Raz in Morality of freedom (1988).

“We conclude that the law makes men good, and this reasoning only draws from the fact that it makes them good subjects, which is less. Aristotle distinguishes the good citizen from the good man. A citizen is called good if he is a good subject, that is, obedient to the command of the law, but the good man has something more of honesty. For, since civil law permits many things with impunity, one can obey the law and yet be evil, namely, a miser, a fornicator, and so on, as we criticised before. Therefore, it is not enough for the law to make good subjects for it to make men simply good” (Soto, 1922, 45-46).

If the argument of exclusion of ideals and State neutrality is usually defended from the liberal perspective, can civic virtues be imposed by the State? It seems that the republic of egoists/atomists is insufficient for cementing society, and the education of these civic values plays a prominent role. However, some authors, such as Sandel, have excelled in justifying the role of civic virtues in cementing democratic societies. Others argue in favour of State neutrality.

“Even if human reason could be a certain rule of our actions, the republic would be much better governed by the living voice of men than by written laws. Therefore, being a judge (as Aristotle says), animated justice would more easily and congruently shake him than deaf and dumb law. For actions being concerned with the use of particular things, human law cannot provide for everything, and consider all the singular circumstances, as the judge would do with his prudence” (Soto, 1922, 108).

The Aristotelian influence is followed here in a particularist dystopia, a triumph of topicality, the living voice of men instead of written laws. The world of law is perfectible, but it has unquestionable qualities. It is a characteristic of the Rule of Law,  which can be summarised with the government by laws, not by men. It was a significant advance from the Ancien Regime. The legal system is made up of general and abstract laws. There is a great doctrinal debate about whether norms, be they rules or principles, must have an open or closed antecedent. Or, on the other hand, whether, in the face of circumstances that are not contemplated, they are defeasible conditionals. It is then when the judge, as an expert and from his experience, must consider the situation as one more piece of the Rule of Law. 

“If a good man better governs the republic than a good law. And he affirms that the law governs better than man. Aristotle also repeats this in another work. Namely, finding one or a few wise legislators is easier than many judges. A few are enough to make laws in a century, but many more are needed to pass judgement. On the other hand, laws are given after a long time of thought, and judgements are resolved very briefly. Therefore, it is easier to err in the latter than in the former” (Soto, 1922, 113).  

In this case, Domingo de Soto has a presumption that the legislators’ tasks are prudent and well thought out in the face of the errors of multiple judges. This could be a general approach; however, in the current legal-philosophical field, there has been an interpretative turn -Alexy, Dworkin- where the key question is what are the solutions for hard cases, and tools are provided to answer this question correctly. Ferrajoli, in his work Wild Powers. The Crisis of Constitutional Democracy (Poderes salvajes. La crisis de la democracia constitucional) (2011) argued why judges must sometimes defend the rule of law against executive meddling. 

“The law should be written in general, that is, it should not command: If such and such a person kills, or for such a reason, or with such a circumstance, let him be punished, but in general: Everyone who kills. These accidental circumstances cannot be included in the law but must be weighed by prudence afterwards. Indeed, just as in speculative matters, as Plato commanded, one must stop at the species, for there is no science but experience about the singular, which is passing, so in practice, there can be no law about the particular, which happens by chance, but only prudence” (Soto, 1922, 136).

Laws should be general, and prudence, i.e. the virtues, should be applied to particular circumstances because science is not possible. The renewed interest in Virtue Jurisprudence arises precisely from the question of the role of virtues, such as temperance, fortitude, humility or honesty, in the work of those charged with applying the law. We hope that justice will consist of implementing certain habits associated with models of excellence when deciding judicial cases. This would bring us closer to the ideal that those who apply justice are virtuous judges. 

References

Ferrajoli, Luigi (2011), Poderes salvajes: la crisis de la democracia constitucional, Madrid: Trotta, trad. Perfecto Andrés Ibáñez.

Soto, Domingo de (1922), Tratado de la Justicia y el Derecho, Madrid: Editorial Reus.

Raz, Joseph (1988), Morality of freedom, Oxford: Clarendon Press.

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Golden Rule of Humanity

There have been some attempts to find the moral norms that are repeated across societies, such as the minimum common denominator of human morality. It is remarkable to note how principles are repeated throughout religions and moral codes. One such attempt was the Declaration for a World Ethic, adopted by the World Parliament of Religions and agreed upon in Chicago in 1993.

The Golden Rule of Humanity is one of the central principles on which this Declaration is based and has two forms. A positive one states that do unto others as you would have done unto you. This deserves some thought. Some see it as a further application of the logical principle of consistency—a way of being consistent with others and yourself. However, things are often more complex.

In a way, the Golden Rule is based on a future expectation that others will act in the same way as you, which is linked to the spirit of reciprocity. However, it is an expectation that does not have to be fulfilled. The other party should realise that you are following the Golden Rule. In other words, you are someone with an expectation of reciprocity.

The Golden Rule has a negative formulation that states do not do unto others what you would not want done unto you. This implies not doing harm if you do not want to be harmed. In this case, the future expectation is that others will not harm you somehow because you have not harmed them. It seems that social cooperation is based on this kind of expectation. However, someone may not reciprocate and not meet these expectations.

Therefore, some advocate that in the face of the good intentions of the Golden Rule, a Silver Rule should be upheld, which states that you treat others as others treat you. This rule is based strictly on reciprocity, not expectations. It is Axelrod‘s solution to the Prisoner’s Dilemma from TIT for TAT. Or known as an ‘eye for an eye’. The explanation is that someone who used the Golden Rule in the prisoner’s dilemma would get good results initially but would be exploited by someone who opted for betrayal. The TIT for TAT rule rewards or punishes based on the specific behaviour of others.

The conclusion is that, although they are linked, the Silver Rule is the reverse of the Golden Rule. The Golden Rule is based on a reciprocity of expectations, and the Silver Rule is based on a reciprocity of actions. The Golden Rule is based on the future, and the Silver Rule is based on the past.

It is often said that the Golden Rule is also a commitment to empathy, to ‘putting oneself in the other shoes’. This is a highly relevant ethical principle. However, on closer examination, the Golden Rule would be based on the false assumption that we all have the same tastes and needs.

If I have a vegetarian friend and I love meat, the way to treat him as I would like to be treated would be to prepare a big meat feast for him. But he won’t like it, he won’t appreciate it, and he will even get upset. This Golden Rule seems to be agent-centred, where the agent determines what is right. However, while it may be appropriate at times, it does not always work, so some advocate for a Platinum Rule.

The Platinum Rule states you should treat others as they would like to be treated. This rule holds that we should act towards others based on their interests or tastes, for example, my vegetarian friend would have a wonderful salad.

The problem with the Platinum Rule is that the tastes and interests of others are also particular, which can sometimes lead to paradoxical situations, such as whether someone is an addict or a masochist. This Rule is more demanding than the Golden Rule and the Silver Rule. It is an altruistic view that can become heroic.

The key is reciprocity. If my vegetarian friend wants to thank me for the salad, the Golden Rule leads him to prepare a gazpacho and the Platinum Rule to cook a sirloin steak. That is why it is essential to inform each other and to be able to clarify the terms of reciprocity.

The Golden Rule is a moral principle reflected in many of humanity’s religious and secular texts. It is a good principle for judging moral actions and is based on expectations, the future, and the spirit of reciprocity. The main criticism is that the agent is shown as the criterion of moral correctness.

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Virtuous ethical model

The last model I will discuss is the virtuous ethical model, which comprises a few principles. First, to know the right action in a situation, one must think how a virtuous person would act. Second, a virtuous person is one who possesses virtues. Third, virtues are habits or dispositions that forge the character of human beings and show the excellence of a specific practice.

There is confusion about the language of virtues in the religious and ethical approaches. The virtues of the Christian religion are faith, hope, and charity. However, the approach to virtue ethics predates Christianity and is identified with the work of Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, which considers prudence, courage, justice, and temperance as virtues.

The educational component in virtue ethics is relevant. One becomes virtuous by acting virtuously. Or, to put it another way, one’s character becomes virtuous by repeating virtuous habits. This is why this model is so essential in education and why virtues, in general terms, can be learned.

But what is a virtue? This ethical model is more flexible than the deontological model. The virtuous ethical model is more contextualist and pluralist. Everyone can find their own models of excellence -virtues- and try to act following them. Nevertheless, not everything can be a virtue; it is not a relativistic approach. Some behaviours are closer to vices than virtues and, although there is a contextualist component, some clear cases cannot be virtues. Evil, murder or envy can never be considered virtues.

What are the virtues of a strategist? From what we have seen so far, virtues are learned by behaving virtuously, and there is a contextual element where everyone finds their own models of excellence, but with some limits. Aristotle claimed there to be at least three exciting perspectives on virtues: a) The law of the ‘middle ground’; b) The importance of experience; c) The virtue of prudence as practical wisdom. These will now be applied to the strategist perspective. 

A virtue is the middle ground between two extremes or vices, one by defect and the other by excess. This is basically what the law of the ‘middle ground’ holds. It is a call for moderation in various actions. The analysis that can be made is that given specific objectives, one should determine which actions are virtuous -within the middle ground- and which are excessive -by default or excess-.

The virtue ethics approach places great importance on experience. By learning to be virtuous, we learn the virtues of strategy. The best way to learn from the right foundations is through experience. In practice, everyone finds their models of excellence, which allows us to see that virtues depend on context. Experience also allows us to assess whether we are really dealing with a virtue or an excess.

Of all the virtues, Aristotle highlights prudence, which he considers to be synonymous of practical wisdom. He refers to the word phronesis as the central virtue of human beings. For strategists, prudence is also a central virtue. Prudence means constantly weighing up all alternatives, considering the various opportunity costs, promoting impartial testing methods, using third parties or experts and, above all, thinking through -and not rushing into- different transactions.

From the virtuous ethical model, we can conclude that the virtues of the strategist can be learned, that one becomes virtuous by acting virtuously, that experience teaches us the way, that a balance must be made to find virtues and excesses. The virtues are in moderation and, finally, that the central virtue for strategists is prudence, which is practical wisdom. The path to virtue is an apprenticeship towards excellence based on experience and prudence. Do we dare to walk it?