The Harvard negotiation method is explained in the famous book Getting to Yes, to which I have dedicated several posts. One of its authors, William Ury, elaborated on some of its concepts more specifically in his book Getting Past No, which has a very descriptive subtitle: Negotiating with difficult situations. From the outset Ury makes clear that it is not about negotiating with difficult people, but rather about how to negotiate in difficult situations.
In this post I will analyse some of the techniques in this book, as being able to identify them is the first step to act accordingly and counter their effect.
In Getting Past No, Ury proposes an insight strategy that addresses five elements: a) One’s reaction; b) The emotions of others; c) The position of others; d) The discontent of others; e) The power of others. The book is devoted to each of these elements. Here I will focus on the first, self-reaction.
The natural reactions to an attack by another person are to counterattack, to give in or to break off relations. The first option -counter-attacking- means responding on the same level as the other party and is usually negative and can lead to relationships becoming entrenched, especially when they become a succession of emails of grievances. The second option -giving in- means limiting bargaining power by maintaining a good personal relationship and can sometimes lead to some form of exploitation. Breaking off relations, the third option, is a radical way out of certain dissatisfactions in the relationship and, in most situations, is not justified.
In the face of these natural reactions, Ury proposes Don’t react: go to the balcony. This means that in negotiations, it is good to analyse situations from a distance, as if you were something unconnected. It is important to eliminate the emotional element that is implicit in all negotiations. In this regard, Ury says that getting on the balcony means letting go of natural impulses and emotions. If, during a negotiation, an emotional outburst occurs, it is advisable to let the emotions flow and, when appropriate, pick up where the meeting left off.
One of the basic functions of learning strategy, which underlies the spirit of the Minerva Strategy Blog, is to know how to identify the tactics of the other party, especially if they have a component of stratagem, deception, simulation, etc. It is important to know strategy so as not to be exploited by people who use tricks that are not what they seem.
An important step in dismantling such a tactic is to identify it and to reveal, during the negotiation, that it is being used. The first tactic Ury talks about is the stone wall. This tactic consists in not giving in. It involves conveying to the other party the firm conviction that there is no alternative to the proposed solution. It is an inflexible form of negotiation, which does not allow any kind of concession.
The way to go against the stone wall is to identify the tactic and conduct a thorough analysis of the interests and needs of the other side. For this analysis it is necessary to have your own statements and unbiased sources of information. The classic example is the purchase and sale of a flat, where, in addition to the information from the sellers, it is good to check the average price of the properties in the area with another agency.
The second stratagem is attacks, which is made up of pressure tactics designed to intimidate or make a party feel uncomfortable that will eventually lead them to give in. The most common is the threat where a negative consequence is presented if the alternative of not giving in is followed. The way to dismantle these threats is to analyse their credibility and act accordingly. Threats are sometimes made strategically without a real will to carry them out, only to change the will of the other party.
The third stratagem is trickery, which is a tactic aimed at deceiving a party. In these cases, biased or false information is often given. In the context of negotiations, the habit of impartial fact-checking is important and should not be seen as a symptom of mistrust, but as a professional way of proceeding.
Ury’s advice is that it is relevant to identify these tactics when they are used, but also not to be certain, but to see them as clues about the attitude and style of the other party.
It is also important to analyse yourself. This means that it is necessary to know one’s own emotions, and sometimes our facial gestures or body position can be more illustrative of our thoughts than we think. It is important to control emotions when dealing with relevant issues and especially that these emotions do not condition the final outcome.
In the context of negotiations, Ury advises on certain occasions to pause and be quiet. The pause can be used to step onto the balcony and take a distance. It can also serve to separate oneself from emotions and impulses. However, it is important to keep quiet because in these informal pauses a lot of information and even concessions are often offered to the other party.
Ury says to take time to think. It is relevant to analyse the various alternatives and the pros and cons of the various options in the negotiation. The joint and divergent interests of the parties should be explored because sometimes people with different interests can reach intelligent and cooperative agreements for both parties.
In the following passage, Ury advises against haste when it comes to important decisions. Major decisions require time, analysis, expert advice, and weighing up the advantages and disadvantages. It is not good to rush into something important, although it is also true that you should not let a good opportunity slip through your fingers. But we will only know that it is a good opportunity after having analysed other alternatives.
In short, Ury says that our natural impulse in the face of a difficult situation or person is to react, but that is also the worst mistake we can make. Instead of losing your temper or trying to get even, focus on getting what you want.