Category: Negotiation

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Getting Past No

Oscar Pérez de la Fuente

Carlos III University of Madrid

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3708-846X

Abstract

This paper examines key ideas from William Ury’s Getting Past No, a practical extension of the Harvard negotiation approach for dealing with difficult situations. Rather than focusing on “difficult people” as fixed types, Ury reframes negotiation problems as situations shaped by emotions, positions, dissatisfaction, and power. The discussion centres on the first and most immediate obstacle in negotiation: one’s own reaction. The text explains how common impulses such as counterattacking, yielding, or breaking off relations usually worsen outcomes or reduce bargaining power. As an alternative, Ury proposes the technique of “going to the balcony,” a metaphor for stepping back mentally, regulating emotions, and observing the interaction with detachment. The paper also reviews three manipulative tactics frequently used in hard bargaining: the stone wall, attacks, and trickery. For each, it highlights the importance of recognition, emotional control, independent verification of facts, and careful analysis of the other party’s interests. Overall, the article argues that successful negotiation depends less on immediate reaction than on strategic patience, self-awareness, and disciplined thinking, which together make constructive and intelligent agreement more likely in difficult contexts.

Keywords: principled negotiation, cooperative agreements, stratagems, tactics

The Harvard negotiation method is explained in the famous book Getting to Yes, to which I have dedicated several posts. One of its authors, William Ury, elaborated on some of its concepts more specifically in his book Getting Past No (1997), , which has a very descriptive subtitle: Negotiating with difficult situations. From the outset Ury makes clear that it is not about negotiating with difficult people, but rather about how to negotiate in difficult situations.

In this post I will analyse some of the techniques in this book, as being able to identify them is the first step to act accordingly and counter their effect.

In Getting Past No, Ury proposes an insight strategy that addresses five elements: a) One’s reaction; b) The emotions of others; c) The position of others; d) The discontent of others; e) The power of others (Ury 1997, 24-25). The book is devoted to each of these elements. Here I will focus on the first, self-reaction.

The natural reactions to an attack by another person are to counterattack, to give in or to break off relations. The first option -counter-attacking- means responding on the same level as the other party and is usually negative and can lead to relationships becoming entrenched, especially when they become a succession of emails of grievances. The second option -giving in- means limiting bargaining power by maintaining a good personal relationship and can sometimes lead to some form of exploitation. Breaking off relations, the third option, is a radical way out of certain dissatisfactions in the relationship and, in most situations, is not justified.

In the face of these natural reactions, Ury proposes Don’t react: go to the balcony (Ury 1997, 45).  This means that in negotiations, it is good to analyse situations from a distance, as if you were something unconnected. It is important to eliminate the emotional element that is implicit in all negotiations. In this regard, Ury says that getting on the balcony means letting go of natural impulses and emotions. If, during a negotiation, an emotional outburst occurs, it is advisable to let the emotions flow and, when appropriate, pick up where the meeting left off.

One of the basic functions of learning strategy, which underlies the spirit of the Minerva Strategy Blog, is to know how to identify the tactics of the other party, especially if they have a component of stratagem, deception, simulation, etc. It is important to know strategy so as not to be exploited by people who use tricks that are not what they seem.

An important step in dismantling such a tactic is to identify it and to reveal, during the negotiation, that it is being used. The first tactic Ury talks about is the stone wall. This tactic consists in not giving in. It involves conveying to the other party the firm conviction that there is no alternative to the proposed solution. It is an inflexible form of negotiation, which does not allow any kind of concession.

The way to go against the stone wall is to identify the tactic and conduct a thorough analysis of the interests and needs of the other side (Ury 1997, 52). For this analysis it is necessary to have your own statements and unbiased sources of information. The classic example is the purchase and sale of a flat, where, in addition to the information from the sellers, it is good to check the average price of the properties in the area with another agency.

The second stratagem is attacks, which is made up of pressure tactics designed to intimidate or make a party feel uncomfortable that will eventually lead them to give in (Ury 1997, 52-53). The most common is the threat where a negative consequence is presented if the alternative of not giving in is followed. The way to dismantle these threats is to analyse their credibility and act accordingly. Threats are sometimes made strategically without a real will to carry them out, only to change the will of the other party.

The third stratagem is trickery, which is a tactic aimed at deceiving a party (Ury 1997, 53). In these cases, biased or false information is often given. In the context of negotiations, the habit of impartial fact-checking is important and should not be seen as a symptom of mistrust, but as a professional way of proceeding.

Ury’s advice is that it is relevant to identify these tactics when they are used, but also not to be certain, but to see them as clues about the attitude and style of the other party.

It is also important to analyse yourself. This means that it is necessary to know one’s own emotions, and sometimes our facial gestures or body position can be more illustrative of our thoughts than we think. It is important to control emotions when dealing with relevant issues and especially that these emotions do not condition the final outcome.

In the context of negotiations, Ury advises on certain occasions to pause and be quiet. The pause can be used to step onto the balcony and take a distance. It can also serve to separate oneself from emotions and impulses. However, it is important to keep quiet because in these informal pauses a lot of information and even concessions are often offered to the other party.

Ury says to take time to think (Ury 1997, 56). It is relevant to analyse the various alternatives and the pros and cons of the various options in the negotiation. The joint and divergent interests of the parties should be explored because sometimes people with different interests can reach intelligent and cooperative agreements for both parties.

In the following passage, Ury advises against haste when it comes to important decisions (Ury 1997, 60). Major decisions require time, analysis, expert advice, and weighing up the advantages and disadvantages. It is not good to rush into something important, although it is also true that you should not let a good opportunity slip through your fingers. But we will only know that it is a good opportunity after having analysed other alternatives.

In short, Ury says that our natural impulse in the face of a difficult situation or person is to react, but that is also the worst mistake we can make. Instead of losing your temper or trying to get even, focus on getting what you want.

References

Ury, William (1997), Supere el No. Cómo negociar con personas que adoptan posiciones inflexibles, Barcelona: Ediciones Gestión 2000, trad. Adriana de Hassan. (original title: Gettig past No, 1991)

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Julius Caesar, Zone of Possible Agreement (ZOPA) in Civil War

Oscar Pérez de la Fuente

Carlos III University of Madrid

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3708-846X

Abstract

This paper examines Julius Caesar’s account of the Roman civil war through the lens of negotiation theory, especially the Zone of Possible Agreement (ZOPA). Drawing on passages from Civil War, it analyses the peace proposals exchanged between Caesar and Pompey and evaluates whether their respective Best Alternatives to a Negotiated Agreement (BATNAs) allowed any realistic settlement. Pompey’s proposal required Caesar to withdraw and disarm while his opponents continued mobilising, creating an imbalance that made agreement irrational from Caesar’s perspective. Caesar’s later proposal, by contrast, rested on relative parity and third-party arbitration by the Senate and Roman people, suggesting that negotiations become viable when both sides perceive similar levels of strength and uncertainty. The analysis also shows how non-material factors, particularly pride, reputation, and hostile emotions, narrowed or eliminated the ZOPA. Pompey’s refusal to accept terms that might appear to benefit Caesar, and the explicit desire among some supporters for Caesar’s death, reveal how personal animosity can override strategic calculation. The case illustrates that successful negotiation depends not only on balanced alternatives, but also on emotional management and legitimate, impartial mediation.

Keywords: diplomacy, just war, principled negotiation, emotion, interests, positions 

In a book entitled Civil War (2011), Julius Caesar narrates the political and military conflicts with the Roman Senate and especially with his rival Pompey. These led to a veritable civil war between contending groups looking to seize power.

In this post, I will analyse the successive peace proposals made by Julius Caesar and Pompey, through the lens of ZOPA analysis. The Zone of Possible Agreement – known as ZOPA – is a frame of reference that is relevant to any negotiation. It is defined between the parties’ two BATNAs. That is, between each player’s Best Alternatives to a Negotiated Agreement -BATNA-. Another way of expressing this is to define the ZOPA as the margin between the two reserve prices of each party. In other words, the minimum prices that the parties are willing to accept in a negotiation.

In the work Civil War, the author describes how the conflicts for power in Rome arose. He explains that Pompey made Julius Caesar the following proposal: “Caesar should return to Gaul, withdraw from Rimini, discharge his armies; if he met these terms, Pompey would go to Hispania. Until there was assurance that Caesar would do what he had promised, the consuls and Pompey would not cease levying levies” (Julio César, 2011, 74-75, I.10).

The analysis from ZOPA is that the parties’ BATNAs do not allow for a deal on these terms. The proposed deal is that Julius Caesar must withdraw and disarm while his adversaries continue to arm. Julius Caesar would rather fight with his present forces than disarm. Pompey concedes to go to Hispania but only after he has assembled  the troops. The agreement is unbalanced in terms of the strategic relevance of the concessions between the parties. Therefore, the party that is asked to make a greater effort – to disarm – will easily find a better alternative to the proposed agreement.

Events progressed and it was now Julius Caesar who made a proposal to Pompey for a peace agreement, on the following terms: “that they should cause no more harm to themselves or to the Republic. They themselves were already enough proof, by their own disasters, of how much power fortune has in war. This was the only occasion to treat of peace, so long as both were confident of their strength, and their power was considered equal; if fortune helped only a little to one of the two, he who considered himself superior would not admit of terms for peace, nor consider himself satisfied with a part in which he trusted to possess all.

Since he had not been able to reach an agreement before, the terms for peace had to be requested in Rome from the Senate and the Roman people” (Julio César, 2011, 186-187, III. 10)

This agreement is based on equality of forces and uses the figure of an arbitration by the Senate. It is interesting the reflection that Julius Caesar makes where equality of forces is more favourable to peace, while if one party is more fortunate in combat, it will seek to defeat the other in battle.

What Julius Caesar means is that agreement is possible if the two sides have similar BATNAs. If one side has a very good BATNA – it has a good chance of winning the war – there is no possibility of agreement. The Zone of Potential Agreement -ZOPA- will expand with the uncertainty of the final outcome from two medium BATNAs.

Turning to a third party to settle a dispute is a legitimate, and widely used, way to do so, as long as its impartiality of judgement is guaranteed.

To Julius Caesar’s proposal of peace, Pompey’s reply was: “What does life or the city matter to me if it is to be believed that I have it for Caesar’s benefit; this belief cannot be erased, since it will be believed that by him I have been restored to Italy, when I came out” (Julio César, 2011, 192, III.18).

Here it is worth remembering Fisher and Ury’s rule “Separate the persons from the problem“. One party does not want to enter into a agreement because any solution will look like a success for the other party. In addition to an issue of hierarchy between the two, what seems to be relevant here are the emotions that stand in the way of any agreement. This always leads to conflict.

Proof of this are the words of an officer of the Pompeian army, named Labienus, who at one point in the negotiations said: “Stop talking about peace, for there can be no peace for us unless Caesar’s head is brought to us” (Julio César, 2011, 194, III.20).

It seems clear that there is an emotional problem and that the declared aim of one side is the death of Julius Caesar. In this case, there is no ZOPA. No agreement is possible if one side only wants Caesar’s death to make peace. The other side’s alternative is to fight and defend Julius Caesar’s life.

Pompey’s end also teaches us about strategy. His armies were defeated by Julius Caesar’s armies and set sail for Syria. There he sought help from Ptolemy, king of Egypt, who was at loggerheads with his sister Cleopatra, who later had a relationship with Julius Caesar that has been mythologised. Out of fear of the threat he posed or out of contempt for misfortune, Ptolemy’s advisors agreed to answer Pompey kindly in public and secretly sent two emissaries to kill him (Julio César, 2011, 259, III.104).

This story between Julius Caesar and Pompey can make us reflect on some aspects: a) On the need to establish a Zone of Possible Agreement (ZOPA) according to the BATNA of the parties, their Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement. The key to negotiating power is to have a good BATNA, a good alternative to negotiate; b) Proper management of emotions. They should not be an objective, in themselves, of the negotiation; c) Approach of third parties when their impartiality of judgement is guaranteed.

References

Julio César (2011), Guerra civil, Madrid: Gredos, trans Julio Calonge.

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Thucydides, the negotiating power in the Melian dialogue

Oscar Pérez de la Fuente

Carlos III University of Madrid

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3708-846X

Abstract

This paper examines the Melian Dialogue in Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War through the lens of negotiation theory and bargaining power. It argues that the exchange between Athens and Melos is not only a classic statement of political realism, but also a revealing case study in asymmetric negotiation. The Athenians frame the discussion in terms of power, necessity, and strategic credibility, rejecting appeals to justice except among equals. The Melians, by contrast, defend neutrality, hope, and the possibility of external support, especially from Sparta. Using the concept of BATNA (Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement), the paper analyzes how each side assesses its alternatives and how those assessments shape the negotiation. Athens possesses a stronger BATNA because it can impose its will through military force, while Melos depends on uncertain alliances and resistance. Nevertheless, the paper contends that Athenian strategy is limited, since coercion secures submission but not durable cooperation. The conclusion is that the dialogue illustrates a central lesson of negotiation: bargaining power depends on credible alternatives, but long-term outcomes are often improved by persuasion, legitimacy, and principled agreement rather than force alone.

Keywords: bargaining power, force, neutrality, principled negotiation, BATNA

In the work History of the Peloponnesian War (2013), Thucydides narrates the conflicts that took place in Ancient Greece between the polis of Athens and Sparta. He highlights the famous Melian dialogue in which the Athenians -who held an empire- and the Melians -who inhabited the island of Milos- discuss their future relationship.

This dialogue is characterised by the Melians appealing to arguments of justice, equality and neutrality, while the Athenians use the threat of force and unequal resources. It would be an example, among the classics, of what is called real politik.

The Athenians distinguish between arguments of justice -between equals – and appeals to force -between the powerful and the weak-. The Athenians assert that “justice prevails in the human race in circumstances of equality, and that the powerful do what their strength permits and the weak yield to them” (Tucídides, 2013, 388, V.89). So  according to the Athenians, the Melians must yield.

The Melians attempt to deliberate, advocating a position of neutrality between Sparta and Athens, but offering friendship. The Melians argue “would you not agree that, remaining neutral, we should be your friends rather than your enemies, but not allies of either side” (Tucídides, 2013, 389, V.94).

In a typical response of political realism, the Athenians set their priorities in the relationship with the Melians: 1.- Hatred/Vassalage; 2.- Enmity; 3.- Friendship/Neutrality. Allowing an island to be neutral and friendly is a bad example for the interests of the Athenian empire. From this perspective, the Athenians assert that “your enmity does not harm us so much as your friendship, which is to our vassals a manifest sign of our weakness, while your hatred is a sign of our power” (Tucídides, 2013, 389, V.95).

The Athenians’ argument is an appeal to power and force. They do not try to convince the Melians of the advantages of accepting their position. Rather, they make a serious threat, which given the context must have been credible. The Athenians argue that “this is not a contest for you to measure courage on equal terms so as not to suffer dishonour, but the deliberation is rather about your salvation, which consists in not standing up to those who are much stronger” (Tucídides, 2013, 390, V.101).

The response of the Melians is to relativise the power of the other side and give more value to the alternative of a confrontation than that of surrender. The Melians assert that “wars present vicissitudes that are more evenly shared than the disproportion of forces would suggest. For us to give in immediately holds out no hope, whereas by giving ourselves up to action there is still hope of standing” (Tucídides, 2013, 390, V.102).

This Melian dialogue allows us to address the question of bargaining power. In particular, according to the terminology of the Harvard Method in Getting to yes, from Fisher and Ury, on BATNA. The key element of negotiations is what is the Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement –BATNA-. What is relevant is to identify this BATNA and use it as the yardstick to measure any possible negotiating outcome.

The BATNA marks the worst acceptable outcome of the negotiation. The red line where it is better not to give in. The key is that the better BATNA you have, the more bargaining power a party has. If a party has a strong alternative, it will be able to make greater demands of the other party.

I will now analyse the Melian Dialogue from the perspective of the bargaining power of the parties. The Athenians consider their BATNA to be high because they are powerful and strong. This means that they can conquer the city despite the will of the Melians. The alternatives are the surrender of the Melians or their military defeat.

The Melians try to deliberate and convince the Athenians in terms of equality and justice. Their BATNA is an alliance with Sparta to protect them from Athens. Their alternatives are a lonely and heroic war, an alliance with Sparta, surrender to Athens or compromise with Athens.

From the point of view of strategy, the Athenians failed because they only threatened with force, but did not try to convince the other side of the advantages of being allies. They sought a relationship of vassalage and wanted to impose it through force. The negotiation was about whether they would have to fight to achieve their goals. From today’s perspective, it would be better to have allies than forced vassals.

From the Melians’ point of view, the alternative to negotiating is to ally more strongly with Sparta. The problem with this negotiation is that the alternatives they propose are voluntary surrender or military defeat. These terms are unacceptable to the Melians. The way to improve BATNA is to consolidate and make credible the possible alternatives, particularly the alliance with Sparta. It should also try to deliberate and convince the other side on a principled basis.

Thucydides himself recounts that Athens finally carried out its threat. From this perspective, “the Athenians executed all the Melians of virile age who fell into their hands and reduced the children and women to slavery” ((Tucídides, 2013, 394, V.116). The Melians dialogue does not have a happy ending. The powerful wins by making good on their threat to use force. The lesson, from strategy, is that negotiations should enable parties to improve their bargaining power and better results be obtained, in the long run, from principled and convincing arguments.

References

Tucídides (2013) Historia de la Guerra del Peloponeso, Barcelona: Crítica, trans. Francisco Rodríguez Adrados.

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The strategy of conflict

Oscar Pérez de la Fuente

Carlos III University of Madrid

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3708-846X

Abstract

This article examines Thomas Schelling’s The Strategy of Conflict as a landmark contribution to the analysis of international relations, negotiation, and strategic behaviour. Published in 1960, the book introduced an innovative use of game theory to explain situations in which adversaries are neither locked in absolute opposition nor united by complete cooperation, but instead operate under conditions of mutual dependence. The text highlights Schelling’s distinction between pure conflict, pure cooperation, and mixed conflict-cooperation scenarios, arguing that most human interactions belong to the third category. In such contexts, rational actors seek outcomes that protect their interests while taking account of the choices and expectations of others. Special attention is given to Schelling’s redefinition of strategy as the exploitation of potential force rather than its direct application, a perspective that underpins his influential theory of deterrence. The article also stresses the broader relevance of his framework beyond military affairs, showing its usefulness for politics, business, and everyday decision-making. Ultimately, Schelling’s concept of interdependent decision theory offers a powerful lens for understanding conflict as a negotiable and strategically managed social relationship.

Keywords: diplomacy, detrrence, game theory, interests, positions

In 1960, the economist Thomas Schelling published his work The Strategy of Conflict with a hitherto unusual approach that opened new horizons. His approach was a new analysis of international relations and other areas, applying game theory methods, a part of Economics that carries out simulations of simple games with two or more participants based on the theory of rational choice.

One of the most interesting points of the book is the conceptual material it leaves  to the reader, which allows for multiple applications. Thus, it describes three types of scenarios: pure conflict, pure cooperation, and conflict/cooperation.

Situations of pure conflict would occur if the interests of the antagonists were completely opposed, only “in the case of war, but of a war tending to the total extermination of the enemy.” Situations of pure cooperation are presented as curious exercises in coordination without communication between the parties. For example, where would you meet someone in Madrid – or London or New York- who has received the same instruction, with whom you cannot communicate. Or imagine that you will win 100 euros if you write down on a piece of paper the way to share it out that matches the other party, where communication is impossible.

Schelling’s message is that most scenarios between human beings are ones of cooperation and conflict where there is a common interest and mutual dependence between the parties. Conflict management is sought with mutually acceptable solutions for mutual interests. Hence, the author concludes that most conflict situations are negotiationable scenarios.

The change brought about by this book is its new approach to strategy as applied to international relations and military issues. Thus, strategy does not refer to “the efficient application of force, but to the exploitation of potential force”. This means that the role of armies has an eminently strategic, rather than a purely combative, significance. On another level, this means that victory does not lie in the hand-to-hand combat of the respective forces, but rather in the expectations of the parties and the possibility of respective influence.

From this perspective, Schelling devotes his attention to the notion of “deterrence” as an important element of international relations. He states that an important distinction must be made here between the application of force and the threat of force. Deterrence relates to the exploitation of potential force. Its purpose is to persuade a potential enemy that it is in its own interest to avoid certain courses of action.

The conclusion is that it is not the use of military force, but the threat – serious and credible – of the use of force that would deter the other side from acting. Here would be the paradox that this theory of deterrence is “a theory of the skillful non-use of military force, for which something more than purely military ingenuity is needed”. That is the way to develop strategy as an art and science and to transform some views on international relations and the role of armies. But it would also have applications in business, politics and even everyday life.

In a passage from his book, Schelling offers a definition of strategy based on several elements:

a) it presupposes the existence of a conflict; b) but assumes a common interest of both adversaries; c) it assumes a rational mode of behaviour; d) it focuses on the fact that what appears to each participant as the best course of action depends on what the other does; e) “strategic behaviour” attempts to influence the other’s decisions by acting on their expectations of how the other’s behaviour relates to their own (Schelling, 1980).

How to manage conflict? It seems that this is something we must all deal with in the various spheres of life. In The Strategy of Conflict, Schelling offers a view that was innovative for its time, constructing an analytical framework, based on game theory, to deal with international relations, and at one point he proposes various names for this theory, such as precarious association theory or incomplete antagonism theory.  Perhaps the most successful one is what he called interdependent decision theory. This is the key to the strategy of conflict.

References

Schelling, Thomas (1980), The Strategy of Conflict, Cambridge, Mass. London: Harvard University.

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Prisoners of a dilemma

Oscar Pérez de la Fuente

Carlos III University of Madrid

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3708-846X

Abstract

This article examines the prisoner’s dilemma as a central model for understanding strategic interaction, conflict, and cooperation in social and political life. Starting from Tucker’s classic formulation, the text explains how two rational individuals, acting separately and without communication, may choose betrayal even when mutual cooperation would produce a better outcome for both. The analysis emphasizes the interdependence of decisions, the tension between individual advantage and collective benefit, and the paradoxical nature of rational choice in situations of uncertainty. The article also explores broader implications of the dilemma in politics, economics, international relations, and everyday interactions, showing why it remains one of the most influential concepts in game theory. Special attention is given to repeated interactions, where the possibility of future encounters creates stronger incentives for agreement, trust, and stable cooperation. In this context, the prisoner’s dilemma helps justify the importance of pacts, legal norms, and institutional frameworks that reduce insecurity and discourage betrayal. Ultimately, the article argues that cooperative environments are not spontaneous but require rules and commitments capable of aligning individual interests with mutually beneficial outcomes.

Keywords: prisoner’s dilemma, cooperation, betrayal

Albert Tucker, a distinguished Princeton mathematician, was invited to give a lecture in 1950 at Stanford University. There, he first posed this dilemma:

“Two men, accused of jointly breaking the law, have been confined by the police in separate rooms. Each is told that:

1- If one of them confesses guilty, but the other does not, the first will receive a reward, … and the second will be punished.

2. If both confess, both will be punished.

At the same time, each has good reason to believe that:

3.- If neither confesses, both will go free.”(Poundstone, 1995, 175).

Although there was earlier work by Flood and Dresher on the subject, Tucker was the first to christen it the prisoner’s dilemma. The implications of this dilemma are manifold in politics, international relations, economics and even everyday life. The story of how it came about and some of its applications are recorded in the book The Prisoner’s Dilemma (1995) by William Poundstone.

In a dilemma, it is often the case that whatever the solution, it involves a loss, a sense of remorse or regret. The prisoner’s dilemma is problematic because it defies common sense, says Poundstone. I will discuss the options and implications of the dilemma below.

There are two options for the two players: cooperate or betray. If player A confesses, he chooses to betray his partner. There are two possibilities: a) that the other player B does the same, then the final result is bad, and both are punished; b) that the other player B does not confess, chooses to cooperate, and then the result is very good for player A -he is rewarded- and bad for player B -he is punished-.

Suppose player A chooses to cooperate and does not confess. There are two possibilities: c) the other player B does the same, then the end result is good – both go free; d) the other player B chooses to betray his partner and chooses to confess, then the result is bad for player A – he is punished – and very good for player B – he is rewarded.

It is one of the most famous strategy games in which the interdependence of the players is vital. Whatever player A does, the final outcome depends on what player B does and vice versa. There is an incentive to betray the other player, but if they both follow that incentive and betray, the outcome is bad for both players. If both cooperate, the result is good, but it is challenging to obtain this outcome because of the incentive to betray and the impossibility of communicating.

Some consider that the prisoner’s dilemma has no solution. Others have pointed to the fact that it varies whether the game is played once or more than once. If played once, there is a solid incentive to betray as long as the other party does not do the same. This cannot be guaranteed and is, therefore, a dilemma.

What is most interesting is whether the prisoner’s dilemma must be played repeatedly. Then, it is how one has come to justify the need for the pact, the agreement between the players. This has been a way of justifying the existence of legal norms that guarantee that agreements will be fulfilled.

In Hobbes‘ State of Nature, there was natural liberty but great insecurity; the law of the strongest ruled. Although there could be cooperative behaviour, there was an incentive to betrayal. This leads to a social pact that guarantees peace and security, ensuring the players cooperate and not betray each other.

In a case where it is discovered that the treasurer of a political party, for many years, has 50 million euros in accounts in Switzerland, there would be a prisoner’s dilemma at some point in this case. At some point in this case, a prisoner’s dilemma scheme would emerge: both parties would have a better outcome if they did not confess and settle, but there is an incentive for betrayal.

The prisoner’s dilemma shows that pacts or agreements must promote cooperative environments. If these do not exist, there is an incentive to betray, which does not guarantee the best outcome because of the interdependence of the moves. If both betray, the outcome is terrible. If both cooperate, the result is good. If one cooperates and the other betrays, the outcome is bad for the former and very good for the latter.

There are many readings and applications of the prisoner’s dilemma. One is that cooperation, in the long run, is best guaranteed by a pact or agreement. It justifies the need for agreements that foster cooperative frameworks.

References

Poundstone, William (1995), El dilema del prisionero,. John Von Neumann, la teoría de juegos y la bomba,  Madrid: Alianza, trad. Daniel Manzanarez Fourcade. (original title: The Prisoner’s Dilemma. John Von Neumann, game theory and Puzzle of  the bomb).

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Put yourself in your shoes: from self-criticism to self-understanding

Oscar Pérez de la Fuente

Carlos III University of Madrid

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3708-846X

Abstract

This review examines William Ury’s Getting Yes with Yourself. Overcoming Inner Obstacles to Successful Negotiation as a significant shift in negotiation theory from the analysis of the other party toward deeper self-understanding. While classic negotiation literature emphasizes identifying interests, intentions, and emotions across the table, Ury argues that effective negotiation begins with the ability to recognize and regulate one’s own inner reactions. The text highlights three practical movements in this process: observing oneself “from the balcony,” listening empathetically to one’s own feelings, and uncovering the needs that underlie emotional responses. These practices allow negotiators to move from self-judgment to self-awareness, improving emotional balance, clarity of purpose, and responsiveness in conflict situations. The article shows that this inward turn does not replace attention to the other party, but rather strengthens it by making genuine listening and perspective-taking possible. In this sense, Ury’s proposal links negotiation, emotional intelligence, and personal development, presenting self-knowledge as a precondition for constructive dialogue and more sustainable agreements in personal and professional contexts.

Keywords: needs, emotions, empathy, self-criticism, self-understanding

Most books on negotiation tend to focus on the fact that the key to success lies in knowing the other party’s intentions, true interests, and even any details that provide some information about the other party. This is why it is crucial to know how to listen and to develop emotional intelligence techniques as the basis for a good strategy. 

However, it is no less true that knowing one’s own values and knowing how to manage one’s reactions are essential elements of a negotiation strategy. It is precisely this shift towards one’s own expectations and perspectives that is the focus of the book Getting Yes with Yourself. Overcoming Inner Obstacles to Successful Negotiation, (2015) by William Ury. 

This author is co-founder of the Harvard Negotiation Project and, previously, he had written, together with Roger Fisher, the world-famous negotiation manual entitled Getting to Yes. The Art of Negotiating Without Giving In. Following on from this famous manual, he reflects on his new work on focusing on the agent’s perspective, expectations, and reactions rather than the other party with whom he interacts to achieve his objectives.

After all, negotiation is an exercise of influence in which you try to change another person’s perspective. The first step, Ury explains, in achieving this goal is to understand where their opinions come from. However, putting yourself in someone else’s shoes can be very difficult, especially in a conflict or negotiation. Different cultures and religions have moral precepts based on reciprocity, altruism, and otherness, such as the Golden Rule of Humanity. 

There is a crucial, often overlooked, preliminary move that can help us clarify both what we want and what the other person wants. That move is to put ourselves first. Listening to ourselves can reveal what we really want while clearing our minds and allowing us to listen to other people and understand what they really want.

Putting yourself in your shoes may look strange at first glance, because, after all, aren’t you already in your shoes? (Ury, 2015, 15).  But doing it properly is not as easy as it might seem, because our natural tendency is to judge ourselves critically and to ignore or reject parts of ourselves.

According to Ury, there are three actions that can help us: first, see ourselves from the balcony; second, go deeper and listen empathetically to our underlying feelings and what they are really telling us; and third, go even deeper and discover our needs.

Look at yourself from the balcony

In his lectures and writings, Ury emphasises the idea of going out on the balcony (Ury, 2015, 20). The balcony is a metaphor for a place of perspective, tranquillity, self-control, and calm. We are all actors on the stage of life, so balconies are places from which we can see the whole play and develop with greater clarity to observe ourselves. It is important to go out on the balcony at any time, especially before, during and after a problematic conversation or negotiation. This is really relevant for better management of emotions in negotiations.

Empathetic listening

Empathy and sympathy are always confused, but they are different. Sympathy is feeling sorry for a person’s situation, but not necessarily understanding it. Empathy, however, means understanding what it feels like to be in that situation.

Listening to oneself with empathy is on a deeper level than observing. Observing means seeing from the outside, while listening means feeling from the inside inside (Ury, 2015, 28). Observing gives you a distant view, while listening gives you an intimate understanding.

In this regard, Ury uses this image: When I do my daily exercise each morning, I imagine sitting at a kitchen table to understand and then use the intensity of these feelings. Every thought or emotion related to the family, such as anxiety, fear or shame, is displayed. I offer them a fictitious seat and so I have learned to welcome everyone. I would like to treat them like my old friends or acquaintances. Like a whole table in the kitchen. I listen to the free dialogue of thoughts and feelings.

This image of the kitchen table implies that we must know how to listen to our feelings and give them a place, but the essential thing is to know how to manage emotions properly. This sometimes means balancing emotions and reasons. 

Uncover your needs

Ury argues that we can question ourselves about what is not suitable for us. In what aspects of our lives are we not completely happy or fulfilled? Does work, money, family, relationships, health, or general well-being matter? Is it normal to experience feelings of anxiety, fear, anger, or sadness when your needs are not met? What do you want most? What are your primary motivations? The better you understand your needs, the more likely you are to be able to meet them. 

As simple and natural as it sounds, putting yourself in your place – in your shoes– to see yourself from the balcony, to listen to yourself with empathy, and to discover your underlying needs are often difficult tasks. The path from self-criticism to self-understanding requires constant effort.

References

Ury, William (2015), Getting Yes with Yourself. Overcoming Inner Obstacles to Successful Negotiation, London: Harper Collins Pusblishers.  
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Start with no

Oscar Pérez de la Fuente

Carlos III University of Madrid

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3708-846X

Abstract

This article examines Jim Camp’s negotiation theory as presented in Start with No and considers its relevance from the perspective of the Minerva Strategy Blog. In contrast to approaches centred on win-win outcomes, Camp argues that effective negotiation begins with a clear and constructive “no,” which clarifies positions, reduces illusions, and creates a more realistic basis for dialogue. The text analyses several core elements of Camp’s framework: the central role of emotions in decision-making, the need to manage one’s own emotional responses while interpreting those of the other party, and the importance of separating personal approval from professional outcomes. It also highlights Camp’s criticism of excessive concessions made to preserve relationships, as well as his emphasis on accountability, learning from failure, and strengthening decision-making through discipline and self-confidence. Rather than treating negotiation as a space for harmony at all costs, Camp presents it as a disciplined process aimed at effective and productive results. The article concludes that his method, though counter-intuitive in relation to dominant models, offers a strategic and realistic perspective in which a constructive refusal can become the starting point for better decisions and more successful negotiations.

Keywords: emotions, merits, principles negotiation, constructive no

Approaches based on win-win negotiations, where the parties seeks an agreement that is beneficial for everyone, have been prevalent. Sometimes, however, the art and science of negotiation can lead to other paths. This is the case of Jim Camp, who is known for his books on negotiation, for being a coach, and for his reputation as a fearsome negotiator.

His most famous work , Start with No. The Negotiating Tools That the Pros Don’t Want You to Know (2026), where he deploys a series of principles, values and techniques that, somewhat counter-intuitively in the face of specific dominant approaches, seek to situate the coordinates of negotiations to seek effective and productive results.

Below, we will discuss some of his ideas from the perspective of the Minerva Strategy Blog.

“In a negotiation, decisions are one hundred per cent emotional (…) Negotiations and even decision-making start with emotions. Emotions run rampant, they are at the root of our initial decision, they are not to be trusted, and they can even be destructive, but they do not have the last word. My system considers them for what they are and works with them, not against them. My system teaches you to move from the emotions that never close the deal, all the way to the decisions that do close the deal” (Camp, 2026, 47, 48-49). 

Emotions in negotiation are a classic topic. Camp says that in Japan, where negotiation is considered an art, it is said that decisions should be made with the stomach, never with the heart or the head. This could be a grave mistake: it is good to know that emotions influence the negotiation scenario, especially from the other party. However, it often has dire consequences when the emotional factor is decisive. The prudent thing to do is to moderate and control one’s own emotions and to analyse and know the other party’s emotions. 

“Negotiations start with a “no”, no “maybe”, let alone “yes”, but with a firm and resounding “no”. In any negotiation, this is the key word I want to hear; all of the above is nothing more than window dressing” (Camp, 2026, 49). 

This is Jim Camp’s top piece of advice: start the negotiation with a “no.” Other possibilities are a waste of time or a way of harbouring illusions that do not prosper. This initial “no” is an open door to justify one’s own positions and to continue discussions. It could be considered a constructive “no”.

“For fear of breaking the relationship with the opponent in the negotiation, the colleague did not want to be too demanding. He didn’t want to hurt his feelings by telling him, “If you don’t sign the contract, there will be no show.” Because of his deep desire for approval, he couldn’t see the real problem with the negotiation” (Camp, 2026, 62-63). 

How many times are we forced to make concessions to save the relationship? Negotiations are not territories to seek personal approval, but there are people with great strategic eagerness, where preserving their relationship in good conditions implies making concessions on the line they mark. Jim Camp’s advice is to clearly separate the outcome of negotiations from the quality of personal relationships.

“Every reader can think of a case where they have chosen an obnoxious but effective person over someone likeable but ineffective. What does friendship have to do with doing good business or making good decisions? Absolutely nothing. And as we’ll see below, I always propose and practice respectful and polite agreements with the adversary” (Camp, 2026, 65).  

Here again, the emotions linked to the particularism of how we human beings relate to one another return. This reflection by Camp highlights that professional decisions are made based on bonds of friendship rather than on objective criteria. Human, all too human. It is desirable in professional environments to value the merits of people, regardless of the emotions they may provoke.

“Take responsibility for bad decisions, learn from them, know failure and move forward because you are one decision away from getting back on track. To take on this attitude and approach takes great discipline and a lot of self-confidence because hitting the nail on the head is important to all of us. It is a powerful need and like all needs to be overcome” (Camp, 2026, 67).

There is a growing interest in accountability, which can mean: explaining one’s actions, justifying them and being sanctioned or rewarded. This is a recommendable exercise, especially regarding decisions in the public sector. From a strategic point of view, a future victory can emerge from a failure. For this to be possible, it is crucial to learn from the circumstances, approaches and dynamics that have made this situation possible and emerge stronger. The word crisis in Greek means “to separate”, “to judge”, “to decide”. A crisis has to serve to improve the decision criteria in the future.

“If you can’t take “no,” you’ll burn a lot of bridges and find no way out of a lot of negotiations. Nothing –absolutely nothing– is as important in a successful negotiation as making it clear from the get-go that “no” is a perfectly acceptable answer in any deal” (Camp, 2026, 69).

The feared negotiator, Jim Camp, insists on starting negotiations with a “no”, because he: does not seek to save the relationship, knows how to manage his own and other peoples’ emotions, does not get carried away by particularistic ties, promotes efficiency, learns from failures and operates from a constructive “no”, to continue negotiating.

References

Camp, Jim (2026), Empieza con un no, Barcelona: Ediciones Obelisco, trans. Daniel Aldea (original title: Start with no. The Negotiations Tools that The Pros don’t Want you to Know, 2002).

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Managing negotiations: arguing better 

Oscar Pérez de la Fuente

Carlos III University of Madrid

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3708-846X

Abstract

This paper reviews the chapter on “arguing better” from Managing Negotiations: How to Get a Better Deal by Gavin Kennedy, John Benson, and John McMillan, highlighting negotiation as a mixed process of cooperation and conflict in which parties seek outcomes they cannot obtain alone. The discussion explains how this stage is shaped by the interaction between interests, rights, emotions, and persuasion, and links it to key concepts such as BATNA and the Zone of Possible Agreement (ZOPA). The text emphasises that effective negotiation requires more than defending positions; it depends on managing communication in a way that reduces tension and prevents escalation. In this regard, the authors distinguish between destructive behaviours—such as interrupting, blaming, sarcasm, and threats—and constructive practices, including active listening, asking open questions, clarifying positions, summarising issues, and giving informative feedback. These strategies help negotiators uncover priorities, test commitment, and avoid misunderstandings that can block agreement. Overall, the chapter presents argument not as a purely confrontational exchange, but as a disciplined and strategic phase in which respectful dialogue improves mutual understanding and increases the likelihood of reaching better negotiated outcomes.

Keywords: principled negotiation, arguing, emotions

A common topic on negotiation courses is the appropriate combination of emotions, tactics, and interests. Sometimes, an idealised and overly collaborative image of negotiation situations is presented when, actually, it is essential to deal with emotional tensions and, in particular, to avoid being manipulated by the other party. Gavin Kennedy, John Benson, and John McMillan approach their book Managing Negotiations: How to Get a Better Deal  (1988) from this “realistic” perspective, where a chapter is devoted to the negotiation stage of arguing better.

The authors start by asserting that people negotiate because they have or believe they have a conflict of rights or interests with the other party. Most negotiation scenarios occur in mixed situations of cooperation and conflict, in which the parties want something from the other party that they cannot achieve on their own. This defines the Zone of Possible Agreement -ZOPA- between the parties’ BATNAs -Best Alternative to Not Negotiating-.

People with different interests argue. When interests close to their heart are threatened, most people know how to argue, and even anyone can become emotional. It is for this reason that we should be concerned about those who avoid speaking up because little or nothing of what they value has been threatened. While some people say they don’t have to argue, others admit they must debate or discuss. This is enough.

Regardless of their name, Kennedy, Benson, and McMillan have chosen to call this phase of negotiation argument.Opening, Presentation, and Exchange are alternative ways of describing this stage. However, the authors opt for the term argument since it indicates that both parties are involved. Although the word usually suggests emotional conflict, it can also mean a rational presentation of the reason for doing or not doing something.

Each side gives reasons why they believe something is necessary or attempts to show by reasoning why something is true. They will discuss these conclusions and try to persuade each other through reasoning.

Improving behaviour

Eliminating the habit of interrupting your opponent from your behaviour is one of the most straightforward and most beneficial steps to improve your negotiating performance. People who interrupt someone are essentially telling them to “shut up.” (“You can’t talk while I’m interrupting you”) (Kennedy, Benson, McMillan, 1998, 54). Naturally, the person receiving this message resents it, and before long, there is shouting between some parties during the negotiation; shouting, including insults, can be expected. The other is treated without respect.

Negative discussions reinforce your opponent’s initial inhibitions, which prevent avenues of negotiation from opening and sometimes prevent agreement on an issue, even if the deal is beneficial to both parties.

Constructive behaviour

The remedy is quite simple: Listen more than you talk. Now, that’s easier said than done. However, this alone is not enough. Positive listening behaviour must be matched by positive speaking behaviour. When speaking, be sure to use time effectively. One way to do this is to ask open-ended questions for your opponent to explain and develop their case.

Your opponent is not prepared to explain everything to you, nor can he be willing to explain anything about his limit position. He will try to accept that his opening position is his limit (Kennedy, Benson, McMillan, 1998, 57). As a result, parties who are in an opening position can easily get into a useless and fruitless conversation. You should not focus too much on the issue on the opening positions. Therefore, as much as possible, let us know your position through questions of clarification and explanation. For more information, you may inadvertently disclose your commitment to your position and the likely routes you are preparing to move forward.

Synthesising is always beneficial, especially when the issues are numerous and complex. It also eliminates confusion and negative arguments. “Let’s summarise what you are asking” is a positive action and helps refocus negotiations (Kennedy, Benson, McMillan, 1998, 58). No matter how absurd or ambitious your demands are, it gives the opponent the feeling that they are at least being listened to with respect.

Constructive feedback

Your answer to the other side is what your opponent can do for you. It is to give your opponent information about your position. If you have extracted data from your opponent in the way suggested above, you can better respond to his position and explain yours.

Settings for an argument:

Avoid:

Interrupting, pointing out, attacking, blaming, being too smart, talking too much, shouting, sarcasm, threats.

Practice:

Listening, clarifying questions, summarising issues as a matter of fact.

Asking to justify your case point by point means being attentive to the signs.

Not being committed to your proposal and your explanations.

Testing your commitment to your position-analysing clues about your priorities.

Seeking and giving information – be wary of unintentional signals (Kennedy, Benson, McMillan, 1998, 62).

To successfully manage negotiations, it is essential to anticipate and prepare for the argument or dispute stage, where the parties present and discuss their rationale, interests and positions to persuade each other. Avoiding attitudes that can hinder effective communication and instead encourage constructive behaviours is crucial. Doing so allows you to negotiate and discuss more effectively, leading to better outcomes.

References

Kennedy, Gavin, Benson, John, McMillan, John (1988), Managing Negotiations. How to get a better deal, London: Hutchinson.

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Insisting on using objective criteria

Oscar Pérez de la Fuente

Carlos III University of Madrid

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3708-846X

Abstract

This article examines the fourth rule of Fisher and Ury’s Harvard Negotiation Project method: insisting on objective criteria rather than yielding to pressure. It argues that negotiation should be understood as a process of reason-giving in which parties seek intelligent and fair agreements grounded in principles, precedents, and shared standards that are independent of their immediate preferences. The paper explores the two central questions raised by this rule: how objective criteria are identified and how they should be used in practice. In response, it highlights the need for criteria that are legitimate, practical, and acceptable to both sides, while also stressing that their authority must not depend solely on bargaining power. The analysis further connects this approach with Jon Elster’s idea of the civilising function of hypocrisy, showing how appeals to impartiality can discipline self-interest and create argumentative space that may benefit weaker parties. Finally, the article defends the view that principled negotiation offers a constructive alternative to positional bargaining, threats, and manipulation. By encouraging openness to reason and joint deliberation, it presents agreement not as conquest, but as a cooperative task aimed at mutual benefit.

Keywords: pirnciples negotiation, fairness, impartiality, objective criteria

The fourth rule of Fisher and Ury’s Harvard Negotiation Project Method is based on the relevance of principled agreements and not giving in to pressure. Negotiations should be arenas for developing good arguments, and negotiators should be open to reason but closed to threats.

In the book Getting Yes. How to negotiate without giving in (1988), Fisher and Ury establish that negotiations aim to reach intelligent and fair agreements, and a good way to achieve this is to turn to established principles, precedents, or community practices. These have an unusual power of attraction when the parties must reach an agreement.

There are two questions to ask at this point: “How do you develop objective criteria?” and second, “How do you use them in negotiation?” On the first question, Fisher and Ury consider that objective criteria need to be independent of what each party wants to achieve and need to be legitimate and practical. These criteria would fulfil an anchoring function in the negotiation, and their legitimacy would be independent of the parties (Fisher, Ury, 1988, 88-89).

Here, it is worth reflecting on what the philosopher Jon Elster has called the civilising force of hypocrisy, where the most powerful party defends arguments with the language of impartiality, where, in fact, it appeals to its own interests. Elster believes that, despite everything, this exercise of turning arguments into the language of fairness favours minorities.

The Harvard Method of Negotiation holds that each issue should be framed as a joint search for an objective criterion. To achieve this impartiality of the method, it is crucial to insist on sharing the search. The classic example is two people who want to share a cake. The unbiased method is for one to split the cake and the other to choose the piece they like best. This guarantees agreement with the final split.

Negotiations tend to be more complex and usually incorporate the price dimension. In the joint search for an objective criterion, a relevant question may be asked about the theory behind the price. In sales and purchases, the price theory is usually based on the various alternative offers and demands on the market, in addition to the specific proposal of the other party. This increases or decreases the parties’ bargaining power and gives arguments for their possible demands.

What is relevant is to build a scope for deliberation with the other party to see the arguments for or against each possibility. Fisher and Ury recommend “reason and be open to reasoning about which principles are more appropriate” (Fisher, Ury, 1988, 92-94). Talking about principles, which underlie positions, has greater persuasive power. Negotiators must be open to reasoned persuasion on the merits of each view.

This approach to reaching intelligent and impartial agreements is an attractive alternative to negotiations based on positions, threats or misinformation. Fisher and Ury argue that “never yield to pressure, only to principle.” The best way to get the other party to do something is not by forcing them, but by convincing them with good arguments in what sense the required action is also in their interest.

From this perspective, negotiations are areas of persuasion that would be based on the combination of two premises: a) Being open to reason; b) Insistence on a solution based on an objective criterion.

This is the last rule of the Harvard Method of Negotiation. Fisher and Ury’s approach allows negotiations to be approached from a constructive and cooperative point of view, where it is considered that reaching a good agreement is a joint task of both parties where the various possibilities should be explored well and on the arguments behind the interests of the parties deliberated. Sometimes, obtaining the yes is not a conquest in enemy territory but a more cooperative task to lay the foundations of mutual benefits.

References

Fisher, Roger, Ury, William (1988), Getting to yes. Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In, New York: Penguin Books.

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Inventing options for mutual benefit

benefit

Oscar Pérez de la Fuente

Carlos III University of Madrid

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3708-846X

Abstract

This article examines the third rule of the Harvard Negotiation Method, developed by [Roger Fisher]() and [William Ury](), which urges negotiators to invent options for mutual benefit rather than bargain over fixed positions. The text explains that effective negotiation requires both identifying common interests and exploring creative possibilities before deciding among alternatives. It analyses four major obstacles that usually hinder this process: premature judgment, the search for a single answer, the assumption of a fixed pie, and the belief that solving the other side’s problem is irrelevant. In response, the article highlights the importance of separating invention from evaluation and presents brainstorming as a practical technique for generating multiple possible solutions in a climate free from criticism. It also emphasizes that negotiation is not only a process of managing conflict but also of recognizing cooperation, since parties often share interests that remain implicit. At the same time, differing interests can be strategically valuable, especially when one issue matters more to one side than to the other. Overall, the article argues that good negotiation depends on creativity, cooperation, and the explicit search for agreements that improve outcomes for both parties.

Keywords: principled negotiation, interests, positions, creativity

In the third rule of the Harvard Negotiation Method, Fisher and Ury propose, on the one hand, exploring the various possibilities that may arise and, on the other hand, making the common interests explicit. The authors’ first piece of advice is to “expand the pie before dividing it”.

In the face of this rule that demands “inventing options for mutual benefit,” some obstacles in the form of attitudes or inertia inhibit the creative process of inventing multiple options. The first is premature judgment when negotiators with tunnel vision focus on specific options. The second is the search for a single answer, where it is taken for granted that each situation has only one possible solution. The third is to assume that the pie is fixed and the only variable is to share it when there may be situations where the pie increases to benefit both parties. The fourth is to think that “solving your problem is your problem”, where the issue is that the negotiation is approached from a competitive view between the parties and the cooperative aspects are forgotten. It is possible to increase mutual benefit from the cooperative approach by analysing the various options (Fisher, Ury, 1988, 59-62).

Faced with this scenario, in which the various possibilities of negotiations are not taken advantage of, Fisher and Ury propose multiple solutions. The main approach is to consider that negotiations have a creative component where the act of inventing options has to be separated from the act of judging them. This can be achieved by brainstorming, a process where the parties meet and openly and uninhibitedly put forward all possible options. It is a process where creativity counts and where there is a rule of non-criticism. Afterwards, it is necessary to evaluate and decide whether to incorporate the multiple options into the negotiation.

By following these steps, negotiation is transformed into a creative and cooperative process of finding the best mutually beneficial solutions. Ways must be invented to make the decision easy for both parties. It is sometimes forgotten that negotiations occur because the parties have common interests. Most of the time, these common interests remain implicit. The Harvard Negotiation Method states that these common interests must be made explicit and insists upon as a productive basis for negotiation.

On the other hand, the differences in interests of the parties have great strategic power for the smooth course of negotiations. In particular, there may be situations where an issue is of great interest to you and of little importance to the other party or vice versa. This can lead to a compromise agreement. It is precisely the exploration of differing interests that can be the key to a successful negotiation.

Negotiations occur in scenarios of cooperation and conflict between human beings. One party wants something from the other and vice versa. One way to approach negotiation is as a competition between adversaries who are jockeying for positions. Fisher and Ury propose a method for seeking intelligent agreements through a creative process of inventing multiple options for mutual benefit. Parties may have partly common and partly divergent interests. Insisting on shared interests and creatively managing differing interests is the best way to find an agreement that is best for both parties. Negotiating well also means being creative.

References

Fisher, Roger, Ury, William (1988), Getting to yes. Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In, New York: Penguin Books.