Oscar Pérez de la Fuente
Carlos III University of Madrid
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3708-846X
Abstract
This article examines why nuclear wars have not occurred by drawing on Thomas Schelling’s strategic thought as interpreted by Robert Ayson. It argues that the nuclear age is best understood through the concepts of stability and the balance of deterrence, which together explain why nuclear-armed states are strongly discouraged from initiating conflict. The core claim is that deterrence works when the expected costs of aggression exceed its possible gains, especially under conditions where both sides retain the capacity to retaliate after an attack. In this context, mutual fear of retaliation functions as a stabilizing mechanism, since any first strike would likely provoke a devastating counterattack and generate unacceptable losses for all parties. The article also stresses that nuclear equilibrium is fragile and depends on preventing surprise attacks, misperceptions, and accidental escalation. By linking Schelling’s approach to broader strategic reasoning, the paper shows that the avoidance of nuclear war is not simply a matter of good fortune, but the result of a structure of incentives and disincentives shaped by credible deterrence. It concludes that negotiation and arms control remain essential complements to strategic stability.
Keywords: diplomacy, deterrence, prisoner’s dilemma, equilibrium, stability, positions
It is not a frequently asked question, and we certainly hope they never happen, but you have not asked yourselves why nuclear wars have not happened? The answer to this disturbing question can be found in Robert Ayson’s book, Thomas Schelling and the Nuclear Age (2004), which explains the ideas of Thomas Schelling, winner of the 2005 Nobel Prize in Economics, who has made significant contributions to the world of strategy and international relations.
In several of his works, Schelling analyses the issue of nuclear armament from the perspective of strategy. His approach is to make international relations, especially military decisions, eminently strategic territory. Lessons can be learned from his contributions for other strategy development and success areas.
According to Schelling, the key concepts to explain the nuclear age are stability and balance of deterrence (Ayson, 2004, 72). The strategy must be aimed at seeking stability between the parties. This is achieved by the balance of deterrence, which is based on two elements: a) a situation in which the disincentives outweigh the incentives for both sides to initiate war; b) it is “stable” when it is reasonably secure against shocks, alarms and disturbances.
Therefore, initiating conflict must be discouraged and unexpected events, such as a surprise attack, must be prevented. Schelling’s lesson in the nuclear age is that the respective incentives and disincentives condition stability.
In his explanation of nuclear strategy, Ayson alludes to Brodie’s work, which provides the key: “Precisely because there is no defence against the atomic bomb, any party, possessing atomic weapons, threatened with attack, has the ability to impose heavy costs on the attacker” (Ayson, 2004, 1997, 58).
The state of equilibrium is produced by ‘mutual fear of retaliation’. The costs of all kinds involved in the use of nuclear weapons discourage an attack for fear of a response, in the form of a counterattack, from the other side.
Equilibrium occurs because both sides have disincentives to initiate an attack, and the costs of taking one on by the other side are very high. Special care must be taken to avoid surprise attacks and unexpected situations that can change the equilibrium.
It can be argued that the equilibrium in the nuclear age has aspects that resemble the prisoner’s dilemma. Thus, betrayals by the players have a very high cost for both sides because there is a response rule in the form of a nuclear counterattack. As Poundstone explains, nuclear war would be a case of simultaneous and mutual bombing. As early as 1945, Senator Brien McMahon said: “If there is a nuclear Pearl Harbor, there will not be a jury of statesmen left to study the case” (Poundstone, 1995, 215).
Schelling’s approach focuses on the role of stability and negotiation in the nuclear age. We could draw some conclusions from his approach: the best strategy is the one that seeks stability, which is guaranteed if the disincentives to conflict are greater than the incentives; the balance of deterrence is produced by fear of retaliation by the other side, which comes at significant cost; the best alternative to an endless arms race is negotiation.
In other words, stability is ensured by the parties’ disincentives to conflict and fear of retaliation, which entails high costs. By discouraging conflict, equilibrium is achieved.
References
Ayson, Robert (2004), Thomas Schelling and the Nuclear Age. Strategy as a Social Science, New York, London: Routledge.
Poundstone, William (1995), El dilema del prisionero,. John Von Neumann, la teoría de juegos y la bomba, Madrid: Alianza, trad. Daniel Manzanarez Fourcade. (original title: The Prisoner’s Dilemma. John Von Neumann, game theory and Puzzle of the bomb).