Category: Politics

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Vicente Montano, Arcane of Princes

Oscar Pérez de la Fuente

Carlos III University of Madrid

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3708-846X

Abstract

Manuel Martín Rodríguez’s preliminary study on Arcano de Príncipes argues, following Cánovas del Castillo and Robert S. Smith, that there is a 17th-century manuscript considered to be a precursor to Malthus. Smith documents that this manuscript, found in the National Library, is not anonymous: it is signed by Captain Vicente Montano and dated 19 September 1681. It is not, however, a demographic treatise, but rather a compilation of political precepts comparable to Machiavelli and Bodin, dedicated to the Duke of Medinaceli, minister to Charles II. Drawing on fragments annotated ‘in the style of Minerva’s Strategy’, several theses are highlighted: the utility of war and provisioning as means to distract and subdue the people (‘bread and circuses’); the advisability of avoiding perpetual provincial governments to reduce resistance and the risks of corruption; and the use of ambiguity and obscure language as a technique of simulation and dissimulation to legitimise decisions without revealing their true aims. Finally, the strategic relationship between war and peace is examined, along with the place of truth in government action, highlighting the Machiavellian logic of the preservation of power.

Keywords: Machiavellianism, bread and circuses, accountability

In Manuel Martín Rodríguez’s preliminary study of the work Arcano de Príncipes /Arcane of Princes in the edition published by the Spanish Centre for Constitutional Studies/Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, it is argued that Cánovas del Castillo was the first to mention an anonymous manuscript that was a true precursor to Malthus (Martín Rodríguez, 1986, XIII).  As Robert S. Smith explains in the article “Spanish Malthusianism in the 17th Century“: “A recent search in the National Library in Madrid has uncovered a manuscript entitled Arcano de Príncipes, which is clearly the work consulted by Cánovas del Castillo, although it is not the copy he used. The manuscript in the National Library bears the name of its author, Captain Vicente Montano, and is dated 19 September 1681″ (Smith, 1955, 351).

Smith adds: “The Arcano de Príncipes is not a treatise on population but rather a compilation of political precepts comparable to the writings of Machiavelli, Bodin and (among Spaniards) Saavedra Fajardo. The essay is dedicated to the Duke of Medinaceli, chamberlain and prime minister of Charles II” (Smith, 1955, 351).  Once again, political philosophers are close to the exercise of power, although they do not wield it, and seek to provide the best advice for the exercise of public responsibilities, a fruitful combination of Theory and Practice.

Next, excerpts from Vicente Montano’s Arcano de Príncipes will be discussed in the style of Estrategia Minerva Blog.

“The surest occupation, and one that brings princes the benefit for which they seek it, is to wage war as soon as the common people begin to discuss the government, for, contenting themselves with talking only about matters pertaining to the public state, they extend their curiosity to abundance, since, once war is waged, they usually buy their daily sustenance, and in this way, having nothing to do but eat, and their thoughts being base and vile, they never raise their spirits to sublime and painful things that might give their princes cause for concern. The satirist Juvenal understood well, in two words, the way to keep it more pleasant, which is to give it bread and festivals, a sentence that applies to all domains” (Montano, 1986, 18).

How beautifully expressed in these lines is the universal principle of “panem et circenses” (bread and circuses)! It seems that in Rome they already knew how to manipulate the people based on their appetites. The incisive point made by Captain Montano is that the way to entertain the people was to wage war, which would greatly occupy their conversations, combined with an abundance of food, resulting in minimal problems for the government. A universal recipe for politics, since Juvenal. 

“The present King of France, having recognised that the perpetual governments enjoyed by the Princes of the blood had at other times served as a support to give greater rigour to the concerns of the Kingdom, has divided the provinces in another way, varying their governors and changing them when he sees fit. The dignitaries of a monarchy should not remain in the government of the provinces for life, because when a new successor is appointed, they find it very difficult to relinquish their command” (Montano, 1986, 46). 

Holding public office for many years gives incumbents a wealth of experience, but, as is often pointed out, there is a greater risk of corruption. If constitutionalism emerged as an approach that sought to affirm that all power had limits in the face of absolutism, democracy implies that public officials must be accountable for their actions. This means explaining the actions taken, justifying them, and being rewarded or punished for them. This is linked to transparency and accountability as inherent characteristics of a democracy of quality.

“There are many traces, maxims, and stratagems that the Prince can use to make the world believe that everything he does is based on reason and justice, without the common people being able to penetrate any of his operations, deceiving even the wisest and most prudent so that they do not recognise the ambiguity of his intentions, however great they may be, dressing his speeches in obscure words and profound concepts, even when he appears to be making himself clearly understood” (Montano, 1986, 52-53). 

This paragraph seems to have been written by Machiavelli, who can be interpreted  in different ways, some more elitist, others more republican. One possible reading is that he recommends that rulers engage in simulation and dissimulation to achieve their predetermined objectives, without any necessary link to morality. This is political rationality, which has its own rules and is autonomous from ethics and religion. In this paragraph of Arcano de Príncipes, we sense the Machiavellian Machiavelli giving stark advice. 

“And except for some ministers of the first rank, who share the burden of government, the rest of the subordinates must live as blind as the lowest common people. However, to completely blindfold the vassals, and make them believe that the Prince is working for their greater good and tranquillity, he must flatter them with the peace they have so desired during the war, without them being able to see through this deception. Having already disturbed the peace by the desire for war, he cannot abandon war for the sake of peace, because in peace the vassals do not die except in accordance with the merits of their crimes, but in war, the innocent and the guilty share the same fate” (Montano, 1986, 53).

Vicente Montano combines two variables: the role of truth in politics and the strategic use of war and peace. As mentioned above, Arcano de Príncipes is in line with Machiavelli’s thought, where political expediency, and among these, the main one of remaining in power, must guide the actions of the ruler, who must publicly maintain an irreproachable and convincing position, the result of hypocrisy towards their true interests. Using war and peace within political calculations is regrettable but common. Wars often cause many casualties and irreparable damage, and it would be desirable for exceptional situations to elicit exceptional responses. However, this point of view is not always shared.  

References

Montano, Vicente (1986), Arcano de príncipes, Madrid: Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, preliminary study of  Manuel Martín Rodríguez.

Smith, Robert S. (1955), “Maltusianismo español del siglo XVII: el Arcano de príncipes de Vicente Montano”, El Trimestre Económico, 22(87), 350–358. Available: https://www.eltrimestreeconomico.com.mx/index.php/te/article/view/2417 (Las visit: 2 May 2026).

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The demagogue’s handbook

Oscar Pérez de la Fuente

Carlos III University of Madrid

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3708-846X

Abstract

The text presents Raoul Frary’s Manual of the Demagogue, published in Spanish by Sequitur, translated and edited by Miguel Catalán, and offers an ironic commentary on various passages, in the style of *Estrategia Minerva*. Following a brief biographical note on the author (1842–1892), Fernando Savater’s summary is included: Frary writes like a seasoned politician instructing an aspiring demagogue, that is, someone who seeks to guide others for their own benefit. The text highlights that the work combines serious matters with humour and deliberate frivolity, inviting reflection.

In the passages discussed, praise is highlighted as a demagogic tool: effective flattery must appear sincere and ‘genuine’, avoiding anything crude, even if it may be excessive. Political ‘dogma’ is also explained as a form of faith: it does not matter whether it is true or clear, but rather that it is believed and that the believer feels proud. Frary contrasts the moralist, who promotes responsibility and moderation, with the demagogue, who attributes success to chance and shifts blame onto laws and fate. Finally, he analyses the use of envy and inequality: he warns against their demagogic exploitation, noting that reducing legitimate inequalities is no simple task.

Keywords: demagogy, envy, politics, praise

I will continue with the series dedicated to handbooks, with the book Manual del demagogo (The demagogue’s handbook), written by Raoul Frary. This work is published in Spanish by Sequitur, and the editing and translation are by Miguel Catalán.

The author of the book, Henry François Raoul Frary, born on 17 April 1842 in Tracy-le-Mont and died on 19 April 1892 in Plessis-Bouchard, was a French professor, journalist and essayist.

According to Fernando Savater’s summary in a column entitled “Consejos (Advices)“, Frary wrote this pamphlet “with the advice of a seasoned politician to an aspiring demagogue, that is, to guide others by pulling the reins and obtaining the best benefits for himself.” In the prologue, Miguel Catalán describes the author as an “idealist disguised as a cynic.” The irony and sense of humour that permeate the lines of this work are remarkable. While dealing with very serious issues, the tone used is somewhat frivolous, which invites complicity and reflection.  

Next, excerpts from Raoul Frary’s work Manual del demogogo will be discussed, in the style of Minerva Strategy Blog.

“Let us emphasise from the outset that praise is never strong enough. It is not good to be rude, but there is no problem with being excessive in flattery. Rarely are so many good things said about us as we think we deserve (…) The least justified compliments are often the most welcome: they are more novel. Persuading an apathetic person of their courage, a debauched person of their wisdom, and a fool of their intelligence is the pinnacle of art. But one must know how to act with delicacy and not bring the censer out into the public sphere. Success is achieved by using tact and choosing your evidence well” (Frary, 2017, 33).

Flattery is one of the favourite weapons of demagogues. Nothing pleases the ears more than praising words that applaud the audience. While this is true as a general principle, there is a real art to praise. This is because praise, to have the best effect, must appear sincere or be the subject of serious analysis. Excessive flattery can backfire by coming across as artificial and insincere, material for gullible people who do not question the true intentions of those who use so many flattering expressions. 

“Herein lies one of the secrets of demagoguery, if I may call a method whose excellence is obvious a secret. All the passions and interests of the world would not suffice without the pride of faith. The French during the Revolution would not have endured such a harsh government, such severe deprivation and such terrible dangers, if they had not felt so flattered by the promulgation of a new dogma (…) it is not necessary for the dogma to be true, nor for it to be noble, nor for it to be clear and understandable. It is enough that it is believed and that the believer feels proud to believe”  (Frary, 2017, 36).

Parallels are sometimes drawn between religion and politics. Here, we seek to reflect on attitudes towards political beliefs that are assimilated into the dogmatism of a faith, into the beliefs of a religious believer. Ideologies tend to have a conception of the world —values about what society or human beings should be— where they often mix scientific knowledge with emotional components and a powerful mobilising effect. Frary warns that these political ideologies have elements of religious faith and that this motivates their believers. This brings to mind some current debates, raised from sectarian perspectives, where people always want to be right, leaving no room for temperance, tolerance and consensus.   

“The moralist teaches us patience, sobriety in pleasures, moderation in desires, and the consequences of our efforts. He constantly directs our attention to those who have succeeded through their own merit and those who have fallen through their mistakes. He reduces the responsibility of Fortune and increases our own responsibility. He diminishes the power of laws and enhances the power of customs. The demagogue does just the opposite. He asserts that Fortune distributes her gifts blindly, that success is due to chance, perhaps even to vice, that the unfortunate are victims of an artificial fatality, that misery is inevitable in today’s society. Far from exhorting us to become better, he does not even admit that it depends on us. If our habits are bad, he pretends to ignore them; he does not suspect that the weaknesses of our behaviour reinforce the difficulties of our existence. He rails against social climbers and ridicules edifying tales of morality put into practice. He diminishes the responsibility of customs in all things in order to increase that of laws. He does not instil patience in us, nor does he make us reflect on our fault” (Frary, 2017, 45).

In this passage, Frary compares the moralist and the demagogue, whose aims and advice differ greatly. The former exhorts moderation and a responsible approach to life, while the latter does not call for a change in behaviour, since success is due to chance, appealing to the responsibility of laws rather than customs. However, the fundamental difference between the two is omitted in Frary’s text: the demagogue has spurious aims, generally to obtain his own benefit or that of his group, while the moralist would generally seek the good of those he seeks to advise.

“The envious person says to himself: ‘Inequality is unjust. It is possible, and even easy, to eliminate it. If it is eliminated, it will benefit me.’ If you want to stir up demagogic envy and use it to your advantage, you can never emphasise these three propositions enough, to place them beyond all doubt, to root them ever more deeply in people’s minds and hearts” (Frary, 2017, 56).

There are entire libraries dedicated to the subject of this paragraph from the work Manual del demagogo. The Spanish Royal Academy of Language defines envy as “sadness or regret for the good fortune of others.” There are people who suffer greatly from the successes of others, and the worst thing about envy is the actions it sometimes provokes from the envious person. On the other hand, the fight against certain social and economic inequalities is the legitimate objective of the social and democratic rule of law. Frary’s reasoning takes an argumentative leap when he asserts that it is easy to eliminate inequality. First, we must distinguish what type of inequality we are dealing with, whether it affects politics (inclusion), economy (redistribution) or culture (recognition). If the ultimate goal is to eliminate inequality, it will not be easy, but it is a task that can engage society. However, Frary was warning against the demagogic use of inequality, linked to envy. And again, the question is: What are the demagogue’s objectives?

References

Frary, Raoul (2017), Manual del demagogo, Madrid: Sequitur, trad. Miguel Catalán.

Savater, Fernando “Consejos”, El País, 29-10-2016. Disponible: https://elpais.com/elpais/2016/10/28/opinion/1477660333_481282.html (ultima consulta: 14 mayo 2026).

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Thomas More, Utopia

Oscar Pérez de la Fuente

Carlos III University of Madrid

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3708-846X

Resumen

This text presents an annotated reading of Thomas More’s Utopia (1516), combining historical contextualisation with a philosophical and moral analysis of several significant passages. After situating More as a jurist and statesman executed for his opposition to Henry VIII’s break with Rome, the utopian ideal is explored as a critique of private vices and social inequalities: the prohibition of idleness, the absence of opportunities for corruption, and the equitable distribution of goods are presented as institutional conditions for preventing poverty and begging. Drawing on selected quotations, the relationship between happiness, pleasure and virtue is discussed, linking More’s proposal to the Aristotelian tradition of eudaimonia and emphasising the centrality of temperance and prudence. The commentary also addresses the tension between self-interest and the common good through various formulations of reciprocity (the Silver, Gold and Platinum Rules), and examines examples where form and moral substance are at odds, such as the wedding ceremony or the mockery of disability. Overall, the paper proposes understanding Utopia as a laboratory of norms and values for reflecting on social justice, the limits of humour and inclusive coexistence.

Palabras clave: Utopia, Golden Rule, honesty, humor

Sir Thomas More (1478-1535),  who was executed in July 1535 for his resistance to supporting the separation of the Church of England from the Catholic Church of Rome, was a jurist, intellectual, statesman and Lord Chancellor of Henry VIII of England, who ruled from 1509 to 1547. A highly principled man of deep values, More disagreed with the monarch’s divorce from his first wife, Catherine of Aragon (1485-1536), and especially with the promotion of Henry as head of the Church of England in place of the pope. Before his foray into politics, Thomas More was a renowned writer and scholar, and his most recognisable work today is Utopia, which presents a philosophical description of an ideal society set on an island.

Below, some passages from Thomas More’s Utopia (2000) will be discussed in the style of the Minerva Strategy Blog.

“There are no taverns, no ale-houses, nor stews among them, nor any other occasions of corrupting each other, of getting into corners, or forming themselves into parties; all men live in full view, so that all are obliged both to perform their ordinary task and to employ themselves well in their spare hours; and it is certain that a people thus ordered must live in great abundance of all things, and these being equally distributed among them, no man can want or be obliged to beg” (More, 2000).

It is significant that Thomas More’s utopian society discards private vices: alcohol, prostitution, gossip, the underworld, and rather, citizens focus on honest work. This means that goods should be distributed equally, without great inequalities or the tale of the lazy grasshopper and the hard-working ant.

“Yet they do not place happiness in all sorts of pleasures, but only in those that in themselves are good and honest. There is a party among them who place happiness in bare virtue; others think that our natures are conducted by virtue to happiness, as that which is the chief good of man. They define virtue thus—that it is a living according to Nature” (More, 2000).

Aristotle argues that the purpose of human beings is eudaimonia, a Greek term usually translated as happiness, human flourishing, or good life. This concept is linked to the exercise of virtues such as prudence or temperance. However, there are different conceptions of happiness and pleasure, which some positions unify. What Thomas More says here is that only good and honest pleasure leads to happiness. His life is an example of honesty and courage in dying for what he believed in, against his personal well-being. 

““They think it is an evidence of true wisdom for a man to pursue his own advantage as far as the laws allow it, they account it piety to prefer the public good to one’s private concerns, but they think it unjust for a man to seek for pleasure by snatching another man’s pleasures from him; and, on the contrary, they think it a sign of a gentle and good soul for a man to dispense with his own advantage for the good of others, and that by this means a good man finds as much pleasure one way as he parts with another; for as he may expect the like from others when he may come to need it, so, if that should fail him, yet the sense of a good action, and the reflections that he makes on the love and gratitude of those whom he has so obliged, gives the mind more pleasure than the body could have found in that from which it had restrained itself” (More, 2000).

There are several levels of possible strategic interactions between human beings: a) Silver Rule: Reciprocate the response obtained from the other party. It is the biblical ‘an eye for an eye’ or TITforTAT strategy; b) Golden Rule as reciprocity expectation: Treat others as you would like to be treated, with the expectation that they will do the same to you in the future; c) Golden Rule as unlimited altruism: Treat others as you would like to be treated, as part of your philosophy, without expecting anything in return. It is known as love your enemy; d) Platinum Rule: Treat others as others would like to be treated. Here the aim is to go against the particularism of the Golden Rule, which can have its variants of reciprocity and unlimited altruism. 

What is interesting here is that More speaks, in relation to good deeds, of reciprocity of benefits and of conscience as two indicators of the moral rightness of an action. Which of the rules analysed was he referring to?

“Yet they do not place happiness in all sorts of pleasures, but only in those that in themselves are good and honest. There is a party among them who place happiness in bare virtue; others think that our natures are conducted by virtue to happiness, as that which is the chief good of man. They define virtue thus—that it is a living according to Nature” (More, 2000).

Choosing the person with whom to share one’s life requires prudence and a proper assessment of several factors. Foremost among these are the character traits with which to deal with everyday conflicts. As Thomas More warns, it is somewhat inept that part of the nuptial ritual is to briefly show the future spouse naked.  Once again, the relevance between the substance and the form of a relationship, between what is important and what is superficial, is fundamental. 

“There was a Jester standing by, that counterfeited the fool so naturally that he seemed to be really one; the jests which he offered were so cold and dull that we laughed more at him than at them, yet sometimes he said, as it were by chance, things that were not unpleasant, so as to justify the old proverb, ‘That he who throws the dice often, will sometimes have a lucky hit.’ When one of the company had said that I had taken care of the thieves, and the Cardinal had taken care of the vagabonds, so that there remained nothing but that some public provision might be made for the poor whom sickness or old age had disabled from labour” (More, 2000).

The limits of humour in the age of political correctness have become controversial. Laughing at the ignorance or foolishness of the public can be an easy resource. One might expect humour to have a healthy function of social criticism, rather than a reinforcement of prejudices and stereotypes that are already ingrained. In the case posed by Thomas More, making humour about people with disabilities because of their condition is not justified as humour that is compatible with human rights, intelligent humour that makes us think, or humour that invites us to consider values for a more open, plural, and inclusive society, where there is room for everyone. 

References

More, Thomas (2000), Utopia, The Project Gutemberg, Morely, Henry (ed.),  available:

https://www.gutenberg.org/files/2130/2130-h/2130-h.htm (last visit: 17-5-26).

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The Candidate. Media relations handbook 

Oscar Pérez de la Fuente

Carlos III University of Madrid

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3708-846X

Abstract

The text reviews The Candidate: A Media Relations Handbook (for politicians and journalists) (2008), by Julio César Herrero and Amalio Rodríguez Chuliá, as a practical handbook on political marketing aimed at managing the relationship between candidates and the media. It is emphasised that in Spain there is little literature ‘from within’ on this subject and that the central aim is to help communicate effectively in order to achieve electoral goals. The authors are briefly described and key ideas are introduced: political marketing seeks to ‘sell’ candidates and traditionally relied on the mainstream media, but today social media amplify phenomena such as filter bubbles. The handbook advises crafting messages that are impactful in form, using expressive resources without resorting to extravagance. Drawing on Sartori, it reflects on the power of the media and the risk of favouring celebrities over good leaders. It also distinguishes between anonymous sources and leaks, emphasising the journalistic duty to verify. In the post-truth era, ethical media coexists with disinformation and fake news. It is recommended to avoid technical jargon and to communicate clearly without oversimplifying. Finally, it lists the “principles of a good debater” and questions their compatibility with deliberative democracy, recalling the Sophist tradition and arguing that democratic quality depends on high-quality public deliberation.

Keywords: candidate, public deliberation, fake news, media, politics, politics as show business, rhetoric, sophists

In the series of posts about handbooks, this one will deal with the work The candidate. Media relations handbook (for politicians and journalists)/El candidato. Manual de relaciones con los medios (para políticos y periodistas), written by Julio César Herrero and Amalio Rodríguez Chuliá in 2008. It seems that political candidates have to deal with the media, and with journalists, to achieve their objectives. This book seeks to give practical and entertaining advice on various situations, and how best to deal with them, in the world of communication. 

Julio César Herrero is a journalist, university professor, writer and specialist in political communication and marketing born in Mieres, Asturias, in 1973. He holds a PhD in Journalism from the Complutense University of Madrid and has developed an outstanding career in the academic, journalistic and political consultancy fields. He maintains a personal website. 

Amalio Rodríguez Chuliá (Catarroja, Valencia, 1971) is a Spanish scriptwriter, creative artist, journalist, playwright and television format creator with a diverse career in media, advertising and political communication.

The following are commentaries of the excerpts from the book El candidato. Manual de relaciones con los medios (para políticos y periodistas), written by Julio César Herrero and Amalio Rodríguez Chuliá in the style of Minerva Strategy Blog.

“This book is, in essence, a political marketing handbook. Most of the literature that exists on the subject it deals with is American. Unfortunately, in Spain, hardly any texts have been published that deal, from the inside, with the subject of this one: the relations between politicians and the media from a practical point of view” (Herrero, Rodríguez Chuliá, 2008, 11).

One of the usual objectives of marketing is to sell products and, by extension, political marketing seeks to sell candidates or parties in electoral contests. The goal of the latter is to get people to vote and the medium, traditionally, has been the mainstream media, especially television. Currently, social networks are of great importance, with phenomena such as the “filter bubbles“, where the personalisation of preferences for users on the network, means that they only receive news or messages in line with their ideology, and never views from other perspectives.  

“Shocking. Making statements that, not so much in substance but in form, catch the journalist’s attention is the best way for them to become a headline (in ‘cut’ and radio, in ‘soundbite’ for television). It is by no means about being alarming or extravagant in the statements, but it is about being original. The use of analogies, metaphors or other literary devices makes the language break out of the routine and catches the eye” (Herrero, Rodríguez Chuliá, 2008, 49). 

In his work Homo Videns. La sociedad teledirigida/ Homo Videns: The Remote-Controlled Society, Sartori talked about how television changed democracy. It is worth reflecting on how social networks can change the practice of democratic societies, for example, by encouraging political activism or accountability, but also by giving fuel to demagogy and disinformation. 

One of the issues that Sartori points out is that what is relevant nowadays is to appear in the media; this gives media power, as opposed to the former prestige of intellectuals. When political parties look for a candidate, they prefer a profile such as a sportsman or an actor, or similar, who already have media power. However, the media power of someone does not guarantee that they have the virtues of a good governor or public representative.

“When journalists use information from unnamed sources, they often use expressions such as “according to well-informed sources”, “sources close to” or “according to one of the advisers”, depending on the extent to which the journalist wishes to indicate the provenance of the information.

Up to this point, reference has been made to circumstances where the journalist knows the identity of the source, but chooses not to reveal it. It is a different matter when the journalist does not know the identity of the source. In this case, we are dealing with a leak. Information that is always of interest to the journalist, but which he or she is unaware that he or she is providing it. It is the journalist’s obligation to check the data before publishing or disseminating it” (Herrero, Rodríguez Chuliá, 2008, 72).

This is still the case in general terms, but there is a new element to take into account in the post-truth and social media era: disintermediation. There are conventional media, which are usually committed to the principles of professional journalistic ethics, such as the search for truth, impartiality or honesty. Nowadays, in social networks and in some media, issuers of disinformation coexist, which has several variants, the best known of which are fake news. There is great controversy about this concept, and its viability as a political weapon/etiquette, however, there is a broad consensus on its deliberate intention to deceive or confuse. Once again, we reiterate the importance of following the duties, values and virtues of journalistic deontology, which make up the ideal profile that information professionals must have.   

“Do not abuse technical jargon. Jargon, i.e. terms specific to a trade or profession, can be used in a speech as long as they are not abused. It depends on the audience you are addressing. If they are specialised listeners, there will be no problem in using terms that only the politician and the audience are familiar with: no one else should understand them, although this is not usual. But if the audience does not master a subject in which technical terms are frequently used, the politician will have to make an effort to translate these terms so that the listeners can understand what he or she is saying” (Herrero, Rodríguez Chuliá, 2008, 107).  

This handbook with the media refers to the fact that the candidate must simplify complex issues or terms in order to be understood by wide audiences. Ortega y Gasset is credited with saying that clarity is the courtesy of the philosopher. It is important to be clear in public discourse, but one must know how to communicate well, at the risk of falling into simplification, manichaeism or demagoguery. Political issues do not usually have black/white solutions, but it is necessary for politics to become a good pedagogy to explain the management of the range of greys that make up public affairs. 

Fundamental principles of a good polemicist 

“1.-A good polemicist never tries to convince his opponent of anything. 

2.-A good polemicist chooses the sector of the audience he wants to address. 

3.-The good polemicist is the first to define the terms of the debate.

4.- A good polemicist prefers to ask questions rather than answer them. 

5.- A good polemicist repeats, repeats and, if there is time, repeats. 

6.- A good polemicist knows how to use the same argument in several ways. 

7.- A good polemicist, perhaps a very good debater, wins with his own weapons, but above all, fundamentally, with those of his opponent.

8.- The good polemicist handles fallacies to perfection and strives to prevent the other side from using them. If he succeeds, he exposes and ridicules them so that the audience can decide” (Herrero, Rodríguez Chuliá,2008, 124-134). 

I would like to conclude with reflections on the Fundamental Principles of the Good Polemicist, which is proposed in this handbook. As mentioned at the beginning, the aim of this work is political marketing from a practical perspective and, for such a goal, the effectiveness of this advice could be contextualised. 

The ideal of deliberative democracy, where debates allow for persuading and being persuaded, participants are rational and reasonable, and agreements can be forged based on fairness or unanimity, would seem to have limited effect in practical politics, as actors are more interested in following the tactics of good polemicists.

In the end, there is nothing new under the sun. Many centuries ago, the sophists educated in rhetorical tactics and strategies, to increase the power of conviction of their pupils, citizens of the polis of Athens, to debate public affairs in the Agora. This was a form of education for democracy, which was based on good polemicists. Now, as then, it is easier to fall into polemics than to engage in good dialogues, when it is obvious that the quality of democracy is improved by the quality of public deliberation. 

References

Herrero, Julio César, Rodríguez Chuliá, Amalio (2008), El candidato. Manual de relaciones con los medios (para políticos y periodistas), Sevilla, Zamora: Comunicación Social. Ediciones y Publicaciones.

Herrero, Julio César (2024),”JCH”, Available: https://juliocesarherrero.es

(Last visit: 2 de May 2026).

Sartori, Giovanni (2012), Homo videos. La sociedad teledirigida, Madrid: Taurus.

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Handbook of the perfect parliamentarian

Oscar Pérez de la Fuente

Carlos III University of Madrid

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3708-846X

Abstract

The text presents and discusses Mario Merlino’sManual del perfecto parlamentario(1981), a humorous work written at a time of political upheaval and aimed at promoting a culture of parliamentary life. A brief profile of the author (1948–2009) is provided; he was an Argentine-Spanish writer and translator renowned for his literary work.

Drawing on various passages, the text reflects on the figure of the parliamentarian as a ‘professional’ who requires the ability to manoeuvre, which may be associated with opportunism and a lack of principles; it seeks, however, to distinguish between the effectiveness of political techniques and the ethical legitimacy of the ends pursued. Parliament is highlighted as a central institution of democracy: a space where speech allows for the exchange of views, deliberation and the negotiation of agreements, despite historical criticisms such as those of Carl Schmitt, who regarded it as an empty formality.

Furthermore, the text examines ideological polarisation and the resurgence of identity-based conflicts (political correctness, cancellation culture), which may fuel sectarianism and alienate the public—particularly young people—from politics. It recalls the parliamentary origins of the terms ‘left’ and ‘right’ and Bobbio’s interpretation based on inequality. Finally, the ‘crisis’ is presented as an opportunity: crises reveal leadership and force decisions to be made, which is why Parliament should be a privileged forum for seeking solutions geared towards the common good.

Palabras clave: crisis, deliberation, Parliament, politics

We continue with the series dedicated to handbooks. On this occasion, the Manual del perfecto parlamentario (Handbook of the perfect parliamentarian) (1981) by Mario Merlino. It is a work with a markedly humorous tone, which was written at a time of political changes in Spain, and popularising work in favour of a political culture of parliamentarism was noteworthy. 

Mario-Jorge Merlino Tornini (1948-2009), Argentina/Spain, was a writer and literary translator of works mainly written in Portuguese, Italian and English. He studied at the University of Bahía Blanca and had a radio programme with his friend César Aria. He has translated, among other authors, Jorge Amado, Clarice Lispector, Lygia Bojunga Nunes and Ana María Machado. In 2004 he received the Spanish National Prize for best translation for Auto dos condenados, by António Lobo Antunes.

The Handbook of the Perfect Parliamentarian was written by Mario Merlino and published by Altalena in 1981. Excerpts from this book will be commented using the style of Minerva Strategy Blog.

“The parliamentarian is a rare professional, it is said, ‘professional of a badly organised job’. He or she is a trainee in public affairs. An Italian, Giovanni Sartori, speaks of the professionalisation of politics. From a characterological point of view, he stresses that the parliamentarian (that professional politician) must be able to manoeuvre -manipulative skills-and that this fact (malicious Sartori!) implies opportunism and lack of principles”(Merlino, 1981, 11).

The parliamentarian must have manipulative skills, which implies opportunism and lack of principle, as this Handbook suggests. A distinction should be made between technique and objectives. Good strategy involves using the best means to achieve the proposed objectives; it is purely a question of effectiveness. These means may include tactics and stratagems. Parliamentarians’ goals relate to justice or public ethics; however, since Machiavelli, a politician’s primary goal is often considered to be to stay in power, for which they become professionals.   

“Parliament, as a fundamental institution of democracy, and as its etymology indicates, is the place where people talk and chatter. We have not always thought about the importance of what it means to institute the power of speech. Of course, you will say that we often talk too much, or that words are pretexts for postponing solutions, and the good thing, if short, is twice as good, OK. But apart from that, the Parliament, properly understood, is the right place to confront opinions, discuss or dynamically put different positions on different problems” (Merlino, 1981, 14).

Carl Schmitt, in the 1930s, criticised the democratic parliament as an empty formality, showing autocracy as an alternative. Periodically, parliament, which is perfectible, is criticised. It is the place for negotiation and compromise. In addition to the competition for votes each election period, parliamentarians have a responsibility to ensure that their work is close to the interests of citizens and that they are properly accountable. Ideally, parliamentary debates should be complemented by deliberative mechanisms that involve the population in some way. 

“There is no way today that the ideology of the people of one side can be changed or improved by that of the other. The controversies of the sectarians are contrived and always false. Each ideology, which is generally a collection of commonplaces, defends itself by closing itself off like an oyster”. (Pío Baroja) quoted by (Merlino, 1981, 35).

From the ‘end of ideologies’ – Bell – or the ‘end of history’ – Fukuyama – we are moving to a stage of an apparent revival of conflicts, which are often based on identity-related issues rather than socio-economic explanations. Political correctness and the cancel culture are current examples of identity politics. Here the roles seem to have been reversed: the left, once utopian, seeks to regulate, prohibit and intervene, while the right, traditionally associated with conservatism, has become libertarian and, in a way, anarchist. It seems that the dynamics of sectarianism and polarisation are in the interest of some political sectors, but they make citizens, especially young people, uninterested in politics.  

“This left, centre and right thing, let’s face it, arose as a problem of geometrical arrangement and, no doubt, as a function of the architectural possibilities of parliamentary space. England’s oldest parliamentary democracy provides an example of the link between physical location and ideological choice. The Tories, ardent supporters of the monarchy, sat to the right of the speaker. The Whigs, on the other hand, were on the left. The French set the “parliamentary cliché” of the situation on the right, centre and left, equivalent respectively to the Montagnard, Girondins and Jacobins. These are the times of the Revolution” (Merlino, 1981, 38). 

Left and right are terms of parliamentary geometry, from the very beginning.  Faced with the disorientation of the fall of the Berlin Wall, Bobbio wrote Left and Right and focused the distinction on the different approaches to inequality. That is, whether redistribution of resources to the less advantaged is justified, whether by genetic lottery or by social circumstances. It is important that there is broad social – and political – consensus on the implementation of human rights, especially when it comes to social rights or minority rights. Some contents of public ethics in European countries have been incorporating these consensuses, while in other parts of the world, such as China or the United States, there are different perspectives. 

“Crisis: it is a word that produces fear because it is always used in a negative sense: what crisis, there is an economic, social, ideas, values, moral, religious and even marital crisis. 

A good parliamentarian should vindicate the fertilising power (with apologies) of the CRISIS. We must not forget that crisis is linked to criticism. To put in crisis means, fundamentally, to look for new ways to solve problems, that is, to solve, if you like, the crises that are so abundant in these times” (Merlino, 1981, 70).  

In times of crisis, there is a need for real leaders. Parliament can be a forum for providing solutions to crises. The etymological origin of the term krisis in Greek means “decision”, “judgement” or “turning point”. Crises should be seen as opportunities to improve and emerge stronger. Some commentators have the opinion that we are in a permanent crisis; even more reason why Parliament should be the place to seek solutions and take decisions for the common good. 

References

Merlino, Mario (1981), Manual del perfecto parlamentario, Madrid: Altalena.

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Breviary for politicians

Oscar Pérez de la Fuente

Carlos III University of Madrid

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3708-846X

Abstract

The text presents and discusses the Breviary for Politicians (1684), attributed to Cardinal Jules Mazarin or his circle. Mazarin (1602–1661), an Italian cardinal in the service of the French monarchy, played a decisive role in the early years of Louis XIV’s reign and helped lay the foundations of French power in Europe. The text also highlights the influence of Richelieu, who promoted his career, as well as the underlying themes of political realism and pragmatism reminiscent of Machiavelli. The author announces that this will be followed by an edition by María Blanco (La política del disimulo), which provides the historical context for the work.

Strategic lessons are drawn from these quotations: speak with caution and avoid over-confidence, as rumours can destroy one’s reputation; feign modesty, kindness and equanimity to gain esteem; exercise responsibilities with moderation and a spirit of public service; and avoid intervening in polarised disputes if one cannot prove one is in the right. In one’s dealings with others, it is recommended not to make promises lightly, to be difficult to deceive and to remain consistent, although the commentator notes that it may be wise to rectify one’s course. To avoid hatred, he advises acting with grace in the face of dismissal and not harbouring grudges. Finally, he suggests listening, reflecting, allowing time to resolve complex matters and not meddling in other people’s problems—advice that is also applicable outside the realm of politics.

Keywords: deception, strategy, Machiavellianism, prudence, pretence

We continue with the series dedicated to handbooks. This time it is dedicated to Breviary for politicians, published in 1684, attributed to Cardinal Mazarin, or someone close to him. Jules Mazarin was born in Pescina, Italy, in 1602 and died in Vincennes, France, in 1661. He was an Italian cardinal, without being ordained a priest, in the service of the French monarchy who exercised power in the early years of the reign of Louis XIV. He was a politician, diplomat, military officer, and adviser to Louis XIV, and he was responsible – as Prime Minister – for laying the foundations for making France a great European power.

For those interested in politics and strategy, and somewhat mythomaniacal, it is noteworthy that the historical figure who supported and turned Cardinal Mazarin into a statesman was the famous Cardinal Richelieu, whom he replaced in office. Both are presumed to be clever and astute, as well as efficient and reasonable in leading government. Machiavelli‘s pragmatic approach and political realism influence this Breviary for politicians.

The following is a commentary on passages from Cardinal Mazarin’s Breviary for politicians in the style of Estrategia Minerva Blog. It is worth noting that it follows the edition of this work by María Blanco entitled La política del disimulo. Cómo descubrir las artimañas del poder con Mazarino (2024), of Editorial Rosamerón, which includes the essay of the editor.

Gaining esteem and fame 

“Never forget that anyone is liable to spread rumours about you if you have behaved – or spoken – too freely or rudely in his presence. In this matter, do not trust servants or pages. People look at an isolated incident to generalise; they take advantage of it to spread your bad reputation” (Cardenal Mazarino, 2024, 69). 

It is excellent advice to be cautious when speaking and be wary of who might be listening. Rumour-mongers/moral lordscan use past confidences to destroy your image. Your public reputation may be based on a hoax a thousand times repeated. According to the Spanish Royal Academy of Language, a hoax is “false news propagated for some purpose”. It is better to be prudent and leave hoaxes and rumours to others.

“Feign modesty, candour, kindness and perfect equanimity. Be grateful, congratulate, show yourself available, even to those who have done nothing to deserve it” (Cardenal Mazarino,2024, 71).

If you ever have a responsibility, exercising it with moderation, equanimity, and a willingness to serve the public is essential. Your character must adapt to the circumstances and cultivate, in addition to prudence, the Aristotelian virtues of temperance, justice and courage.

“Refrain from intervening in discussions where opposing points of view clash unless you are absolutely sure you are right and can prove it” (Cardenal Mazarino, 2024, 73). 

There are two pernicious tendencies: civil war/factionalism that seeks to divide society into irreconcilable camps and want-to-be-right-about-everything. If one is in a position of authority, it is crucial to make dissent and unity compatible.

Gaining each other’s favour 

“Avoid easy promises and granting too many permissions. Be difficult to deceive and circumspect in giving your opinion. But once given, do not change it” (Cardenal Mazarino,2024, 74).

The ideal is to become reliable, credible, and a source of legitimacy. This is a departure from the Machiavellian approach, where the prince would always find an excuse not to keep his word. I disagree with Mazarin that one should never change one’s mind. In some situations, it is wise to rectify.

Avoid hatred 

“If you are relieved of your duties at any time, publicly express your satisfaction, even your gratitude to those who have given you back the peace and quiet to which you aspired so much. Find the most convincing arguments for those listening to you: in this way, you will avoid adding sarcasm to disgrace” (Cardenal Mazarino, 2024, 89).

It is relevant in this life to do things with elegance and fair play, even if it is not fashionable or in style. If your public responsibilities end, it is good to look to the future and not to hold grudges from the past. There should be an art and science for resigning and leaving office, which should include, in addition to good manners, always avoiding criticism, especially of superiors, and easing the way for those to come.

Acquiring wisdom 

“In most circumstances, it is better to stand still, to listen to the advice of another and to ponder it long and hard. Do not overestimate the extent of either your words or your actions, and do not take up matters that are useless to you now or later. Do not meddle in other people’s affairs”  (Cardenal Mazarino, 2024, 97).  

A Spanish politician had responsibilities at different levels of public administration. He made his strategy for handling issues, especially the most complex ones, famous, and his secret was to let time pass. As incredible as it may seem, many issues have been found to be solved in this way before being considered again. 

Another great piece of advice is not to interfere in other people’s affairs because there is a very Latin tendency to solve other people’s lives based on one’s own prejudices and stereotypes. 

From the Baroque period, based on the experience of some of the most powerful politicians of the time, Cardinal Mazarin advises, in summary: to be prudent in speaking and not to trust who might be listening; to feign modesty, kindness and equanimity; to exercise any responsibility with moderation and a desire for public service; and to refrain from intervening in discussions with opposing points of view unless one is sure of being right and can prove it. Finally, he recommends listening to the advice of others, meditating long and hard, and not meddling in other people’s affairs.

The best reading that can be made of Mazarin’s approach is that it may be suitable for politics as well as for other areas of life.

References

Cardenal Mazarino (2024), “Breviario para políticos” in Blanco, María, La política de disimulo. Cómo descubrir las artimañas del poder con Mazarino, España: Rosamerón, trans. Alberto Torrego.

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The perfect politician’s handbook

Oscar Pérez de la Fuente

Carlos III University of Madrid

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3708-846X

Abstract

This text marks the start of a series of reflections on “manuals”, defined by the RAE as compendiums of the essentials of a subject. The first is the Manual del perfecto político (1991) by the journalist and writer José de Cora, a humorous and ironic work, excerpts from which are discussed. It is emphasised that choosing collaborators is a crucial decision: one should surround oneself with the best, even those superior to the leader, but with one indispensable virtue: loyalty to values and people. Intelligence is put into perspective as the sole requirement for politics, recalling that both the incompetent and the wise have governed, and different styles are distinguished: from the Platonic or Erasmian ideal to the Machiavellian, and between those who show empathy for citizens and those who seek to perpetuate themselves in power. Subtlety is championed—as something that can be learnt and is necessary to maintain decorum—and the contemporary demand for brevity is qualified, calling for spaces for deliberation. Provocation would only be justified if it opens up a valuable debate. It is also advised to learn from criticism, distinguishing between destructive and constructive feedback, and the isolation following departure from office is described, which is useful for recognising friendships based on self-interest. Finally, the idea of ‘always succeeding’ by remaining in politics is questioned, and calls are made for term limits, accountability and the selection of the best candidates.

Keywords: learning, resignation, politics, accountability, subtlety, virtues

With this post, we will start a series dedicated to handbooks as a reason to reflect on the practical dimensions in specific fields.  One of the meanings of the word “handbook” in the Spanish Royal Academy of Language is “book in which the most substantial aspects of a subject are summarised.” We begin with the Handbook of the perfect politician.

José de Cora Paradela, born in Lugo in 1951, is a prominent Spanish writer and journalist. Throughout his career, he has worked in various media, including news agencies, newspapers, magazines, radio, cinema and television.  In 1991, José de Cora published the book Manual del perfecto político (Handbook of the Perfect Politician) in the editorial Espasa Calpe, in which he discusses on current affairs with humour and Galician irony with more general elements of reflection. Some fragments of this book will be commented below in the style of Minerva Strategy. 

On how to choose subordinates

“If you have the possibility to do so, every time you accept a new collaborator into your circle of work, you are facing one of the most important decisions of your life. That is why it is advisable not to make a mistake because just as a correct choice can be a victory in advance, a wrong one would be tantamount to a defeat beforehand” (Cora, 1991, 23). 

The best advice for building a team is to surround yourself with the best people, even if they are better than the boss, but always with loyalty as a virtue. Teams must be based on quality and must be loyal to values and people as a condition for participating in public affairs.

How intelligence is not essential 

“Political practice has such a mixture of components that it would be utterly stupid to think that the most intelligent man is also best placed for its exercise. Undocumented people, mules, and even oligophrenics have occupied the highest political offices without demerit: in the same way that wise and enlightened people have committed so many atrocities that they would claim to be the work of inferior beings” (Cora, 1991, 53).  

There are different modes of political intelligence. In the History of Ideas, Plato’s Philosopher King is often contrasted with Erasmus of Rotterdam’s virtues of the good Christian prince, with the hypocrisy, shrewdness, and fortitude promoted by Machiavelli. In public life, politicians who can show emotional intelligence towards citizens are often distinguished from those whose maxim of action is to stay in power. 

On how to be subtle

“The dosage of subtlety, knowing when it should be used in a stream or distributed in an eyedropper, is, dear prince, a teaching reserved for experience. It alone will inform you of the qulaities that adorn you in this section; for subtlety, like stature, is received without our intervention, and only by a complicated operation is it possible to modify the quantity of the one and the length of the other.” (Cora, 1991, 59).

We disagree with José de Cora here.  On the one hand, subtlety is commendable for any public servant and should also be for politicians. It is not necessary to offend; it is better to take care of manners and make people think about the underlying issues. Moreover, and more importantly, subtlety can be learned; it is not innate. It is a virtue of rhetoric that can be acquired and for which it is necessary to be trained. 

On how to abbreviate

“Baltasar Gracián’s teachings against long-winded approaches and in favour of brevity in expositions are gold-plated for a politician with aspirations. The sentences that outlive an author and those that are most successful in influencing public opinion must be short and concentrated, like black coffee”  (Cora, 1991, 62). 

It used to be said that there were two types of speeches: long speeches and good speeches. Nowadays, with social networks, we are committed to brevity, to the headline, and to summarising our thoughts in 140 characters. Politicians enter into this dynamic and hold press conferences, where journalists “fish” for headlines. Brevity, perhaps, yes, but let’s give space for calm reflection, deliberation, fruitful exchange of opinions, persuading and being persuaded, in short… a public opinion.  

On how to provoke

“One of the aspects of Evita Perón’s personality that most attracted the attention of foreign politicians who knew her, was her taste for provoking and scandalising the interlocutor of the moment, with no other aim than her personal satisfaction at seeing the surprised faces that her outbursts caused” (Cora, 1991, 77). 

One might ask here: to provoke, what for? If the only aim is to attract attention, it would seem to be another form of manipulation. If the provocation has a positive objective and promotes a “free and uninhibited” debate on a given topic, usually far from the spotlight, it could be justified in that case.  

On how to take criticism 

“If you have decided to dive into the waters of public administration, you should bear in mind something as elementary as water for the fish, no matter how well you do it, no matter how many quintals of intelligence distinguish you from the rest of the administrators, no matter how many successes decorate your management, there will always be people who criticise it, who do not feel identified with your way of proceeding and who will criticise you, apart of course from your natural political enemies, those who sit with you in Parliament”  (Cora, 1991, 90). 

A distinction is usually made between destructive criticism -based on negative attacks, often including personal ones- and constructive criticism -where proposals for improvement are made. The latter are the most interesting, and the former tend to contribute little. 

Politicians tend to distinguish between political adversaries and party colleagues, and relations with the latter are much more difficult. Something which, at the time of the Spanish Transition, was summed up by the politician Pío Cabanillas when he said: “Hit the deck, our men are coming!

On how to behave in the face of dismissal 

“The politician who comes to occupy a public office, such as the one that awaits you if nothing stands in your way, must know how to conjugate these three verbs: resign, dismiss, or leave, because inexorably one of them will put an end to your direct contact with power” (Cora, 1991, 164).    

When a politician leaves public office, their phone stops ringing. All those who congratulated them on their appointment evaporated, and only a few close friends communicated with them. It is a good opportunity to read Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, where he distinguishes between friends by affinity and by interest.

On how to maintain greatness in the face of defeat 

“If you have decided to embark on the tortuous path of politics, you should know from the outset that there is no such thing as failure, unless you abandon this activity through force majeure or of your own free will. As long as you are in politics, politics itself will protect you from any doubt as to whether you are a winner or a loser. You always succeed because “being” is synonymous with “winning”. Being in politics is enough” (Cora, 1991, 173).  

We do not like this approach here by José de Cora.  Unfortunately, there seems to be an abundance of politicians whose only goal is to stay in power and politicians whose only work experience is in politics. A society must be able to find mechanisms to elect the best people to positions of public responsibility. It is a good general principle that these responsibilities should be temporarily limited. It is good to be able to walk away from public affairs, to exercise good accountability, and to be rewarded or punished for governance.

References

Cora, José de (1991), Manual del perfecto político, Madrid: Espasa Calpe.

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Juan de Mariana, on tyranny

Oscar Pérez de la Fuente

Universidad Carlos III de Madrid

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3708-846X

Abstract

This article examines Juan de Mariana’s political thought on tyranny through his major work Del Rey y de la institución real. It analyses Mariana’s contrast between the virtuous king, who governs for the common good under the law, and the tyrant, who rules for private interest through greed, cruelty, and arbitrariness. The text also addresses Mariana’s controversial defence of tyrannicide and situates it within broader debates on resistance to illegitimate authority, the limits of political obedience, and the preservation of the commonwealth. Finally, the article connects Mariana’s ideas with later traditions of political thought, including Aquinas’s doctrine of the lesser evil, reason of state, social contract theory, and the modern rule of law.

Keywords: tyranny, monarchy, accountability, right to resistance

Juan de Mariana was a prominent theologian, historian, philologist and political philosopher Spanish Jesuit. He was born in Talavera de la Reina (Toledo) in 1536 and died in Toledo in 1624. He studied at various European universities, most notably the University of Alcalá, where he also taught. He became famous with his work “Historia General de España“.

In Political Philosophy, his work Del Rey y de la institución real (2018), of which Rogelio Fernández Delgado, on the website of theSpanish Royal Academy of History, points out that “not only it is considered to be the most notable and daring work of political literature written in Spain, but it has even been compared to El Quijote, in the sense that what Cervantes’ book represents for literature, Juan de Mariana’s work represents for Political Theory.”

The analysis in this post, in the style of Estrategia Minerva, will focus on this work of Political Philosophy by Juan de Mariana, on his characterisation of tyranny and on the controversial question of tyrannicide. This would be the flip side of the question of what virtues a good ruler should have, a classic topic.

Juan de Mariana starts from the famous typology of forms of government, formulated by Aristotle, where monarchy is the government of one in favour of the common good and tyranny, for one’s own benefit, and compares them as follows:

“Even if he starts with good intentions, he falls into all kinds of vices, especially greed, ferocity and avarice. It is proper for a good king to defend innocence, to repress wickedness, to save those in danger, to procure for the republic happiness and every kind of good; But not the tyrannus, who makes his greatest power consist in being able to indulge unrestrainedly in his passions, who thinks no wickedness unseemly, who commits all manner of crimes, destroys the estates of the mighty, violates chastity, kills the good, and comes to the end of his life without there being a single vile deed to which he has not given himself up. He is, moreover, the king who is humble, approachable, accessible, a friend to live under the same right  as his fellow-citizens; and the tyrant, distrustful, medicious, a friend to terrify by the apparatus of his force and his fortune, by the severity of his customs, by the cruelty of the judgments passed by his bloody tribunals” (Mariana, 2018, 76, chap. V).

The tyrant commits vile deeds, evils and crimes and falls into greed, ferocity and avarice. A good king defends innocence, happiness, stands against evil and danger, is humble, approachable, and seeks to be governed by the same rules as his fellow citizens.

Although there are certain anachronisms, it is worth considering whether some of today’s rulers fall more under this tyrannical profile or that of the kindly king.

Specifically, on the polemic of tyrannicide, Juan de Mariana states that “not because the citizens cannot gather together should they lack the natural ardour to overthrow serfdom, to avenge the manifest and intolerable evils of the prince, or to repress the attempts that tend to the ruin of the people, such as that of upsetting the religions of the homeland and calling to the kingdom our enemies. I can never believe that he was wrong who, seconding public desires, has in such circumstances made an attempt on the life of his prince” (Mariana, 2018, 91, chap. VI)..

In this paragraph, tyrannicide is justified. There is a tradition in the History of Ideas in this sense, but here it is made explicit. It can be argued that the murder of a person cannot be the solution to political problems, which have other, more civilised channels and do not require such sacrifices of human life. What also underlies here is the notion of raison d’état, defended by Machiavelli, where illegal or immoral actions would be justified if the state is in danger.  

It is relevant because Thomas Aquinas refers to the fight against tyranny, from more moderate premises and assuming the principle of the lesser evil. Thus, he states: “the tyrannical regime is not just, since it is not ordered to the common good, but to the particular good of the one who holds power, as Aristotle proves in Politics. Hence, the disturbance of this regime does not have the character of sedition, unless the regime of the tyrant is altered in such a disorderly way that the tyrannised multitude suffers greater detriment than with the tyrannical regime” (Tomás de Aquino, Suma Teológica II-II, c. 43).

Juan de Mariana insists on the lawfulness of the right of resistance to illegitimate authority, in these terms: “but when there is no more hope, when the sanctity of religion and the health of the kingdom are already endangered, who will be so lacking in reason as not to confess that it is lawful to shake tyranny with the force of law, with the laws, with arms?” (Mariana, 2018, 94, cap. VI).

This connects with ideas of the Enlightenment thinkers, where power is based on a covenant and if one party – the ruler – does not comply with it, the other party – the people – has the right to resist that ruler and his rules. In Locke‘s formulation, the legitimacy of power is based on the tacit consent of the people. These theories of the Social Contract are conditional, the agreement must be fulfilled to achieve legitimacy. Otherwise, it would be justified to react to the injustice of tyranny.

On the duty of the ruler to obey the law, Juan de Mariana states “let the prince finally know that the sacrosanct laws on which public health rests will only be stable if he himself sanctions them by his example. He must lead such a life that he never allows himself or anyone else to have more power than the laws, for since they contain what is lawful, it is indispensable that he who violates them should depart from probity and justice, which is granted to no one, least of all to the king, who must use all his power to sanction equity and to vindicate crime, always having in both things his understanding and his care” (Mariana, 2018, 255, cap. IX).

The ruler must comply with the laws he promotes. Later, this is considered one of the key principles on which the Rule of Law is based. Beyond the merely legal sphere, the current demands of accountability require those in power exemplarity—they are references or role models for society—and coherence—harmony between public statements and private behaviours-.

References

Mariana, Juan de (2018), Del Rey y de la institución real, Barcelona: Ediciones Deusto.

Fernández Delgado, Rogelio (n.d.), “Juan de Mariana”, Real Academia de la Historia. Available: https://dbe.rah.es/biografias/11507/juan-de-mariana (last visit: 26 May 2026).

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Machiavelic ethical model

Oscar Pérez de la Fuente

Universidad Carlos III de Madrid

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3708-846X

Abstract

This article examines the Machiavelic ethical model as an extreme and distinctive version of consequentialism inspired by Niccolò Machiavelli’s political thought. It argues that this model places success at the centre of moral evaluation and gives priority to ends over means, while not necessarily endorsing immorality in every case. Drawing mainly on The Prince, the analysis revisits the widespread association between Machiavelli and the idea that the end justifies the means, clarifying that this formula does not literally appear in his work, even though related arguments can be found in his reflections on power, prudence, and political survival. The text explores Machiavelli’s treatment of promises, truthfulness, and strategic deception, identifying the circumstances in which breaking one’s word may be considered advisable within this framework. It also contrasts the Machiavelic perspective with deontological ethics and reviews competing interpretations of Machiavelli, from the image of an immoral thinker to that of a republican theorist and founder of political science. Finally, the article considers the strategic implications of confronting Machiavelic actors in public and institutional life.

Keywords:olitical realism, machiavelism, the ens justifes the means

There is a new approach that is called the Machiavelic ethical model, which is an extreme and particular version of the consequentialist ethical model. It is inspired by the work of Niccolò Machiavelli . It is curious how a term Machiavellianism has emerged from a thinker that the Spanish Royal Academy of Language defined as “a way of proceeding with cunning, duplicity and perfidy”. Machiavelli has not had much good press, but the Machiavelic ethical method is more common than it seems.

Machiavelli’s best-known motto is the end justifies the means but this attribution is not entirely accurate because the phrase does not appear in any of his works. However, in The Prince , he states:”(…) :”(…) When they are weighing up what someone has achieved -and this is particularly true with rulers, who can be held to account- people look at the end result. So if a leader does what it takes to win power and keep it, his method will always be reckoned honourable and widely praised”. (Machiavelli, 2009, 71, chap. XVIII).

The Machiavelic ethical model affirms, as a fundamental rule, the desire for success and the ends chosen are more important than the means. However, that does not mean that behaviour must automatically be immoral. The Prince is a treatise on human nature, from which we can learn that the prince if he wants to achieve success, must be duplicitous and cover his tracks.

This may involve an apparent adherence to values, but ultimately being pragmatic. In one of the best-known passages, Machiavelli asks “in what way a prince must keep his word” and offers an answer that is in his line: “”A sensible leader cannot and must not keep his word it by doing so he puts himself at risk, and if the reasons that made him give his word in the first place and no longer valid. If all men were good, this would be bad advice, but since they are a sad lot and won’t be keeping their promises to you, you hardly need to keep yours to them. Anyway, a ruler will never be short of good reasons to explain away a broken promise” (Machiavelli, 2009, 68-69, chap. XVIII).

From the deontological ethical model, it could be argued that promises should always be kept and the truth always told. If we analyse the scenario according to Machiavelli, there are three circumstances that make it advisable not to keep a promise: a) The consequences of the promise have changed over time; b) The reasons for the promise no longer exist; c) The other person will not keep their word with you. The second reason is the strongest and could be invoked if the reasons for the promise really no longer exist. The first should have been adequately foreseen and for the third, many people will honour their promises.

There are several interpretations of Machiavelli. The Machiavelic version of Machiavelli sees Machiavelli as a diabolical, immoral, anti-Christian author who justifies any action to achieve his goals. The republican version of Machiavelli states that he was a patriot, that he wanted to defend the State above all and that he considered that the Prince should have civil and political virtues and not religious ones.

For this reason, some consider him to be the founder of Political Science, because he considers that politics has its own rules distinct from ethics and religion.

From a strategic point of view, Machiavelli offers interesting readings, doubts and reflections. For example, we find this interesting advice for strategists: “you have to play the fox to set the snares and the lion to scare off the wolves” (Machiavelli, 2009, 69, chap.  XVIII). But perhaps the key element in strategy is how to act in the face of someone Machiavelic.The first and most difficult task will be to identify him because, as Aranguren states, “the first thing to do is to identify him.  a self-confessed Machiavellianism would be annulled as such: to be effective it has to be hypocritical and pay tribute to virtue” (Aranguren, 1999, 75-76).

The strategist must be vigilant and, for example, establish mechanisms for impartial verification of the different operations. Someone seeking success, feigning conformity, does not keep their word. Strategies must be developed to prevent such situations. Machiavelli points out that if we learn from the qualities of the fox and the lion, we can get closer to success.

References

Aranguren, José Luis L. (1999), Ética y política, Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva.

Machiavelli, Nicolò (2009), The Prince, London, New York: Penguin Books, trans: Tim Parks.

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Kissinger, the global negotiator

Oscar Pérez de la Fuente

Universidad Carlos III de Madrid

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3708-846X

Abstract

This article examines Henry Kissinger’s distinctive contribution to the theory and practice of negotiation, drawing especially on the analysis developed by James K. Sebenius, R. Nicholas Burns, and Robert H. Mnookin in Kissinger, the Negotiator. It argues that Kissinger stands out not merely as a diplomat of exceptional influence, but as a negotiator able to connect immediate bargaining with wider strategic objectives. His method combines realism, adaptability, and a strong capacity to reshape the structure of negotiations in complex, multi-party settings. The article emphasizes Kissinger’s criticism of conventional bargaining based on gradual concessions, highlighting instead his preference for bold initial positions, clarity about underlying interests, and the cultivation of credibility, reliability, and long-term trust. Particular attention is given to two central devices in his negotiating practice: constructive ambiguity and tacit agreements. These mechanisms allowed opposing sides to preserve face, avoid political costs, and move beyond deadlock without necessarily eliminating substantive disagreement. Through these insights, the article presents Kissinger as a global negotiator whose legacy offers enduring lessons for diplomacy, conflict resolution, and high-level dealmaking.

Keywords: diplomacy, constructive ambiguity, tacit agreements

From John F. Kennedy until recently, every U.S. president has sought the counsel of Henry Kissinger (1923-2023), along with CEOs and political leaders from around the world. His views on foreign policy, State affairs, and world order have been much discussed. However, his remarkable world record as a negotiator has largely gone unnoticed, leading James K. Sebenius, Nicholas Burns and Robert H. Mnookin to author the book Kissinger, the Negotiator. Lessons from Dealmaking at the Highest Level (2018). Sebenius is a professor with the Harvard Negotiation Project and wrote the book 3-d Negotiation: Powerful Tools to Change the Game in Your Most Important Deals (2006).

Some negotiators prefer strategy and the big picture, whilst others focus on the emotion and empathy, and specific points. Few combine both positions. Sebenius et al. examine Kissinger’s uniquely developed ability to focus on a broader perspective. They characterise his approach as strategic, realistic, prone to change the game, and agile in multi-party situations.

Many people believe that negotiation is simply bargaining; it is not unlike a bazaar, where one person makes an extremely high offer and the counterpart keeps offering the same. Concessions are made gradually with the goal of bringing the parties to a final agreement. Kissinger characterised and criticised this standard approach to negotiation early in his career and later this was reflected in his negotiations: There is no point in moderating offers if the agreement is normally between two starting positions. Effective negotiation would propose a much more radical starting point than one is willing to accept. The more outrageous the initial offer, the clearer the idea of what one “really” wants to be considered a compromise (Kissinger, 2018, 223).

Kissinger advised convincing the other side of one’s own underlying objectives and interests rather than exaggerating tactics. He argued that failure to do so hinders effective negotiation. In general negotiations, Kissinger expressed, “I made a considerable effort to leave no doubt of our fundamental approach. Only romantics think they can prevail in a negotiation by trickery: only pedants believe in the advantage of obfuscation. In a society of sovereign states, an agreement will only hold if all parties consider it in their interest. They must have  a sense of participation in the result. The art of diplomacy is not to outsmart the other side, but to convince it either of  common interest or of penalties if an impasse continues”. He continued “The wise diplomat understands that he cannot afford to trick his opponent; in the long run a reputation for reliability and fairness is an important assets. The same negotiators meet over and over again: their ability to deal with one another is undermined if a diplomat acquires a reputation of evasion or duplicity” (Kissinger, 2018, 224). 

It is evident that the realist in Henry Kissinger values actions and results rather than words: “Statesmen value the steadiness and reliability in a partner, not the restless quest for even-new magic formulas” (Kissinger, 2018, 226).  This brings us closer to a virtuous model, to maintain stable relationships over time, based on trust and reputation, than the Machiavellian model of short-term results.

Analysing the negotiations in which Kissinger was involved, the best contribution to more than 130 meetings between China and the United States in Warsaw was when an ambiguous and elegant formula that both parties could live with was achieved. This enabled the United States and China to cooperate on many other relevant issues. The crucial sentence is as follows:

“The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either sides of the Taiwan Straits maintain that there is but one China. The United States Government does not challenge that position”(Kissinger, 2018, 227).

Just words? Hardly. There have been countless examples of such creatively ambiguous formulations of Kissinger negotiations. The common denominator is always face-saving formulations, but they result in both sides declaring victory and being able to move forward from previous deadlocks.

In some cases, however, no word of the agreement may be too costly to pronounce or formalise in writing. These are tacit agreements. However, the constructively proposed agreement may be unacceptable if enforced.  

These tacit agreements, in general, can be useful when there is a group of stakeholders, or a powerful audience, internal or external, that opposes a formal agreement and can impose costs on a negotiator who agrees to them.  Without many of the possible costs, a tacit agreement can be based on the desired content, irrespective of its form.

Constructive ambiguity and tacit agreements have a privileged place in the tactical toolkit of Kissinger, the global negotiator.

References

Lax, David A., Sebenius, James K. (2006), 3-D Negotiation. Powerful Tools to Change the Game in Your Most Important Deals, Boston, Mass.: Harvard Business School Press.

Sebenius, James K. (2018), Kissinger, the Negotiator. Lessons from Dealmaking at the Highest Level, London, New York: Harper.