Tag: Strategy

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Machiavelli, pragmatism and power

Oscar Pérez de la Fuente

Carlos III University of Madrid

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3708-846X

Abstract

This paper examines Niccolò Machiavelli’s political thought through the lens of pragmatism and strategic power, drawing primarily on The Discourses alongside the more familiar claims associated with The Prince. It outlines how Machiavelli can be read in two registers: as the supposed advocate of ruthless expediency and as a republican thinker concerned with civic virtue and the preservation of the state. The discussion highlights a further, influential interpretation—Machiavelli’s separation of politics from ethics and religion—arguing that political action follows distinct rules shaped by uncertainty, conflict, and changing circumstances. Selected passages from The Discourses are used to illustrate concrete strategic lessons: when to temporize rather than suppress emerging tensions; why agreement is easier on generalities than on particulars; the importance of adapting to the “times” as a condition of continued success; and the claim that defending one’s country may justify extraordinary means when the state itself is at risk. The text also stresses the informational dimension of strategy, including skepticism toward apparent opponent errors and the need for verification mechanisms. Overall, Machiavelli is presented less as a theorist of cynicism than as an analyst of decision-making under pressure, where ends, means, and context must be aligned.

Keywords: political pragmatism, strategy, power

The best-known work by Niccolò Machiavelli is The Prince; however, it is perhaps in this work  The discourses (2003 )that his political ideas are most clearly revealed. Some people see two sides to Machiavelli: a) The Machiavellian Machiavelli of The Prince, where ‘the end justifies the means’; b) The republican Machiavelli of the Discourses, who is a patriot concerned with civic virtues.

Another interesting interpretation of Machiavelli is the view that he was the first to separate politics from ethics and religion. He claims that politics has its own rules, which are different from ethics.

In this post, I have selected several topics addressed by Machiavelli in The discourses, which have an undeniable strategic background and numerous applications.

I.33.- When either within a State or against a State an inconvenience has made headway, the safer course is to temporise, not to supress it (Machiavelli, 2003, 190).

Machiavelli’s advice is that, when a source of conflict arises, one should try to adapt to it rather than confront it head-on. Facing the problem may escalate it, while avoiding it may eventually cause it to fade away for extrinsic or intrinsic reasons.

A well-known Spanish politician often uses this tactic to manage conflicts, although rather than attributing it to his reading of Machiavelli, people tend to put it down to his personality. This strategy has its pros and cons, which should be analysed on a case-by-case basis.

The main concern will be the assets at stake and the potential losses or damage if the conflict succeeds. If the conflict is of minor significance, it may be advisable to avoid it. However, when it comes to matters of vital importance, it is better to confront it, even if this does not always mean launching a direct attack. It does, however, involve a plan of action based on the best strategy available.

I.47.- Though men make mistakes about things in general, they do not make mistakes about the particulars (Machiavelli, 2003, 225).

There is a certain tension between discussions of abstract issues and those concerning specific matters. When it comes to the former, people tend to say a great deal and may even reach a consensus. What Machiavelli points out is that when the discussion turns to specific matters, it becomes more difficult to reach agreement and easier for someone to be misled.

It is worth recalling the rule of the Harvard Method Focus on interests, not positions. Behind individual positions lie underlying interests, and these must be properly explored to reach effective and sensible agreements.

III.9.- That is behoves one to adapt oneself to the times if one wants to enjoy continued good fortune (Machiavelli, 2003, 425).

One definition of intelligence is the ability to adapt to change. Any good strategy is based on the understanding that the current situation is not permanent. The key issue addressed by strategic intelligence is how to manage change in such a way as to achieve the best possible results.

Situations of change often involve tension and uncertainty, but the key is to be clear about the objectives that really matter and to devise an appropriate strategy.

III.41.-The one’s country should be defended whether is entail ignominy or glory, and that it is good to defend it in any way whatsoever (Machiavelli, 2003, 514). 

This would be the version of ‘the end justifies the means’ that appears in The Discourses. If the State is in danger, any means are justified. The statement could be interpreted in a Machiavellian light or, alternatively, as the view of a true patriot. According to the latter interpretation, this would not be applicable to other spheres and could only be applied when the State, as the highest interest, is in danger.

This view of means and ends is characteristic of Machiavelli. But the alignment of means and ends is precisely the key element of strategy. In other posts, I have outlined the deontological, consequentialist, Machiavellian and virtuous ethical models, where each one addresses the ethical dimensions of various strategic approaches. Strategy aims for victory or success, but each ethical model involves a qualitatively different way of achieving it.

III.44.- Results are often obtained by impetuosity and daring which could never have been obtain by ordinary methods (Machiavelli, 2003, 519).

In a dynamic environment, it is crucial to thoroughly evaluate all possibilities, even those that may initially appear improbable. One should aim for the highest possible expectations once the data has been thoroughly and realistically analysed.

It is essential to clearly understand your priorities and what you value. You need to know your desired outcome and the non-negotiable points. Strengths depend on the parties’ needs, which may not always align, and that’s where agreement can be found.

III.48.- When the enemy is seen to be making a big mistake, it should be assumed that it is but an artifice (Machiavelli, 2003, 524).

Having the most and best information about the other party enables one to assess their actions and statements. It is important to understand their intentions, views, and character. One should be wary of the possibility of deception or some other subtle form of pretence. Mechanisms should be established to verify data, statements or assessments impartially. It is necessary to cross-verify accounts between people with differing strategic interests.

Occasionally, some people take these impartial checks as a sign of mistrust. However, one must separate personal relationships from the subject of the negotiation. Verifying the relevant facts is the duty of any good strategist. 

References

Machiavelli, Nicolò (2003), The Discourses, London New York: Penguin Books, trans. Leslie J. Walker. 

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The best strategy is to prevent stratagems

Oscar Pérez de la Fuente

Universidad Carlos III de Madrid

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3708-846X

Abstract

This essay clarifies the ethical boundary between strategy and stratagem by revisiting strategy’s military origins and its contemporary use in business, politics, and everyday life. Strategy is presented as the art and science of planning and selecting appropriate means to achieve a goal, while stratagem is distinguished as a ruse in war and, outside that context, as cunning or deceptive artifice. The discussion asks why deception can appear more legitimate in war, noting the high cost of defeat and the prevalence of zero-sum logics, and contrasts this with the mixed landscape of cooperation and conflict in ordinary life. Against this backdrop, four ethical models are used to evaluate when, if ever, stratagems are acceptable. A deontological approach rejects deception on principle, emphasizing truth-telling and promise-keeping. Consequentialism permits stratagems only insofar as outcomes justify them, but highlights their instability over time as discovery becomes likely. Machiavellianism treats success as the supreme rule and relies on simulation and dissimulation, yet faces the same temporal risk of exposure. Virtue ethics takes an ambivalent, moderation-based stance, allowing limited cunning only when it can plausibly align with virtuous character. The overall conclusion is cautionary: a robust strategy should minimise dependence on stratagems.

Keywords: strategy, stratagem, consequantialist ethical model, deontological ethical model, Machiavelian ethical model, virtuous ethical model

Strategy has military origins, where a series of skills and abilities were required to organise operations aimed at achieving victory for armies. Nowadays, strategy is discussed in relation to a myriad of topics that, on the surface, seem to have little to do with its military background. Perhaps what they have in common is that the need to be strategic stems from the cost of losing, which can sometimes be unbearable. In other words, strategy arises because we seek the best and most suitable means to guarantee the end goal, whether it be military victory or success in business, politics, or life.

In previous posts, I have analysed four ethical models associated with strategy: deontological, consequentialist, Machiavellian, and virtuous. It is time to take stock. To do so, I will draw on the distinction between strategy and stratagem.

There are several possible definitions of the first term, depending on the field (military, business, politics, game theory, etc.). I will adopt a definition that serves explanatory purposes. Strategy is the art and science of developing a plan and choosing the appropriate means to achieve the proposed goals.

On the other hand, the Spanish Royal Academy of Language defines stratagem as, in its first meaning, “a ruse of war” and, in its second meaning, “cunning, pretence and artful deception”. As can be seen, stratagem also has a military origin. The term “ruse” is defined by the Spanish Royal Academy of Language as “a device, a means skilfully and cleverly employed to achieve some end”.

One possible conclusion seems to be that, according to these definitions, skilful and cunningly employed device is more justified in war than in other areas. In other words, a stratagem in a military context is a ruse and, outside that context, it is artful deception.  The answer may lie in the fact that the objective of war is victory, but if it is not successful, military defeat and its dire consequences ensue. Also, because in military terms, we often talk about enemies and consider scenarios that economists refer to as zero-sum: what they lose, we gain, and vice versa.

Life is richer in nuances than war. People find themselves in situations of cooperation and conflict and develop their life plans to achieve their professional or personal goals. I mentioned in a previous post that we are all philosophers—we ask ourselves questions, we define our alpha and omega—and that we would be better off if we were all strategists. What role do stratagems play?

Here we will see the functionality of the ethical models analysed in previous posts. The deontological strategist condemns the use of stratagems because they have an element of deception. The two maxims of the deontological model are to always tell the truth and keep promises. We should walk a fine line to use a stratagem that complies with these two maxims and leads to success.

The consequentialist strategist evaluates actions based on their results or on the maximisation of a chosen variable – well-being, utility, money, happiness, etc. According to this model, stratagems will be valid depending on the consequences they produce. The key question is whether an artificial deception can be stable over time. A distinction should be made between interactions that occur once or over a longer period or are lifelong. The use of stratagems does not last over time because it increases the risk of being discovered and, therefore, would no longer produce the desired consequences.

The Machiavellian strategist is a specialist in stratagems, but authentic Machiavellianism consists precisely in not being noticed. Their vision is an art of simulation and dissimulation, the highest rule of which is the desire for success. The means are appropriate if they achieve the ends proposed. The Machiavellian strategist makes abundant use of cunning and pretence to achieve their goals. However, like the consequentialist, the passage of time increases the risk that their true actions and intentions may be discovered.

The virtuous strategist has an ambivalent position on stratagems. They can develop skills and dispositions that shape their character and involve pretence or cunning, but within known limits. According to the law of the middle term, virtue lies in moderation, never in excess. Furthermore, according to this view, not everything can be called a virtue; it is a pluralistic view, but not a relativistic one.

In summary, the deontological strategist condemns stratagems; the consequentialist strategist values stratagems based on the consequences they produce, fearing discovery over time; the Machiavellian strategist habitually uses stratagems while pretending not to; and the virtuous strategist may use stratagems, in moderation, but only if they can be considered virtues.

After these reflections, it can be said that the best strategy is to be wary of stratagems.