Handbook of the perfect parliamentarian

We continue with the series dedicated to handbooks. On this occasion, the Manual del perfecto parlamentario (Handbook of the perfect parliamentarian) by Mario Merlino. It is a work with a markedly humorous tone, which was written at a time of political changes in Spain, and popularising work in favour of a political culture of parliamentarism was noteworthy. 

Mario-Jorge Merlino Tornini (1948-2009), Argentina/Spain, was a writer and literary translator of works mainly written in Portuguese, Italian and English. He studied at the University of Bahía Blanca and had a radio programme with his friend César Aria. He has translated, among other authors, Jorge Amado, Clarice Lispector, Lygia Bojunga Nunes and Ana María Machado. In 2004 he received the Spanish National Prize for best translation for Auto dos condenados, by António Lobo Antunes.

The Handbook of the Perfect Parliamentarian was written by Mario Merlino and published by Altalena in 1981. Excerpts from this book will be commented using the style of Minerva Strategy Blog.

“The parliamentarian is a rare professional, it is said, ‘professional of a badly organised job’. He or she is a trainee in public affairs. An Italian, Giovanni Sartori, speaks of the professionalisation of politics. From a characterological point of view, he stresses that the parliamentarian (that professional politician) must be able to manoeuvre -manipulative skills-and that this fact (malicious Sartori!) implies opportunism and lack of principles” (Mario Merlino, Manual del perfecto parlamentario).

The parliamentarian must have manipulative skills, which implies opportunism and lack of principle, as this Handbook suggests. A distinction should be made between technique and objectives. Good strategy involves using the best means to achieve the proposed objectives; it is purely a question of effectiveness. These means may include tactics and stratagems. Parliamentarians’ goals relate to justice or public ethics; however, since Machiavelli, a politician’s primary goal is often considered to be to stay in power, for which they become professionals.   

“Parliament, as a fundamental institution of democracy, and as its etymology indicates, is the place where people talk and chatter. We have not always thought about the importance of what it means to institute the power of speech. Of course, you will say that we often talk too much, or that words are pretexts for postponing solutions, and the good thing, if short, is twice as good, OK. But apart from that, the Parliament, properly understood, is the right place to confront opinions, discuss or dynamically put different positions on different problems” (Mario Merlino, Manual del perfecto parlamentario).

Carl Schmitt, in the 1930s, criticised the democratic parliament as an empty formality, showing autocracy as an alternative. Periodically, parliament, which is perfectible, is criticised. It is the place for negotiation and compromise. In addition to the competition for votes each election period, parliamentarians have a responsibility to ensure that their work is close to the interests of citizens and that they are properly accountable. Ideally, parliamentary debates should be complemented by deliberative mechanisms that involve the population in some way. 

“There is no way today that the ideology of the people of one side can be changed or improved by that of the other. The controversies of the sectarians are contrived and always false. Each ideology, which is generally a collection of commonplaces, defends itself by closing itself off like an oyster”. (Pío Baroja).

From the ‘end of ideologies’ – Bell – or the ‘end of history’ – Fukuyama – we are moving to a stage of an apparent revival of conflicts, which are often based on identity-related issues rather than socio-economic explanations. Political correctness and the cancel culture are current examples of identity politics. Here the roles seem to have been reversed: the left, once utopian, seeks to regulate, prohibit and intervene, while the right, traditionally associated with conservatism, has become libertarian and, in a way, anarchist. It seems that the dynamics of sectarianism and polarisation are in the interest of some political sectors, but they make citizens, especially young people, uninterested in politics.  

“This left, centre and right thing, let’s face it, arose as a problem of geometrical arrangement and, no doubt, as a function of the architectural possibilities of parliamentary space. England’s oldest parliamentary democracy provides an example of the link between physical location and ideological choice. The Tories, ardent supporters of the monarchy, sat to the right of the speaker. The Whigs, on the other hand, were on the left. The French set the “parliamentary cliché” of the situation on the right, centre and left, equivalent respectively to the Montagnard, Girondins and Jacobins. These are the times of the Revolution” (Mario Merlino, Manual del perfecto parlamentario).

Left and right are terms of parliamentary geometry, from the very beginning.  Faced with the disorientation of the fall of the Berlin Wall, Bobbio wrote Left and Right and focused the distinction on the different approaches to inequality. That is, whether redistribution of resources to the less advantaged is justified, whether by genetic lottery or by social circumstances. It is important that there is broad social – and political – consensus on the implementation of human rights, especially when it comes to social rights or minority rights. Some contents of public ethics in European countries have been incorporating these consensuses, while in other parts of the world, such as China or the United States, there are different perspectives. 

Crisis: it is a word that produces fear because it is always used in a negative sense: what crisis, there is an economic, social, ideas, values, moral, religious and even marital crisis. 

A good parliamentarian should vindicate the fertilising power (with apologies) of the CRISIS. We must not forget that crisis is linked to criticism. To put in crisis means, fundamentally, to look for new ways to solve problems, that is, to solve, if you like, the crises that are so abundant in these times”. (Mario Merlino, Manual del perfecto parlamentario).

In times of crisis, there is a need for real leaders. Parliament can be a forum for providing solutions to crises. The etymological origin of the term krisis in Greek means “decision”, “judgement” or “turning point”. Crises should be seen as opportunities to improve and emerge stronger. Some commentators have the opinion that we are in a permanent crisis; even more reason why Parliament should be the place to seek solutions and take decisions for the common good. 

Julius Caesar, Zone of Possible Agreement (ZOPA) in Civil War

In a book entitled Civil WarJulius Caesar narrates the political and military conflicts with the Roman Senate and especially with his rival Pompey. These led to a veritable civil war between contending groups looking to seize power.

In this post, I will analyse the successive peace proposals made by Julius Caesar and Pompey, through the lens of ZOPA analysis. The Zone of Possible Agreement – known as ZOPA – is a frame of reference that is relevant to any negotiation. It is defined between the parties’ two BATNAs. That is, between each player’s Best Alternatives to a Negotiated Agreement -BATNA-. Another way of expressing this is to define the ZOPA as the margin between the two reserve prices of each party. In other words, the minimum prices that the parties are willing to accept in a negotiation.

In the work Civil War, the author describes how the conflicts for power in Rome arose. He explains that Pompey made Julius Caesar the following proposal: “Caesar should return to Gaul, withdraw from Rimini, discharge his armies; if he met these terms, Pompey would go to Hispania. Until there was assurance that Caesar would do what he had promised, the consuls and Pompey would not cease levying levies” (I.10).

The analysis from ZOPA is that the parties’ BATNAs do not allow for a deal on these terms. The proposed deal is that Julius Caesar must withdraw and disarm while his adversaries continue to arm. Julius Caesar would rather fight with his present forces than disarm. Pompey concedes to go to Hispania but only after he has assembled  the troops. The agreement is unbalanced in terms of the strategic relevance of the concessions between the parties. Therefore, the party that is asked to make a greater effort – to disarm – will easily find a better alternative to the proposed agreement.

Events progressed and it was now Julius Caesar who made a proposal to Pompey for a peace agreement, on the following terms: “that they should cause no more harm to themselves or to the Republic. They themselves were already enough proof, by their own disasters, of how much power fortune has in war. This was the only occasion to treat of peace, so long as both were confident of their strength, and their power was considered equal; if fortune helped only a little to one of the two, he who considered himself superior would not admit of terms for peace, nor consider himself satisfied with a part in which he trusted to possess all.

Since he had not been able to reach an agreement before, the terms for peace had to be requested in Rome from the Senate and the Roman people” (III. 10). (III. 10)

This agreement is based on equality of forces and uses the figure of an arbitration by the Senate. It is interesting the reflection that Julius Caesar makes where equality of forces is more favourable to peace, while if one party is more fortunate in combat, it will seek to defeat the other in battle.

What Julius Caesar means is that agreement is possible if the two sides have similar BATNAs. If one side has a very good BATNA – it has a good chance of winning the war – there is no possibility of agreement. The Zone of Potential Agreement -ZOPA- will expand with the uncertainty of the final outcome from two medium BATNAs.

Turning to a third party to settle a dispute is a legitimate, and widely used, way to do so, as long as its impartiality of judgement is guaranteed.

To Julius Caesar’s proposal of peace, Pompey’s reply was: “What does life or the city matter to me if it is to be believed that I have it for Caesar’s benefit; this belief cannot be erased, since it will be believed that by him I have been restored to Italy, when I came out” (III.18).

Here it is worth remembering Fisher and Ury’s rule “Separate the persons from the problem“. One party does not want to enter into a agreement because any solution will look like a success for the other party. In addition to an issue of hierarchy between the two, what seems to be relevant here are the emotions that stand in the way of any agreement. This always leads to conflict.

Proof of this are the words of an officer of the Pompeian army, named Labienus, who at one point in the negotiations said: “Stop talking about peace, for there can be no peace for us unless Caesar’s head is brought to us” (III.20).

It seems clear that there is an emotional problem and that the declared aim of one side is the death of Julius Caesar. In this case, there is no ZOPA. No agreement is possible if one side only wants Caesar’s death to make peace. The other side’s alternative is to fight and defend Julius Caesar’s life.

Pompey’s end also teaches us about strategy. His armies were defeated by Julius Caesar’s armies and set sail for Syria. There he sought help from Ptolemy, king of Egypt, who was at loggerheads with his sister Cleopatra, who later had a relationship with Julius Caesar that has been mythologised. Out of fear of the threat he posed or out of contempt for misfortune, Ptolemy’s advisors agreed to answer Pompey kindly in public and secretly sent two emissaries to kill him (III.104).

This story between Julius Caesar and Pompey can make us reflect on some aspects: a) On the need to establish a Zone of Possible Agreement (ZOPA) according to the BATNA of the parties, their Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement. The key to negotiating power is to have a good BATNA, a good alternative to negotiate; b) Proper management of emotions. They should not be an objective, in themselves, of the negotiation; c) Approach of third parties when their impartiality of judgement is guaranteed.