Tag: Strategy

Posted on

Vegetius: trust, effort and expectations

Oscar Pérez de la Fuente

Carlos III University of Madrid

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3708-846

Abstract

This article examines several rules of war formulated by Vegetius and interprets them as principles of strategic action beyond the strictly military field. The analysis focuses on the importance of accurate information, strategic advantage, effort, expectations, confidentiality and surprise. Vegetius’s reflections show that successful action depends not only on strength or resources, but also on the ability to assess one’s own position and that of the opposing party with precision. In this sense, concepts such as BATNA and ZOPA help translate classical military insights into contemporary strategic and negotiation contexts. The text also highlights the role of hard work and disciplined habits as conditions for success, as well as the importance of positive expectations in shaping action and influencing others. At the same time, it stresses the need to control the information shared with opponents and to protect strategic plans from premature disclosure. Finally, the element of surprise is presented as a way to prevent the other party from preparing an effective response. Overall, Vegetius’s work remains valuable because it offers practical lessons on trust, effort, prudence and strategic judgement.

Keywords: strategy, expectations, negotiation, military tactics

ISSN: 3127-3416

https://doi.org/10.67647/minervastrategy.2026.14

In this post, I will continue to analyse the rules of war set out by Vegetius in the Compendium of Military Tactics, interpreting them with a view to their strategic application in other areas.

g) Having as much accurate information as possible about the other party – and about our own side – is the key factor (Vegetius, 2006, p. 310, III.XVIII).

Vegetius’s ninth rule of war states: “It is difficult to defeat someone who is able to make an accurate assessment of their own troops and those of the enemy” (III.XXVI).

This relates to the need to have the best and most comprehensive information about the parties in order to make a decision. It is also linked to how the ZOPA (Zone of Possible Agreement) is defined in each situation – whether one actually has the necessary information to assess each party’s real options. This also means that all information and communication from the other party must be analysed and verified impartially.

h) Sometimes the strategic advantage is a given 

The tenth rule of war states that “courage is of greater help than the number of soldiers”. And the eleventh states that “position often provides a greater advantage than courage” (Vegetius, 2006, p. 310, III.XVIII).

Applied to other areas of strategy, one could say that strategic advantage stems from a better BATNA – the best alternative to a negotiated agreement.  But even in such situations, it is possible to engage in negotiation and explore common interests.

i)Hard work brings success; idleness does not

The thirteenth rule of war states: ‘The army thrives on effort, but is ruined by apathy”  (Vegetius, 2006, p. 310, III.XVIII).

This is linked to the view that hard work is more likely to lead to success than apathy. It is connected to habits and dispositions that shape character, which are known as virtues. If one works hard and practises these virtues, one eventually becomes virtuous.

j) Expectations are the key

The fourteenth rule of war states that “you must never lead a soldier into open battle unless you see that he has a chance of victory” (Vegetius, 2006, p. 310, III.XVIII).

This is excellent advice. You must expect to win if you want to succeed. In many situations, the key lies in our own expectations and, above all, in the expectations others have of us. If you are striving to achieve a goal, you must have the highest expectations and convey them to others, while still taking impartial information into account.

k) Be careful about the information you provide to the opponent

Vegetius’s twenty-eighth rule of war states that “when you realise that your plan has been revealed to the enemy, it is advisable to change your tactics” (Vegetius, 2006, p. 311, III.XVIII).

The information you provide to your opponent should be limited to that which works to your strategic advantage. It is important to know exactly what they actually know about your plans. You should interact with them in such a way as to convey only what works to your advantage.

l) Don’t reveal your plans to just anyone

The twenty-ninth rule of war states that “consult many people on what ought to be done, but consult only a very few whom you trust completely – or, better still, only yourself – on what you are actually going to do” (Vegetius, 2006, p. 311, III.XVIII).

It is important that, once the strategic objectives have been defined, the specific ways of actually achieving them – the detailed action plan – do not necessarily need to be made public. It is important to consult trusted experts to test ideas against their views. However, it is not wise to shout the action plan from the rooftops. A distinction must be made between deliberation and the actual taking of decisions.

m) Do not let your opponent prepare their defence against your predictable attack

Vegetius’s thirty-third rule of war states that “the enemy must not know how you intend to conduct the battle, so that they do not attempt to put up resistance by taking appropriate measures” (Vegetius, 2006, p. 311, III.XVIII).

This is the strategic advantage of the element of surprise: opponents prepare their defences for the points where they believe they will be attacked. This, for example, calls for creativity in devising various options and using arguments that have not been widely explored. The awkwardness of the situation may lead them to improvise a response, which can involve making concessions to the other party.

It can be concluded that Vegetius’s Compendium of Military Technique is a classic work on military strategy and also offers important lessons: the best way to tackle a situation is with confidence, hard work and a positive outlook.

References


Vegetius Flavius Vegetius Renatus (2006), Compendio de técnica militar, Cátedra, Madrid, trans. David Paniagua Aguilar.

Posted on

Vegetius: Learning Before Acting and Fostering Good Opportunities

Oscar Pérez de la Fuente

Carlos III University of Madrid

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3708-846X

Abstract

This article examines selected passages from Vegetius’s Compendium of Military Technique to extract strategic lessons that extend beyond the military sphere. It highlights the importance of learning before acting, systematic training, experience, information management, and the capacity to recognise and seize opportunities. The analysis also considers the limits of applying military logic to everyday life, where cooperation and competition often coexist. Through commentary on Vegetius’s rules of warfare, the text argues that preparation, prudence, alliances, and indirect forms of influence can provide decisive advantages in uncertain contexts.

Keywords: learning, strategy, war, technique, alliances

ISSN: 3127-3408

https://doi.org/10.67647/minervastrategy.2026.12

Among the works on military strategy from the classical period, one stands out above all: Vegetius’s Compendium of Military Technique (2006). Written at the behest of the Roman emperor, it compiles the military techniques and tactics of the time. One of the first points it makes is that the Romans achieved dominance over other peoples through their superior use of military technique.

Below, I shall analyse various passages from Vegetius’s work, particularly the rules of warfare he sets out, and offer my comments in the style of Minerva Strategy, with applications across a range of fields.

a) Learning before acting, and technique as a strategic advantage

“Knowledge of military discipline fosters the courage to fight: no one fears putting into practice what they are certain they have learnt well. And, indeed, in the heat of battle, a small number of well-trained soldiers are better equipped for victory, whilst a rough and untrained mob is always at risk of being massacred” (Vegetius, 2006, p. 135; I.7–8).

It is necessary to learn new techniques before putting them into practice. It is important to practise these techniques regularly. The use of techniques and tactics provides a strategic advantage.

b) War is a zero-sum game, but life is not quite so

At one point in the work, Vegetius sets out some rules of war that have an undeniable strategic dimension. The first states that “in every battle, the nature of the campaign is such that what favours you undermines the enemy, and what benefits him always harms you. Therefore, we must never undertake or neglect any action at the enemy’s behest, but only that which is useful to us” (Vegetius, 2006, p. 309; III.XXVI).

War is a zero-sum game, whilst life is usually a mix of cooperation and competition. In that sense, there is interdependence, and it is sometimes useful for us to take action to accommodate the other party’s wishes. What matters is that this forms part of a well-designed strategy or an agreement – whether explicit or implicit – involving mutual concessions.

c) The key lies in training and experience

The second rule of war, Vegetius maintains, is that “in war, whoever shows the greatest dedication and has made the greatest effort to train their soldiers will be exposed to fewer risks” (Vegetius, 2006, p. 309; III.XXVI). The third states that “you must never lead a soldier into battle whose ability you have not first tested” (Vegetius, 2006, p. 309; III.XXVI).

Taking action when the outcome is uncertain requires knowledge of the relevant techniques and adequate training. The best information, together with the ability to analyse situations, provides a strategic advantage. Experience is important when assigning responsibilities, and information must be verified impartially.

d) Circumstantial factors may determine the outcome more than the main activity

Vegetius’s fourth rule of war states that “it is better to subdue the enemy through starvation, surprise attacks or fear than in battle, where chance usually plays a greater part than valour” (Vegetius, 2006, p. 309; III.XXVI).

As the Spanish king Philip II said, “I did not send my ships to fight the elements”, referring to the defeat of the Spanish Armada. Every situation has a main action and a series of attendant circumstances. Sometimes, the final outcome is determined by those circumstances rather than by the central dynamic itself.

Another way of interpreting Vegetius’s desire to avoid pitched battles is to view it as an appeal to manage conflict by avoiding direct confrontations and seeking to exert influence through other means.

e) Creating good opportunities

The fifth rule of war, according to Vegetius, states: “There is no better plan than one which the enemy is unaware of before you put it into action” (Vegetius, 2006, p. 309; III.XXVI).
This means that one must be very careful about the information provided to the enemy, particularly regarding future plans that concern them. However, it is also possible to make strategic use of this principle and deliberately mislead the enemy.

The sixth rule of war states that “seizing opportunities is often more helpful in war than courage” (Vegetius, 2006, p. 309; III.XXVI).

It is certainly true that luck plays a part in life. But sooner or later, a significant opportunity arises, and one must be prepared to make the most of it. It is essential to ensure that it is a genuine opportunity and not a trap. What matters is the process of preparation – study, analysis, training – so that one can make the most of life’s opportunities.

f) Building alliances and weakening your adversary

Vegetius’s seventh rule of war states that “one must place great trust in luring and harbouring enemies, provided they come in good faith, for deserters inflict greater losses on the enemy than casualties do” (Vegetius, 2006, p. 309; III.XXVI).

It may be a worthwhile strategy to form alliances with people who were previously part of an opposing group, provided their intentions are good. The first step is to impartially verify their account of events. The second is to be generous, ensuring they feel better treated than they did in their original group. The result is to weaken the opposing group through diplomatic means.

References


Vegetius Flavius Vegetius Renatus (2006), Compendio de técnica militar, Cátedra, Madrid, trans. David Paniagua Aguilar.

Posted on

Machiavelli, pragmatism and power

Oscar Pérez de la Fuente

Carlos III University of Madrid

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3708-846X

Abstract

This paper examines Niccolò Machiavelli’s political thought through the lens of pragmatism and strategic power, drawing primarily on The Discourses alongside the more familiar claims associated with The Prince. It outlines how Machiavelli can be read in two registers: as the supposed advocate of ruthless expediency and as a republican thinker concerned with civic virtue and the preservation of the state. The discussion highlights a further, influential interpretation—Machiavelli’s separation of politics from ethics and religion—arguing that political action follows distinct rules shaped by uncertainty, conflict, and changing circumstances. Selected passages from The Discourses are used to illustrate concrete strategic lessons: when to temporize rather than suppress emerging tensions; why agreement is easier on generalities than on particulars; the importance of adapting to the “times” as a condition of continued success; and the claim that defending one’s country may justify extraordinary means when the state itself is at risk. The text also stresses the informational dimension of strategy, including skepticism toward apparent opponent errors and the need for verification mechanisms. Overall, Machiavelli is presented less as a theorist of cynicism than as an analyst of decision-making under pressure, where ends, means, and context must be aligned.

Keywords: political pragmatism, strategy, power

ISSN: 3127-3408

https://doi.org/10.67647/minervastrategy.2026.10

The best-known work by Niccolò Machiavelli is The Prince; however, it is perhaps in this work  The discourses (2003 )that his political ideas are most clearly revealed. Some people see two sides to Machiavelli: a) The Machiavellian Machiavelli of The Prince, where ‘the end justifies the means’; b) The republican Machiavelli of the Discourses, who is a patriot concerned with civic virtues.

Another interesting interpretation of Machiavelli is the view that he was the first to separate politics from ethics and religion. He claims that politics has its own rules, which are different from ethics.

In this post, I have selected several topics addressed by Machiavelli in The discourses, which have an undeniable strategic background and numerous applications.

I.33.- When either within a State or against a State an inconvenience has made headway, the safer course is to temporise, not to supress it (Machiavelli, 2003, 190).

Machiavelli’s advice is that, when a source of conflict arises, one should try to adapt to it rather than confront it head-on. Facing the problem may escalate it, while avoiding it may eventually cause it to fade away for extrinsic or intrinsic reasons.

A well-known Spanish politician often uses this tactic to manage conflicts, although rather than attributing it to his reading of Machiavelli, people tend to put it down to his personality. This strategy has its pros and cons, which should be analysed on a case-by-case basis.

The main concern will be the assets at stake and the potential losses or damage if the conflict succeeds. If the conflict is of minor significance, it may be advisable to avoid it. However, when it comes to matters of vital importance, it is better to confront it, even if this does not always mean launching a direct attack. It does, however, involve a plan of action based on the best strategy available.

I.47.- Though men make mistakes about things in general, they do not make mistakes about the particulars (Machiavelli, 2003, 225).

There is a certain tension between discussions of abstract issues and those concerning specific matters. When it comes to the former, people tend to say a great deal and may even reach a consensus. What Machiavelli points out is that when the discussion turns to specific matters, it becomes more difficult to reach agreement and easier for someone to be misled.

It is worth recalling the rule of the Harvard Method Focus on interests, not positions. Behind individual positions lie underlying interests, and these must be properly explored to reach effective and sensible agreements.

III.9.- That is behoves one to adapt oneself to the times if one wants to enjoy continued good fortune (Machiavelli, 2003, 425).

One definition of intelligence is the ability to adapt to change. Any good strategy is based on the understanding that the current situation is not permanent. The key issue addressed by strategic intelligence is how to manage change in such a way as to achieve the best possible results.

Situations of change often involve tension and uncertainty, but the key is to be clear about the objectives that really matter and to devise an appropriate strategy.

III.41.-The one’s country should be defended whether is entail ignominy or glory, and that it is good to defend it in any way whatsoever (Machiavelli, 2003, 514). 

This would be the version of ‘the end justifies the means’ that appears in The Discourses. If the State is in danger, any means are justified. The statement could be interpreted in a Machiavellian light or, alternatively, as the view of a true patriot. According to the latter interpretation, this would not be applicable to other spheres and could only be applied when the State, as the highest interest, is in danger.

This view of means and ends is characteristic of Machiavelli. But the alignment of means and ends is precisely the key element of strategy. In other posts, I have outlined the deontological, consequentialist, Machiavellian and virtuous ethical models, where each one addresses the ethical dimensions of various strategic approaches. Strategy aims for victory or success, but each ethical model involves a qualitatively different way of achieving it.

III.44.- Results are often obtained by impetuosity and daring which could never have been obtain by ordinary methods (Machiavelli, 2003, 519).

In a dynamic environment, it is crucial to thoroughly evaluate all possibilities, even those that may initially appear improbable. One should aim for the highest possible expectations once the data has been thoroughly and realistically analysed.

It is essential to clearly understand your priorities and what you value. You need to know your desired outcome and the non-negotiable points. Strengths depend on the parties’ needs, which may not always align, and that’s where agreement can be found.

III.48.- When the enemy is seen to be making a big mistake, it should be assumed that it is but an artifice (Machiavelli, 2003, 524).

Having the most and best information about the other party enables one to assess their actions and statements. It is important to understand their intentions, views, and character. One should be wary of the possibility of deception or some other subtle form of pretence. Mechanisms should be established to verify data, statements or assessments impartially. It is necessary to cross-verify accounts between people with differing strategic interests.

Occasionally, some people take these impartial checks as a sign of mistrust. However, one must separate personal relationships from the subject of the negotiation. Verifying the relevant facts is the duty of any good strategist. 

References

Machiavelli, Nicolò (2003), The Discourses, London New York: Penguin Books, trans. Leslie J. Walker. 

Posted on

The best strategy is to prevent stratagems

Oscar Pérez de la Fuente

Universidad Carlos III de Madrid

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3708-846X

Abstract

This essay clarifies the ethical boundary between strategy and stratagem by revisiting strategy’s military origins and its contemporary use in business, politics, and everyday life. Strategy is presented as the art and science of planning and selecting appropriate means to achieve a goal, while stratagem is distinguished as a ruse in war and, outside that context, as cunning or deceptive artifice. The discussion asks why deception can appear more legitimate in war, noting the high cost of defeat and the prevalence of zero-sum logics, and contrasts this with the mixed landscape of cooperation and conflict in ordinary life. Against this backdrop, four ethical models are used to evaluate when, if ever, stratagems are acceptable. A deontological approach rejects deception on principle, emphasizing truth-telling and promise-keeping. Consequentialism permits stratagems only insofar as outcomes justify them, but highlights their instability over time as discovery becomes likely. Machiavellianism treats success as the supreme rule and relies on simulation and dissimulation, yet faces the same temporal risk of exposure. Virtue ethics takes an ambivalent, moderation-based stance, allowing limited cunning only when it can plausibly align with virtuous character. The overall conclusion is cautionary: a robust strategy should minimise dependence on stratagems.

Keywords: strategy, stratagem, consequantialist ethical model, deontological ethical model, Machiavelian ethical model, virtuous ethical model

ISSN: 3127-3408

https://doi.org/10.67647/minervastrategy.2025.18

Strategy has military origins, where a series of skills and abilities were required to organise operations aimed at achieving victory for armies. Nowadays, strategy is discussed in relation to a myriad of topics that, on the surface, seem to have little to do with its military background. Perhaps what they have in common is that the need to be strategic stems from the cost of losing, which can sometimes be unbearable. In other words, strategy arises because we seek the best and most suitable means to guarantee the end goal, whether it be military victory or success in business, politics, or life.

In previous posts, I have analysed four ethical models associated with strategy: deontological, consequentialist, Machiavellian, and virtuous. It is time to take stock. To do so, I will draw on the distinction between strategy and stratagem.

There are several possible definitions of the first term, depending on the field (military, business, politics, game theory, etc.). I will adopt a definition that serves explanatory purposes. Strategy is the art and science of developing a plan and choosing the appropriate means to achieve the proposed goals.

On the other hand, the Spanish Royal Academy of Language defines stratagem as, in its first meaning, “a ruse of war” and, in its second meaning, “cunning, pretence and artful deception”. As can be seen, stratagem also has a military origin. The term “ruse” is defined by the Spanish Royal Academy of Language as “a device, a means skilfully and cleverly employed to achieve some end”.

One possible conclusion seems to be that, according to these definitions, skilful and cunningly employed device is more justified in war than in other areas. In other words, a stratagem in a military context is a ruse and, outside that context, it is artful deception.  The answer may lie in the fact that the objective of war is victory, but if it is not successful, military defeat and its dire consequences ensue. Also, because in military terms, we often talk about enemies and consider scenarios that economists refer to as zero-sum: what they lose, we gain, and vice versa.

Life is richer in nuances than war. People find themselves in situations of cooperation and conflict and develop their life plans to achieve their professional or personal goals. I mentioned in a previous post that we are all philosophers—we ask ourselves questions, we define our alpha and omega—and that we would be better off if we were all strategists. What role do stratagems play?

Here we will see the functionality of the ethical models analysed in previous posts. The deontological strategist condemns the use of stratagems because they have an element of deception. The two maxims of the deontological model are to always tell the truth and keep promises. We should walk a fine line to use a stratagem that complies with these two maxims and leads to success.

The consequentialist strategist evaluates actions based on their results or on the maximisation of a chosen variable – well-being, utility, money, happiness, etc. According to this model, stratagems will be valid depending on the consequences they produce. The key question is whether an artificial deception can be stable over time. A distinction should be made between interactions that occur once or over a longer period or are lifelong. The use of stratagems does not last over time because it increases the risk of being discovered and, therefore, would no longer produce the desired consequences.

The Machiavellian strategist is a specialist in stratagems, but authentic Machiavellianism consists precisely in not being noticed. Their vision is an art of simulation and dissimulation, the highest rule of which is the desire for success. The means are appropriate if they achieve the ends proposed. The Machiavellian strategist makes abundant use of cunning and pretence to achieve their goals. However, like the consequentialist, the passage of time increases the risk that their true actions and intentions may be discovered.

The virtuous strategist has an ambivalent position on stratagems. They can develop skills and dispositions that shape their character and involve pretence or cunning, but within known limits. According to the law of the middle term, virtue lies in moderation, never in excess. Furthermore, according to this view, not everything can be called a virtue; it is a pluralistic view, but not a relativistic one.

In summary, the deontological strategist condemns stratagems; the consequentialist strategist values stratagems based on the consequences they produce, fearing discovery over time; the Machiavellian strategist habitually uses stratagems while pretending not to; and the virtuous strategist may use stratagems, in moderation, but only if they can be considered virtues.

After these reflections, it can be said that the best strategy is to be wary of stratagems.