Tag: Tactics

Posted on

3-D Negotiation

Oscar Pérez de la Fuente

Universidad Carlos III de Madrid

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3708-846X

Abstract

This text presents key ideas from David A. Lax and James K. Sebenius’s 3-D Negotiation framework, which views negotiation as the interaction of three simultaneous dimensions: tactics at the table, deal design that uncovers true economic and non-economic interests, and the broader setup that shapes the situation off the table. Focusing on interests is central to this approach because stated positions often mask implicit goals, constraints, and concerns. The discussion highlights perspective-taking, careful assessment of one’s own priorities, and the use of classic tools such as BATNA and ZOPA, while warning against reducing analysis to a single distributive variable such as price. The text also identifies wider contextual factors that influence outcomes, including relationships, emotions, and cultural orientations toward either results or relationships. It stresses the role of the “social contract” or spirit of the agreement in establishing expectations, trust, and conflict-resolution norms, and it notes how process choices and tactics (e.g., anchoring) can distort results. Finally, it addresses ethical tensions in negotiating behaviour through deontological, consequentialist, Machiavellian, and virtue-based lenses, and it concludes with four practices to safeguard interests: ask and probe, map interests using public information, leverage internal sources, and consult knowledgeable advisers.

Keywords: principled egotiation, BATNA/ZOPA, Deal design, emotions, tactics

Professors David A. Lax and James K. Sebenius, who are involved in the Harvard University Negotiation Project, in their book 3-D Negotiation. Powerful Tools to Change the Game in Your Most Important Deals (2006) offer new perspectives when it comes to conducting negotiations.

According to this approach, negotiations should be understood as three-dimensional, with three elements occurring more or less simultaneously throughout the actual negotiation. These dimensions are: a) Tactics, which involve persuasive manoeuvres and give-and-take. It is worth noting that poor tactics can ruin a negotiation; b) Deal design: beyond the obvious, this involves uncovering the parties’ true economic and non-economic interests; and c) Setup: off the table, which shapes and reshapes the situation (Lax, Sebenius, 2006, 9). . 

Below, we will examine the topic of exploring interests from the perspective of the Minerva Strategy Blog.

Lax and Sebenius begin by defining interest as whatever you care about that is potentially at stake in the outcome (Lax, Sebenius, 2006, 76).  Their entire approach is based on the observation that the interests stated at the negotiating table are one thing, whereas the parties’ actual or implicit interests are quite another, whether or not these have been clearly articulated. 

When exploring these interests (whether explicit or implicit) in the handling of information about the other party, it is essential to practice, at various stages of the negotiation process, the exercise of putting oneself in the other person’s shoes. It’s also vital for oneself or the negotiating team to calmly assess the true interests at stake: what one wants from the negotiation, what could be gained, and what could be lost. In the standard terminology of Negotiation Theory, what is the best alternative to a no-deal outcome (BATNA), and how is the Zone of Possible Agreement (ZOPA) established between the parties? 

However, Lax and Sebenius’s emphasis on the importance of (actual) interests within the framework of three-dimensional negotiation highlights the fact that focusing all one’s attention in negotiations on linear distributive dimensions—such as price negotiation—can cause one to lose sight of a range of potentially richer interests.

From this perspective, analysing BATNA and ZOPA can be useful tools, but not by focusing on a single variable; rather, by taking into account all the factors at play within the negotiating context.  

In many negotiations, relationships are a key factor to bear in mind. Sometimes, emotions guide the parties’ behaviour, and such feelings can distort certain expectations. On other occasions, poor or mediocre results are accepted simply to maintain the relationship. On this point, Lax and Sebenius distinguish between countries that focus on relationships—such as those in Southern Europe and Latin America—and others that focus on results, such as Anglo-Saxon and Northern European countries  (Lax, Sebenius, 2006, 74). 

Another factor to bear in mind is the social contract; beyond its strictly economic dimension, this governs people’s expectations regarding the nature, scope and duration of the agreement, the process to be followed, and the way in which unforeseen events are handled. As Lax and Sebenius state, it is “the spirit of the agreement.” It is important to clearly understand this broad framework to avoid conflicts or to resolve them without too much difficulty. It is about establishing relationships within a framework of trust, within the framework of a shared negotiating culture, where the obligations of the parties and the usual way of resolving potential conflicts are clearly established (Lax, Sebenius, 2006, 74).

The third factor is the process itself. Certain negotiation processes often influence the outcome, and sometimes negotiators employ tricks and tactics, such as anchoring. These tactics can be particularly detrimental to one of the parties, who must be able to identify them and defend their position, especially when they are unaware of these strategies or lack experience in negotiation scenarios. Another important point is to distinguish the negotiating table from the wider negotiating context. It is usually easier to make progress in negotiations in informal settings (Lax, Sebenius, 2006, 75).    

Finally, one factor to bear in mind is ethics. Certain aspects of some negotiations may be morally controversial; for example, some negotiating tactics that involve withholding or manipulating information from the other party. From an ethical standpoint, the response will differ between the deontological model, with its duty to always tell the truth; the consequentialist model, which advocates the greatest happiness for the greatest number of people; the Machiavellian model, focused on success; and the virtuous model, which proposes acting as a virtuous person would in that situation  (Lax, Sebenius, 2006, 75).

Lax and Sebenius argue that we should not confuse negotiating positions with a broader set of actual interests, and they propose four practices that will help you safeguard your interests:

–Ask, listen and probe

Information about the other party’s interests is essential. The best way to get this is to listen carefully and gauge how they might respond to the negotiation map’s options. 

–Use public sources to map interests

When important decisions need to be made, it is advisable to consult public records and the relevant institutions to gather objective information. Having reports from independent bodies and other credible sources of information is also beneficial.

–Tap internal sources

Naturally, if you can obtain firsthand information from someone who understands the other party’s interests, this can be particularly useful. It is also important to have information about the negotiator and the people involved, as well as their explicit, implicit and underlying interests.

–Tap knowledgeable advisers

In complex business situations, people often turn to professionals such as lawyers or intermediaries. Lax and Sebenius recommend asking them about their experience in such situations. Perhaps this is because – as Aristotle pointed out many centuries ago – experience can help one to better understand a particular situation (Lax, Sebenius, 2006, 77-79).

References

Lax, David A., Sebenius, James K. (2006), 3-D Negotiation. Powerful Tools to Change the Game in Your Most Important Deals, Boston, Mass.: Harvard Business School Press. 

Posted on

Negotiation gambits and tactics

Oscar Pérez de la Fuente

Carlos III University of Madrid

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3708-846X

Abstract

This paper examines the distinction between negotiation tactics and gambits and analyses their strategic and ethical implications in business and institutional contexts. While tactics are presented as legitimate methods for pursuing negotiated outcomes, gambits are characterised as more controversial devices because they may rely on deception, pressure, or the manipulation of expectations. The discussion situates these practices within the broader debate on whether desired ends can justify questionable means, highlighting the relevance of ethical judgment in negotiation. Drawing on Kennedy, Benson, and McMillan’s Managing Negotiations. How to get a better deal (1988), the paper reviews four well-known negotiation gambits: shot gun, off-limits, tough guy, nice guy, and Russian Front. For each case, it explains how the gambit operates, why it can be effective, and what strategic responses may help neutralise its impact. Special attention is given to power asymmetries, credibility, perceived alternatives, and the role of BATNA in assessing positions and reactions. The paper argues that effective negotiators must not only recognise these manoeuvres but also respond in ways that preserve their interests without escalating conflict unnecessarily.

Keywords: negotiation, gambits, tactics, business ethics

The Spanish Royal Academy of Language defines tactics as: “method or system for executing or achieving something” while gambit is defined as: “ruse or trap used to achieve an end”. It seems that the use of tactics would be something proper to any strategy: putting in place the means to achieve a certain end. Tricks are more morally controversial, because in the means used, directly or indirectly, there may be a certain element of deception or manipulation of perceptions.

On the ethical assessment of business tactics and tricks, reference can be made to the more general debate on whether the ‘end justifies the means’ along the lines of Machiavelli. Regarding their strategic use, the first point is that one must be aware of these tactics–gambits to be able to identify them correctly. Secondly, one must know how to react properly to dismantle these negotiation tactics and tricks, as they are a way of gaining an advantage over the other party by manipulating their perceptions and expectations.

In the book Managing negotiations. How to get a better deal (1988), Gavin Kennedy, John Benson, John McMillan offer an extensive catalogue of these negotiation tactics or tricks:

Shot gun

This negotiation tactic consists of using adherence to the conditions of the other party, at a certain point, as an inexcusable condition for continuing negotiations, or even relations between the parties. Kennedy, Benson and McMillan give an example of the shot gun tactic:

“Unless you do not agree immediately to… we are not prepared to discuss anything else” (often accompanied by a sanction threat).

Your opponent is forcing you to abandon some position you hold, as well as weakening your ability to extract concessions from him -from that position- in areas that you -in fact- can negotiate. Your opponent asks for immediate adherence to his negotiating approach. For example, in the insistence of a precondition for negotiation where the highest principle is at stake: “There is no negotiation with the Arab States unless they recognise the State of Israel” or vice versa, “…the State of Palestine” (Kennedy, Benson, McMillan, 1988, 180-181).

Your answer is conditioned by the balance of power. Large companies or banks often use this tactic when dealing with their customers, where we are in a market of free competition, but individually operate with adhesion contracts. To be able to react to this tactic, it must be determined whether the claims of the other party correspond to a real position of power in the strategic scenario of the situation.

Off-limits

In formal relationships it is not uncommon for the parties to specify the extent and nature of the limits to which they agree to adhere. In this context, it is not unusual to see the “off-limits” tactic used in the following formulation:

“The issue of …, is, as far as we are concerned, non-negotiable” (often accompanied by a reference to the items that are negotiable) (Kennedy, Benson, McMillan, 1988, 182).

This is relevant, for example, in negotiations where there are ideological elements, with emotive connotations of great impact, which are set as insurmountable limits to sit down to talk or start – or break off – a negotiation. There is another strategic element, which has to do with why the parties are negotiating and whether they could achieve their objectives unilaterally. This is known as the dimensions of BATNA. We are usually in situations of interdependence, where there are complex relationships between the parties.

The way to deal with this “off-limits” tactic is to go little by little, dealing with other issues: “let’s leave this aside, let’s talk about other issues”. At the right moment, know how to summarise the relevant elements that made up the initial proposal.

Tough guy, nice guy

This tactic has been seen many times in the movies, in the interrogation of suspects by the police, where one has an antagonistic role and the other a cooperative role. In the negotiation tactic, your opponent opens with a very hard line on the subject, they may even allude to the threat of sanctions. They are accompanied by another member of their team (sometimes they may even play both roles), who expresses a more reasonable point of view compared to the first speaker, although this ‘reasonableness’ may still be unacceptable to you.

This is one of the oldest tactics and is usually successful, although it has its risks. It is a way of manipulating perceptions, where it is clearly a trick or tactic agreed by the other party from the outset. The first thing is to know how to identify it when it is being used in a negotiation, and to know how to react strategically to obtain the best possible result.

Russian Front

This is an adaptation of the tough guy, nice guy gambit, using alternative proposals rather than alternative styles of presentation. Your opponent is offered two choices, one of them worse (for them) than the other. They are intimidated into accepting the other offer, to avoid the one that is horrible (‘anything, but don’t send me to the Russian Front’ (Kennedy, Benson, McMillan, 1988, 185)). The chances of success depend on the credibility of the alternatives.

Your opponent may introduce a proposal that is totally unacceptable to you, but you believe that he intends to force you to implement it. You then feel lucky to escape the possibility -which was credible to you- that you could have been on the Russian Front.

Since this is a tactic or gambit, perhaps there is no such Russian Front and the chosen option, which also seemed unacceptable to you at first, is the coveted victory in one of your opponent’s positions. One way to deal with this tactic is to use the discarding of extreme options as a form of mutual exchange in the negotiating space.

References

Kennedy, Gavin, Benson, John, McMillan, John (1988), Managing Negotiations. How to get a better deal, London: Hutchinson.

Posted on

Getting Past No

Oscar Pérez de la Fuente

Carlos III University of Madrid

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3708-846X

Abstract

This paper examines key ideas from William Ury’s Getting Past No, a practical extension of the Harvard negotiation approach for dealing with difficult situations. Rather than focusing on “difficult people” as fixed types, Ury reframes negotiation problems as situations shaped by emotions, positions, dissatisfaction, and power. The discussion centres on the first and most immediate obstacle in negotiation: one’s own reaction. The text explains how common impulses such as counterattacking, yielding, or breaking off relations usually worsen outcomes or reduce bargaining power. As an alternative, Ury proposes the technique of “going to the balcony,” a metaphor for stepping back mentally, regulating emotions, and observing the interaction with detachment. The paper also reviews three manipulative tactics frequently used in hard bargaining: the stone wall, attacks, and trickery. For each, it highlights the importance of recognition, emotional control, independent verification of facts, and careful analysis of the other party’s interests. Overall, the article argues that successful negotiation depends less on immediate reaction than on strategic patience, self-awareness, and disciplined thinking, which together make constructive and intelligent agreement more likely in difficult contexts.

Keywords: principled negotiation, cooperative agreements, stratagems, tactics

The Harvard negotiation method is explained in the famous book Getting to Yes, to which I have dedicated several posts. One of its authors, William Ury, elaborated on some of its concepts more specifically in his book Getting Past No (1997), , which has a very descriptive subtitle: Negotiating with difficult situations. From the outset Ury makes clear that it is not about negotiating with difficult people, but rather about how to negotiate in difficult situations.

In this post I will analyse some of the techniques in this book, as being able to identify them is the first step to act accordingly and counter their effect.

In Getting Past No, Ury proposes an insight strategy that addresses five elements: a) One’s reaction; b) The emotions of others; c) The position of others; d) The discontent of others; e) The power of others (Ury 1997, 24-25). The book is devoted to each of these elements. Here I will focus on the first, self-reaction.

The natural reactions to an attack by another person are to counterattack, to give in or to break off relations. The first option -counter-attacking- means responding on the same level as the other party and is usually negative and can lead to relationships becoming entrenched, especially when they become a succession of emails of grievances. The second option -giving in- means limiting bargaining power by maintaining a good personal relationship and can sometimes lead to some form of exploitation. Breaking off relations, the third option, is a radical way out of certain dissatisfactions in the relationship and, in most situations, is not justified.

In the face of these natural reactions, Ury proposes Don’t react: go to the balcony (Ury 1997, 45).  This means that in negotiations, it is good to analyse situations from a distance, as if you were something unconnected. It is important to eliminate the emotional element that is implicit in all negotiations. In this regard, Ury says that getting on the balcony means letting go of natural impulses and emotions. If, during a negotiation, an emotional outburst occurs, it is advisable to let the emotions flow and, when appropriate, pick up where the meeting left off.

One of the basic functions of learning strategy, which underlies the spirit of the Minerva Strategy Blog, is to know how to identify the tactics of the other party, especially if they have a component of stratagem, deception, simulation, etc. It is important to know strategy so as not to be exploited by people who use tricks that are not what they seem.

An important step in dismantling such a tactic is to identify it and to reveal, during the negotiation, that it is being used. The first tactic Ury talks about is the stone wall. This tactic consists in not giving in. It involves conveying to the other party the firm conviction that there is no alternative to the proposed solution. It is an inflexible form of negotiation, which does not allow any kind of concession.

The way to go against the stone wall is to identify the tactic and conduct a thorough analysis of the interests and needs of the other side (Ury 1997, 52). For this analysis it is necessary to have your own statements and unbiased sources of information. The classic example is the purchase and sale of a flat, where, in addition to the information from the sellers, it is good to check the average price of the properties in the area with another agency.

The second stratagem is attacks, which is made up of pressure tactics designed to intimidate or make a party feel uncomfortable that will eventually lead them to give in (Ury 1997, 52-53). The most common is the threat where a negative consequence is presented if the alternative of not giving in is followed. The way to dismantle these threats is to analyse their credibility and act accordingly. Threats are sometimes made strategically without a real will to carry them out, only to change the will of the other party.

The third stratagem is trickery, which is a tactic aimed at deceiving a party (Ury 1997, 53). In these cases, biased or false information is often given. In the context of negotiations, the habit of impartial fact-checking is important and should not be seen as a symptom of mistrust, but as a professional way of proceeding.

Ury’s advice is that it is relevant to identify these tactics when they are used, but also not to be certain, but to see them as clues about the attitude and style of the other party.

It is also important to analyse yourself. This means that it is necessary to know one’s own emotions, and sometimes our facial gestures or body position can be more illustrative of our thoughts than we think. It is important to control emotions when dealing with relevant issues and especially that these emotions do not condition the final outcome.

In the context of negotiations, Ury advises on certain occasions to pause and be quiet. The pause can be used to step onto the balcony and take a distance. It can also serve to separate oneself from emotions and impulses. However, it is important to keep quiet because in these informal pauses a lot of information and even concessions are often offered to the other party.

Ury says to take time to think (Ury 1997, 56). It is relevant to analyse the various alternatives and the pros and cons of the various options in the negotiation. The joint and divergent interests of the parties should be explored because sometimes people with different interests can reach intelligent and cooperative agreements for both parties.

In the following passage, Ury advises against haste when it comes to important decisions (Ury 1997, 60). Major decisions require time, analysis, expert advice, and weighing up the advantages and disadvantages. It is not good to rush into something important, although it is also true that you should not let a good opportunity slip through your fingers. But we will only know that it is a good opportunity after having analysed other alternatives.

In short, Ury says that our natural impulse in the face of a difficult situation or person is to react, but that is also the worst mistake we can make. Instead of losing your temper or trying to get even, focus on getting what you want.

References

Ury, William (1997), Supere el No. Cómo negociar con personas que adoptan posiciones inflexibles, Barcelona: Ediciones Gestión 2000, trad. Adriana de Hassan. (original title: Gettig past No, 1991)