Tag: war

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Vegetius: Learning Before Acting and Fostering Good Opportunities

Oscar Pérez de la Fuente

Carlos III University of Madrid

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3708-846X

Abstract

This article examines selected passages from Vegetius’s Compendium of Military Technique to extract strategic lessons that extend beyond the military sphere. It highlights the importance of learning before acting, systematic training, experience, information management, and the capacity to recognise and seize opportunities. The analysis also considers the limits of applying military logic to everyday life, where cooperation and competition often coexist. Through commentary on Vegetius’s rules of warfare, the text argues that preparation, prudence, alliances, and indirect forms of influence can provide decisive advantages in uncertain contexts.

Keywords: learning, strategy, war, technique, alliances

ISSN: 3127-3408

https://doi.org/10.67647/minervastrategy.2026.12

Among the works on military strategy from the classical period, one stands out above all: Vegetius’s Compendium of Military Technique (2006). Written at the behest of the Roman emperor, it compiles the military techniques and tactics of the time. One of the first points it makes is that the Romans achieved dominance over other peoples through their superior use of military technique.

Below, I shall analyse various passages from Vegetius’s work, particularly the rules of warfare he sets out, and offer my comments in the style of Minerva Strategy, with applications across a range of fields.

a) Learning before acting, and technique as a strategic advantage

“Knowledge of military discipline fosters the courage to fight: no one fears putting into practice what they are certain they have learnt well. And, indeed, in the heat of battle, a small number of well-trained soldiers are better equipped for victory, whilst a rough and untrained mob is always at risk of being massacred” (Vegetius, 2006, p. 135; I.7–8).

It is necessary to learn new techniques before putting them into practice. It is important to practise these techniques regularly. The use of techniques and tactics provides a strategic advantage.

b) War is a zero-sum game, but life is not quite so

At one point in the work, Vegetius sets out some rules of war that have an undeniable strategic dimension. The first states that “in every battle, the nature of the campaign is such that what favours you undermines the enemy, and what benefits him always harms you. Therefore, we must never undertake or neglect any action at the enemy’s behest, but only that which is useful to us” (Vegetius, 2006, p. 309; III.XXVI).

War is a zero-sum game, whilst life is usually a mix of cooperation and competition. In that sense, there is interdependence, and it is sometimes useful for us to take action to accommodate the other party’s wishes. What matters is that this forms part of a well-designed strategy or an agreement – whether explicit or implicit – involving mutual concessions.

c) The key lies in training and experience

The second rule of war, Vegetius maintains, is that “in war, whoever shows the greatest dedication and has made the greatest effort to train their soldiers will be exposed to fewer risks” (Vegetius, 2006, p. 309; III.XXVI). The third states that “you must never lead a soldier into battle whose ability you have not first tested” (Vegetius, 2006, p. 309; III.XXVI).

Taking action when the outcome is uncertain requires knowledge of the relevant techniques and adequate training. The best information, together with the ability to analyse situations, provides a strategic advantage. Experience is important when assigning responsibilities, and information must be verified impartially.

d) Circumstantial factors may determine the outcome more than the main activity

Vegetius’s fourth rule of war states that “it is better to subdue the enemy through starvation, surprise attacks or fear than in battle, where chance usually plays a greater part than valour” (Vegetius, 2006, p. 309; III.XXVI).

As the Spanish king Philip II said, “I did not send my ships to fight the elements”, referring to the defeat of the Spanish Armada. Every situation has a main action and a series of attendant circumstances. Sometimes, the final outcome is determined by those circumstances rather than by the central dynamic itself.

Another way of interpreting Vegetius’s desire to avoid pitched battles is to view it as an appeal to manage conflict by avoiding direct confrontations and seeking to exert influence through other means.

e) Creating good opportunities

The fifth rule of war, according to Vegetius, states: “There is no better plan than one which the enemy is unaware of before you put it into action” (Vegetius, 2006, p. 309; III.XXVI).
This means that one must be very careful about the information provided to the enemy, particularly regarding future plans that concern them. However, it is also possible to make strategic use of this principle and deliberately mislead the enemy.

The sixth rule of war states that “seizing opportunities is often more helpful in war than courage” (Vegetius, 2006, p. 309; III.XXVI).

It is certainly true that luck plays a part in life. But sooner or later, a significant opportunity arises, and one must be prepared to make the most of it. It is essential to ensure that it is a genuine opportunity and not a trap. What matters is the process of preparation – study, analysis, training – so that one can make the most of life’s opportunities.

f) Building alliances and weakening your adversary

Vegetius’s seventh rule of war states that “one must place great trust in luring and harbouring enemies, provided they come in good faith, for deserters inflict greater losses on the enemy than casualties do” (Vegetius, 2006, p. 309; III.XXVI).

It may be a worthwhile strategy to form alliances with people who were previously part of an opposing group, provided their intentions are good. The first step is to impartially verify their account of events. The second is to be generous, ensuring they feel better treated than they did in their original group. The result is to weaken the opposing group through diplomatic means.

References


Vegetius Flavius Vegetius Renatus (2006), Compendio de técnica militar, Cátedra, Madrid, trans. David Paniagua Aguilar.

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Vicente Montano, Arcane of Princes

Oscar Pérez de la Fuente

Carlos III University of Madrid

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3708-846X

Abstract

Manuel Martín Rodríguez’s preliminary study on Arcano de Príncipes argues, following Cánovas del Castillo and Robert S. Smith, that there is a 17th-century manuscript considered to be a precursor to Malthus. Smith documents that this manuscript, found in the National Library, is not anonymous: it is signed by Captain Vicente Montano and dated 19 September 1681. It is not, however, a demographic treatise, but rather a compilation of political precepts comparable to Machiavelli and Bodin, dedicated to the Duke of Medinaceli, minister to Charles II. Drawing on fragments annotated ‘in the style of Minerva’s Strategy’, several theses are highlighted: the utility of war and provisioning as means to distract and subdue the people (‘bread and circuses’); the advisability of avoiding perpetual provincial governments to reduce resistance and the risks of corruption; and the use of ambiguity and obscure language as a technique of simulation and dissimulation to legitimise decisions without revealing their true aims. Finally, the strategic relationship between war and peace is examined, along with the place of truth in government action, highlighting the Machiavellian logic of the preservation of power.

Keywords: Machiavellianism, bread and circuses, accountability

ISSN: 3127-3408

https://doi.org/10.67647/minervastrategy.2025.15

In Manuel Martín Rodríguez’s preliminary study of the work Arcano de Príncipes /Arcane of Princes in the edition published by the Spanish Centre for Constitutional Studies/Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, it is argued that Cánovas del Castillo was the first to mention an anonymous manuscript that was a true precursor to Malthus (Martín Rodríguez, 1986, XIII).  As Robert S. Smith explains in the article “Spanish Malthusianism in the 17th Century“: “A recent search in the National Library in Madrid has uncovered a manuscript entitled Arcano de Príncipes, which is clearly the work consulted by Cánovas del Castillo, although it is not the copy he used. The manuscript in the National Library bears the name of its author, Captain Vicente Montano, and is dated 19 September 1681″ (Smith, 1955, 351).

Smith adds: “The Arcano de Príncipes is not a treatise on population but rather a compilation of political precepts comparable to the writings of Machiavelli, Bodin and (among Spaniards) Saavedra Fajardo. The essay is dedicated to the Duke of Medinaceli, chamberlain and prime minister of Charles II” (Smith, 1955, 351).  Once again, political philosophers are close to the exercise of power, although they do not wield it, and seek to provide the best advice for the exercise of public responsibilities, a fruitful combination of Theory and Practice.

Next, excerpts from Vicente Montano’s Arcano de Príncipes will be discussed in the style of Estrategia Minerva Blog.

“The surest occupation, and one that brings princes the benefit for which they seek it, is to wage war as soon as the common people begin to discuss the government, for, contenting themselves with talking only about matters pertaining to the public state, they extend their curiosity to abundance, since, once war is waged, they usually buy their daily sustenance, and in this way, having nothing to do but eat, and their thoughts being base and vile, they never raise their spirits to sublime and painful things that might give their princes cause for concern. The satirist Juvenal understood well, in two words, the way to keep it more pleasant, which is to give it bread and festivals, a sentence that applies to all domains” (Montano, 1986, 18).

How beautifully expressed in these lines is the universal principle of “panem et circenses” (bread and circuses)! It seems that in Rome they already knew how to manipulate the people based on their appetites. The incisive point made by Captain Montano is that the way to entertain the people was to wage war, which would greatly occupy their conversations, combined with an abundance of food, resulting in minimal problems for the government. A universal recipe for politics, since Juvenal. 

“The present King of France, having recognised that the perpetual governments enjoyed by the Princes of the blood had at other times served as a support to give greater rigour to the concerns of the Kingdom, has divided the provinces in another way, varying their governors and changing them when he sees fit. The dignitaries of a monarchy should not remain in the government of the provinces for life, because when a new successor is appointed, they find it very difficult to relinquish their command” (Montano, 1986, 46). 

Holding public office for many years gives incumbents a wealth of experience, but, as is often pointed out, there is a greater risk of corruption. If constitutionalism emerged as an approach that sought to affirm that all power had limits in the face of absolutism, democracy implies that public officials must be accountable for their actions. This means explaining the actions taken, justifying them, and being rewarded or punished for them. This is linked to transparency and accountability as inherent characteristics of a democracy of quality.

“There are many traces, maxims, and stratagems that the Prince can use to make the world believe that everything he does is based on reason and justice, without the common people being able to penetrate any of his operations, deceiving even the wisest and most prudent so that they do not recognise the ambiguity of his intentions, however great they may be, dressing his speeches in obscure words and profound concepts, even when he appears to be making himself clearly understood” (Montano, 1986, 52-53). 

This paragraph seems to have been written by Machiavelli, who can be interpreted  in different ways, some more elitist, others more republican. One possible reading is that he recommends that rulers engage in simulation and dissimulation to achieve their predetermined objectives, without any necessary link to morality. This is political rationality, which has its own rules and is autonomous from ethics and religion. In this paragraph of Arcano de Príncipes, we sense the Machiavellian Machiavelli giving stark advice. 

“And except for some ministers of the first rank, who share the burden of government, the rest of the subordinates must live as blind as the lowest common people. However, to completely blindfold the vassals, and make them believe that the Prince is working for their greater good and tranquillity, he must flatter them with the peace they have so desired during the war, without them being able to see through this deception. Having already disturbed the peace by the desire for war, he cannot abandon war for the sake of peace, because in peace the vassals do not die except in accordance with the merits of their crimes, but in war, the innocent and the guilty share the same fate” (Montano, 1986, 53).

Vicente Montano combines two variables: the role of truth in politics and the strategic use of war and peace. As mentioned above, Arcano de Príncipes is in line with Machiavelli’s thought, where political expediency, and among these, the main one of remaining in power, must guide the actions of the ruler, who must publicly maintain an irreproachable and convincing position, the result of hypocrisy towards their true interests. Using war and peace within political calculations is regrettable but common. Wars often cause many casualties and irreparable damage, and it would be desirable for exceptional situations to elicit exceptional responses. However, this point of view is not always shared.  

References

Montano, Vicente (1986), Arcano de príncipes, Madrid: Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, preliminary study of  Manuel Martín Rodríguez.

Smith, Robert S. (1955), “Maltusianismo español del siglo XVII: el Arcano de príncipes de Vicente Montano”, El Trimestre Económico, 22(87), 350–358. Available: https://www.eltrimestreeconomico.com.mx/index.php/te/article/view/2417 (Las visit: 2 May 2026).