Tag: Negotiation

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Frontinus: It’s All About Expectations

Oscar Pérez de la Fuente

Carlos III University of Madrid

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3708-846X

Abstract

This essay examines a selection of stratagems recounted by Frontinus in the Strategemata to show how the management of expectations shapes strategic outcomes. Through episodes involving simulated reinforcements, the concealment of setbacks, the appearance of abundance and displays of determination, it identifies deception, morale, perceived alternatives and credible commitment as central strategic mechanisms. The analysis connects these classical military ruses with contemporary negotiation theory, particularly the role of information, verification and the best alternative to a negotiated agreement (BATNA). It argues that strategic advantage often depends less on material conditions than on influencing how the other party interprets them, while also drawing attention to the ethical risks posed by manipulation and dirty tricks.

Keywords: strategy, expectations, negotiation, deception, BATNA

ISSN: 3127-3408

https://doi.org/10.67647/minervastrategy.2026.16

Frontinus’ Stratagemata is a classic work is a classic of military strategy from antiquity. One of its distinctive features is that it is written in a casuistic style, with each topic drawing on stories or anecdotes that would have been widely known at the time.

In this essay, I shall discuss a series of tactics and stratagems, as recounted by Frontinus, all of which share  a common feature: they are linked to the expectations of the parties involved. This is a key element of strategy. It is essential to know how to manage the parties’ expectations with the aim of achieving specific interests. As we shall see, some military ruses would fall within the Machiavellian model and the maxim commonly attributed to Machiavelli “the end justifies the means”. Some are dirty tricks, and every good strategist must be able to recognise them and respond  appropriately.

Below is an analysis of Frontinus’ stratagems, with a commentary on their significance in terms of the general principles of strategy.

On how to strike fear into the enemy’s ranks

When the consul Gaius Sulpicius Peticus was about to engage the Gauls in battle, he ordered certain mule drivers to withdraw secretly with their mules to the nearby hills, and then, once the fighting had begun, to repeatedly show themselves to the combatants, as though they were riding horses. The Gauls, therefore, imagining that reinforcements were on their way, retreated before the Romans, even though they were already on the verge of victory (Frontinus, 2010, 199).

This is a form of deception. From a distance, the mule drivers created the illusions  that reinforcements were on their way, when in fact this was not the case. Deception is a classic example of a dirty trick in negotiations. The way counter this is through impartial verification of the facts and by consulting various sources of information. At times, this may be seen as a sign of mistrust, but it is precisely impartial verification that can prevent this sort of trickery by one of the parties. Verification should be accepted as a normal part of such situations.

How to hide setbacks

The consul Titus Quinctius Capitolinus, after the Romans had lost ground in a battle, falsely claimed that the enemy had been defeated on the other flank. In this way, by bolstering the morale of his men, he secured victory (Frontinus, 2010, 217).

This is a way of raising one party’s expectations – and thereby improving its final outcome. In the context of negotiations, it reminds me of the strategic moves following the initial offer in a particular deal. If expectations are low and the BATNA – the best alternative to a negotiated agreement – is low, the other party’s counter-offer will be similar to the initial offer. Conversely, if there is a sense of having won, expectations are high and the BATNA is high, then the counter-offer will almost certainly be significantly different from the initial offer.

How to create the impression of abundance where there is a lack

When the Capitol was besieged by the Gauls, the Romans, on the brink of starvation, threw bread into the enemy’s ranks. In this way, they gave the impression that they were well supplied with food, and thus held out against the siege until Camillus arrived (Frontinus, 2010, 243).

This is a form of deception designed to alter the other party’s expectations and an ingenious one. No one would expect a starving garrison to throw bread at the enemy. The key point is that, when faced with the other party, a weakness is presented as a strength. One pretends to have food when in fact one lacks it, thereby altering the other party’s expectations.

On determination (the will to win)

When Viriathus offered to return their wives and children to the people of Segovia, they chose to witness the execution of their loved ones rather than betray the Romans (Frontinus, 2010, 266).

The inhabitants of Numantia chose to barricade themselves in their homes and starve to death rather than surrender (Frontinus, 2010, 266).

In any strategy, priorities must be established amongst different elements. In these examples proposed by Frontinus, theoverriding priority is loyalty or resistance, to which everything else is subordinated; in one case, the inhabitants renounce their loved ones; and in the other, they choose to starve to death. In the context of negotiations, this may prompt reflection on the firmness of commitments. These are strategic manoeuvres in which one of the parties voluntarily restricts their own will in anticipation of a concession in return.

Such commitments are central to negotiation and constitute a strategic factor, as they bring about a lasting change in expectations. The examples of Segovia and Numantia, as recounted by Frontinus, are extreme cases because they involve sacrificing elements of vital importance in order to secure a military victory; however, the lesson is that a credible display of resolve can change the other side’s expectations, although these extreme cases also show the high price such commitment may carry

References

Frontinus, Sextus Julius (2010), “Strategemata”, en Roca Barea, María Elvira (ed.),  Tratado militar de Frontino. Humanismo y caballeria en el cuatrocientos castellano, Madrid, CSIC, pp. 145-275. 

(English version: Frontino: Bennett, Charles E. (trans.) (1925), Frontinus: Stratagems. Aqueducts of Rome, Loeb Classical Library 174, Cambridge (MA): Harvard University Press)

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Vegetius: trust, effort and expectations

Oscar Pérez de la Fuente

Carlos III University of Madrid

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3708-846

Abstract

This article examines several rules of war formulated by Vegetius and interprets them as principles of strategic action beyond the strictly military field. The analysis focuses on the importance of accurate information, strategic advantage, effort, expectations, confidentiality and surprise. Vegetius’s reflections show that successful action depends not only on strength or resources, but also on the ability to assess one’s own position and that of the opposing party with precision. In this sense, concepts such as BATNA and ZOPA help translate classical military insights into contemporary strategic and negotiation contexts. The text also highlights the role of hard work and disciplined habits as conditions for success, as well as the importance of positive expectations in shaping action and influencing others. At the same time, it stresses the need to control the information shared with opponents and to protect strategic plans from premature disclosure. Finally, the element of surprise is presented as a way to prevent the other party from preparing an effective response. Overall, Vegetius’s work remains valuable because it offers practical lessons on trust, effort, prudence and strategic judgement.

Keywords: strategy, expectations, negotiation, military tactics

ISSN: 3127-3408

https://doi.org/10.67647/minervastrategy.2026.14

In this post, I will continue to analyse the rules of war set out by Vegetius in the Compendium of Military Tactics, interpreting them with a view to their strategic application in other areas.

g) Having as much accurate information as possible about the other party – and about our own side – is the key factor (Vegetius, 2006, p. 310, III.XVIII).

Vegetius’s ninth rule of war states: “It is difficult to defeat someone who is able to make an accurate assessment of their own troops and those of the enemy” (III.XXVI).

This relates to the need to have the best and most comprehensive information about the parties in order to make a decision. It is also linked to how the ZOPA (Zone of Possible Agreement) is defined in each situation – whether one actually has the necessary information to assess each party’s real options. This also means that all information and communication from the other party must be analysed and verified impartially.

h) Sometimes the strategic advantage is a given 

The tenth rule of war states that “courage is of greater help than the number of soldiers”. And the eleventh states that “position often provides a greater advantage than courage” (Vegetius, 2006, p. 310, III.XVIII).

Applied to other areas of strategy, one could say that strategic advantage stems from a better BATNA – the best alternative to a negotiated agreement.  But even in such situations, it is possible to engage in negotiation and explore common interests.

i)Hard work brings success; idleness does not

The thirteenth rule of war states: ‘The army thrives on effort, but is ruined by apathy”  (Vegetius, 2006, p. 310, III.XVIII).

This is linked to the view that hard work is more likely to lead to success than apathy. It is connected to habits and dispositions that shape character, which are known as virtues. If one works hard and practises these virtues, one eventually becomes virtuous.

j) Expectations are the key

The fourteenth rule of war states that “you must never lead a soldier into open battle unless you see that he has a chance of victory” (Vegetius, 2006, p. 310, III.XVIII).

This is excellent advice. You must expect to win if you want to succeed. In many situations, the key lies in our own expectations and, above all, in the expectations others have of us. If you are striving to achieve a goal, you must have the highest expectations and convey them to others, while still taking impartial information into account.

k) Be careful about the information you provide to the opponent

Vegetius’s twenty-eighth rule of war states that “when you realise that your plan has been revealed to the enemy, it is advisable to change your tactics” (Vegetius, 2006, p. 311, III.XVIII).

The information you provide to your opponent should be limited to that which works to your strategic advantage. It is important to know exactly what they actually know about your plans. You should interact with them in such a way as to convey only what works to your advantage.

l) Don’t reveal your plans to just anyone

The twenty-ninth rule of war states that “consult many people on what ought to be done, but consult only a very few whom you trust completely – or, better still, only yourself – on what you are actually going to do” (Vegetius, 2006, p. 311, III.XVIII).

It is important that, once the strategic objectives have been defined, the specific ways of actually achieving them – the detailed action plan – do not necessarily need to be made public. It is important to consult trusted experts to test ideas against their views. However, it is not wise to shout the action plan from the rooftops. A distinction must be made between deliberation and the actual taking of decisions.

m) Do not let your opponent prepare their defence against your predictable attack

Vegetius’s thirty-third rule of war states that “the enemy must not know how you intend to conduct the battle, so that they do not attempt to put up resistance by taking appropriate measures” (Vegetius, 2006, p. 311, III.XVIII).

This is the strategic advantage of the element of surprise: opponents prepare their defences for the points where they believe they will be attacked. This, for example, calls for creativity in devising various options and using arguments that have not been widely explored. The awkwardness of the situation may lead them to improvise a response, which can involve making concessions to the other party.

It can be concluded that Vegetius’s Compendium of Military Technique is a classic work on military strategy and also offers important lessons: the best way to tackle a situation is with confidence, hard work and a positive outlook.

References


Vegetius Flavius Vegetius Renatus (2006), Compendio de técnica militar, Cátedra, Madrid, trans. David Paniagua Aguilar.

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Negotiation gambits and tactics

Oscar Pérez de la Fuente

Carlos III University of Madrid

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3708-846X

Abstract

This paper examines the distinction between negotiation tactics and gambits and analyses their strategic and ethical implications in business and institutional contexts. While tactics are presented as legitimate methods for pursuing negotiated outcomes, gambits are characterised as more controversial devices because they may rely on deception, pressure, or the manipulation of expectations. The discussion situates these practices within the broader debate on whether desired ends can justify questionable means, highlighting the relevance of ethical judgment in negotiation. Drawing on Kennedy, Benson, and McMillan’s Managing Negotiations. How to get a better deal (1988), the paper reviews four well-known negotiation gambits: shot gun, off-limits, tough guy, nice guy, and Russian Front. For each case, it explains how the gambit operates, why it can be effective, and what strategic responses may help neutralise its impact. Special attention is given to power asymmetries, credibility, perceived alternatives, and the role of BATNA in assessing positions and reactions. The paper argues that effective negotiators must not only recognise these manoeuvres but also respond in ways that preserve their interests without escalating conflict unnecessarily.

Keywords: negotiation, gambits, tactics, business ethics

ISSN: 3127-3408

https://doi.org/10.67647/minervastrategy.2025.11

The Spanish Royal Academy of Language defines tactics as: “method or system for executing or achieving something” while gambit is defined as: “ruse or trap used to achieve an end”. It seems that the use of tactics would be something proper to any strategy: putting in place the means to achieve a certain end. Tricks are more morally controversial, because in the means used, directly or indirectly, there may be a certain element of deception or manipulation of perceptions.

On the ethical assessment of business tactics and tricks, reference can be made to the more general debate on whether the ‘end justifies the means’ along the lines of Machiavelli. Regarding their strategic use, the first point is that one must be aware of these tactics–gambits to be able to identify them correctly. Secondly, one must know how to react properly to dismantle these negotiation tactics and tricks, as they are a way of gaining an advantage over the other party by manipulating their perceptions and expectations.

In the book Managing negotiations. How to get a better deal (1988), Gavin Kennedy, John Benson, John McMillan offer an extensive catalogue of these negotiation tactics or tricks:

Shot gun

This negotiation tactic consists of using adherence to the conditions of the other party, at a certain point, as an inexcusable condition for continuing negotiations, or even relations between the parties. Kennedy, Benson and McMillan give an example of the shot gun tactic:

“Unless you do not agree immediately to… we are not prepared to discuss anything else” (often accompanied by a sanction threat).

Your opponent is forcing you to abandon some position you hold, as well as weakening your ability to extract concessions from him -from that position- in areas that you -in fact- can negotiate. Your opponent asks for immediate adherence to his negotiating approach. For example, in the insistence of a precondition for negotiation where the highest principle is at stake: “There is no negotiation with the Arab States unless they recognise the State of Israel” or vice versa, “…the State of Palestine” (Kennedy, Benson, McMillan, 1988, 180-181).

Your answer is conditioned by the balance of power. Large companies or banks often use this tactic when dealing with their customers, where we are in a market of free competition, but individually operate with adhesion contracts. To be able to react to this tactic, it must be determined whether the claims of the other party correspond to a real position of power in the strategic scenario of the situation.

Off-limits

In formal relationships it is not uncommon for the parties to specify the extent and nature of the limits to which they agree to adhere. In this context, it is not unusual to see the “off-limits” tactic used in the following formulation:

“The issue of …, is, as far as we are concerned, non-negotiable” (often accompanied by a reference to the items that are negotiable) (Kennedy, Benson, McMillan, 1988, 182).

This is relevant, for example, in negotiations where there are ideological elements, with emotive connotations of great impact, which are set as insurmountable limits to sit down to talk or start – or break off – a negotiation. There is another strategic element, which has to do with why the parties are negotiating and whether they could achieve their objectives unilaterally. This is known as the dimensions of BATNA. We are usually in situations of interdependence, where there are complex relationships between the parties.

The way to deal with this “off-limits” tactic is to go little by little, dealing with other issues: “let’s leave this aside, let’s talk about other issues”. At the right moment, know how to summarise the relevant elements that made up the initial proposal.

Tough guy, nice guy

This tactic has been seen many times in the movies, in the interrogation of suspects by the police, where one has an antagonistic role and the other a cooperative role. In the negotiation tactic, your opponent opens with a very hard line on the subject, they may even allude to the threat of sanctions. They are accompanied by another member of their team (sometimes they may even play both roles), who expresses a more reasonable point of view compared to the first speaker, although this ‘reasonableness’ may still be unacceptable to you.

This is one of the oldest tactics and is usually successful, although it has its risks. It is a way of manipulating perceptions, where it is clearly a trick or tactic agreed by the other party from the outset. The first thing is to know how to identify it when it is being used in a negotiation, and to know how to react strategically to obtain the best possible result.

Russian Front

This is an adaptation of the tough guy, nice guy gambit, using alternative proposals rather than alternative styles of presentation. Your opponent is offered two choices, one of them worse (for them) than the other. They are intimidated into accepting the other offer, to avoid the one that is horrible (‘anything, but don’t send me to the Russian Front’ (Kennedy, Benson, McMillan, 1988, 185)). The chances of success depend on the credibility of the alternatives.

Your opponent may introduce a proposal that is totally unacceptable to you, but you believe that he intends to force you to implement it. You then feel lucky to escape the possibility -which was credible to you- that you could have been on the Russian Front.

Since this is a tactic or gambit, perhaps there is no such Russian Front and the chosen option, which also seemed unacceptable to you at first, is the coveted victory in one of your opponent’s positions. One way to deal with this tactic is to use the discarding of extreme options as a form of mutual exchange in the negotiating space.

References

Kennedy, Gavin, Benson, John, McMillan, John (1988), Managing Negotiations. How to get a better deal, London: Hutchinson.