Diego de Saavedra Fajardo, Political enterprises (II)

Diego de Saavedra Fajardo was a Spanish political writer, literary critic, poet, philosopher, and jurist, who was born in Algezares in 1584 and died in Madrid in 1648. I recently dedicated a post to his essay Empresas políticas/Political enterprises, a monumental work comprising four volumes and 100 enterprises, as the subtitle suggests. These books bring together the advice of a diplomat by profession on how to exercise political power effectively. 

Below, excerpts from volume II of the book by Diego de Saavedra Fajardo, Empresas políticas o Idea de un príncipe político cristiano representada en cien empresas/Political Enterprises or Idea of a Christian political prince represented in hundred enterprises, will be discussed in the style of Minerva Strategy Blog.

“Those who are very keen on aggrandising themselves and amassing their fortune are dangerous in positions of power. Although some seek merit and glory, and these are always worthy ministers, many consider it safer to build their fortunes on riches, and not to keep the reward and satisfaction of their services in the hands of the prince, who is almost always ungrateful to those who deserve it most” (Diego de Saavedra Fajardo, Empresas políticas o Idea de un príncipe político cristiano representada en cien empresas, LIII).

The pursuit of profit is often cited as the driving force behind the private sector. Adam Smith’s invisible hand and Mandeville’s fable of the bees, with varying degrees of intensity and nuance, argue that private vices such as greed, luxury, the pursuit of profit and envy lead to positive public consequences such as wealth, efficiency and free competition. However, as Saavedra Fajardo contends in this passage, it is not appropriate for the pursuit of profit to be the goal of those with responsibilities in the public sector. Politics is legitimised in such a way that those in power are accountable, which must be characterised by transparency, rigour in public budget, and adequate management of conflicts of interest. 

“But even when necessity compels the prince to do so, he must not live carelessly and detached from affairs, even if he has very capable and loyal ministers. For the body of the States is like natural beings who, lacking the inner warmth of the soul, no remedies or efforts are sufficient to maintain or sustain them so that they do not decay. The prince is the soul of his republic, and for it to live, he must in some way attend to its members and organs” (Diego de Saavedra Fajardo, Empresas políticas o Idea de un príncipe político cristiano representada en cien empresas, LVII).

With due regard for contextual differences, in these lines, Saavedra Fajardo alludes, in an incipient way, to the notion of political responsibility. In legal responsibility, if someone commits a crime and is convicted by a judge, they must then serve a sentence, which may consist of imprisonment, a fine or barred from exercising political rights. In political responsibility, if someone has a public position and has committed acts that warrant serious reproach that lead to the loss of the trust of the person who appointed them, they must resign. Resignation or dismissal is the sanction for political responsibility. In addition, the ruler is politically responsible if he has not properly supervised his subordinates –culpa in vigilando– or if he appointed someone and was negligent in not realising how manifestly unsuitable his candidate was for the position –culpa in eligendo-. It is noteworthy that the responsibility of those in power goes beyond merely not committing crimes and, in serious cases, if political responsibility is exercised, the best course of action is to leave public office.

“The strings of this harp of the kingdom are the people. Their nature is monstrous in every way and uneven, fickle and varied. They are governed by appearances without going deeper. They consult rumours. It is poor in means and counsel, unable to distinguish the false from the true; always inclined towards the worst. At any given moment, it is dressed in two contrary affections. But it is led more by them than by reason, more by impetus than by prudence, more by shadows than by truth” (Diego de Saavedra Fajardo, Empresas políticas o Idea de un príncipe político cristiano representada en cien empresas, LXI).

There has been an elitist tradition in the History of Ideas since Plato. Sartori expressed some misgivings in Homo Videns about videocracy and how the criterion for choosing candidates in political parties was to look for actors or sports stars because they were already famous, because they appeared on television. Umberto Eco criticised social media because it had given a voice to the uninformed who previously hardly anyone listened to. In the digital age, the key is whether the manipulation of people by demagogues becomes even more sophisticated, camouflaged by technological advances.

“Three things are required in resolutions: prudence to deliberate them, skill to arrange them, and perseverance to complete them. All the work and enthusiasm in their principles would be in vain if we were to overlook (as often happens) the ends. With both anchors, it is necessary that prudence secure them” (Diego de Saavedra Fajardo, Empresas políticas o Idea de un príncipe político cristiano representada en cien empresas, LXIII).

This seems like an interesting approach to establishing a strategy. Two sources of inspiration can be identified: Machiavelli and Aristotle. On the one hand, Saavedra Fajardo’s words reveal pragmatism and a matching of means to ends, sometimes referred to as efficiency, which aligns with some of Machiavelli’s writings. On the other hand, there is an emphasis on prudence, which Aristotle considered the virtue of virtues, focusing on practical rationality and aiming at the ends of human beings, happiness or human flourishing. Virtues, according to the Aristotelian perspective, arise as a middle ground between vices, one by default and the other by excess. An appeal to moderation as a guide for human life. 

The demagogue’s handbook

I will continue with the series dedicated to handbooks, with the book Manual del demagogo (The demagogue’s handbook), written by Raoul Frary. This work is published in Spanish by Sequitur, and the editing and translation are by Miguel Catalán.

The author of the book, Henry François Raoul Frary, born on 17 April 1842 in Tracy-le-Mont and died on 19 April 1892 in Plessis-Bouchard, was a French professor, journalist and essayist.

According to Fernando Savater’s summary in a column entitled “Consejos (Advices)“, Frary wrote this pamphlet “with the advice of a seasoned politician to an aspiring demagogue, that is, to guide others by pulling the reins and obtaining the best benefits for himself.” In the prologue, Miguel Catalán describes the author as an “idealist disguised as a cynic.” The irony and sense of humour that permeate the lines of this work are remarkable. While dealing with very serious issues, the tone used is somewhat frivolous, which invites complicity and reflection.  

Next, excerpts from Raoul Frary’s work Manual del demogogo will be discussed, in the style of Minerva Strategy Blog.

“Let us emphasise from the outset that praise is never strong enough. It is not good to be rude, but there is no problem with being excessive in flattery. Rarely are so many good things said about us as we think we deserve (…) The least justified compliments are often the most welcome: they are more novel. Persuading an apathetic person of their courage, a debauched person of their wisdom, and a fool of their intelligence is the pinnacle of art. But one must know how to act with delicacy and not bring the censer out into the public sphere. Success is achieved by using tact and choosing your evidence well” (Raoul Frary, Manual del demagogo, II.2).

Flattery is one of the favourite weapons of demagogues. Nothing pleases the ears more than praising words that applaud the audience. While this is true as a general principle, there is a real art to praise. This is because praise, to have the best effect, must appear sincere or be the subject of serious analysis. Excessive flattery can backfire by coming across as artificial and insincere, material for gullible people who do not question the true intentions of those who use so many flattering expressions. 

“Herein lies one of the secrets of demagoguery, if I may call a method whose excellence is obvious a secret. All the passions and interests of the world would not suffice without the pride of faith. The French during the Revolution would not have endured such a harsh government, such severe deprivation and such terrible dangers, if they had not felt so flattered by the promulgation of a new dogma (…) it is not necessary for the dogma to be true, nor for it to be noble, nor for it to be clear and understandable. It is enough that it is believed and that the believer feels proud to believe”  (Raoul Frary, Manual del demagogo, II.2).

Parallels are sometimes drawn between religion and politics. Here, we seek to reflect on attitudes towards political beliefs that are assimilated into the dogmatism of a faith, into the beliefs of a religious believer. Ideologies tend to have a conception of the world —values about what society or human beings should be— where they often mix scientific knowledge with emotional components and a powerful mobilising effect. Frary warns that these political ideologies have elements of religious faith and that this motivates their believers. This brings to mind some current debates, raised from sectarian perspectives, where people always want to be right, leaving no room for temperance, tolerance and consensus.   

“The moralist teaches us patience, sobriety in pleasures, moderation in desires, and the consequences of our efforts. He constantly directs our attention to those who have succeeded through their own merit and those who have fallen through their mistakes. He reduces the responsibility of Fortune and increases our own responsibility. He diminishes the power of laws and enhances the power of customs. The demagogue does just the opposite. He asserts that Fortune distributes her gifts blindly, that success is due to chance, perhaps even to vice, that the unfortunate are victims of an artificial fatality, that misery is inevitable in today’s society. Far from exhorting us to become better, he does not even admit that it depends on us. If our habits are bad, he pretends to ignore them; he does not suspect that the weaknesses of our behaviour reinforce the difficulties of our existence. He rails against social climbers and ridicules edifying tales of morality put into practice. He diminishes the responsibility of customs in all things in order to increase that of laws. He does not instil patience in us, nor does he make us reflect on our fault” (Raoul Frary, Manual del demogogo, II.3).

In this passage, Frary compares the moralist and the demagogue, whose aims and advice differ greatly. The former exhorts moderation and a responsible approach to life, while the latter does not call for a change in behaviour, since success is due to chance, appealing to the responsibility of laws rather than customs. However, the fundamental difference between the two is omitted in Frary’s text: the demagogue has spurious aims, generally to obtain his own benefit or that of his group, while the moralist would generally seek the good of those he seeks to advise.

“The envious person says to himself: ‘Inequality is unjust. It is possible, and even easy, to eliminate it. If it is eliminated, it will benefit me.’ If you want to stir up demagogic envy and use it to your advantage, you can never emphasise these three propositions enough, to place them beyond all doubt, to root them ever more deeply in people’s minds and hearts” (Raoul Frary, Manual del demagogo, II.6).

There are entire libraries dedicated to the subject of this paragraph from the work Manual del demagogo. The Spanish Royal Academy of Language defines envy as “sadness or regret for the good fortune of others.” There are people who suffer greatly from the successes of others, and the worst thing about envy is the actions it sometimes provokes from the envious person. On the other hand, the fight against certain social and economic inequalities is the legitimate objective of the social and democratic rule of law. Frary’s reasoning takes an argumentative leap when he asserts that it is easy to eliminate inequality. First, we must distinguish what type of inequality we are dealing with, whether it affects politics (inclusion), economy (redistribution) or culture (recognition). If the ultimate goal is to eliminate inequality, it will not be easy, but it is a task that can engage society. However, Frary was warning against the demagogic use of inequality, linked to envy. And again, the question is: What are the demagogue’s objectives?