Tag: BATNA

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Frontinus: It’s All About Expectations

Oscar Pérez de la Fuente

Carlos III University of Madrid

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3708-846X

Abstract

This essay examines a selection of stratagems recounted by Frontinus in the Strategemata to show how the management of expectations shapes strategic outcomes. Through episodes involving simulated reinforcements, the concealment of setbacks, the appearance of abundance and displays of determination, it identifies deception, morale, perceived alternatives and credible commitment as central strategic mechanisms. The analysis connects these classical military ruses with contemporary negotiation theory, particularly the role of information, verification and the best alternative to a negotiated agreement (BATNA). It argues that strategic advantage often depends less on material conditions than on influencing how the other party interprets them, while also drawing attention to the ethical risks posed by manipulation and dirty tricks.

Keywords: strategy, expectations, negotiation, deception, BATNA

ISSN: 3127-3408

https://doi.org/10.67647/minervastrategy.2026.16

Frontinus’ Stratagemata is a classic work is a classic of military strategy from antiquity. One of its distinctive features is that it is written in a casuistic style, with each topic drawing on stories or anecdotes that would have been widely known at the time.

In this essay, I shall discuss a series of tactics and stratagems, as recounted by Frontinus, all of which share  a common feature: they are linked to the expectations of the parties involved. This is a key element of strategy. It is essential to know how to manage the parties’ expectations with the aim of achieving specific interests. As we shall see, some military ruses would fall within the Machiavellian model and the maxim commonly attributed to Machiavelli “the end justifies the means”. Some are dirty tricks, and every good strategist must be able to recognise them and respond  appropriately.

Below is an analysis of Frontinus’ stratagems, with a commentary on their significance in terms of the general principles of strategy.

On how to strike fear into the enemy’s ranks

When the consul Gaius Sulpicius Peticus was about to engage the Gauls in battle, he ordered certain mule drivers to withdraw secretly with their mules to the nearby hills, and then, once the fighting had begun, to repeatedly show themselves to the combatants, as though they were riding horses. The Gauls, therefore, imagining that reinforcements were on their way, retreated before the Romans, even though they were already on the verge of victory (Frontinus, 2010, 199).

This is a form of deception. From a distance, the mule drivers created the illusions  that reinforcements were on their way, when in fact this was not the case. Deception is a classic example of a dirty trick in negotiations. The way counter this is through impartial verification of the facts and by consulting various sources of information. At times, this may be seen as a sign of mistrust, but it is precisely impartial verification that can prevent this sort of trickery by one of the parties. Verification should be accepted as a normal part of such situations.

How to hide setbacks

The consul Titus Quinctius Capitolinus, after the Romans had lost ground in a battle, falsely claimed that the enemy had been defeated on the other flank. In this way, by bolstering the morale of his men, he secured victory (Frontinus, 2010, 217).

This is a way of raising one party’s expectations – and thereby improving its final outcome. In the context of negotiations, it reminds me of the strategic moves following the initial offer in a particular deal. If expectations are low and the BATNA – the best alternative to a negotiated agreement – is low, the other party’s counter-offer will be similar to the initial offer. Conversely, if there is a sense of having won, expectations are high and the BATNA is high, then the counter-offer will almost certainly be significantly different from the initial offer.

How to create the impression of abundance where there is a lack

When the Capitol was besieged by the Gauls, the Romans, on the brink of starvation, threw bread into the enemy’s ranks. In this way, they gave the impression that they were well supplied with food, and thus held out against the siege until Camillus arrived (Frontinus, 2010, 243).

This is a form of deception designed to alter the other party’s expectations and an ingenious one. No one would expect a starving garrison to throw bread at the enemy. The key point is that, when faced with the other party, a weakness is presented as a strength. One pretends to have food when in fact one lacks it, thereby altering the other party’s expectations.

On determination (the will to win)

When Viriathus offered to return their wives and children to the people of Segovia, they chose to witness the execution of their loved ones rather than betray the Romans (Frontinus, 2010, 266).

The inhabitants of Numantia chose to barricade themselves in their homes and starve to death rather than surrender (Frontinus, 2010, 266).

In any strategy, priorities must be established amongst different elements. In these examples proposed by Frontinus, theoverriding priority is loyalty or resistance, to which everything else is subordinated; in one case, the inhabitants renounce their loved ones; and in the other, they choose to starve to death. In the context of negotiations, this may prompt reflection on the firmness of commitments. These are strategic manoeuvres in which one of the parties voluntarily restricts their own will in anticipation of a concession in return.

Such commitments are central to negotiation and constitute a strategic factor, as they bring about a lasting change in expectations. The examples of Segovia and Numantia, as recounted by Frontinus, are extreme cases because they involve sacrificing elements of vital importance in order to secure a military victory; however, the lesson is that a credible display of resolve can change the other side’s expectations, although these extreme cases also show the high price such commitment may carry

References

Frontinus, Sextus Julius (2010), “Strategemata”, en Roca Barea, María Elvira (ed.),  Tratado militar de Frontino. Humanismo y caballeria en el cuatrocientos castellano, Madrid, CSIC, pp. 145-275. 

(English version: Frontino: Bennett, Charles E. (trans.) (1925), Frontinus: Stratagems. Aqueducts of Rome, Loeb Classical Library 174, Cambridge (MA): Harvard University Press)

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Never Split the Difference

Oscar Pérez de la Fuente

Carlos III University of Madrid

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3708-846X

Abstract

This paper reviews Chris Voss’s Never Split the Difference through the lens of the Minerva Strategy Blog, contrasting the “art” of negotiation derived from hostage-crisis practice with the “science” of negotiation associated with the Harvard Negotiation Project. It highlights how Voss challenges rational-actor assumptions by foregrounding empathy, emotional attachment, and perception management as decisive factors in bargaining. Central to the analysis is Voss’s claim that eliciting “that’s right” signals genuine understanding and can unlock cooperative behaviour more effectively than a simple “yes” or “you’re right.” The discussion also examines Voss’s scepticism toward “middle ground” compromises, juxtaposing this stance with standard negotiation concepts such as BATNA and reservation thresholds. Additional attention is given to time pressure and deadlines as drivers of impulsive concessions, and to emotionally loaded terms—especially “fair”—as rhetorical devices that shift leverage by forcing defensive reactions. Finally, the paper considers “anchoring” as a method for shaping the counterpart’s reality by setting extreme reference points that make subsequent offers appear reasonable. Overall, the text presents Voss’s techniques as a pragmatic, psychologically informed toolkit that complements, and sometimes conflicts with, orthodox negotiation theory.

Keywords: empathy, negotiation tactics, anchoring, BATNA

ISSN: 3127-3408

https://doi.org/10.67647/minervastrategy.2026.08

In the opening pages of the book Never Split the Difference. Negotiating as if your life depended on it, the author, Chris Voss, is set to meet with several professors from the Harvard Negotiation Project. Chris Voss was a local police officer who had been promoted to the FBI and was part of a team that used hostage negotiation techniques. He embodied the art of negotiation, which is the practical application of various techniques and principles to strategic scenarios. The Harvard Negotiation Project represents the science of negotiation, where categories, terminology and analysis are established and based on certain assumptions, such as the idea that human beings are rational. 

Below, I will analyse Chris Voss’s book Never Split the Difference. Negotiating as if your life depended on it from the perspective of the Minerva Strategy Blog. It is remarkable because the Spanish title translation of this book is slightly different: Breaking Through the ‘No’ Barrier. 9 principles for negotiation as if your life depended on it. This implies some different nuances from languages perspective.

In the chapter Trigger the Two Words That Immediately Transform Any Negotiation, Voss carries out an analytical exercise in which he links the positive affirmation of empathy with the emotions and emotional attachment involved. He states: “Creating unconditional positive regard opens the door to a changing thought and behaviours. Humans have an innate urge toward socially constructive behaviour. The more a person feels understood, and positively affirmed in that understanding, the more likely that urge for constructive behaviour will take hold” (Voss, 2016, 112).

In short, when someone feels understood, they adopt a more constructive attitude. The conclusion is that the key words in any negotiation scenario are ‘that’s right’. Voss adds, “’That is right’ is better than “yes”. Strive for it. Reaching ‘that’s right’ in a negotiation creates breakthroughs.” But he clarifies that a ‘that’s right’ is not a ‘yes’ or a ‘you’re right’ (Voss, 2016, 112)

In the chapter entitled Bend Their Reality, Voss focuses on the topic of true interests and how differing perceptions and signals can sometimes distort approaches in negotiation scenarios. It is interesting because Voss’s views stem from the art of negotiation and his professional experience in FBI negotiation teams, and some of them are at odds with what is usually said in the science of negotiation.

It is one thing for the parties to make statements in formal settings, but quite another to understand their true interests. Before entering into negotiations, it is important to be clear about one’s own interests and to have the best possible information about the other party’s interests. It is also important to be clear about the best strategy for mutually defending the interests of both parties or, at least, the best way to reconcile them.

In another part of the book, Voss states: “Splitting the difference of wearing one black and one brown shoe, so don’t compromise. Meeting halfway often leads to bad deals for both sides.” (Voss, 2016, 139)

The middle ground is usually seen as an impartial basis for reaching an agreement. Before any negotiation begins, each party must be clear about: a) what their best alternative to negotiation (BATNA) is; b) what their satisfaction threshold is, or their specific minimum and maximum objectives in the negotiation. Negotiating involves giving something up to obtain, in return, something desired. It is a kind of transaction. To this end, information regarding the interests and expectations of both parties is key. This is what the science of negotiation would say; however, as we have seen, the art of negotiation is wary of middle ground.  

Later, in Never Split the Difference, we read that the looming deadline urges people to try to wrap up negotiations as quickly as possible and to act impulsively in ways that go against their own interests.

Ultimatums and deadlines are sometimes a negotiation tactic or gambit. On other occasions, they provide a good excuse to move the negotiation forward. Here, Voss warns us about the tendency to make concessions—which would otherwise not be made—under the influence of these time-sensitive circumstances. One must remain vigilant and know not to give in on points previously deemed non-negotiable.  

Voss also argues that the ‘J-bomb’—the term ‘fair’—is a concept with great emotional impact for people, who often use it to put the other party on the defensive and force them to make concessions. If the other party drops that bomb, don’t fall into the trap. Instead, ask them why they claim you are being unfair to them (Voss, 2016, 139).

Another negotiation tactic or gambit involves manipulating the perceptions and emotions of the parties by using emotionally charged terms such as fair, objective, impartial, neutral, etc. Although this may be a good way of reaching agreements in this manner, it is always worth analysing who stands to lose and who stands to gain from the application of these ‘abstract’ criteria, which are presented as magic potions for solving problems. 

In another passage of the book Never Split the Difference, Voss states that it is possible to shape the other party’s reality by setting their starting point. Before making an offer, you can emotionally anchor their mindset by making them believe they are about to receive a terrible offer. When the time comes to put a figure on the table, you set an extreme benchmark to make the ‘real’ offer seem more reasonable, or you offer a range to appear less aggressive. The true value of anything depends on the perspective from which it is viewed (Voss, 2016, 139).

References

Voss, Chris, Raz, Tahl (2016), Never split the difference. Negotiating as if your life depended on it, Harper Collins Publishers, Kindle edition. 

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3-D Negotiation

Oscar Pérez de la Fuente

Universidad Carlos III de Madrid

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3708-846X

Abstract

This text presents key ideas from David A. Lax and James K. Sebenius’s 3-D Negotiation framework, which views negotiation as the interaction of three simultaneous dimensions: tactics at the table, deal design that uncovers true economic and non-economic interests, and the broader setup that shapes the situation off the table. Focusing on interests is central to this approach because stated positions often mask implicit goals, constraints, and concerns. The discussion highlights perspective-taking, careful assessment of one’s own priorities, and the use of classic tools such as BATNA and ZOPA, while warning against reducing analysis to a single distributive variable such as price. The text also identifies wider contextual factors that influence outcomes, including relationships, emotions, and cultural orientations toward either results or relationships. It stresses the role of the “social contract” or spirit of the agreement in establishing expectations, trust, and conflict-resolution norms, and it notes how process choices and tactics (e.g., anchoring) can distort results. Finally, it addresses ethical tensions in negotiating behaviour through deontological, consequentialist, Machiavellian, and virtue-based lenses, and it concludes with four practices to safeguard interests: ask and probe, map interests using public information, leverage internal sources, and consult knowledgeable advisers.

Keywords: principled egotiation, BATNA/ZOPA, Deal design, emotions, tactics

ISSN: 3127-3408

https://doi.org/10.67647/minervastrategy.2026.06

Professors David A. Lax and James K. Sebenius, who are involved in the Harvard University Negotiation Project, in their book 3-D Negotiation. Powerful Tools to Change the Game in Your Most Important Deals (2006) offer new perspectives when it comes to conducting negotiations.

According to this approach, negotiations should be understood as three-dimensional, with three elements occurring more or less simultaneously throughout the actual negotiation. These dimensions are: a) Tactics, which involve persuasive manoeuvres and give-and-take. It is worth noting that poor tactics can ruin a negotiation; b) Deal design: beyond the obvious, this involves uncovering the parties’ true economic and non-economic interests; and c) Setup: off the table, which shapes and reshapes the situation (Lax, Sebenius, 2006, 9). . 

Below, we will examine the topic of exploring interests from the perspective of the Minerva Strategy Blog.

Lax and Sebenius begin by defining interest as whatever you care about that is potentially at stake in the outcome (Lax, Sebenius, 2006, 76).  Their entire approach is based on the observation that the interests stated at the negotiating table are one thing, whereas the parties’ actual or implicit interests are quite another, whether or not these have been clearly articulated. 

When exploring these interests (whether explicit or implicit) in the handling of information about the other party, it is essential to practice, at various stages of the negotiation process, the exercise of putting oneself in the other person’s shoes. It’s also vital for oneself or the negotiating team to calmly assess the true interests at stake: what one wants from the negotiation, what could be gained, and what could be lost. In the standard terminology of Negotiation Theory, what is the best alternative to a no-deal outcome (BATNA), and how is the Zone of Possible Agreement (ZOPA) established between the parties? 

However, Lax and Sebenius’s emphasis on the importance of (actual) interests within the framework of three-dimensional negotiation highlights the fact that focusing all one’s attention in negotiations on linear distributive dimensions—such as price negotiation—can cause one to lose sight of a range of potentially richer interests.

From this perspective, analysing BATNA and ZOPA can be useful tools, but not by focusing on a single variable; rather, by taking into account all the factors at play within the negotiating context.  

In many negotiations, relationships are a key factor to bear in mind. Sometimes, emotions guide the parties’ behaviour, and such feelings can distort certain expectations. On other occasions, poor or mediocre results are accepted simply to maintain the relationship. On this point, Lax and Sebenius distinguish between countries that focus on relationships—such as those in Southern Europe and Latin America—and others that focus on results, such as Anglo-Saxon and Northern European countries  (Lax, Sebenius, 2006, 74). 

Another factor to bear in mind is the social contract; beyond its strictly economic dimension, this governs people’s expectations regarding the nature, scope and duration of the agreement, the process to be followed, and the way in which unforeseen events are handled. As Lax and Sebenius state, it is “the spirit of the agreement.” It is important to clearly understand this broad framework to avoid conflicts or to resolve them without too much difficulty. It is about establishing relationships within a framework of trust, within the framework of a shared negotiating culture, where the obligations of the parties and the usual way of resolving potential conflicts are clearly established (Lax, Sebenius, 2006, 74).

The third factor is the process itself. Certain negotiation processes often influence the outcome, and sometimes negotiators employ tricks and tactics, such as anchoring. These tactics can be particularly detrimental to one of the parties, who must be able to identify them and defend their position, especially when they are unaware of these strategies or lack experience in negotiation scenarios. Another important point is to distinguish the negotiating table from the wider negotiating context. It is usually easier to make progress in negotiations in informal settings (Lax, Sebenius, 2006, 75).    

Finally, one factor to bear in mind is ethics. Certain aspects of some negotiations may be morally controversial; for example, some negotiating tactics that involve withholding or manipulating information from the other party. From an ethical standpoint, the response will differ between the deontological model, with its duty to always tell the truth; the consequentialist model, which advocates the greatest happiness for the greatest number of people; the Machiavellian model, focused on success; and the virtuous model, which proposes acting as a virtuous person would in that situation  (Lax, Sebenius, 2006, 75).

Lax and Sebenius argue that we should not confuse negotiating positions with a broader set of actual interests, and they propose four practices that will help you safeguard your interests:

–Ask, listen and probe

Information about the other party’s interests is essential. The best way to get this is to listen carefully and gauge how they might respond to the negotiation map’s options. 

–Use public sources to map interests

When important decisions need to be made, it is advisable to consult public records and the relevant institutions to gather objective information. Having reports from independent bodies and other credible sources of information is also beneficial.

–Tap internal sources

Naturally, if you can obtain firsthand information from someone who understands the other party’s interests, this can be particularly useful. It is also important to have information about the negotiator and the people involved, as well as their explicit, implicit and underlying interests.

–Tap knowledgeable advisers

In complex business situations, people often turn to professionals such as lawyers or intermediaries. Lax and Sebenius recommend asking them about their experience in such situations. Perhaps this is because – as Aristotle pointed out many centuries ago – experience can help one to better understand a particular situation (Lax, Sebenius, 2006, 77-79).

References

Lax, David A., Sebenius, James K. (2006), 3-D Negotiation. Powerful Tools to Change the Game in Your Most Important Deals, Boston, Mass.: Harvard Business School Press. 

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More negotiation gambits and tactics

Oscar Pérez de la Fuente

Carlos III University of Madrid

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3708-846X

Abstract

This paper examines a set of negotiation gambits and tactics drawn from Managing Negotiations: How to Get a Better Deal by Gavin Kennedy, John Benson, and John McMillan. It focuses on six tactics that shape bargaining dynamics through persuasion, sequencing, pressure, and issue linkage: sell cheap, become famous, salami, the demands of the mandate, veiled threats, connecting, and yes, but…. The discussion shows how negotiators seek advantage by appealing to prestige, introducing concessions gradually, invoking external authority, signalling potential sanctions, tying separate issues together, or reopening agreement through new conditions. The paper argues that these tactics are effective because they alter perception, redefine bargaining boundaries, and influence the other party’s assessment of risk, alternatives, and acceptable outcomes. At the same time, they may blur the line between legitimate strategy and manipulation. By explaining each gambit through practical examples, the text highlights the importance of recognizing tactical behaviour, assessing credibility, and responding with disciplined counter-strategies. Overall, the analysis contributes to a clearer understanding of how negotiation tactics operate in commercial and professional settings.

Keywords: negotiation, threats,, tactics and gambits, mandate

ISSN: 3127-3408

https://doi.org/10.67647/minervastrategy.2025.13

Previously, I analysed the following negotiation gambits and tactics: shot gun, off-limits, tough guy, nice guy, Russian Front. The analysis of these situations, which involve a change in perception in a negotiation context, sometimes including manipulation, is based on the book Managing Negotiations: How to Get a Better Deal, by Gavin Kennedy, John Benson, and John McMillan. Below, I will analyse other negotiation gambits and tactics:

Sell cheap, become famous

One way of formulating this tactic could be: “We are making you a cheap offer that will greatly enhance your company’s image, as you will benefit from being a supplier to an international, million-dollar company like ours. Think about how much good us as a customer on your client list having will do for your future sales” (Kennedy, Benson, McMillan, 1988, 188).

This trick is used at all levels and in all areas of life. Companies do not advertise their jobs with “low salaries”; they talk about “good prospects”; buyers talk about possible “future orders”; interns, who are paid very little, are commonly appealed to by the prestige of the company they work for. Sometimes these promises are, however, not always true. If you believe them, you will accept them, but often it is important to acknowledge what it is: a trick to sell something cheaper.

Salami

Salami comes in thin slices and is not eaten all at once. This is the intention behind this particular tactic. It suggests that something is better postponed at different times to make it more digestible than applying it all at once. It offers the possibility of introducing certain changes into agreements gradually, over a relatively long period of time. In this way, it is understood that there will be less resistance from those affected.

The demands of the mandate

Third-party negotiators are bound by their mandate. This usually takes the form of  “I have been instructed to obtain this amount and I am mandated not to give in until I get it” (Kennedy, Benson, McMillan, 1988, 191). This tactic is very common. For example, when someone says they must consult with their partner about a decision regarding a property or rent. Or a lawyer representing a client who is inflexible on certain positions. Or when a board implements shareholders’ resolutions. This becomes a negotiating trick when such a mandate is an excuse to improve certain positions in the negotiation and may in fact be the widest room for manoeuvre.

Veiled threats

Threats of sanctions can be very risky. They raise the emotional temperature. “Are you threatening me?” is a sure sign that what you are saying makes you the antagonist. “Of course not” is the expected response if you are trying to warn them of the consequences of bringing themselves into your disapproval (Kennedy, Benson, McMillan, 1988, 195). There are two useful ways to effectively use a threat of punishment:

First, the consequences of disagreeing are these, but neither of us wants to see them as a threat. How can we avoid it? Here it depends on where you stand. Zone of Possible Agreement -ZOPA-, which defines the negotiation panorama. The Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement – BATNA- of each party’s  ability to seek an agreement more easily implies how credible the threat of breaking it is.

Second, you make the sanction credible: “…we naturally do not want to require this component, as our engineers are currently investigating an alternative method that appears to be marginally cheaper…” In threats, credibility is key, and this is often linked to the strength of the BATNA. If you have a stronger alternative, it is very likely that you will not end up agreeing, and/or you can threaten to break off negotiations and demand better terms.

Connecting

Your opponent may start negotiations with you in a weak position on some issues, so their best approach is to try to connect these issues where they are weak with other issues where they are strong. For example, you may be prepared to discuss late payments of your invoices, but the other party wants to talk about the poor quality of the components you sent last week. Connecting issues in this way involves linking one issue to another and making them unacceptable together. Thus, a certain clause in the contract at the price you are asking for becomes extremely difficult to accept. If you have chosen the right clause — preferably a non-negotiable issue — it is quite likely that the price will move. If the price is firm, then you will have to revisit the clause.

Yes, but…

The “Yes, but…” tactic consists of saying, “Yes, we agree with what you are offering, but we have this other problem that we need to resolve before we can agree to everything” (Kennedy, Benson, McMillan, 1988, 198-199). The other problem is a new issue that has not been evaluated previously. This can lead to certain risks, such as affecting the patience of the losing party and suffering allegations of bad faith or of dealing with negotiators who are not serious. To avoid the “Yes, but…” tactic, all conditional proposals should be made, all objections should be kept open, and for each new option proposed, use a “No, but…” in reply: “We cannot accept these new conditions, but if you insist, we will have to rethink the terms of the entire negotiation…”

References

Kennedy, Gavin, Benson, John, McMillan, John (1988), Managing Negotiations. How to get a better deal, London: Hutchinson.

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The Power of a Positive No

Oscar Pérez de la Fuente

Carlos III University of Madrid

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3708-846X

Abstract

This paper examines William Ury’s The Power of a Positive No (2008) and its contribution to negotiation theory and interpersonal communication. The central argument is that saying no effectively is not an act of rejection alone, but a disciplined practice that balances personal interests, legitimate power, and the preservation of relationships. Ury shows that people often respond to difficult situations by accommodating, attacking, or avoiding, yet these reactions rarely produce constructive outcomes. As an alternative, he proposes the framework of the “positive No,” structured as “Yes! No. Yes?”: the first yes affirms one’s core interests, the no sets a clear boundary, and the second yes opens the way to a respectful and workable agreement. The analysis also highlights the importance of developing a strong Plan B, or BATNA, as a source of positive power in negotiation. Additional emphasis is placed on brainstorming alternatives, building supportive coalitions, anticipating the other party’s moves, and assessing worst-case scenarios. Overall, the book presents a practical method for defending one’s rights and interests while sustaining dialogue and cooperation.

Keywords: principled, negotiation, emotions, interests, positions

ISSN: 3127-3408

https://doi.org/10.67647/minervastrategy.2025.10

After his work Getting Past No (1997), William Ury wrote another work entitled The Power of a Positive No (2008). In this new original book, he explains how to face one of the most challenging things we must do every day: to say no to people who work with us, who we love, and with whom we have relationships of various kinds. As Ury says: “No is the biggest challenge today” (Ury, 2008, 10).

The analysis in this book starts from the consideration that: “It may not be the most important word in our vocabulary, but it is the hardest to say well”. The special idiosyncrasy of this term is linked to the inherent tension between exercising your power and tending your relationship. Thus, in certain situations, Ury describes three common ways out:

a) Accommodate: say-yes-when-you-want-to-say-no (Ury, 2008, 11). This is especially frequent when we want to maintain the personal relationship by making concessions.

b) Attacking: be-passive-aggressive-when-saying-no (Ury, 2008, 12). It is the opposite of accommodating. It is about using power without any consideration for the relationship. It is linked to anger or rage.

c) Avoidance: we-say-no-absolutely-nothing (Ury, 2008, 13). In these cases, communication and relationships are suspended. It is a way of coping with problems by avoiding people.

As can be imagined, these three ways out do not lead to success, and Ury’s proposal in this book is to affirm a positive No. Then the author summarises his formula: “A positive No is a Yes! No. Yes? The first Yes expresses your interests, the Noaffirms your power, and the second Yes strengthens your relationship. A positive No balances power and relationship in service of your interests (Ury, 2008, 17).

The first Yes could be seen as internally focused – the assertion of one’s own interests – and the second Yes is externally focused -an invitation to the other to come to an agreement that satisfies those interests-. In this post, I will focus on the elements that give power to your No.

Saying No is not easy. Ury suggests that positive power must be developed, which is achieved by having a plan B. It is a matter of considering the worst-case scenario and seeing the possibilities one would have to achieve one’s objectives (Ury, 2008, 61-63).

Plan B is also called BATNA (Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement). It is not an option to an agreement but an alternative to the agreement, a course of action that can be taken independently of the agreement with the other party. A better BATNA gives more bargaining power. A plan B is positive power; it does not mean punishing the other party. It is a strategic element that can condition the negotiation and must be considered.

The key question, then, is how to strengthen your plan B. One element that can help is brainstorming, where you use your imagination to develop various possible solutions without looking at their feasibility. Alternatives to a given situation should be carefully considered. These may include a) Do it yourself: achieve your goals by your own means without going to the other party; b) Run away: sometimes a possible way out is to end the relationship; c) Third party: sometimes the intervention of a third party as an intermediary is positive (Ury, 2008, 64-65).

Along with building a powerful No, Ury recommends “building a winning coalition”. In each situation, allies with similar interests should be sought, and a common action plan can be addressed.

The key to the various interactions is information, especially about the interests and opinions of the other party. Ury advises, “anticipate the other’s next move”. Foreseeing likely courses of action and possible responses is strategically relevant. Anticipation gives a strategic advantage to the foresighted (Ury, 2008, 66-68).

From this perspective, Ury argues that one should consider the worst-case scenario. It would be to put yourself in the position of checking what you could lose in the negotiation, on the one hand, and what plan B or BATNA is, on the other hand.

In conclusion, Ury reaffirms your decision to decide No in three questions: “Do you have the interest? Do you have the power? Do you have the right?” (Ury, 2008, 71). This point must be complemented with other negotiating elements, allowing you to reach efficient and intelligent agreements, from different interactions, based on building a positive No.

References

Ury, William (1997), Supere el No. Cómo negociar con personas que adoptan posiciones inflexibles, Barcelona: Ediciones Gestión 2000, trad. Adriana de Hassan. (original title: Gettig past No, 1991)

Ury, William (2008), The Power of a Positive No. How To Say No & Still Get to Yes, London: Hodder & Stoughton.

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Julius Caesar, Zone of Possible Agreement (ZOPA) in Civil War

Oscar Pérez de la Fuente

Carlos III University of Madrid

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3708-846X

Abstract

This paper examines Julius Caesar’s account of the Roman civil war through the lens of negotiation theory, especially the Zone of Possible Agreement (ZOPA). Drawing on passages from Civil War, it analyses the peace proposals exchanged between Caesar and Pompey and evaluates whether their respective Best Alternatives to a Negotiated Agreement (BATNAs) allowed any realistic settlement. Pompey’s proposal required Caesar to withdraw and disarm while his opponents continued mobilising, creating an imbalance that made agreement irrational from Caesar’s perspective. Caesar’s later proposal, by contrast, rested on relative parity and third-party arbitration by the Senate and Roman people, suggesting that negotiations become viable when both sides perceive similar levels of strength and uncertainty. The analysis also shows how non-material factors, particularly pride, reputation, and hostile emotions, narrowed or eliminated the ZOPA. Pompey’s refusal to accept terms that might appear to benefit Caesar, and the explicit desire among some supporters for Caesar’s death, reveal how personal animosity can override strategic calculation. The case illustrates that successful negotiation depends not only on balanced alternatives, but also on emotional management and legitimate, impartial mediation.

Keywords: diplomacy, just war, principled negotiation, emotion, interests, positions 

ISSN: 3127-3408

https://doi.org/10.67647/minervastrategy.2025.07

In a book entitled Civil War (2011), Julius Caesar narrates the political and military conflicts with the Roman Senate and especially with his rival Pompey. These led to a veritable civil war between contending groups looking to seize power.

In this post, I will analyse the successive peace proposals made by Julius Caesar and Pompey, through the lens of ZOPA analysis. The Zone of Possible Agreement – known as ZOPA – is a frame of reference that is relevant to any negotiation. It is defined between the parties’ two BATNAs. That is, between each player’s Best Alternatives to a Negotiated Agreement -BATNA-. Another way of expressing this is to define the ZOPA as the margin between the two reserve prices of each party. In other words, the minimum prices that the parties are willing to accept in a negotiation.

In the work Civil War, the author describes how the conflicts for power in Rome arose. He explains that Pompey made Julius Caesar the following proposal: “Caesar should return to Gaul, withdraw from Rimini, discharge his armies; if he met these terms, Pompey would go to Hispania. Until there was assurance that Caesar would do what he had promised, the consuls and Pompey would not cease levying levies” (Julio César, 2011, 74-75, I.10).

The analysis from ZOPA is that the parties’ BATNAs do not allow for a deal on these terms. The proposed deal is that Julius Caesar must withdraw and disarm while his adversaries continue to arm. Julius Caesar would rather fight with his present forces than disarm. Pompey concedes to go to Hispania but only after he has assembled  the troops. The agreement is unbalanced in terms of the strategic relevance of the concessions between the parties. Therefore, the party that is asked to make a greater effort – to disarm – will easily find a better alternative to the proposed agreement.

Events progressed and it was now Julius Caesar who made a proposal to Pompey for a peace agreement, on the following terms: “that they should cause no more harm to themselves or to the Republic. They themselves were already enough proof, by their own disasters, of how much power fortune has in war. This was the only occasion to treat of peace, so long as both were confident of their strength, and their power was considered equal; if fortune helped only a little to one of the two, he who considered himself superior would not admit of terms for peace, nor consider himself satisfied with a part in which he trusted to possess all.

Since he had not been able to reach an agreement before, the terms for peace had to be requested in Rome from the Senate and the Roman people” (Julio César, 2011, 186-187, III. 10)

This agreement is based on equality of forces and uses the figure of an arbitration by the Senate. It is interesting the reflection that Julius Caesar makes where equality of forces is more favourable to peace, while if one party is more fortunate in combat, it will seek to defeat the other in battle.

What Julius Caesar means is that agreement is possible if the two sides have similar BATNAs. If one side has a very good BATNA – it has a good chance of winning the war – there is no possibility of agreement. The Zone of Potential Agreement -ZOPA- will expand with the uncertainty of the final outcome from two medium BATNAs.

Turning to a third party to settle a dispute is a legitimate, and widely used, way to do so, as long as its impartiality of judgement is guaranteed.

To Julius Caesar’s proposal of peace, Pompey’s reply was: “What does life or the city matter to me if it is to be believed that I have it for Caesar’s benefit; this belief cannot be erased, since it will be believed that by him I have been restored to Italy, when I came out” (Julio César, 2011, 192, III.18).

Here it is worth remembering Fisher and Ury’s rule “Separate the persons from the problem“. One party does not want to enter into a agreement because any solution will look like a success for the other party. In addition to an issue of hierarchy between the two, what seems to be relevant here are the emotions that stand in the way of any agreement. This always leads to conflict.

Proof of this are the words of an officer of the Pompeian army, named Labienus, who at one point in the negotiations said: “Stop talking about peace, for there can be no peace for us unless Caesar’s head is brought to us” (Julio César, 2011, 194, III.20).

It seems clear that there is an emotional problem and that the declared aim of one side is the death of Julius Caesar. In this case, there is no ZOPA. No agreement is possible if one side only wants Caesar’s death to make peace. The other side’s alternative is to fight and defend Julius Caesar’s life.

Pompey’s end also teaches us about strategy. His armies were defeated by Julius Caesar’s armies and set sail for Syria. There he sought help from Ptolemy, king of Egypt, who was at loggerheads with his sister Cleopatra, who later had a relationship with Julius Caesar that has been mythologised. Out of fear of the threat he posed or out of contempt for misfortune, Ptolemy’s advisors agreed to answer Pompey kindly in public and secretly sent two emissaries to kill him (Julio César, 2011, 259, III.104).

This story between Julius Caesar and Pompey can make us reflect on some aspects: a) On the need to establish a Zone of Possible Agreement (ZOPA) according to the BATNA of the parties, their Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement. The key to negotiating power is to have a good BATNA, a good alternative to negotiate; b) Proper management of emotions. They should not be an objective, in themselves, of the negotiation; c) Approach of third parties when their impartiality of judgement is guaranteed.

References

Julio César (2011), Guerra civil, Madrid: Gredos, trans Julio Calonge.

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Thucydides, the negotiating power in the Melian dialogue

Oscar Pérez de la Fuente

Carlos III University of Madrid

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3708-846X

Abstract

This paper examines the Melian Dialogue in Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War through the lens of negotiation theory and bargaining power. It argues that the exchange between Athens and Melos is not only a classic statement of political realism, but also a revealing case study in asymmetric negotiation. The Athenians frame the discussion in terms of power, necessity, and strategic credibility, rejecting appeals to justice except among equals. The Melians, by contrast, defend neutrality, hope, and the possibility of external support, especially from Sparta. Using the concept of BATNA (Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement), the paper analyzes how each side assesses its alternatives and how those assessments shape the negotiation. Athens possesses a stronger BATNA because it can impose its will through military force, while Melos depends on uncertain alliances and resistance. Nevertheless, the paper contends that Athenian strategy is limited, since coercion secures submission but not durable cooperation. The conclusion is that the dialogue illustrates a central lesson of negotiation: bargaining power depends on credible alternatives, but long-term outcomes are often improved by persuasion, legitimacy, and principled agreement rather than force alone.

Keywords: bargaining power, force, neutrality, principled negotiation, BATNA

ISSN: 3127-3408

https://doi.org/10.67647/minervastrategy.2025.05

In the work History of the Peloponnesian War (2013), Thucydides narrates the conflicts that took place in Ancient Greece between the polis of Athens and Sparta. He highlights the famous Melian dialogue in which the Athenians -who held an empire- and the Melians -who inhabited the island of Milos- discuss their future relationship.

This dialogue is characterised by the Melians appealing to arguments of justice, equality and neutrality, while the Athenians use the threat of force and unequal resources. It would be an example, among the classics, of what is called real politik.

The Athenians distinguish between arguments of justice -between equals – and appeals to force -between the powerful and the weak-. The Athenians assert that “justice prevails in the human race in circumstances of equality, and that the powerful do what their strength permits and the weak yield to them” (Tucídides, 2013, 388, V.89). So  according to the Athenians, the Melians must yield.

The Melians attempt to deliberate, advocating a position of neutrality between Sparta and Athens, but offering friendship. The Melians argue “would you not agree that, remaining neutral, we should be your friends rather than your enemies, but not allies of either side” (Tucídides, 2013, 389, V.94).

In a typical response of political realism, the Athenians set their priorities in the relationship with the Melians: 1.- Hatred/Vassalage; 2.- Enmity; 3.- Friendship/Neutrality. Allowing an island to be neutral and friendly is a bad example for the interests of the Athenian empire. From this perspective, the Athenians assert that “your enmity does not harm us so much as your friendship, which is to our vassals a manifest sign of our weakness, while your hatred is a sign of our power” (Tucídides, 2013, 389, V.95).

The Athenians’ argument is an appeal to power and force. They do not try to convince the Melians of the advantages of accepting their position. Rather, they make a serious threat, which given the context must have been credible. The Athenians argue that “this is not a contest for you to measure courage on equal terms so as not to suffer dishonour, but the deliberation is rather about your salvation, which consists in not standing up to those who are much stronger” (Tucídides, 2013, 390, V.101).

The response of the Melians is to relativise the power of the other side and give more value to the alternative of a confrontation than that of surrender. The Melians assert that “wars present vicissitudes that are more evenly shared than the disproportion of forces would suggest. For us to give in immediately holds out no hope, whereas by giving ourselves up to action there is still hope of standing” (Tucídides, 2013, 390, V.102).

This Melian dialogue allows us to address the question of bargaining power. In particular, according to the terminology of the Harvard Method in Getting to yes, from Fisher and Ury, on BATNA. The key element of negotiations is what is the Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement –BATNA-. What is relevant is to identify this BATNA and use it as the yardstick to measure any possible negotiating outcome.

The BATNA marks the worst acceptable outcome of the negotiation. The red line where it is better not to give in. The key is that the better BATNA you have, the more bargaining power a party has. If a party has a strong alternative, it will be able to make greater demands of the other party.

I will now analyse the Melian Dialogue from the perspective of the bargaining power of the parties. The Athenians consider their BATNA to be high because they are powerful and strong. This means that they can conquer the city despite the will of the Melians. The alternatives are the surrender of the Melians or their military defeat.

The Melians try to deliberate and convince the Athenians in terms of equality and justice. Their BATNA is an alliance with Sparta to protect them from Athens. Their alternatives are a lonely and heroic war, an alliance with Sparta, surrender to Athens or compromise with Athens.

From the point of view of strategy, the Athenians failed because they only threatened with force, but did not try to convince the other side of the advantages of being allies. They sought a relationship of vassalage and wanted to impose it through force. The negotiation was about whether they would have to fight to achieve their goals. From today’s perspective, it would be better to have allies than forced vassals.

From the Melians’ point of view, the alternative to negotiating is to ally more strongly with Sparta. The problem with this negotiation is that the alternatives they propose are voluntary surrender or military defeat. These terms are unacceptable to the Melians. The way to improve BATNA is to consolidate and make credible the possible alternatives, particularly the alliance with Sparta. It should also try to deliberate and convince the other side on a principled basis.

Thucydides himself recounts that Athens finally carried out its threat. From this perspective, “the Athenians executed all the Melians of virile age who fell into their hands and reduced the children and women to slavery” ((Tucídides, 2013, 394, V.116). The Melians dialogue does not have a happy ending. The powerful wins by making good on their threat to use force. The lesson, from strategy, is that negotiations should enable parties to improve their bargaining power and better results be obtained, in the long run, from principled and convincing arguments.

References

Tucídides (2013) Historia de la Guerra del Peloponeso, Barcelona: Crítica, trans. Francisco Rodríguez Adrados.