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Diego de Saavedra Fajardo, Political enterprises

Diego de Saavedra Fajardo was a Spanish political writer, literary critic, poet, philosopher and jurist, who was born in Algezares in 1584 and died in Madrid in 1648. He was private secretary to Cardinal Gaspar Borja (1606) and Spanish ambassador to the Papal States. He later served as ambassador to Rome (1631), Germany (1632) and Regensburg (1636), and represented Spain at the conferences in Münster (1643).

In his introduction, “To the Reader”, Saavedra Fajardo explains how the work Empresas políticas o Idea de un príncipe político cristiano representada en cien empresas/ (Political Enterprises or Idea of a Christian Political Prince Represented in One Hundred Enterprises) came about in the few spare moments his work as a diplomat allowed him. The intended recipient was none other than the son of Philip IV, Prince Baltasar Carlos, who would never reign in Spain, as he died as a child and who inspired Velázquez’s portrait “Príncipe Baltasar Carlos, a caballo”. This work, which consists of several volumes, follows the political philosophy tradition of giving advice to those in positions of power on how to govern better. 

Bellow, excerpts from the book Empresas políticas o Idea de un príncipe político cristiano representada en cien empresasby Diego de Saavedra Fajardo in the style of Minerva Strategy Blog will be discussed.

“This good education is more necessary for princes than for others, because they are instruments of political happiness and public health. For other people, poor education is detrimental to each individual or to a few; in the prince, it is detrimental to him and to all, because some are offended by it, and others by his example” (Diego de Saavedra Fajardo, Empresas políticas o Idea de un príncipe político cristiano representada en cien empresas, II).

The expression “good manners” can be understood as referring to etiquette or as a path to virtue. If we follow the perspective of manners, it is interesting that Emily Post, in her classic book Etiquette’s Manners for a New World,summarises that, rather than archaic rules, good manners are guidelines for life based on respect, consideration and honesty. 

If we follow the perspective of the path to virtue, good education involves shaping character towards dispositions and habits associated with models of excellence, inherent in the practices of human life. In other words, this approach involves fostering virtues and avoiding vices. 

“A wise prince is the security of his subjects, and an ignorant one is their ruin. From this we can infer how barbaric the judgement of Emperor Lucinius was, who called the sciences a public plague and philosophers and orators the poison of republics. No less barbaric was the rebuke of the Goths to the mother of King Alaric, because she taught him literacy, saying that it made him unfit for political matters” (Diego de Saavedra Fajardo, Empresas políticas o Idea de un príncipe político cristiano representada en cien empresas, IV).

Should politicians be required to have a minimum level of education? Can we be governed by ignorant people? Plato’s Myth of the Cave is at the origin of his political ideas, and among his most famous is the notion of the Philosopher King. This approach has been criticised for its elitism. Aristotle, more moderate, argued that the best government is that of the middle class. Politics has its own rationale for decision-making, and it is good to seek advice from experts. Sophists and philosophers were the first educators of Athenian citizens in democracy. In the face of ignorance, it is advisable to learn how to make the best decisions.

“History is the teacher of true politics, and the best teacher of how to reign for a prince, because it contains the experience of all past governments and the prudence and judgement of those who came before. It is an advisor that is with him at all times. From jurisprudence, the prince takes that part that belongs to government, reading the laws and constitutions of his States that deal with it, which Reason of State found and long use approved” (Diego de Saavedra Fajardo, Empresas políticas o Idea de un príncipe político cristiano representada en cien empresas, IV).

History explains the present. Understanding how things happened in the past and what criteria were involved at a given moment is crucial. That account comes from History for generations who did not directly experience the events. It is regrettable how easy it is to forget the experiences, sufferings and aspirations of past generations. 

“All human actions have some kind of good as their goal, and because we deceive ourselves in our knowledge of it, we err. The greatest quality seems small in our power, and very great in that of others. We are unaware of our own vices and notice them in others. How gigantic the tyrannical inventions of others appear to us! How dwarfed are our own! We consider vices to be virtues, wanting ambition to be greatness of spirit, cruelty to be justice, prodigality to be liberality, recklessness to be courage, without prudence discerning what is honest from what is evil and what is useful from what is harmful. We are deceived by things when we look at them through the lens of our affections or passions; only benefits should be viewed from both sides” (Diego de Saavedra Fajardo, Empresas políticas o Idea de un príncipe político cristiano representada en cien empresas, VII).

Sectarianism and factionalism lead to this double standard. There is no truth or falsehood, good or evil; everything depends on whether the person doing it is one of us. The group strengthens itself with closed-mindedness and dogmatism. It would be desirable to use equanimity and impartiality when judging the qualities of others, leaving tribal emotions aside.

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The best strategy is to prevent stratagems

Strategy has military origins, where a series of skills and abilities were required to organise operations aimed at achieving victory for armies. Nowadays, strategy is discussed in relation to a myriad of topics that, on the surface, seem to have little to do with its military background. Perhaps what they have in common is that the need to be strategic stems from the cost of losing, which can sometimes be unbearable. In other words, strategy arises because we seek the best and most suitable means to guarantee the end goal, whether it be military victory or success in business, politics, or life.

In previous posts, I have analysed four ethical models associated with strategy: deontological, consequentialist, Machiavellian, and virtuous. It is time to take stock. To do so, I will draw on the distinction between strategy and stratagem.

There are several possible definitions of the first term, depending on the field (military, business, politics, game theory, etc.). I will adopt a definition that serves explanatory purposes. Strategy is the art and science of developing a plan and choosing the appropriate means to achieve the proposed goals.

On the other hand, the Spanish Royal Academy of Language defines stratagem as, in its first meaning, “a ruse of war” and, in its second meaning, “cunning, pretence and artful deception”. As can be seen, stratagem also has a military origin. The term “ruse” is defined by the Spanish Royal Academy of Language as “a device, a means skilfully and cleverly employed to achieve some end”.

One possible conclusion seems to be that, according to these definitions, skilful and cunningly employed device is more justified in war than in other areas. In other words, a stratagem in a military context is a ruse and, outside that context, it is artful deception.  The answer may lie in the fact that the objective of war is victory, but if it is not successful, military defeat and its dire consequences ensue. Also, because in military terms, we often talk about enemies and consider scenarios that economists refer to as zero-sum: what they lose, we gain, and vice versa.

Life is richer in nuances than war. People find themselves in situations of cooperation and conflict and develop their life plans to achieve their professional or personal goals. I mentioned in a previous post that we are all philosophers—we ask ourselves questions, we define our alpha and omega—and that we would be better off if we were all strategists. What role do stratagems play?

Here we will see the functionality of the ethical models analysed in previous posts. The deontological strategist condemns the use of stratagems because they have an element of deception. The two maxims of the deontological model are to always tell the truth and keep promises. We should walk a fine line to use a stratagem that complies with these two maxims and leads to success.

The consequentialist strategist evaluates actions based on their results or on the maximisation of a chosen variable – well-being, utility, money, happiness, etc. According to this model, stratagems will be valid depending on the consequences they produce. The key question is whether an artificial deception can be stable over time. A distinction should be made between interactions that occur once or over a longer period or are lifelong. The use of stratagems does not last over time because it increases the risk of being discovered and, therefore, would no longer produce the desired consequences.

The Machiavellian strategist is a specialist in stratagems, but authentic Machiavellianism consists precisely in not being noticed. Their vision is an art of simulation and dissimulation, the highest rule of which is the desire for success. The means are appropriate if they achieve the ends proposed. The Machiavellian strategist makes abundant use of cunning and pretence to achieve their goals. However, like the consequentialist, the passage of time increases the risk that their true actions and intentions may be discovered.

The virtuous strategist has an ambivalent position on stratagems. They can develop skills and dispositions that shape their character and involve pretence or cunning, but within known limits. According to the law of the middle term, virtue lies in moderation, never in excess. Furthermore, according to this view, not everything can be called a virtue; it is a pluralistic view, but not a relativistic one.

In summary, the deontological strategist condemns stratagems; the consequentialist strategist values stratagems based on the consequences they produce, fearing discovery over time; the Machiavellian strategist habitually uses stratagems while pretending not to; and the virtuous strategist may use stratagems, in moderation, but only if they can be considered virtues.

After these reflections, it can be said that the best strategy is to be wary of stratagems.

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Abraham Lincoln, ambition and recognition of leadership

This post starts a series on the Minerva Strategy Blog dedicated to political leadership. The first subject of analysis will be Abraham Lincoln, who was born in Hodgenville, United States, in 1809 and died in Washington in 1865. An American lawyer and politician, he was the 16th President of the United States (1861-1865). Always remembered as the president who abolished slavery, Abraham Lincoln is one of the most admired figures in American history.

On ambition and recognition of leadership, Doris Kearns Goodwin dedicates a chapter to Abraham Lincoln in her book Leadership in Turbulent Times: Lessons from the Presidents. Below, I will discuss excerpts from this chapter in the style of the Minerva Strategy Blog.

“How Lincoln responded to attacks directed against him and his party reveals much about his temperament and the character of his developing leadership. Such was the law of politics in the antebellum era that discussions and debate between Whigs and Democrats regularly attracted the fanatic attraction of hundreds of people. Opponents attacked each other in fiery, abusive language, much of the delight of raucous audiences, inciting an atmosphere that could burst into fistfights, even, on occasion, guns being drawn. While Lincoln was as thin-skinned and prickly as most politicians, his retorts were generally full of such good-humoured raillery that members of both parties could not help but laugh and relax on the pleasure of the entertaining and well-told stories” (Doris Kearns Goodwin, Leadership in Turbulent Times. Lessons from the Presidents).

In everything, a distinction can be made between content and form. The terms used by Aristotle for these concepts were substance and accident. In many cases, form is very important, even more so than content. For some, politics is tension and polarisation, while a sense of humour and good manners are always welcome. Lincoln was a leader who used irony as a political weapon, while today some persons use rumours, insults or violence. 

“I desire to live, and I desire place and distinction; but I would rather die now than, like the gentleman, live to see the day I would change my politics for an office worth 3000 dollars a year, and then feel compelled to erect a lightning-rod to protect guilty conscience from an offended God” (Doris Kearns Goodwin, Leadership in Turbulent Times. Lessons from the Presidents).

This quote refers to someone who changed political parties due to a new, very lucrative position. Lincoln defended honesty and consistency with one’s own ideals in the face of political opportunism. Therefore, we live in times when politicians feel discredited by the behaviour of some who find private benefits in politics. In the end, it all boils down to one of the great philosophical questions: What is the meaning of life? What is politics?

“By the disproportionate vote of 77 to 6 the Assembly resolved that “we highly disapproved the formation of abolition societies” and hold “sacred” the “right of property in slaves”. Lincoln was among the things who voted no. Registering a formal protest, he proclaimed that “the institution of slavery is found on both injustice and bad politics.” he had always believed, and he later said, that ”if slavery is not wrong, nothing is wrong”.  Lincoln’s protest stopped well short of abolitionism (Doris Kearns Goodwin, Leadership in Turbulent Times. Lessons from the Presidents).

The notion of slavery is contrary to equal human dignity, which is at the core of human rights. However, slavery, which turns human beings into property, has been existed until unusually recent times. Even today, there are cases of forced labour and human trafficking. Lincoln’s leadership lesson is that there are values that cannot be compromised; they are non-negotiable and, on these occasions, it is good to hold fast to one’s convictions.

“While the ambition of the hallowed framers had been ‘inseparable linked’ with building up a constitutional government allowing the people to govern themselves, he feared that in the chaos of the moblike behaviour, men of the likes of ‘an Alexander, a Caesar, or a Napoleon’ would likely seek distinction by boldly setting themselves ‘to the task of pulling down’. Such men of ‘towering’ egos, in whom ambition is divorced from the people’s best interests, were not men to lead a democracy; they were despots” (Doris Kearns Goodwin, Leadership in Turbulent Times. Lessons from the Presidents).

There is a risk of drifting towards authoritarianism in different countries. Some analysts will argue that democracy is mutating. However, we must be wary of “men with excessive egos”. The rule of law emerged as a reaction to the power of the absolutist king. Locke’s approach emphasises the separation of powers, limited power and the right of resistance if the Social Contract is not fulfilled. Charismatic leaders who accumulate power are a risk to political pluralism, alternance, checks and balances, and the vitality of a democracy of quality. 

“To counter the troublesome ambition of such men, Lincoln called upon his fellow Americans to renew the framers’ values and to embrace the Constitution and its laws. ‘Let reverence for the laws be breathed by every American mother,’ taught in every school, and preached in every pulpit. The great bulwark argument against a potential dictator is an informed people ‘attached to the government and the laws’. This argument takes Lincoln back to his first statement to the people of Sangamon County when he spoke of education as the cornerstone of democracy. Why is education so central? Because, as he said then, every citizen must be able to read history to “appreciate the value of our free institutions” (Doris Kearns Goodwin, Leadership in Turbulent Times. Lessons from the Presidents).

Emphasis is placed on the role of public education as a prerequisite for democracy and as a form of defence against “a potential dictator”. It is worth considering that education and digital literacy are becoming elements that should be included among the virtues that citizens should cultivate. To make autonomous decisions, it is necessary to be well informed, among other conditions. To appreciate free institutions, education for citizenship is beneficial, as in the early days of democracy, the Sophists stood up to demagogues and authoritarian threats. 

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Strategic tightrope walking

United States President John F. Kennedy declared a naval blockade in Cuba on 22 October 1962, after a week of internal deliberations. The Soviet Union could have reacted to this action by increasing the risk of nuclear conflict to critical levels, which Kennedy believed had a one-third to one-half chance of occurring. After days of tension, statements, and clandestine talks, Khrushchev chose to avoid direct confrontation, withdrawing the missiles from Cuba and returning them to the Soviet Union. This was done in exchange for a promise from the United States to withdraw its missiles from Turkey in the near future. Khrushchev chose to back down after considering the possibility of a nuclear catastrophe.

Dixit and Nalebuff, in their works Thinking Strategically and The Art of Strategy, examine this historical event and explore the idea of strategic tightrope walking. This tactic is based on deliberately creating a risk that is sufficiently intolerable for the opponent that they are induced to eliminate it, thereby complying with our wishes. This is a technique that requires skilful use of credibility and proper risk management, as one might expect, but it can also be a very effective strategy for achieving predetermined goals. 

The classic example of strategic tightrope walking has been the Cold War and the use of nuclear deterrence. To prevent the Soviets from launching a conventional attack against Europe or the United States, it is necessary to expose them to the possibility that the conflict will escalate and a nuclear exchange will occur. The Soviets would proceed more slowly if the risk of pursuing that course increased. The United States and the Soviets would likely offer mutual concessions, despite running a greater risk of escalation.

The increased probability of a conventional conflict escalating should be offset by the decreased probability of initiating a war. If Khrushchev considered the level of risk unacceptable, the use of strategic tightrope walking will be successful. It would have allowed Kennedy to choose a larger threat that is large enough to be effective but small enough to be credible.

Like any other strategic move, its aim is to alter the opponent’s expectations to influence their actions. Therefore, strategic tightrope walking is a type of qualified threat. To use this tactic successfully, it is necessary to understand its distinctive characteristics.

Dixit and Nalebuff ask: First, why not threaten the opponent with the certainty of a terrible outcome, rather than the lesser risk of it happening? Second, how do you determine whether the risk will materialise? Third, what is the appropriate level of risk?

Strategic tightrope walking is the tactic of pushing your opponent to the brink of catastrophe to make them back down. This is an extreme application of the Silver Rule: do not do unto others what you would not have them do unto you. The individual eventually gives in to your tactic because they do not want to cause an avoidable disaster.

This strategic tightrope walking bears a resemblance to the chicken game dilemma. In game theory, the chicken game dilemma arises when two drivers are travelling in opposite directions at high speed towards the same point on the same road. Each driver is aware of their car’s reaction time and turning radius, which are assumed to be identical for both competitors. Each must decide when the time comes to swerve. This decision must be made without considering the other driver’s decision, as it is irrevocable. One opponent’s quick decision cannot affect the other.

This chicken dilemma is based on a scenario where there is increasing risk and an outcome that is interdependent on the other player’s decisions in relation to one’s own decisions.  This increasing risk, if both players fail to change their attitude, could lead, in the worst-case scenario, to a collision between the two vehicles, with fatal consequences.

It seems that strategic tightrope walking is an initially more cautious approach, which considers all possible scenarios and selects the one that presents the least risk. In chicken games, with the same game structure, the outcome is uncertain and depends on how the other driver acts compared to the driver in question. The crucial question is: who is the first to give way?

Let us imagine a fragile seven-party agreement, with disparate and even conflicting interests and idiosyncrasies, with another negotiator who holds a position of power—which depends on maintaining this fragile agreement. Here, strategic tightrope walking—and the parties’ risk management—would be combined with the salami tactic. With the threat that the pact will end, one party obtains a concession, with each slice it cuts, no matter how small, having the potential to be the last straw. The key to making this type of threat credible is that none of the parties has exact knowledge of where the dividing line lies.

Strategic tightrope walking involves not only creating a risk, but also carefully keeping the level of that risk under control. Reaching this conclusion does not mean that one must accept the situation and accept the risk of nuclear war. To reduce the risk, it is necessary to address the problem at a more fundamental level, that is, to change the game.

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Vicente Montano, Arcane of Princes

In Manuel Martín Rodríguez’s preliminary study of the work Arcano de Príncipes /Arcane of Princes in the edition published by the Spanish Centre for Constitutional Studies/Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, it is argued that Cánovas del Castillo was the first to mention an anonymous manuscript that was a true precursor to Malthus. As Robert S. Smith explains in the article “Spanish Malthusianism in the 17th Century“: “A recent search in the National Library in Madrid has uncovered a manuscript entitled Arcano de Príncipes, which is clearly the work consulted by Cánovas del Castillo, although it is not the copy he used. The manuscript in the National Library bears the name of its author, Captain Vicente Montano, and is dated 19 September 1681.”

Smith adds: “The Arcano de Príncipes is not a treatise on population but rather a compilation of political precepts comparable to the writings of Machiavelli, Bodin and (among Spaniards) Saavedra Fajardo. The essay is dedicated to the Duke of Medinaceli, chamberlain and prime minister of Charles II.” Once again, political philosophers are close to the exercise of power, although they do not wield it, and seek to provide the best advice for the exercise of public responsibilities, a fruitful combination of Theory and Practice.

Next, excerpts from Vicente Montano’s Arcano de Príncipes will be discussed in the style of Estrategia Minerva Blog.

“The surest occupation, and one that brings princes the benefit for which they seek it, is to wage war as soon as the common people begin to discuss the government, for, contenting themselves with talking only about matters pertaining to the public state, they extend their curiosity to abundance, since, once war is waged, they usually buy their daily sustenance, and in this way, having nothing to do but eat, and their thoughts being base and vile, they never raise their spirits to sublime and painful things that might give their princes cause for concern. The satirist Juvenal understood well, in two words, the way to keep it more pleasant, which is to give it bread and festivals, a sentence that applies to all domains” (Vicente Montano, Arcano de Príncipes).

How beautifully expressed in these lines is the universal principle of “panem et circenses” (bread and circuses)! It seems that in Rome they already knew how to manipulate the people based on their appetites. The incisive point made by Captain Montano is that the way to entertain the people was to wage war, which would greatly occupy their conversations, combined with an abundance of food, resulting in minimal problems for the government. A universal recipe for politics, since Juvenal. 

“The present King of France, having recognised that the perpetual governments enjoyed by the Princes of the blood had at other times served as a support to give greater rigour to the concerns of the Kingdom, has divided the provinces in another way, varying their governors and changing them when he sees fit. The dignitaries of a monarchy should not remain in the government of the provinces for life, because when a new successor is appointed, they find it very difficult to relinquish their command” (Vicente Montano, Arcano de Príncipes).

Holding public office for many years gives incumbents a wealth of experience, but, as is often pointed out, there is a greater risk of corruption. If constitutionalism emerged as an approach that sought to affirm that all power had limits in the face of absolutism, democracy implies that public officials must be accountable for their actions. This means explaining the actions taken, justifying them, and being rewarded or punished for them. This is linked to transparency and accountability as inherent characteristics of a democracy of quality.

“There are many traces, maxims, and stratagems that the Prince can use to make the world believe that everything he does is based on reason and justice, without the common people being able to penetrate any of his operations, deceiving even the wisest and most prudent so that they do not recognise the ambiguity of his intentions, however great they may be, dressing his speeches in obscure words and profound concepts, even when he appears to be making himself clearly understood” (Vicente Montano, Arcano de Príncipes).

This paragraph seems to have been written by Machiavelli, who can be interpreted  in different ways, some more elitist, others more republican. One possible reading is that he recommends that rulers engage in simulation and dissimulation to achieve their predetermined objectives, without any necessary link to morality. This is political rationality, which has its own rules and is autonomous from ethics and religion. In this paragraph of Arcano de Príncipes, we sense the Machiavellian Machiavelli giving stark advice. 

“And except for some ministers of the first rank, who share the burden of government, the rest of the subordinates must live as blind as the lowest common people. However, to completely blindfold the vassals, and make them believe that the Prince is working for their greater good and tranquillity, he must flatter them with the peace they have so desired during the war, without them being able to see through this deception. Having already disturbed the peace by the desire for war, he cannot abandon war for the sake of peace, because in peace the vassals do not die except in accordance with the merits of their crimes, but in war, the innocent and the guilty share the same fate” (Vicente Montano, Arcano de Príncipes).

Vicente Montano combines two variables: the role of truth in politics and the strategic use of war and peace. As mentioned above, Arcano de Príncipes is in line with Machiavelli’s thought, where political expediency, and among these, the main one of remaining in power, must guide the actions of the ruler, who must publicly maintain an irreproachable and convincing position, the result of hypocrisy towards their true interests. Using war and peace within political calculations is regrettable but common. Wars often cause many casualties and irreparable damage, and it would be desirable for exceptional situations to elicit exceptional responses. However, this point of view is not always shared.  

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The Power of Empathy

Through the Harvard Negotiation Project,  the Harvard Business School has developed its  own negotiation method, the principles of which are explained in the best-selling book  Getting to Yes. How to Negotiate without Giving in, by Robert Fisher and William Ury. Another Harvard professor, Deepak Malhotra, has a work entitled  Negotiating the Impossible. How to Break Deadlocks and Resolve Ugly Conflicts (without Money or Muscle), where he analyses how they act in the context of complicated negotiations. 

Below, I will analyse some of Malhotra’s advice in the section of his book on difficult negotiations entitled ‘The Power of Empathy”, from the perspective of Minerva Strategy Blog.

Empathy expands the set of options you have for resolving the conflict. The better you understand the other side’s perspective, the more likely you are to find a solution.

Empathy is often understood as putting oneself in the other’s shoes.  The Golden Rule  is “treat others as you would like to be treated.” A good exercise is to ask yourself: if I were in the other person’s situation, how would I like to be treated and how would I behave? This rule is fine, but it should have some safeguards in place so that it is not exploited. The Silver Rule states: “Do not do to others what you would not want them to do to you.” This would be a practical application of empathy. However, ultimately, there is the Bronze Rule, which states, “Do to others what others do to you.” This would be an extreme form of reciprocity and, at times, the mere possibility of applying this Bronze Rule may have strategic value.

Empathy is needed most with people who seem to deserve it least. The more intolerable their behaviour, the greater the potential benefit of understanding it.

There may be individuals with 1) challenging personalities, 2) who find themselves in complicated situations, 3) who may behave unusually due to cultural, religious, gender, disability, or other identity-related factors.

The relevant issue is that, in business contexts, information about the parties’ background is key. This data can be useful in explaining certain behaviours and attitudes and/or justifying each party’s actions and action plan from their point of view. This exercise in understanding the other party can be useful, as it can highlight differences in interests, assessments, or perceptions that may be of strategic interest.

There is almost always a trade-off between maintaining strategic flexibility and safeguarding credibility.

The expression trade-off is used in Economics as a synonym for compromise, in the sense that there is a situation where gains are made on one side and losses on the other. 

Credibility is the degree to which others believe that we will follow through on our commitments. The Kantian ethical model is the ultimate example of credibility, as he maintained that promises must always be kept. Strategic flexibility is the option to change one’s mind if continuing with previous commitments seems unwise. From the Machiavellian model, Machiavelli is the paradigm of strategic flexibility, for example in chapter XVIII of the work The Prince, where he analyses whether the prince should keep his word. 

Typically, Malhotra asserts, we want as much credibility as flexibility as possible. However, if we invest more in strategic flexibility, we typically have less credibility, and vice versa. 

Don’t force people to choose between doing what is smart and doing what helps them save face.

A first rule of negotiation, linked to empathy, is that offers of agreement and subsequent negotiations should be linked to one party trying to help the other “save face”. In other words, consider the specific consequences that the proposed deal will have for the other. Here Malhotra, in line with the Harvard Negotiation Project, goes further and requires negotiators to be provided with an intelligent solution. This means that both must consider it a good agreement. 

Ignore ultimatums. The more attention you give to them, the harder it will be for the other side to back down if the situation changes.

Ultimatums can be seen as a kind of threat. A distinction should be made between negotiation threats and actual threats. The former plays a strategic role in negotiation, and the key is the credibility of their plausibility in the eyes of the other party. Actual threats will entail a certain response, with negative consequences, towards certain behaviours. Malhotra’s advice is to ignore and reformulate ultimatums and threats so that they can be incorporated into the broader negotiating framework. 

Think trilaterally: evaluate how third parties influence or alter the interests, constraints, and alternatives of those at the table.

In certain negotiations, the weight and influence of third parties is very present, conditioning the entire negotiating framework, whether in terms of interests, communication between the parties, or perception. A key point from this perspective is what the real power of third parties is in the framework, development, and agreement of the negotiation, and what type of link connects the other negotiating party and the third party. If the real power and link of the third party are strong, there is no doubt that we must think trilaterally. Even if it is weak, it is good to consider the power of third party’s influence in our favour. 

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The demagogue’s handbook

I will continue with the series dedicated to handbooks, with the book Manual del demagogo (The demagogue’s handbook), written by Raoul Frary. This work is published in Spanish by Sequitur, and the editing and translation are by Miguel Catalán.

The author of the book, Henry François Raoul Frary, born on 17 April 1842 in Tracy-le-Mont and died on 19 April 1892 in Plessis-Bouchard, was a French professor, journalist and essayist.

According to Fernando Savater’s summary in a column entitled “Consejos (Advices)“, Frary wrote this pamphlet “with the advice of a seasoned politician to an aspiring demagogue, that is, to guide others by pulling the reins and obtaining the best benefits for himself.” In the prologue, Miguel Catalán describes the author as an “idealist disguised as a cynic.” The irony and sense of humour that permeate the lines of this work are remarkable. While dealing with very serious issues, the tone used is somewhat frivolous, which invites complicity and reflection.  

Next, excerpts from Raoul Frary’s work Manual del demogogo will be discussed, in the style of Minerva Strategy Blog.

“Let us emphasise from the outset that praise is never strong enough. It is not good to be rude, but there is no problem with being excessive in flattery. Rarely are so many good things said about us as we think we deserve (…) The least justified compliments are often the most welcome: they are more novel. Persuading an apathetic person of their courage, a debauched person of their wisdom, and a fool of their intelligence is the pinnacle of art. But one must know how to act with delicacy and not bring the censer out into the public sphere. Success is achieved by using tact and choosing your evidence well” (Raoul Frary, Manual del demagogo, II.2).

Flattery is one of the favourite weapons of demagogues. Nothing pleases the ears more than praising words that applaud the audience. While this is true as a general principle, there is a real art to praise. This is because praise, to have the best effect, must appear sincere or be the subject of serious analysis. Excessive flattery can backfire by coming across as artificial and insincere, material for gullible people who do not question the true intentions of those who use so many flattering expressions. 

“Herein lies one of the secrets of demagoguery, if I may call a method whose excellence is obvious a secret. All the passions and interests of the world would not suffice without the pride of faith. The French during the Revolution would not have endured such a harsh government, such severe deprivation and such terrible dangers, if they had not felt so flattered by the promulgation of a new dogma (…) it is not necessary for the dogma to be true, nor for it to be noble, nor for it to be clear and understandable. It is enough that it is believed and that the believer feels proud to believe”  (Raoul Frary, Manual del demagogo, II.2).

Parallels are sometimes drawn between religion and politics. Here, we seek to reflect on attitudes towards political beliefs that are assimilated into the dogmatism of a faith, into the beliefs of a religious believer. Ideologies tend to have a conception of the world —values about what society or human beings should be— where they often mix scientific knowledge with emotional components and a powerful mobilising effect. Frary warns that these political ideologies have elements of religious faith and that this motivates their believers. This brings to mind some current debates, raised from sectarian perspectives, where people always want to be right, leaving no room for temperance, tolerance and consensus.   

“The moralist teaches us patience, sobriety in pleasures, moderation in desires, and the consequences of our efforts. He constantly directs our attention to those who have succeeded through their own merit and those who have fallen through their mistakes. He reduces the responsibility of Fortune and increases our own responsibility. He diminishes the power of laws and enhances the power of customs. The demagogue does just the opposite. He asserts that Fortune distributes her gifts blindly, that success is due to chance, perhaps even to vice, that the unfortunate are victims of an artificial fatality, that misery is inevitable in today’s society. Far from exhorting us to become better, he does not even admit that it depends on us. If our habits are bad, he pretends to ignore them; he does not suspect that the weaknesses of our behaviour reinforce the difficulties of our existence. He rails against social climbers and ridicules edifying tales of morality put into practice. He diminishes the responsibility of customs in all things in order to increase that of laws. He does not instil patience in us, nor does he make us reflect on our fault” (Raoul Frary, Manual del demogogo, II.3).

In this passage, Frary compares the moralist and the demagogue, whose aims and advice differ greatly. The former exhorts moderation and a responsible approach to life, while the latter does not call for a change in behaviour, since success is due to chance, appealing to the responsibility of laws rather than customs. However, the fundamental difference between the two is omitted in Frary’s text: the demagogue has spurious aims, generally to obtain his own benefit or that of his group, while the moralist would generally seek the good of those he seeks to advise.

“The envious person says to himself: ‘Inequality is unjust. It is possible, and even easy, to eliminate it. If it is eliminated, it will benefit me.’ If you want to stir up demagogic envy and use it to your advantage, you can never emphasise these three propositions enough, to place them beyond all doubt, to root them ever more deeply in people’s minds and hearts” (Raoul Frary, Manual del demagogo, II.6).

There are entire libraries dedicated to the subject of this paragraph from the work Manual del demagogo. The Spanish Royal Academy of Language defines envy as “sadness or regret for the good fortune of others.” There are people who suffer greatly from the successes of others, and the worst thing about envy is the actions it sometimes provokes from the envious person. On the other hand, the fight against certain social and economic inequalities is the legitimate objective of the social and democratic rule of law. Frary’s reasoning takes an argumentative leap when he asserts that it is easy to eliminate inequality. First, we must distinguish what type of inequality we are dealing with, whether it affects politics (inclusion), economy (redistribution) or culture (recognition). If the ultimate goal is to eliminate inequality, it will not be easy, but it is a task that can engage society. However, Frary was warning against the demagogic use of inequality, linked to envy. And again, the question is: What are the demagogue’s objectives?

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More negotiation gambits and tactics

Previously, I analysed the following negotiation gambits and tactics: shot gun, off-limits, tough guy, nice guy, Russian Front. The analysis of these situations, which involve a change in perception in a negotiation context, sometimes including manipulation, is based on the book Managing Negotiations: How to Get a Better Deal, by Gavin Kennedy, John Benson, and John McMillan. Below, I will analyse other negotiation gambits and tactics:

Sell cheap, become famous

One way of formulating this tactic could be: “We are making you a cheap offer that will greatly enhance your company’s image, as you will benefit from being a supplier to an international, million-dollar company like ours. Think about how much good us as a customer on your client list having will do for your future sales.”

This trick is used at all levels and in all areas of life. Companies do not advertise their jobs with “low salaries”; they talk about “good prospects”; buyers talk about possible “future orders”; interns, who are paid very little, are commonly appealed to by the prestige of the company they work for. Sometimes these promises are, however, not always true. If you believe them, you will accept them, but often it is important to acknowledge what it is: a trick to sell something cheaper.

Salami

Salami comes in thin slices and is not eaten all at once. This is the intention behind this particular tactic. It suggests that something is better postponed at different times to make it more digestible than applying it all at once. It offers the possibility of introducing certain changes into agreements gradually, over a relatively long period of time. In this way, it is understood that there will be less resistance from those affected.

The demands of the mandate

Third-party negotiators are bound by their mandate. This usually takes the form of  “I have been instructed to obtain this amount and I am mandated not to give in until I get it.” This tactic is very common. For example, when someone says they must consult with their partner about a decision regarding a property or rent. Or a lawyer representing a client who is inflexible on certain positions. Or when a board implements shareholders’ resolutions. This becomes a negotiating trick when such a mandate is an excuse to improve certain positions in the negotiation and may in fact be the widest room for manoeuvre.

Veiled threats

Threats of sanctions can be very risky. They raise the emotional temperature. “Are you threatening me?” is a sure sign that what you are saying makes you the antagonist. “Of course not” is the expected response if you are trying to warn them of the consequences of bringing themselves into your disapproval. There are two useful ways to effectively use a threat of punishment:

First, the consequences of disagreeing are these, but neither of us wants to see them as a threat. How can we avoid it? Here it depends on where you stand. Zone of Possible Agreement -ZOPA-, which defines the negotiation panorama. The Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement – BATNA- of each party’s  ability to seek an agreement more easily implies how credible the threat of breaking it is.

Second, you make the sanction credible: “…we naturally do not want to require this component, as our engineers are currently investigating an alternative method that appears to be marginally cheaper…” In threats, credibility is key, and this is often linked to the strength of the BATNA. If you have a stronger alternative, it is very likely that you will not end up agreeing, and/or you can threaten to break off negotiations and demand better terms.

Connecting

Your opponent may start negotiations with you in a weak position on some issues, so their best approach is to try to connect these issues where they are weak with other issues where they are strong. For example, you may be prepared to discuss late payments of your invoices, but the other party wants to talk about the poor quality of the components you sent last week. Connecting issues in this way involves linking one issue to another and making them unacceptable together. Thus, a certain clause in the contract at the price you are asking for becomes extremely difficult to accept. If you have chosen the right clause — preferably a non-negotiable issue — it is quite likely that the price will move. If the price is firm, then you will have to revisit the clause.

Yes, but…

The “Yes, but…” tactic consists of saying, “Yes, we agree with what you are offering, but we have this other problem that we need to resolve before we can agree to everything.” The other problem is a new issue that has not been evaluated previously. This can lead to certain risks, such as affecting the patience of the losing party and suffering allegations of bad faith or of dealing with negotiators who are not serious. To avoid the “Yes, but…” tactic, all conditional proposals should be made, all objections should be kept open, and for each new option proposed, use a “No, but…” in reply: “We cannot accept these new conditions, but if you insist, we will have to rethink the terms of the entire negotiation…”

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Thomas More, Utopia

Sir Thomas More (1478-1535),  who was executed in July 1535 for his resistance to supporting the separation of the Church of England from the Catholic Church of Rome, was a jurist, intellectual, statesman and Lord Chancellor of Henry VIII of England, who ruled from 1509 to 1547. A highly principled man of deep values, More disagreed with the monarch’s divorce from his first wife, Catherine of Aragon (1485-1536), and especially with the promotion of Henry as head of the Church of England in place of the pope. Before his foray into politics, Thomas More was a renowned writer and scholar, and his most recognisable work today is Utopia, which presents a philosophical description of an ideal society set on an island.

Below, some passages from Thomas More’s Utopia will be discussed in the style of the Minerva Strategy Blog.

“There are no taverns, no ale-houses, nor stews among them, nor any other occasions of corrupting each other, of getting into corners, or forming themselves into parties; all men live in full view, so that all are obliged both to perform their ordinary task and to employ themselves well in their spare hours; and it is certain that a people thus ordered must live in great abundance of all things, and these being equally distributed among them, no man can want or be obliged to beg” (Thomas More, Utopia).

It is significant that Thomas More’s utopian society discards private vices: alcohol, prostitution, gossip, the underworld, and rather, citizens focus on honest work. This means that goods should be distributed equally, without great inequalities or the tale of the lazy grasshopper and the hard-working ant.

“Yet they do not place happiness in all sorts of pleasures, but only in those that in themselves are good and honest. There is a party among them who place happiness in bare virtue; others think that our natures are conducted by virtue to happiness, as that which is the chief good of man. They define virtue thus—that it is a living according to Nature” (Thomas More, Utopia).

Aristotle argues that the purpose of human beings is eudaimonia, a Greek term usually translated as happiness, human flourishing, or good life. This concept is linked to the exercise of virtues such as prudence or temperance. However, there are different conceptions of happiness and pleasure, which some positions unify. What Thomas More says here is that only good and honest pleasure leads to happiness. His life is an example of honesty and courage in dying for what he believed in, against his personal well-being. 

““They think it is an evidence of true wisdom for a man to pursue his own advantage as far as the laws allow it, they account it piety to prefer the public good to one’s private concerns, but they think it unjust for a man to seek for pleasure by snatching another man’s pleasures from him; and, on the contrary, they think it a sign of a gentle and good soul for a man to dispense with his own advantage for the good of others, and that by this means a good man finds as much pleasure one way as he parts with another; for as he may expect the like from others when he may come to need it, so, if that should fail him, yet the sense of a good action, and the reflections that he makes on the love and gratitude of those whom he has so obliged, gives the mind more pleasure than the body could have found in that from which it had restrained itself” (Thomas More, Utopia).

There are several levels of possible strategic interactions between human beings: a) Silver Rule: Reciprocate the response obtained from the other party. It is the biblical ‘an eye for an eye’ or TITforTAT strategy; b) Golden Rule as reciprocity expectation: Treat others as you would like to be treated, with the expectation that they will do the same to you in the future; c) Golden Rule as unlimited altruism: Treat others as you would like to be treated, as part of your philosophy, without expecting anything in return. It is known as love your enemy; d) Platinum Rule: Treat others as others would like to be treated. Here the aim is to go against the particularism of the Golden Rule, which can have its variants of reciprocity and unlimited altruism. 

What is interesting here is that More speaks, in relation to good deeds, of reciprocity of benefits and of conscience as two indicators of the moral rightness of an action. Which of the rules analysed was he referring to?

“Yet they do not place happiness in all sorts of pleasures, but only in those that in themselves are good and honest. There is a party among them who place happiness in bare virtue; others think that our natures are conducted by virtue to happiness, as that which is the chief good of man. They define virtue thus—that it is a living according to Nature” (Thomas More, Utopia).

Choosing the person with whom to share one’s life requires prudence and a proper assessment of several factors. Foremost among these are the character traits with which to deal with everyday conflicts. As Thomas More warns, it is somewhat inept that part of the nuptial ritual is to briefly show the future spouse naked.  Once again, the relevance between the substance and the form of a relationship, between what is important and what is superficial, is fundamental. 

“There was a Jester standing by, that counterfeited the fool so naturally that he seemed to be really one; the jests which he offered were so cold and dull that we laughed more at him than at them, yet sometimes he said, as it were by chance, things that were not unpleasant, so as to justify the old proverb, ‘That he who throws the dice often, will sometimes have a lucky hit.’ When one of the company had said that I had taken care of the thieves, and the Cardinal had taken care of the vagabonds, so that there remained nothing but that some public provision might be made for the poor whom sickness or old age had disabled from labour (Thomas More, Utopia).

The limits of humour in the age of political correctness have become controversial. Laughing at the ignorance or foolishness of the public can be an easy resource. One might expect humour to have a healthy function of social criticism, rather than a reinforcement of prejudices and stereotypes that are already ingrained. In the case posed by Thomas More, making humour about people with disabilities because of their condition is not justified as humour that is compatible with human rights, intelligent humour that makes us think, or humour that invites us to consider values for a more open, plural, and inclusive society, where there is room for everyone. 

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Negotiation gambits and tactics

The Spanish Royal Academy of Language defines tactics as: “method or system for executing or achieving something” while gambit is defined as: “ruse or trap used to achieve an end”. It seems that the use of tactics would be something proper to any strategy: putting in place the means to achieve a certain end. Tricks are more morally controversial, because in the means used, directly or indirectly, there may be a certain element of deception or manipulation of perceptions.

On the ethical assessment of business tactics and tricks, reference can be made to the more general debate on whether the ‘end justifies the means’ along the lines of Machiavelli. Regarding their strategic use, the first point is that one must be aware of these tactics–gambits to be able to identify them correctly. Secondly, one must know how to react properly to dismantle these negotiation tactics and tricks, as they are a way of gaining an advantage over the other party by manipulating their perceptions and expectations.

In the book Managing negotiations. How to get a better deal, Gavin Kennedy, John Benson, John McMillan offer an extensive catalogue of these negotiation tactics or tricks:

Shot gun

This negotiation tactic consists of using adherence to the conditions of the other party, at a certain point, as an inexcusable condition for continuing negotiations, or even relations between the parties. Kennedy, Benson and McMillan give an example of the shot gun tactic:

“Unless you do not agree immediately to… we are not prepared to discuss anything else” (often accompanied by a sanction threat).

Your opponent is forcing you to abandon some position you hold, as well as weakening your ability to extract concessions from him -from that position- in areas that you -in fact- can negotiate. Your opponent asks for immediate adherence to his negotiating approach. For example, in the insistence of a precondition for negotiation where the highest principle is at stake: “There is no negotiation with the Arab States unless they recognise the State of Israel” or vice versa, “…the State of Palestine”.

Your answer is conditioned by the balance of power. Large companies or banks often use this tactic when dealing with their customers, where we are in a market of free competition, but individually operate with adhesion contracts. To be able to react to this tactic, it must be determined whether the claims of the other party correspond to a real position of power in the strategic scenario of the situation.

Off-limits

In formal relationships it is not uncommon for the parties to specify the extent and nature of the limits to which they agree to adhere. In this context, it is not unusual to see the “off-limits” tactic used in the following formulation:

“The issue of …, is, as far as we are concerned, non-negotiable” (often accompanied by a reference to the items that are negotiable).

This is relevant, for example, in negotiations where there are ideological elements, with emotive connotations of great impact, which are set as insurmountable limits to sit down to talk or start – or break off – a negotiation. There is another strategic element, which has to do with why the parties are negotiating and whether they could achieve their objectives unilaterally. This is known as the dimensions of BATNA. We are usually in situations of interdependence, where there are complex relationships between the parties.

The way to deal with this “off-limits” tactic is to go little by little, dealing with other issues: “let’s leave this aside, let’s talk about other issues”. At the right moment, know how to summarise the relevant elements that made up the initial proposal.

Tough guy, nice guy

This tactic has been seen many times in the movies, in the interrogation of suspects by the police, where one has an antagonistic role and the other a cooperative role. In the negotiation tactic, your opponent opens with a very hard line on the subject, they may even allude to the threat of sanctions. They are accompanied by another member of their team (sometimes they may even play both roles), who expresses a more reasonable point of view compared to the first speaker, although this ‘reasonableness’ may still be unacceptable to you.

This is one of the oldest tactics and is usually successful, although it has its risks. It is a way of manipulating perceptions, where it is clearly a trick or tactic agreed by the other party from the outset. The first thing is to know how to identify it when it is being used in a negotiation, and to know how to react strategically to obtain the best possible result.

Russian Front

This is an adaptation of the tough guy, nice guy gambit, using alternative proposals rather than alternative styles of presentation. Your opponent is offered two choices, one of them worse (for them) than the other. They are intimidated into accepting the other offer, to avoid the one that is horrible (‘anything, but don’t send me to the Russian Front’). The chances of success depend on the credibility of the alternatives.

Your opponent may introduce a proposal that is totally unacceptable to you, but you believe that he intends to force you to implement it. You then feel lucky to escape the possibility -which was credible to you- that you could have been on the Russian Front.

Since this is a tactic or gambit, perhaps there is no such Russian Front and the chosen option, which also seemed unacceptable to you at first, is the coveted victory in one of your opponent’s positions. One way to deal with this tactic is to use the discarding of extreme options as a form of mutual exchange in the negotiating space.