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Francisco Suárez, on the just cause 

Oscar Pérez de la Fuente

Carlos III University of Madrid

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3708-846X

Abstract

This paper presents an interpretation of Francisco Suárez’s theory of just war and its relevance to understanding contemporary conflicts. Following a brief biographical and intellectual overview of the author, the text reconstructs the core of his argument: no war can be deemed just without a legitimate cause that is necessary and based on a grave wrong already committed which cannot be redressed by other means. From there, it examines the principle of proportionality—the cause must be grave and proportionate to the foreseeable damages of war—and distinguishes three classical just causes of war: the unjust appropriation of property or territories, the denial of common rights under the ius gentium(transit and trade), and grave injury to honour. The analysis translates these scenarios into contemporary terms (territorial disputes, the protection of human rights and the limits of reputation as a cause for war) and discusses the role of war as a last resort in the face of institutional and diplomatic alternatives. Finally, it addresses the possibility of armed resistance against a tyrant, linking it to debates on the legitimacy of origin and exercise, and concludes with a warning about political polarisation and the need for strategies to prevent the escalation of conflict.

Keywords: just war, proportionality, diplomacy, tyrannicide

ISSN: 3127-3408

https://doi.org/10.67647/minervastrategy.2025.06

Francisco Suárez is the greatest exponent of 16th-century scholastic philosophy in Spain. He was born in Granada in 1548 and died in Lisbon in 1617. He was a philosopher, theologian, and jurist. He was Jesuit (1564) and he studied in Salamanca and taught theology in Segovia (1571), Valladolid (1576), and Rome (1580). He was Professor of Theology at the Universities of Alcalá (1585) and Salamanca (1593), and in 1597 he went to Coimbra, where he had to take another doctorate in Theology to be able to teach. His works include Metaphysical Disputations/ Disputaciones metafísicas, which was very successful in his time, based on classical and scholastic authors.

This will be followed by a discussion of Francisco Suárez’s just cause theory of war, as reflected in his essay War, Intervention, International Peace/Guerra, intervención, paz internacional (1956), in the style of Estrategia Minerva Blog. 

What are the just titles of war according to natural reason?

“No war can be just unless there is a legitimate and necessary cause. The conclusion is certain and evident. Now this just cause and sufficient reason for war is a grave injury already consummated which can neither be avenged nor otherwise redressed” (Suárez, 1956, 75).

Bobbio recalls that the positions that tend to justify all wars are called warmongering; those that tend not to justify any are included in active pacifism and the intermediate ones that approve some and condemn others are just war theories. Precisely, Suárez’s approach is to specify the assumptions under which a war would be just.  

Bobbio affirms two fundamental principles: “the certainty of the criteria for judgement and the impartiality of the judge”.  He concludes that neither of these two principles is respected in the declaration and conduct of a war (Bobbio, 1999, 52).

Francisco Suárez’s doctrine of war is that it is only just as an ultima ratio, when other means of compensation, redress, or restoration are not available in cases of of grave injury. It is interesting to think that Clausewitz, the great theorist of strategy, said that “war is a mere continuation of politics by other means”. Strategy and negotiation must be elements that minimise the negative consequences of war. In other words, war, as a bad outcome, can help the parties to move strategically to avoid it.

“Not just any cause is sufficient to justify war, but only that cause which is grave and proportionate to the damage of war. It would be against natural reason to inflict very serious damage for a slight injury. Nor can the judge punish all kinds of offences, but only those which offend against the general peace and the good of the State” (Suárez, 1965, 76).

It is associated with prudence, and a principle of justice, that the just cause of war must be serious and proportionate to its damage. However, this is not always the case.  

“Various kinds of injury are the cause of just war; these may be grouped into three chapters. First, when the prince seizes the property of another and refuses to restore it. Second, when without reasonable cause he denies the common rights of peoples, such as the right of transit on public roads and international trade. Thirdly, a grave injury to reputation or honour. These injuries are also sufficient cause for war when they are inflicted on the sovereign himself or on his subjects, for the prince is the guardian of the State and of the citizens” (Suárez, 1956, 77). .

Translated into more contemporary language, the first scenario would be that of territorial disputes between two States over a particular territory, where issues such as sovereignty, territorial integrity, etc. are mixed. This is a classic source of conflict, which can be handled diplomatically, although it sometimes ends in war.

The second scenario would be a serious violation of human rights, here there would be questions such as whether the issue of interference in internal affairs, whether democracy can be exported or universal jurisdiction of human rights. It could be argued that there are universal, regional and state systems to protect human rights, with many mechanisms for conflict resolution, although in the end a defensive war to protect human rights may be justified.

The third case of serious injury to reputation or honour would not currently be grounds for just cause for war, as there are other mechanisms for protection.  Instead, social networks have popularised the cancel culture, where people are denigrated for their actions or opinions considered politically incorrect.

“The war of the people against their sovereign is not intrinsically evil, even if it is aggressive; the other conditions of just war must, however, be fulfilled for it to be honest. This conclusion is only reached if the prince is a tyrant. It can happen in two ways: first, if the prince is a tyrant in terms of his dominion and power; second, if he is a tyrant only in terms of the way he rules.” (Suárez, 1956, 126).

This distinction of Suárez would be a precedent for the notions established by Max Weber as legitimacy in origin and legitimacy in exercise when dealing with the analysis of power. These words on the conditions of just war against the tyrant follow the medieval tradition of justifying tyrannicide, but give broader coverage by including this struggle within the types of just war.

In the first place, the tyrant is, Suárez clarifies, the one “who obtains the government of a State against the Law, especially if he rules it without justice and according to his will”. Secondly, the tyrant is he “who abuses his power, superiority or force in any concept or matter, or who simply imposes that power and superiority to an extraordinary degree”.

Just war would be a mechanism for protection against the abuse of power. Is war the best mechanism for that purpose? Constitutionalism had that very aim, which looks to counterbalance the different powers. However, there are conceptions of the separation of powers in democratic societies about who should have the last word on the most controversial issues and about whether all issues can be put to a vote. 

As Foucault put it, “politics is the continuation of war by other means”. The growing political polarisation is worrying. Carl Schmitt argued that politics is about benefiting your friends and prejudicing your enemies. This is known as the friend/enemy dialectic. Considering political adversaries as enemies is the first step to strong polarisation, civil conflict, and disunity. Let us hope that politics will find the best means and strategies for a better future and few, if any, just cause for war.

References

Bobbio, Norberto (1999), El problema de la guerra y las vías de la paz, Barcelona: Altaya, trad. Jorge Binaghi.

Suárez, Francisco (1956), Guerra, intervención y paz internacional, Madrid: Espasa Calpe.

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Thucydides, the negotiating power in the Melian dialogue

Oscar Pérez de la Fuente

Carlos III University of Madrid

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3708-846X

Abstract

This paper examines the Melian Dialogue in Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War through the lens of negotiation theory and bargaining power. It argues that the exchange between Athens and Melos is not only a classic statement of political realism, but also a revealing case study in asymmetric negotiation. The Athenians frame the discussion in terms of power, necessity, and strategic credibility, rejecting appeals to justice except among equals. The Melians, by contrast, defend neutrality, hope, and the possibility of external support, especially from Sparta. Using the concept of BATNA (Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement), the paper analyzes how each side assesses its alternatives and how those assessments shape the negotiation. Athens possesses a stronger BATNA because it can impose its will through military force, while Melos depends on uncertain alliances and resistance. Nevertheless, the paper contends that Athenian strategy is limited, since coercion secures submission but not durable cooperation. The conclusion is that the dialogue illustrates a central lesson of negotiation: bargaining power depends on credible alternatives, but long-term outcomes are often improved by persuasion, legitimacy, and principled agreement rather than force alone.

Keywords: bargaining power, force, neutrality, principled negotiation, BATNA

ISSN: 3127-3408

https://doi.org/10.67647/minervastrategy.2025.05

In the work History of the Peloponnesian War (2013), Thucydides narrates the conflicts that took place in Ancient Greece between the polis of Athens and Sparta. He highlights the famous Melian dialogue in which the Athenians -who held an empire- and the Melians -who inhabited the island of Milos- discuss their future relationship.

This dialogue is characterised by the Melians appealing to arguments of justice, equality and neutrality, while the Athenians use the threat of force and unequal resources. It would be an example, among the classics, of what is called real politik.

The Athenians distinguish between arguments of justice -between equals – and appeals to force -between the powerful and the weak-. The Athenians assert that “justice prevails in the human race in circumstances of equality, and that the powerful do what their strength permits and the weak yield to them” (Tucídides, 2013, 388, V.89). So  according to the Athenians, the Melians must yield.

The Melians attempt to deliberate, advocating a position of neutrality between Sparta and Athens, but offering friendship. The Melians argue “would you not agree that, remaining neutral, we should be your friends rather than your enemies, but not allies of either side” (Tucídides, 2013, 389, V.94).

In a typical response of political realism, the Athenians set their priorities in the relationship with the Melians: 1.- Hatred/Vassalage; 2.- Enmity; 3.- Friendship/Neutrality. Allowing an island to be neutral and friendly is a bad example for the interests of the Athenian empire. From this perspective, the Athenians assert that “your enmity does not harm us so much as your friendship, which is to our vassals a manifest sign of our weakness, while your hatred is a sign of our power” (Tucídides, 2013, 389, V.95).

The Athenians’ argument is an appeal to power and force. They do not try to convince the Melians of the advantages of accepting their position. Rather, they make a serious threat, which given the context must have been credible. The Athenians argue that “this is not a contest for you to measure courage on equal terms so as not to suffer dishonour, but the deliberation is rather about your salvation, which consists in not standing up to those who are much stronger” (Tucídides, 2013, 390, V.101).

The response of the Melians is to relativise the power of the other side and give more value to the alternative of a confrontation than that of surrender. The Melians assert that “wars present vicissitudes that are more evenly shared than the disproportion of forces would suggest. For us to give in immediately holds out no hope, whereas by giving ourselves up to action there is still hope of standing” (Tucídides, 2013, 390, V.102).

This Melian dialogue allows us to address the question of bargaining power. In particular, according to the terminology of the Harvard Method in Getting to yes, from Fisher and Ury, on BATNA. The key element of negotiations is what is the Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement –BATNA-. What is relevant is to identify this BATNA and use it as the yardstick to measure any possible negotiating outcome.

The BATNA marks the worst acceptable outcome of the negotiation. The red line where it is better not to give in. The key is that the better BATNA you have, the more bargaining power a party has. If a party has a strong alternative, it will be able to make greater demands of the other party.

I will now analyse the Melian Dialogue from the perspective of the bargaining power of the parties. The Athenians consider their BATNA to be high because they are powerful and strong. This means that they can conquer the city despite the will of the Melians. The alternatives are the surrender of the Melians or their military defeat.

The Melians try to deliberate and convince the Athenians in terms of equality and justice. Their BATNA is an alliance with Sparta to protect them from Athens. Their alternatives are a lonely and heroic war, an alliance with Sparta, surrender to Athens or compromise with Athens.

From the point of view of strategy, the Athenians failed because they only threatened with force, but did not try to convince the other side of the advantages of being allies. They sought a relationship of vassalage and wanted to impose it through force. The negotiation was about whether they would have to fight to achieve their goals. From today’s perspective, it would be better to have allies than forced vassals.

From the Melians’ point of view, the alternative to negotiating is to ally more strongly with Sparta. The problem with this negotiation is that the alternatives they propose are voluntary surrender or military defeat. These terms are unacceptable to the Melians. The way to improve BATNA is to consolidate and make credible the possible alternatives, particularly the alliance with Sparta. It should also try to deliberate and convince the other side on a principled basis.

Thucydides himself recounts that Athens finally carried out its threat. From this perspective, “the Athenians executed all the Melians of virile age who fell into their hands and reduced the children and women to slavery” ((Tucídides, 2013, 394, V.116). The Melians dialogue does not have a happy ending. The powerful wins by making good on their threat to use force. The lesson, from strategy, is that negotiations should enable parties to improve their bargaining power and better results be obtained, in the long run, from principled and convincing arguments.

References

Tucídides (2013) Historia de la Guerra del Peloponeso, Barcelona: Crítica, trans. Francisco Rodríguez Adrados.

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Breviary for politicians

Oscar Pérez de la Fuente

Carlos III University of Madrid

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3708-846X

Abstract

The text presents and discusses the Breviary for Politicians (1684), attributed to Cardinal Jules Mazarin or his circle. Mazarin (1602–1661), an Italian cardinal in the service of the French monarchy, played a decisive role in the early years of Louis XIV’s reign and helped lay the foundations of French power in Europe. The text also highlights the influence of Richelieu, who promoted his career, as well as the underlying themes of political realism and pragmatism reminiscent of Machiavelli. The author announces that this will be followed by an edition by María Blanco (La política del disimulo), which provides the historical context for the work.

Strategic lessons are drawn from these quotations: speak with caution and avoid over-confidence, as rumours can destroy one’s reputation; feign modesty, kindness and equanimity to gain esteem; exercise responsibilities with moderation and a spirit of public service; and avoid intervening in polarised disputes if one cannot prove one is in the right. In one’s dealings with others, it is recommended not to make promises lightly, to be difficult to deceive and to remain consistent, although the commentator notes that it may be wise to rectify one’s course. To avoid hatred, he advises acting with grace in the face of dismissal and not harbouring grudges. Finally, he suggests listening, reflecting, allowing time to resolve complex matters and not meddling in other people’s problems—advice that is also applicable outside the realm of politics.

Keywords: deception, strategy, Machiavellianism, prudence, pretence

ISSN: 3127-3408

https://doi.org/10.67647/minervastrategy.2025.04

We continue with the series dedicated to handbooks. This time it is dedicated to Breviary for politicians, published in 1684, attributed to Cardinal Mazarin, or someone close to him. Jules Mazarin was born in Pescina, Italy, in 1602 and died in Vincennes, France, in 1661. He was an Italian cardinal, without being ordained a priest, in the service of the French monarchy who exercised power in the early years of the reign of Louis XIV. He was a politician, diplomat, military officer, and adviser to Louis XIV, and he was responsible – as Prime Minister – for laying the foundations for making France a great European power.

For those interested in politics and strategy, and somewhat mythomaniacal, it is noteworthy that the historical figure who supported and turned Cardinal Mazarin into a statesman was the famous Cardinal Richelieu, whom he replaced in office. Both are presumed to be clever and astute, as well as efficient and reasonable in leading government. Machiavelli‘s pragmatic approach and political realism influence this Breviary for politicians.

The following is a commentary on passages from Cardinal Mazarin’s Breviary for politicians in the style of Estrategia Minerva Blog. It is worth noting that it follows the edition of this work by María Blanco entitled La política del disimulo. Cómo descubrir las artimañas del poder con Mazarino (2024), of Editorial Rosamerón, which includes the essay of the editor.

Gaining esteem and fame 

“Never forget that anyone is liable to spread rumours about you if you have behaved – or spoken – too freely or rudely in his presence. In this matter, do not trust servants or pages. People look at an isolated incident to generalise; they take advantage of it to spread your bad reputation” (Cardenal Mazarino, 2024, 69). 

It is excellent advice to be cautious when speaking and be wary of who might be listening. Rumour-mongers/moral lordscan use past confidences to destroy your image. Your public reputation may be based on a hoax a thousand times repeated. According to the Spanish Royal Academy of Language, a hoax is “false news propagated for some purpose”. It is better to be prudent and leave hoaxes and rumours to others.

“Feign modesty, candour, kindness and perfect equanimity. Be grateful, congratulate, show yourself available, even to those who have done nothing to deserve it” (Cardenal Mazarino,2024, 71).

If you ever have a responsibility, exercising it with moderation, equanimity, and a willingness to serve the public is essential. Your character must adapt to the circumstances and cultivate, in addition to prudence, the Aristotelian virtues of temperance, justice and courage.

“Refrain from intervening in discussions where opposing points of view clash unless you are absolutely sure you are right and can prove it” (Cardenal Mazarino, 2024, 73). 

There are two pernicious tendencies: civil war/factionalism that seeks to divide society into irreconcilable camps and want-to-be-right-about-everything. If one is in a position of authority, it is crucial to make dissent and unity compatible.

Gaining each other’s favour 

“Avoid easy promises and granting too many permissions. Be difficult to deceive and circumspect in giving your opinion. But once given, do not change it” (Cardenal Mazarino,2024, 74).

The ideal is to become reliable, credible, and a source of legitimacy. This is a departure from the Machiavellian approach, where the prince would always find an excuse not to keep his word. I disagree with Mazarin that one should never change one’s mind. In some situations, it is wise to rectify.

Avoid hatred 

“If you are relieved of your duties at any time, publicly express your satisfaction, even your gratitude to those who have given you back the peace and quiet to which you aspired so much. Find the most convincing arguments for those listening to you: in this way, you will avoid adding sarcasm to disgrace” (Cardenal Mazarino, 2024, 89).

It is relevant in this life to do things with elegance and fair play, even if it is not fashionable or in style. If your public responsibilities end, it is good to look to the future and not to hold grudges from the past. There should be an art and science for resigning and leaving office, which should include, in addition to good manners, always avoiding criticism, especially of superiors, and easing the way for those to come.

Acquiring wisdom 

“In most circumstances, it is better to stand still, to listen to the advice of another and to ponder it long and hard. Do not overestimate the extent of either your words or your actions, and do not take up matters that are useless to you now or later. Do not meddle in other people’s affairs”  (Cardenal Mazarino, 2024, 97).  

A Spanish politician had responsibilities at different levels of public administration. He made his strategy for handling issues, especially the most complex ones, famous, and his secret was to let time pass. As incredible as it may seem, many issues have been found to be solved in this way before being considered again. 

Another great piece of advice is not to interfere in other people’s affairs because there is a very Latin tendency to solve other people’s lives based on one’s own prejudices and stereotypes. 

From the Baroque period, based on the experience of some of the most powerful politicians of the time, Cardinal Mazarin advises, in summary: to be prudent in speaking and not to trust who might be listening; to feign modesty, kindness and equanimity; to exercise any responsibility with moderation and a desire for public service; and to refrain from intervening in discussions with opposing points of view unless one is sure of being right and can prove it. Finally, he recommends listening to the advice of others, meditating long and hard, and not meddling in other people’s affairs.

The best reading that can be made of Mazarin’s approach is that it may be suitable for politics as well as for other areas of life.

References

Cardenal Mazarino (2024), “Breviario para políticos” in Blanco, María, La política de disimulo. Cómo descubrir las artimañas del poder con Mazarino, España: Rosamerón, trans. Alberto Torrego.

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Why are there no nuclear wars?

Oscar Pérez de la Fuente

Carlos III University of Madrid

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3708-846X

Abstract

This article examines why nuclear wars have not occurred by drawing on Thomas Schelling’s strategic thought as interpreted by Robert Ayson. It argues that the nuclear age is best understood through the concepts of stability and the balance of deterrence, which together explain why nuclear-armed states are strongly discouraged from initiating conflict. The core claim is that deterrence works when the expected costs of aggression exceed its possible gains, especially under conditions where both sides retain the capacity to retaliate after an attack. In this context, mutual fear of retaliation functions as a stabilizing mechanism, since any first strike would likely provoke a devastating counterattack and generate unacceptable losses for all parties. The article also stresses that nuclear equilibrium is fragile and depends on preventing surprise attacks, misperceptions, and accidental escalation. By linking Schelling’s approach to broader strategic reasoning, the paper shows that the avoidance of nuclear war is not simply a matter of good fortune, but the result of a structure of incentives and disincentives shaped by credible deterrence. It concludes that negotiation and arms control remain essential complements to strategic stability.

Keywords: diplomacy, deterrence, prisoner’s dilemma, equilibrium, stability, positions

ISSN: 3127-3408

https://doi.org/10.67647/minervastrategy.2025.03

It is not a frequently asked question, and we certainly hope they never happen, but you have not asked yourselves why nuclear wars have not happened? The answer to this disturbing question can be found in Robert Ayson’s book, Thomas Schelling and the Nuclear Age (2004), which explains the ideas of Thomas Schelling, winner of the 2005 Nobel Prize in Economics, who has made significant contributions to the world of strategy and international relations.

In several of his works, Schelling analyses the issue of nuclear armament from the perspective of strategy. His approach is to make international relations, especially military decisions, eminently strategic territory. Lessons can be learned from his contributions for other strategy development and success areas.

According to Schelling, the key concepts to explain the nuclear age are stability and balance of deterrence (Ayson, 2004, 72). The strategy must be aimed at seeking stability between the parties. This is achieved by the balance of deterrence, which is based on two elements: a) a situation in which the disincentives outweigh the incentives for both sides to initiate war; b) it is “stable” when it is reasonably secure against shocks, alarms and disturbances.

Therefore, initiating conflict must be discouraged and unexpected events, such as a surprise attack, must be prevented. Schelling’s lesson in the nuclear age is that the respective incentives and disincentives condition stability.

In his explanation of nuclear strategy, Ayson alludes to Brodie’s work, which provides the key: “Precisely because there is no defence against the atomic bomb, any party, possessing atomic weapons, threatened with attack, has the ability to impose heavy costs on the attacker” (Ayson, 2004, 1997, 58).

The state of equilibrium is produced by ‘mutual fear of retaliation’. The costs of all kinds involved in the use of nuclear weapons discourage an attack for fear of a response, in the form of a counterattack, from the other side.

Equilibrium occurs because both sides have disincentives to initiate an attack, and the costs of taking one on by the other side are very high. Special care must be taken to avoid surprise attacks and unexpected situations that can change the equilibrium.

It can be argued that the equilibrium in the nuclear age has aspects that resemble the prisoner’s dilemma. Thus, betrayals by the players have a very high cost for both sides because there is a response rule in the form of a nuclear counterattack. As Poundstone explains, nuclear war would be a case of simultaneous and mutual bombing. As early as 1945, Senator Brien McMahon said: “If there is a nuclear Pearl Harbor, there will not be a jury of statesmen left to study the case” (Poundstone, 1995, 215).

Schelling’s approach focuses on the role of stability and negotiation in the nuclear age. We could draw some conclusions from his approach: the best strategy is the one that seeks stability, which is guaranteed if the disincentives to conflict are greater than the incentives; the balance of deterrence is produced by fear of retaliation by the other side, which comes at significant cost; the best alternative to an endless arms race is negotiation.

In other words, stability is ensured by the parties’ disincentives to conflict and fear of retaliation, which entails high costs. By discouraging conflict, equilibrium is achieved.

References

Ayson, Robert (2004), Thomas Schelling and the Nuclear Age. Strategy as a Social Science, New York, London: Routledge.

Poundstone, William (1995), El dilema del prisionero,. John Von Neumann, la teoría de juegos y la bomba,  Madrid: Alianza, trad. Daniel Manzanarez Fourcade. (original title: The Prisoner’s Dilemma. John Von Neumann, game theory and Puzzle of  the bomb).

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Montaigne, on barbarism

Oscar Pérez de la Fuente

Carlos III University of Madrid

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3708-846X

Abstract

This text offers an annotated reading of passages from Michel de Montaigne’s Essays focusing on the notion of ‘barbarism’ and its philosophical and political-moral implications. Drawing on passages concerning customs, ethnocentrism and the comparison between “our own people” and “the others”, the commentary highlights Montaigne’s critique of localist prejudice and the uncritical identification of truth, reason and the customs of one’s own country. The analysis distinguishes between social morality and critical morality, and situates the discussion within the debate between relativism and universalism, suggesting that Montaigne’s irony and vital scepticism do not lead to strong relativism, but rather to a call for evaluation criteria more demanding than mere tradition. The text also revisits the author’s provocative inversion—the possibility that the West might exceed in barbarity those it calls barbarians—and connects it with modern historical examples (Auschwitz, the Gulag, Hiroshima and Nagasaki) to demonstrate the concept’s contemporary relevance. Overall, it proposes reading Montaigne as an invitation to moderation, to a comparative examination of one’s own practices, and to an ethical horizon of coexistence in the face of sectarianism and polarisation.

Keywords: barbarism, ethnocentrism, against dogmatism, against prejudice

ISSN: 3127-3408

https://doi.org/10.67647/minervastrategy.2025.02

Michel Eyquem, Monsieur de Montaigne, was born in Périgueux, France, in 1533 and died in Bordeaux, France, in 1592. He was a writer whose fundamental works are the Essays (1580 and 1588). Before writing them, he travelled and obtained material for his work. The essays deal with various topics such as religion, politics and philosophy. Their approach seeks to fight against prejudices and dogmatisms and to encourage open minds and intellectual lucidity. These essays can be seen as an invitation for dialogue, critique and thinking.

The following are some excerpts, which we have translated, from Montaigne’s Essays with comments in the style of the Minerva Strategy Blog.

“I would excuse our people for having no other standard or rule of perfection than their own habits and customs; for it is a general vice not only of the vulgar, but of almost all men, to confine their gaze to the sphere in which they were born” (Montaigne, 2003, 317 chap. XLIX ”De las costumbres antiguas” ).

This is linked to the strength of localisms, which give an unusual moral weight to the place of one’s birth. Specifically, this passage from Montaigne alludes to ethnocentrism, which William Graham Sumner defines in his book Folkways (2008) as “is the technical name for this view of things in which one’s own group is the center of everything, and all others are scaled and rated with reference to it “.

Ethnocentrism conceives that the values of the group set the standard of what is human and outside the group, differences occur as stigmas. Procrustean bed versus heterodoxy by combining the identity/alterity binomial.

“There is nothing barbarous or savage in that nation, according to what I have been told, but that everyone considers barbarous what does not belong to his own customs. Indeed, we seem to have no other view of truth and reason than the model and idea of the opinions and usages of the country in which we are. There is always the perfect religion, the perfect government, the perfect and finished practice of everything” (Montaigne, 2003, 233, chap. XXXI “De los caníbales”). 

What is interesting here is to distinguish between critical morality – rational or justified morality – and social morality – the moral values of the majority of society – on the one hand, and the debate between scepticism/relativism versus universalism on the other. It may be argued that Montaigne’s scathing critique of customs, opinions and usages goes against relativism and favours some version of universalist critical morality compatible with a moderate vital scepticism, which is often attributed to the author of the Essays.  

“I consider that there is greater barbarism in eating a living man than in eating the dead, in tearing a still sentient body with tortures and torments, roasting it little by little, giving it to dogs and pigs to bite and tear to pieces (something we have not only read about, but also seen recently, not among old enemies but among neighbours and fellow citizens and, what is worse, under the pretext of piety and religion), than roasting and eating it after death” (Montaigne, 2003, 237, cap. XXXI “De los caníbales”).

In classical Antiquity, the Greeks claimed that they were civilised and their neighbours were barbarians. Thus began a dichotomy that has subsequently had various applications. For example, it played a role in the Valladolid Controversy between Bartolomé de las Casas and Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda. 

In this case, Montaigne asks who is more barbaric, the cannibalistic indigenous peoples he encountered on his travels in Latin America or the Europeans who burned human beings alive in the public square once condemned by the Inquisition. Here it becomes difficult to establish gradualisms or weightings to barbarism.

“We may well call them barbarians, if we consider the rules of reason, but not if we consider ourselves, who surpass them in every kind of barbarism” Montaigne, 2003, 237-238, cap. XXXI “De los caníbales”). 

In his work on barbarism, Francisco Fernández Buey highlights how historical events in the 20th century in the West have made the notion of barbarism highly topical. He mentions the extermination camps in Nazi Germany such as Auschwitz, the repression of the Stalinist Gulag and the atomic bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

However, this 20th century barbarism incorporates two qualitatively more repulsive and malignant features: “the number of murders without compassion, in a merciless manner, and the coldness and even asepsis with which the acts of barbarism were carried out” (Fernández Buey, 1995, 159). 

“Miracles depend on our ignorance of nature, and not on nature’s being; habit dulls the sight of our judgment. Barbarians do not astonish us any more than we astonish them, nor with any more reason: which all would admit if they knew how, after going over these examples, to look at their own and compare them sincerely” (Montaigne, 2003, 152, cap. XXIII “De la costumbre y de cómo no se cambia fácilmente una ley recibida”).

Us and the Others, identity and otherness, group dynamics, lead to characterising those who are different as inferior and deviant – with a stigma – and members of the group as normal individuals. The paradox is that, from outside the group, from another group, its members can also be labelled as different, deviant and inferior – with a stigma. It makes sense: moderation, common sense. Keep values such as human rights and the Golden Rule of Humanity in mind on a daily basis.

In the above essay on barbarism, Fernández Buey reflects that “the violence and cruelty of others is always fanaticism and fundamentalism; the violence and cruelty of our own is the explicable passion that always drags human beings along” (Fernández Buey, 1995, 187).

A suggestive contemporary reading of Montaigne can be a clear appeal against sectarianism and polarisation. Traveling, reflecting, fighting prejudice, understanding differences, appreciating human beings, and aiming for an ethical horizon.

References

Fernández Buey, Francisco (1995), La barbarie. De ellos y de los nuestros, Barcelona: Paidós.

Montaigne, Michel de (2003), Ensayos completos, Madrid: Cátedra, trad. Almudena Montojo.

Summer, William Graham (2008), Folkways. A Study of the Sociological Importance of Usages, Manners, Customs, Mores, and Morals, The Project Gutemberg. Available:

https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/24253 (last visit 17-5-26).

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The strategy of conflict

Oscar Pérez de la Fuente

Carlos III University of Madrid

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3708-846X

Abstract

This article examines Thomas Schelling’s The Strategy of Conflict as a landmark contribution to the analysis of international relations, negotiation, and strategic behaviour. Published in 1960, the book introduced an innovative use of game theory to explain situations in which adversaries are neither locked in absolute opposition nor united by complete cooperation, but instead operate under conditions of mutual dependence. The text highlights Schelling’s distinction between pure conflict, pure cooperation, and mixed conflict-cooperation scenarios, arguing that most human interactions belong to the third category. In such contexts, rational actors seek outcomes that protect their interests while taking account of the choices and expectations of others. Special attention is given to Schelling’s redefinition of strategy as the exploitation of potential force rather than its direct application, a perspective that underpins his influential theory of deterrence. The article also stresses the broader relevance of his framework beyond military affairs, showing its usefulness for politics, business, and everyday decision-making. Ultimately, Schelling’s concept of interdependent decision theory offers a powerful lens for understanding conflict as a negotiable and strategically managed social relationship.

Keywords: diplomacy, detrrence, game theory, interests, positions

ISSN: 3127-3408

https://doi.org/10.67647/minervastrategy.2025.01

In 1960, the economist Thomas Schelling published his work The Strategy of Conflict with a hitherto unusual approach that opened new horizons. His approach was a new analysis of international relations and other areas, applying game theory methods, a part of Economics that carries out simulations of simple games with two or more participants based on the theory of rational choice.

One of the most interesting points of the book is the conceptual material it leaves  to the reader, which allows for multiple applications. Thus, it describes three types of scenarios: pure conflict, pure cooperation, and conflict/cooperation.

Situations of pure conflict would occur if the interests of the antagonists were completely opposed, only “in the case of war, but of a war tending to the total extermination of the enemy.” Situations of pure cooperation are presented as curious exercises in coordination without communication between the parties. For example, where would you meet someone in Madrid – or London or New York- who has received the same instruction, with whom you cannot communicate. Or imagine that you will win 100 euros if you write down on a piece of paper the way to share it out that matches the other party, where communication is impossible.

Schelling’s message is that most scenarios between human beings are ones of cooperation and conflict where there is a common interest and mutual dependence between the parties. Conflict management is sought with mutually acceptable solutions for mutual interests. Hence, the author concludes that most conflict situations are negotiationable scenarios.

The change brought about by this book is its new approach to strategy as applied to international relations and military issues. Thus, strategy does not refer to “the efficient application of force, but to the exploitation of potential force”. This means that the role of armies has an eminently strategic, rather than a purely combative, significance. On another level, this means that victory does not lie in the hand-to-hand combat of the respective forces, but rather in the expectations of the parties and the possibility of respective influence.

From this perspective, Schelling devotes his attention to the notion of “deterrence” as an important element of international relations. He states that an important distinction must be made here between the application of force and the threat of force. Deterrence relates to the exploitation of potential force. Its purpose is to persuade a potential enemy that it is in its own interest to avoid certain courses of action.

The conclusion is that it is not the use of military force, but the threat – serious and credible – of the use of force that would deter the other side from acting. Here would be the paradox that this theory of deterrence is “a theory of the skillful non-use of military force, for which something more than purely military ingenuity is needed”. That is the way to develop strategy as an art and science and to transform some views on international relations and the role of armies. But it would also have applications in business, politics and even everyday life.

In a passage from his book, Schelling offers a definition of strategy based on several elements:

a) it presupposes the existence of a conflict; b) but assumes a common interest of both adversaries; c) it assumes a rational mode of behaviour; d) it focuses on the fact that what appears to each participant as the best course of action depends on what the other does; e) “strategic behaviour” attempts to influence the other’s decisions by acting on their expectations of how the other’s behaviour relates to their own (Schelling, 1980).

How to manage conflict? It seems that this is something we must all deal with in the various spheres of life. In The Strategy of Conflict, Schelling offers a view that was innovative for its time, constructing an analytical framework, based on game theory, to deal with international relations, and at one point he proposes various names for this theory, such as precarious association theory or incomplete antagonism theory.  Perhaps the most successful one is what he called interdependent decision theory. This is the key to the strategy of conflict.

References

Schelling, Thomas (1980), The Strategy of Conflict, Cambridge, Mass. London: Harvard University.

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The perfect politician’s handbook

Oscar Pérez de la Fuente

Carlos III University of Madrid

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3708-846X

Abstract

This text marks the start of a series of reflections on “manuals”, defined by the RAE as compendiums of the essentials of a subject. The first is the Manual del perfecto político (1991) by the journalist and writer José de Cora, a humorous and ironic work, excerpts from which are discussed. It is emphasised that choosing collaborators is a crucial decision: one should surround oneself with the best, even those superior to the leader, but with one indispensable virtue: loyalty to values and people. Intelligence is put into perspective as the sole requirement for politics, recalling that both the incompetent and the wise have governed, and different styles are distinguished: from the Platonic or Erasmian ideal to the Machiavellian, and between those who show empathy for citizens and those who seek to perpetuate themselves in power. Subtlety is championed—as something that can be learnt and is necessary to maintain decorum—and the contemporary demand for brevity is qualified, calling for spaces for deliberation. Provocation would only be justified if it opens up a valuable debate. It is also advised to learn from criticism, distinguishing between destructive and constructive feedback, and the isolation following departure from office is described, which is useful for recognising friendships based on self-interest. Finally, the idea of ‘always succeeding’ by remaining in politics is questioned, and calls are made for term limits, accountability and the selection of the best candidates.

Keywords: learning, resignation, politics, accountability, subtlety, virtues

ISSN: 3127-3408

https://doi.org/10.67647/minervastrategy.2024.21

With this post, we will start a series dedicated to handbooks as a reason to reflect on the practical dimensions in specific fields.  One of the meanings of the word “handbook” in the Spanish Royal Academy of Language is “book in which the most substantial aspects of a subject are summarised.” We begin with the Handbook of the perfect politician.

José de Cora Paradela, born in Lugo in 1951, is a prominent Spanish writer and journalist. Throughout his career, he has worked in various media, including news agencies, newspapers, magazines, radio, cinema and television.  In 1991, José de Cora published the book Manual del perfecto político (Handbook of the Perfect Politician) in the editorial Espasa Calpe, in which he discusses on current affairs with humour and Galician irony with more general elements of reflection. Some fragments of this book will be commented below in the style of Minerva Strategy. 

On how to choose subordinates

“If you have the possibility to do so, every time you accept a new collaborator into your circle of work, you are facing one of the most important decisions of your life. That is why it is advisable not to make a mistake because just as a correct choice can be a victory in advance, a wrong one would be tantamount to a defeat beforehand” (Cora, 1991, 23). 

The best advice for building a team is to surround yourself with the best people, even if they are better than the boss, but always with loyalty as a virtue. Teams must be based on quality and must be loyal to values and people as a condition for participating in public affairs.

How intelligence is not essential 

“Political practice has such a mixture of components that it would be utterly stupid to think that the most intelligent man is also best placed for its exercise. Undocumented people, mules, and even oligophrenics have occupied the highest political offices without demerit: in the same way that wise and enlightened people have committed so many atrocities that they would claim to be the work of inferior beings” (Cora, 1991, 53).  

There are different modes of political intelligence. In the History of Ideas, Plato’s Philosopher King is often contrasted with Erasmus of Rotterdam’s virtues of the good Christian prince, with the hypocrisy, shrewdness, and fortitude promoted by Machiavelli. In public life, politicians who can show emotional intelligence towards citizens are often distinguished from those whose maxim of action is to stay in power. 

On how to be subtle

“The dosage of subtlety, knowing when it should be used in a stream or distributed in an eyedropper, is, dear prince, a teaching reserved for experience. It alone will inform you of the qulaities that adorn you in this section; for subtlety, like stature, is received without our intervention, and only by a complicated operation is it possible to modify the quantity of the one and the length of the other.” (Cora, 1991, 59).

We disagree with José de Cora here.  On the one hand, subtlety is commendable for any public servant and should also be for politicians. It is not necessary to offend; it is better to take care of manners and make people think about the underlying issues. Moreover, and more importantly, subtlety can be learned; it is not innate. It is a virtue of rhetoric that can be acquired and for which it is necessary to be trained. 

On how to abbreviate

“Baltasar Gracián’s teachings against long-winded approaches and in favour of brevity in expositions are gold-plated for a politician with aspirations. The sentences that outlive an author and those that are most successful in influencing public opinion must be short and concentrated, like black coffee”  (Cora, 1991, 62). 

It used to be said that there were two types of speeches: long speeches and good speeches. Nowadays, with social networks, we are committed to brevity, to the headline, and to summarising our thoughts in 140 characters. Politicians enter into this dynamic and hold press conferences, where journalists “fish” for headlines. Brevity, perhaps, yes, but let’s give space for calm reflection, deliberation, fruitful exchange of opinions, persuading and being persuaded, in short… a public opinion.  

On how to provoke

“One of the aspects of Evita Perón’s personality that most attracted the attention of foreign politicians who knew her, was her taste for provoking and scandalising the interlocutor of the moment, with no other aim than her personal satisfaction at seeing the surprised faces that her outbursts caused” (Cora, 1991, 77). 

One might ask here: to provoke, what for? If the only aim is to attract attention, it would seem to be another form of manipulation. If the provocation has a positive objective and promotes a “free and uninhibited” debate on a given topic, usually far from the spotlight, it could be justified in that case.  

On how to take criticism 

“If you have decided to dive into the waters of public administration, you should bear in mind something as elementary as water for the fish, no matter how well you do it, no matter how many quintals of intelligence distinguish you from the rest of the administrators, no matter how many successes decorate your management, there will always be people who criticise it, who do not feel identified with your way of proceeding and who will criticise you, apart of course from your natural political enemies, those who sit with you in Parliament”  (Cora, 1991, 90). 

A distinction is usually made between destructive criticism -based on negative attacks, often including personal ones- and constructive criticism -where proposals for improvement are made. The latter are the most interesting, and the former tend to contribute little. 

Politicians tend to distinguish between political adversaries and party colleagues, and relations with the latter are much more difficult. Something which, at the time of the Spanish Transition, was summed up by the politician Pío Cabanillas when he said: “Hit the deck, our men are coming!

On how to behave in the face of dismissal 

“The politician who comes to occupy a public office, such as the one that awaits you if nothing stands in your way, must know how to conjugate these three verbs: resign, dismiss, or leave, because inexorably one of them will put an end to your direct contact with power” (Cora, 1991, 164).    

When a politician leaves public office, their phone stops ringing. All those who congratulated them on their appointment evaporated, and only a few close friends communicated with them. It is a good opportunity to read Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, where he distinguishes between friends by affinity and by interest.

On how to maintain greatness in the face of defeat 

“If you have decided to embark on the tortuous path of politics, you should know from the outset that there is no such thing as failure, unless you abandon this activity through force majeure or of your own free will. As long as you are in politics, politics itself will protect you from any doubt as to whether you are a winner or a loser. You always succeed because “being” is synonymous with “winning”. Being in politics is enough” (Cora, 1991, 173).  

We do not like this approach here by José de Cora.  Unfortunately, there seems to be an abundance of politicians whose only goal is to stay in power and politicians whose only work experience is in politics. A society must be able to find mechanisms to elect the best people to positions of public responsibility. It is a good general principle that these responsibilities should be temporarily limited. It is good to be able to walk away from public affairs, to exercise good accountability, and to be rewarded or punished for governance.

References

Cora, José de (1991), Manual del perfecto político, Madrid: Espasa Calpe.

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Prisoners of a dilemma

Oscar Pérez de la Fuente

Carlos III University of Madrid

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3708-846X

Abstract

This article examines the prisoner’s dilemma as a central model for understanding strategic interaction, conflict, and cooperation in social and political life. Starting from Tucker’s classic formulation, the text explains how two rational individuals, acting separately and without communication, may choose betrayal even when mutual cooperation would produce a better outcome for both. The analysis emphasizes the interdependence of decisions, the tension between individual advantage and collective benefit, and the paradoxical nature of rational choice in situations of uncertainty. The article also explores broader implications of the dilemma in politics, economics, international relations, and everyday interactions, showing why it remains one of the most influential concepts in game theory. Special attention is given to repeated interactions, where the possibility of future encounters creates stronger incentives for agreement, trust, and stable cooperation. In this context, the prisoner’s dilemma helps justify the importance of pacts, legal norms, and institutional frameworks that reduce insecurity and discourage betrayal. Ultimately, the article argues that cooperative environments are not spontaneous but require rules and commitments capable of aligning individual interests with mutually beneficial outcomes.

Keywords: prisoner’s dilemma, cooperation, betrayal

ISSN: 3127-3408

https://doi.org/10.67647/minervastrategy.2024.20

Albert Tucker, a distinguished Princeton mathematician, was invited to give a lecture in 1950 at Stanford University. There, he first posed this dilemma:

“Two men, accused of jointly breaking the law, have been confined by the police in separate rooms. Each is told that:

1- If one of them confesses guilty, but the other does not, the first will receive a reward, … and the second will be punished.

2. If both confess, both will be punished.

At the same time, each has good reason to believe that:

3.- If neither confesses, both will go free.”(Poundstone, 1995, 175).

Although there was earlier work by Flood and Dresher on the subject, Tucker was the first to christen it the prisoner’s dilemma. The implications of this dilemma are manifold in politics, international relations, economics and even everyday life. The story of how it came about and some of its applications are recorded in the book The Prisoner’s Dilemma (1995) by William Poundstone.

In a dilemma, it is often the case that whatever the solution, it involves a loss, a sense of remorse or regret. The prisoner’s dilemma is problematic because it defies common sense, says Poundstone. I will discuss the options and implications of the dilemma below.

There are two options for the two players: cooperate or betray. If player A confesses, he chooses to betray his partner. There are two possibilities: a) that the other player B does the same, then the final result is bad, and both are punished; b) that the other player B does not confess, chooses to cooperate, and then the result is very good for player A -he is rewarded- and bad for player B -he is punished-.

Suppose player A chooses to cooperate and does not confess. There are two possibilities: c) the other player B does the same, then the end result is good – both go free; d) the other player B chooses to betray his partner and chooses to confess, then the result is bad for player A – he is punished – and very good for player B – he is rewarded.

It is one of the most famous strategy games in which the interdependence of the players is vital. Whatever player A does, the final outcome depends on what player B does and vice versa. There is an incentive to betray the other player, but if they both follow that incentive and betray, the outcome is bad for both players. If both cooperate, the result is good, but it is challenging to obtain this outcome because of the incentive to betray and the impossibility of communicating.

Some consider that the prisoner’s dilemma has no solution. Others have pointed to the fact that it varies whether the game is played once or more than once. If played once, there is a solid incentive to betray as long as the other party does not do the same. This cannot be guaranteed and is, therefore, a dilemma.

What is most interesting is whether the prisoner’s dilemma must be played repeatedly. Then, it is how one has come to justify the need for the pact, the agreement between the players. This has been a way of justifying the existence of legal norms that guarantee that agreements will be fulfilled.

In Hobbes‘ State of Nature, there was natural liberty but great insecurity; the law of the strongest ruled. Although there could be cooperative behaviour, there was an incentive to betrayal. This leads to a social pact that guarantees peace and security, ensuring the players cooperate and not betray each other.

In a case where it is discovered that the treasurer of a political party, for many years, has 50 million euros in accounts in Switzerland, there would be a prisoner’s dilemma at some point in this case. At some point in this case, a prisoner’s dilemma scheme would emerge: both parties would have a better outcome if they did not confess and settle, but there is an incentive for betrayal.

The prisoner’s dilemma shows that pacts or agreements must promote cooperative environments. If these do not exist, there is an incentive to betray, which does not guarantee the best outcome because of the interdependence of the moves. If both betray, the outcome is terrible. If both cooperate, the result is good. If one cooperates and the other betrays, the outcome is bad for the former and very good for the latter.

There are many readings and applications of the prisoner’s dilemma. One is that cooperation, in the long run, is best guaranteed by a pact or agreement. It justifies the need for agreements that foster cooperative frameworks.

References

Poundstone, William (1995), El dilema del prisionero,. John Von Neumann, la teoría de juegos y la bomba,  Madrid: Alianza, trad. Daniel Manzanarez Fourcade. (original title: The Prisoner’s Dilemma. John Von Neumann, game theory and Puzzle of  the bomb).

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Domingo de Soto, on Justice and Law

Oscar Pérez de la Fuente

Carlos III University of Madrid

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3708-846X

Abstract

This paper presents a critical reading of passages from the Treatise on Justice and Law by Domingo de Soto (1495–1560), a leading figure of the School of Salamanca, with the aim of linking his theses on law, virtue and judgement to contemporary debates in the philosophy of law. Building on Soto’s idea that the primary effect of law is to ‘make subjects good’ through the practice of virtues, the paper analyses the tension between (i) state neutrality regarding conceptions of the good life, associated with liberal traditions, and (ii) the defence of civic virtues as a condition for democratic cohesion. Secondly, the paper examines his preference for judicial prudence and ‘animated justice’ over ‘deaf and dumb’ law, situating this against the modern ideal of the rule of law and current discussions on rules and principles, difficult cases and normative defeatability. Finally, this perspective is linked to the renewed interest in virtue jurisprudence, which proposes evaluating legal decisions by considering habits of excellence (temperance, fortitude, honesty) in those who apply the law. The text adopts a short commentary format, inspired by the Minerva Strategy, aimed at clarifying issues and contrasting positions.

Keywords: State neutrality, civic virtues, legal interpretation, Virtue Jurisprudence

ISSN: 3127-3408

https://doi.org/10.67647/minervastrategy.2024.19

Domingo de Soto was born in Segovia in 1495 and died in Salamanca in 1560. He was a Dominican monk, theologian, jurist, and professor of Theology and Philosophy at the University of Salamanca. He was educated at the University of Alcala and furthered his studies at the University of Paris. He took part in the Council of Trent. He was a royal confessor to Emperor Charles V.  He was a member of the School of Salamanca, along with Francisco de Vitoria, among others. He played a role in the Valladolid controversy between Bartolomé de las Casas and Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda. 

Excerpts from Domingo de Soto’s work Treaty on Justice and Law (Tratado de la Justicia y el Derecho) (1922) will be discussed below, in the style of the Minerva Strategy

The aim of the legislator is to make subjects good, which is based on the primary human end of happiness. 

” This conclusion can easily be deduced from the decision of the above question. For the objective of the law is the common good, of which our beatitude consists: so that nothing achieves it except by the exercise of the virtues, which make good those who have them; all the more so when (as the Philosopher says) the happiness of this world is in the practice of the virtues; therefore it is the effect of the law to make men diligent and honest” (Soto, 1922, 44).

Virtues are habits and moral dispositions linked to a model of excellence associated with a practice. If one acts virtuously -repeating these habits-, one becomes virtuous. This is an ethic that shapes character. And here, there would be two approaches. The first would argue that it is not the government’s task to impose models of the good life, highlighting the famous distinction between theories of justice -public ethics- and conceptions of the good -private ethics-. The second has several versions, the classical Aristotelian one -which inspires Domingo de Soto- and a more up-to-date version, which would make the State’s promotion of virtues compatible with respect for individual autonomy and pluralism of values along the lines defended by Joseph Raz in Morality of freedom (1988).

“We conclude that the law makes men good, and this reasoning only draws from the fact that it makes them good subjects, which is less. Aristotle distinguishes the good citizen from the good man. A citizen is called good if he is a good subject, that is, obedient to the command of the law, but the good man has something more of honesty. For, since civil law permits many things with impunity, one can obey the law and yet be evil, namely, a miser, a fornicator, and so on, as we criticised before. Therefore, it is not enough for the law to make good subjects for it to make men simply good” (Soto, 1922, 45-46).

If the argument of exclusion of ideals and State neutrality is usually defended from the liberal perspective, can civic virtues be imposed by the State? It seems that the republic of egoists/atomists is insufficient for cementing society, and the education of these civic values plays a prominent role. However, some authors, such as Sandel, have excelled in justifying the role of civic virtues in cementing democratic societies. Others argue in favour of State neutrality.

“Even if human reason could be a certain rule of our actions, the republic would be much better governed by the living voice of men than by written laws. Therefore, being a judge (as Aristotle says), animated justice would more easily and congruently shake him than deaf and dumb law. For actions being concerned with the use of particular things, human law cannot provide for everything, and consider all the singular circumstances, as the judge would do with his prudence” (Soto, 1922, 108).

The Aristotelian influence is followed here in a particularist dystopia, a triumph of topicality, the living voice of men instead of written laws. The world of law is perfectible, but it has unquestionable qualities. It is a characteristic of the Rule of Law,  which can be summarised with the government by laws, not by men. It was a significant advance from the Ancien Regime. The legal system is made up of general and abstract laws. There is a great doctrinal debate about whether norms, be they rules or principles, must have an open or closed antecedent. Or, on the other hand, whether, in the face of circumstances that are not contemplated, they are defeasible conditionals. It is then when the judge, as an expert and from his experience, must consider the situation as one more piece of the Rule of Law. 

“If a good man better governs the republic than a good law. And he affirms that the law governs better than man. Aristotle also repeats this in another work. Namely, finding one or a few wise legislators is easier than many judges. A few are enough to make laws in a century, but many more are needed to pass judgement. On the other hand, laws are given after a long time of thought, and judgements are resolved very briefly. Therefore, it is easier to err in the latter than in the former” (Soto, 1922, 113).  

In this case, Domingo de Soto has a presumption that the legislators’ tasks are prudent and well thought out in the face of the errors of multiple judges. This could be a general approach; however, in the current legal-philosophical field, there has been an interpretative turn -Alexy, Dworkin- where the key question is what are the solutions for hard cases, and tools are provided to answer this question correctly. Ferrajoli, in his work Wild Powers. The Crisis of Constitutional Democracy (Poderes salvajes. La crisis de la democracia constitucional) (2011) argued why judges must sometimes defend the rule of law against executive meddling. 

“The law should be written in general, that is, it should not command: If such and such a person kills, or for such a reason, or with such a circumstance, let him be punished, but in general: Everyone who kills. These accidental circumstances cannot be included in the law but must be weighed by prudence afterwards. Indeed, just as in speculative matters, as Plato commanded, one must stop at the species, for there is no science but experience about the singular, which is passing, so in practice, there can be no law about the particular, which happens by chance, but only prudence” (Soto, 1922, 136).

Laws should be general, and prudence, i.e. the virtues, should be applied to particular circumstances because science is not possible. The renewed interest in Virtue Jurisprudence arises precisely from the question of the role of virtues, such as temperance, fortitude, humility or honesty, in the work of those charged with applying the law. We hope that justice will consist of implementing certain habits associated with models of excellence when deciding judicial cases. This would bring us closer to the ideal that those who apply justice are virtuous judges. 

References

Ferrajoli, Luigi (2011), Poderes salvajes: la crisis de la democracia constitucional, Madrid: Trotta, trad. Perfecto Andrés Ibáñez.

Soto, Domingo de (1922), Tratado de la Justicia y el Derecho, Madrid: Editorial Reus.

Raz, Joseph (1988), Morality of freedom, Oxford: Clarendon Press.

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Golden Rule of Humanity

Oscar Pérez de la Fuente

Universidad Carlos III de Madrid

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3708-846X

Abstract

This article examines the Golden Rule of Humanity as a cross-cultural moral principle and analyses its meaning through its relation to reciprocity, empathy, and practical moral judgment. It begins by situating the Golden Rule within attempts to identify a minimum common denominator of human morality, including the 1993 Declaration Toward a Global Ethic. The discussion distinguishes between the positive and negative formulations of the Golden Rule and argues that both rely on expectations of reciprocity rather than guaranteed responses. The article then contrasts the Golden Rule with the Silver Rule, understood as reciprocity based on past actions, and with the Platinum Rule, which proposes treating others as they wish to be treated. By comparing these three rules, the text highlights the strengths and limitations of each. In particular, it shows that the Golden Rule can be overly agent-centred, since one’s own preferences may not match those of others, while the Platinum Rule may become excessively demanding. The article concludes that reciprocity remains the key ethical concept and that moral interaction requires communication to clarify expectations, interests, and the appropriate terms of mutual treatment in pluralistic societies today.

Keywords: Golden Rule, reciprocity, atruism, expectative, TITforTAT

ISSN: 3127-3408

https://doi.org/10.67647/minervastrategy.2024.18

There have been some attempts to find the moral norms that are repeated across societies, such as the minimum common denominator of human morality. It is remarkable to note how principles are repeated throughout religions and moral codes. One such attempt was the Declaration for a World Ethic, adopted by the World Parliament of Religions and agreed upon in Chicago in 1993.

The Golden Rule of Humanity is one of the central principles on which this Declaration is based and has two forms. A positive one states that do unto others as you would have done unto you. This deserves some thought. Some see it as a further application of the logical principle of consistency—a way of being consistent with others and yourself. However, things are often more complex.

In a way, the Golden Rule is based on a future expectation that others will act in the same way as you, which is linked to the spirit of reciprocity. However, it is an expectation that does not have to be fulfilled. The other party should realise that you are following the Golden Rule. In other words, you are someone with an expectation of reciprocity.

The Golden Rule has a negative formulation that states do not do unto others what you would not want done unto you. This implies not doing harm if you do not want to be harmed. In this case, the future expectation is that others will not harm you somehow because you have not harmed them. It seems that social cooperation is based on this kind of expectation. However, someone may not reciprocate and not meet these expectations.

Therefore, some advocate that in the face of the good intentions of the Golden Rule, a Silver Rule should be upheld, which states that you treat others as others treat you. This rule is based strictly on reciprocity, not expectations. It is Axelrod‘s solution to the Prisoner’s Dilemma from TIT for TAT. Or known as an ‘eye for an eye’. The explanation is that someone who used the Golden Rule in the prisoner’s dilemma would get good results initially but would be exploited by someone who opted for betrayal. The TIT for TAT rule rewards or punishes based on the specific behaviour of others.

The conclusion is that, although they are linked, the Silver Rule is the reverse of the Golden Rule. The Golden Rule is based on a reciprocity of expectations, and the Silver Rule is based on a reciprocity of actions. The Golden Rule is based on the future, and the Silver Rule is based on the past.

It is often said that the Golden Rule is also a commitment to empathy, to ‘putting oneself in the other shoes’. This is a highly relevant ethical principle. However, on closer examination, the Golden Rule would be based on the false assumption that we all have the same tastes and needs.

If I have a vegetarian friend and I love meat, the way to treat him as I would like to be treated would be to prepare a big meat feast for him. But he won’t like it, he won’t appreciate it, and he will even get upset. This Golden Rule seems to be agent-centred, where the agent determines what is right. However, while it may be appropriate at times, it does not always work, so some advocate for a Platinum Rule.

The Platinum Rule states you should treat others as they would like to be treated. This rule holds that we should act towards others based on their interests or tastes, for example, my vegetarian friend would have a wonderful salad.

The problem with the Platinum Rule is that the tastes and interests of others are also particular, which can sometimes lead to paradoxical situations, such as whether someone is an addict or a masochist. This Rule is more demanding than the Golden Rule and the Silver Rule. It is an altruistic view that can become heroic.

The key is reciprocity. If my vegetarian friend wants to thank me for the salad, the Golden Rule leads him to prepare a gazpacho and the Platinum Rule to cook a sirloin steak. That is why it is essential to inform each other and to be able to clarify the terms of reciprocity.

The Golden Rule is a moral principle reflected in many of humanity’s religious and secular texts. It is a good principle for judging moral actions and is based on expectations, the future, and the spirit of reciprocity. The main criticism is that the agent is shown as the criterion of moral correctness.

References

Gensler, Harry J. (2013), Ethics and the Golden Rule, New York, London: Routledge.

Parliament of World’s Religions (1993), Declaration Toward a Global Ethic, Chicago, 4 September 1993. Available: https://www.weltethos.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/Decl_english.pdf (last visit: 26 May 2026).