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The Power of a Positive No

After his work Getting Past No, William Ury wrote another work entitled The Power of a Positive No. In this new original book, he explains how to face one of the most challenging things we must do every day: to say no to people who work with us, who we love, and with whom we have relationships of various kinds. As Ury says: “No is the biggest challenge today”.

The analysis in this book starts from the consideration that: “It may not be the most important word in our vocabulary, but it is the hardest to say well”. The special idiosyncrasy of this term is linked to the inherent tension between exercising your power and tending your relationship. Thus, in certain situations, Ury describes three common ways out:

a) Accommodate: say-yes-when-you-want-to-say-no. This is especially frequent when we want to maintain the personal relationship by making concessions.

b) Attacking: be-passive-aggressive-when-saying-no. It is the opposite of accommodating. It is about using power without any consideration for the relationship. It is linked to anger or rage.

c) Avoidance: we-say-no-absolutely-nothing. In these cases, communication and relationships are suspended. It is a way of coping with problems by avoiding people.

As can be imagined, these three ways out do not lead to success, and Ury’s proposal in this book is to affirm a positive No. Then the author summarises his formula: “A positive No is a Yes! No. Yes? The first Yes expresses your interests, the Noaffirms your power, and the second Yes strengthens your relationship. A positive No balances power and relationship in service of your interests.

The first Yes could be seen as internally focused – the assertion of one’s own interests – and the second Yes is externally focused -an invitation to the other to come to an agreement that satisfies those interests-. In this post, I will focus on the elements that give power to your No.

Saying No is not easy. Ury suggests that positive power must be developed, which is achieved by having a plan B. It is a matter of considering the worst-case scenario and seeing the possibilities one would have to achieve one’s objectives.

Plan B is also called BATNA (Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement). It is not an option to an agreement but an alternative to the agreement, a course of action that can be taken independently of the agreement with the other party. A better BATNA gives more bargaining power. A plan B is positive power; it does not mean punishing the other party. It is a strategic element that can condition the negotiation and must be considered.

The key question, then, is how to strengthen your plan B. One element that can help is brainstorming, where you use your imagination to develop various possible solutions without looking at their feasibility. Alternatives to a given situation should be carefully considered. These may include a) Do it yourself: achieve your goals by your own means without going to the other party; b) Run away: sometimes a possible way out is to end the relationship; c) Third party: sometimes the intervention of a third party as an intermediary is positive.

Along with building a powerful No, Ury recommends “building a winning coalition”. In each situation, allies with similar interests should be sought, and a common action plan can be addressed.

The key to the various interactions is information, especially about the interests and opinions of the other party. Ury advises, “anticipate the other’s next move”. Foreseeing likely courses of action and possible responses is strategically relevant. Anticipation gives a strategic advantage to the foresighted.

From this perspective, Ury argues that one should consider the worst-case scenario. It would be to put yourself in the position of checking what you could lose in the negotiation, on the one hand, and what plan B or BATNA is, on the other hand.

In conclusion, Ury reaffirms your decision to decide No in three questions: “Do you have the interest? Do you have the power? Do you have the right?” This point must be complemented with other negotiating elements, allowing you to reach efficient and intelligent agreements, from different interactions, based on building a positive No.

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Tommaso Campanella, The City of the Sun

Tommaso Campanella (Stilo, Italy, 1568-Paris, 1639). Italian philosopher. In 1586, he entered a Dominican convent, where he studied Philosophy. With the impact of the works of Telesius’ naturalistic philosophy, Campanella became one of the critics of Aristotle’s ideas, as the scholastics presented it at the time.

In 1599, he led a rural insurrection with the aim of establishing a theocratic republic, for which he was subjected to several ecclesiastical trials and sentenced to life imprisonment, from which he was finally released in 1634 by the Pope Urban VIII. Campanella was imprisoned for 27 years, during which time he wrote his famous work The City of the Sun, in which he expressed his desire for a utopian communist regime. Campanella’s communist ideals were strongly influenced by Plato.

Below is a commentary of excerpts from Tomasso Campanella’s The City of the Sun in the style of the Minerva Blog Strategy.

Advantages of collective work

“They say, moreover, that grinding poverty renders men worthless, cunning, sulky, thievish, insidious, vagabonds, liars, false witnesses, etc.; and that wealth makes them insolent, proud, ignorant, traitors, assumers of what they know not, deceivers, boasters, wanting in affection, slanderers, etc. But with them all the rich and poor together make up the community. They are rich because they want nothing, poor because they possess nothing; and consequently they are not slaves to circumstances, but circumstances serve them” (Tommaso Campanella, The City of the Sun).

In the Platonic conception of society, guardians should not own “land, houses, and currency” (Plato, Republic, 417a) because these evils are greater. Against this approach, Aristotle, in his work Politics, defends private property based on several arguments. The first is generosity, since “doing a kindness and giving some help to friends, or guests, or comrades, and such kindness and help become possible only when property is privately owned” (Aristotle, Politics, 1263b40). He also argues that greater conflicts derive from common property and that, if it were really a good solution, it would not have gone so unnoticed.

Discussion about the community of women 

“Love is foremost in attending to the charge of the race. He sees that men and women are so joined together, that they bring forth the best offspring. Indeed, they laugh at us who exhibit a studious care for our breed of horses and dogs, but neglect the breeding of human beings” (Tommaso Campanella, The City of the Sun). 

This is one of the most controversial points of Plato’s approach: how he (does not) conceive of the family. For example, he asserts that the children of guardians are to be raised and educated by the State and has an ambivalent position on the status of women. From other assumptions, Aristotle defends the family and criticises the Platonic approach since “every citizen will have a thousand sons; they will not be the sons of each citizen individually: any son whatever will be equally the son of any father whatever. The result will be that all will equally neglect them” (Aristóteles, Politics, 1261b32).

Hospitality

“To strangers they are kind and polite; they keep them for three days at the public expense; after they have first washed their feet, they show them their city and its customs, and they honor them with a seat at the Council and public table, and there are men whose duty it is to take care of and guard the guests. But if strangers should wish to become citizens of their State, they try them first for a month on a farm, and for another month in the city, then they decide concerning them, and admit them with certain ceremonies and oaths” (Tommaso Campanella, The City of the Sun).

This is a precedent for the notion of hospitality that Kant invoked centuries later. Nowadays, it seems that elementary notions that are at the foundation of human rights are questioned and become target issues of political debate, locally and globally. One such issue of relevance is how societies welcome/integrate/accommodate their immigrants. Here we see how in the 16th-century utopia, Campanella provided an inclusive mechanism for acquiring citizenship. Does it still sound like utopia today?

Again, with more details on the election of magistrates, the government, and the Council.

“They do not use lots unless when they are altogether doubtful how to decide. The eight magistrates under Hoh, Power, Wisdom, and Love are changed according to the wish of the people, but the first four are never changed, unless they, taking counsel with themselves, give up the dignity of one to another, whom among them they know to be wiser, more renowned, and more nearly perfect. And then they are obedient and honorable, since they yield willingly to the wiser man and are taught by him. This, however, rarely happens” (Tommaso Campanella, The City of the Sun).

Leaving the most difficult choices to the randomness of a lottery does not seem the most appropriate. Although current trends advocate leaving some decisions to AI algorithms, which are biased, stereotyped, and not necessarily neutral in terms of human rights.

It is commendably “utopian,” in this City of the Sun, that top leaders decide themselves when to leave office and “willingly retire to those who are wiser than they are and learn from them.” It seems to be a carbon copy of the present times…

Laws and judgement 

“They have but few laws, and these short and plain, and written upon a flat table and hanging to the doors of the temple, that is between the columns” (Tommaso Campanella, The City of the Sun).

 The utopia in the legal world is that laws should be few, short, and plain. This would help to bring law and judicial decisions closer to non-experts. The great thing about the legal method is that it makes it possible to deal with various strategies of the parties in a process and to justify the final decision by means of legal arguments. Law is conceived as an interpretative activity, where the power of conviction of each party becomes relevant.

The City of the Sun, by Tommaso Campanella, aims to criticise its present and future through utopian rhetoric, based on ideas that cannot be found anywhere, yet their power of conviction is the horizon that we can focus on (or not) when you look in front of the mirror. 

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Getting Past No

The Harvard negotiation method is explained in the famous book Getting to Yes, to which I have dedicated several posts. One of its authors, William Ury, elaborated on some of its concepts more specifically in his book Getting Past No, which has a very descriptive subtitle: Negotiating with difficult situations. From the outset Ury makes clear that it is not about negotiating with difficult people, but rather about how to negotiate in difficult situations.

In this post I will analyse some of the techniques in this book, as being able to identify them is the first step to act accordingly and counter their effect.

In Getting Past No, Ury proposes an insight strategy that addresses five elements: a) One’s reaction; b) The emotions of others; c) The position of others; d) The discontent of others; e) The power of others. The book is devoted to each of these elements. Here I will focus on the first, self-reaction.

The natural reactions to an attack by another person are to counterattack, to give in or to break off relations. The first option -counter-attacking- means responding on the same level as the other party and is usually negative and can lead to relationships becoming entrenched, especially when they become a succession of emails of grievances. The second option -giving in- means limiting bargaining power by maintaining a good personal relationship and can sometimes lead to some form of exploitation. Breaking off relations, the third option, is a radical way out of certain dissatisfactions in the relationship and, in most situations, is not justified.

In the face of these natural reactions, Ury proposes Don’t react: go to the balcony. This means that in negotiations, it is good to analyse situations from a distance, as if you were something unconnected. It is important to eliminate the emotional element that is implicit in all negotiations. In this regard, Ury says that getting on the balcony means letting go of natural impulses and emotions. If, during a negotiation, an emotional outburst occurs, it is advisable to let the emotions flow and, when appropriate, pick up where the meeting left off.

One of the basic functions of learning strategy, which underlies the spirit of the Minerva Strategy Blog, is to know how to identify the tactics of the other party, especially if they have a component of stratagem, deception, simulation, etc. It is important to know strategy so as not to be exploited by people who use tricks that are not what they seem.

An important step in dismantling such a tactic is to identify it and to reveal, during the negotiation, that it is being used. The first tactic Ury talks about is the stone wall. This tactic consists in not giving in. It involves conveying to the other party the firm conviction that there is no alternative to the proposed solution. It is an inflexible form of negotiation, which does not allow any kind of concession.

The way to go against the stone wall is to identify the tactic and conduct a thorough analysis of the interests and needs of the other side. For this analysis it is necessary to have your own statements and unbiased sources of information. The classic example is the purchase and sale of a flat, where, in addition to the information from the sellers, it is good to check the average price of the properties in the area with another agency.

The second stratagem is attacks, which is made up of pressure tactics designed to intimidate or make a party feel uncomfortable that will eventually lead them to give in. The most common is the threat where a negative consequence is presented if the alternative of not giving in is followed. The way to dismantle these threats is to analyse their credibility and act accordingly. Threats are sometimes made strategically without a real will to carry them out, only to change the will of the other party.

The third stratagem is trickery, which is a tactic aimed at deceiving a party. In these cases, biased or false information is often given. In the context of negotiations, the habit of impartial fact-checking is important and should not be seen as a symptom of mistrust, but as a professional way of proceeding.

Ury’s advice is that it is relevant to identify these tactics when they are used, but also not to be certain, but to see them as clues about the attitude and style of the other party.

It is also important to analyse yourself. This means that it is necessary to know one’s own emotions, and sometimes our facial gestures or body position can be more illustrative of our thoughts than we think. It is important to control emotions when dealing with relevant issues and especially that these emotions do not condition the final outcome.

In the context of negotiations, Ury advises on certain occasions to pause and be quiet. The pause can be used to step onto the balcony and take a distance. It can also serve to separate oneself from emotions and impulses. However, it is important to keep quiet because in these informal pauses a lot of information and even concessions are often offered to the other party.

Ury says to take time to think. It is relevant to analyse the various alternatives and the pros and cons of the various options in the negotiation. The joint and divergent interests of the parties should be explored because sometimes people with different interests can reach intelligent and cooperative agreements for both parties.

In the following passage, Ury advises against haste when it comes to important decisions. Major decisions require time, analysis, expert advice, and weighing up the advantages and disadvantages. It is not good to rush into something important, although it is also true that you should not let a good opportunity slip through your fingers. But we will only know that it is a good opportunity after having analysed other alternatives.

In short, Ury says that our natural impulse in the face of a difficult situation or person is to react, but that is also the worst mistake we can make. Instead of losing your temper or trying to get even, focus on getting what you want.

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Handbook of the perfect parliamentarian

We continue with the series dedicated to handbooks. On this occasion, the Manual del perfecto parlamentario (Handbook of the perfect parliamentarian) by Mario Merlino. It is a work with a markedly humorous tone, which was written at a time of political changes in Spain, and popularising work in favour of a political culture of parliamentarism was noteworthy. 

Mario-Jorge Merlino Tornini (1948-2009), Argentina/Spain, was a writer and literary translator of works mainly written in Portuguese, Italian and English. He studied at the University of Bahía Blanca and had a radio programme with his friend César Aria. He has translated, among other authors, Jorge Amado, Clarice Lispector, Lygia Bojunga Nunes and Ana María Machado. In 2004 he received the Spanish National Prize for best translation for Auto dos condenados, by António Lobo Antunes.

The Handbook of the Perfect Parliamentarian was written by Mario Merlino and published by Altalena in 1981. Excerpts from this book will be commented using the style of Minerva Strategy Blog.

“The parliamentarian is a rare professional, it is said, ‘professional of a badly organised job’. He or she is a trainee in public affairs. An Italian, Giovanni Sartori, speaks of the professionalisation of politics. From a characterological point of view, he stresses that the parliamentarian (that professional politician) must be able to manoeuvre -manipulative skills-and that this fact (malicious Sartori!) implies opportunism and lack of principles” (Mario Merlino, Manual del perfecto parlamentario).

The parliamentarian must have manipulative skills, which implies opportunism and lack of principle, as this Handbook suggests. A distinction should be made between technique and objectives. Good strategy involves using the best means to achieve the proposed objectives; it is purely a question of effectiveness. These means may include tactics and stratagems. Parliamentarians’ goals relate to justice or public ethics; however, since Machiavelli, a politician’s primary goal is often considered to be to stay in power, for which they become professionals.   

“Parliament, as a fundamental institution of democracy, and as its etymology indicates, is the place where people talk and chatter. We have not always thought about the importance of what it means to institute the power of speech. Of course, you will say that we often talk too much, or that words are pretexts for postponing solutions, and the good thing, if short, is twice as good, OK. But apart from that, the Parliament, properly understood, is the right place to confront opinions, discuss or dynamically put different positions on different problems” (Mario Merlino, Manual del perfecto parlamentario).

Carl Schmitt, in the 1930s, criticised the democratic parliament as an empty formality, showing autocracy as an alternative. Periodically, parliament, which is perfectible, is criticised. It is the place for negotiation and compromise. In addition to the competition for votes each election period, parliamentarians have a responsibility to ensure that their work is close to the interests of citizens and that they are properly accountable. Ideally, parliamentary debates should be complemented by deliberative mechanisms that involve the population in some way. 

“There is no way today that the ideology of the people of one side can be changed or improved by that of the other. The controversies of the sectarians are contrived and always false. Each ideology, which is generally a collection of commonplaces, defends itself by closing itself off like an oyster”. (Pío Baroja).

From the ‘end of ideologies’ – Bell – or the ‘end of history’ – Fukuyama – we are moving to a stage of an apparent revival of conflicts, which are often based on identity-related issues rather than socio-economic explanations. Political correctness and the cancel culture are current examples of identity politics. Here the roles seem to have been reversed: the left, once utopian, seeks to regulate, prohibit and intervene, while the right, traditionally associated with conservatism, has become libertarian and, in a way, anarchist. It seems that the dynamics of sectarianism and polarisation are in the interest of some political sectors, but they make citizens, especially young people, uninterested in politics.  

“This left, centre and right thing, let’s face it, arose as a problem of geometrical arrangement and, no doubt, as a function of the architectural possibilities of parliamentary space. England’s oldest parliamentary democracy provides an example of the link between physical location and ideological choice. The Tories, ardent supporters of the monarchy, sat to the right of the speaker. The Whigs, on the other hand, were on the left. The French set the “parliamentary cliché” of the situation on the right, centre and left, equivalent respectively to the Montagnard, Girondins and Jacobins. These are the times of the Revolution” (Mario Merlino, Manual del perfecto parlamentario).

Left and right are terms of parliamentary geometry, from the very beginning.  Faced with the disorientation of the fall of the Berlin Wall, Bobbio wrote Left and Right and focused the distinction on the different approaches to inequality. That is, whether redistribution of resources to the less advantaged is justified, whether by genetic lottery or by social circumstances. It is important that there is broad social – and political – consensus on the implementation of human rights, especially when it comes to social rights or minority rights. Some contents of public ethics in European countries have been incorporating these consensuses, while in other parts of the world, such as China or the United States, there are different perspectives. 

“Crisis: it is a word that produces fear because it is always used in a negative sense: what crisis, there is an economic, social, ideas, values, moral, religious and even marital crisis. 

A good parliamentarian should vindicate the fertilising power (with apologies) of the CRISIS. We must not forget that crisis is linked to criticism. To put in crisis means, fundamentally, to look for new ways to solve problems, that is, to solve, if you like, the crises that are so abundant in these times”. (Mario Merlino, Manual del perfecto parlamentario).

In times of crisis, there is a need for real leaders. Parliament can be a forum for providing solutions to crises. The etymological origin of the term krisis in Greek means “decision”, “judgement” or “turning point”. Crises should be seen as opportunities to improve and emerge stronger. Some commentators have the opinion that we are in a permanent crisis; even more reason why Parliament should be the place to seek solutions and take decisions for the common good. 

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Julius Caesar, Zone of Possible Agreement (ZOPA) in Civil War

In a book entitled Civil War, Julius Caesar narrates the political and military conflicts with the Roman Senate and especially with his rival Pompey. These led to a veritable civil war between contending groups looking to seize power.

In this post, I will analyse the successive peace proposals made by Julius Caesar and Pompey, through the lens of ZOPA analysis. The Zone of Possible Agreement – known as ZOPA – is a frame of reference that is relevant to any negotiation. It is defined between the parties’ two BATNAs. That is, between each player’s Best Alternatives to a Negotiated Agreement -BATNA-. Another way of expressing this is to define the ZOPA as the margin between the two reserve prices of each party. In other words, the minimum prices that the parties are willing to accept in a negotiation.

In the work Civil War, the author describes how the conflicts for power in Rome arose. He explains that Pompey made Julius Caesar the following proposal: “Caesar should return to Gaul, withdraw from Rimini, discharge his armies; if he met these terms, Pompey would go to Hispania. Until there was assurance that Caesar would do what he had promised, the consuls and Pompey would not cease levying levies” (I.10).

The analysis from ZOPA is that the parties’ BATNAs do not allow for a deal on these terms. The proposed deal is that Julius Caesar must withdraw and disarm while his adversaries continue to arm. Julius Caesar would rather fight with his present forces than disarm. Pompey concedes to go to Hispania but only after he has assembled  the troops. The agreement is unbalanced in terms of the strategic relevance of the concessions between the parties. Therefore, the party that is asked to make a greater effort – to disarm – will easily find a better alternative to the proposed agreement.

Events progressed and it was now Julius Caesar who made a proposal to Pompey for a peace agreement, on the following terms: “that they should cause no more harm to themselves or to the Republic. They themselves were already enough proof, by their own disasters, of how much power fortune has in war. This was the only occasion to treat of peace, so long as both were confident of their strength, and their power was considered equal; if fortune helped only a little to one of the two, he who considered himself superior would not admit of terms for peace, nor consider himself satisfied with a part in which he trusted to possess all.

Since he had not been able to reach an agreement before, the terms for peace had to be requested in Rome from the Senate and the Roman people” (III. 10). (III. 10)

This agreement is based on equality of forces and uses the figure of an arbitration by the Senate. It is interesting the reflection that Julius Caesar makes where equality of forces is more favourable to peace, while if one party is more fortunate in combat, it will seek to defeat the other in battle.

What Julius Caesar means is that agreement is possible if the two sides have similar BATNAs. If one side has a very good BATNA – it has a good chance of winning the war – there is no possibility of agreement. The Zone of Potential Agreement -ZOPA- will expand with the uncertainty of the final outcome from two medium BATNAs.

Turning to a third party to settle a dispute is a legitimate, and widely used, way to do so, as long as its impartiality of judgement is guaranteed.

To Julius Caesar’s proposal of peace, Pompey’s reply was: “What does life or the city matter to me if it is to be believed that I have it for Caesar’s benefit; this belief cannot be erased, since it will be believed that by him I have been restored to Italy, when I came out” (III.18).

Here it is worth remembering Fisher and Ury’s rule “Separate the persons from the problem“. One party does not want to enter into a agreement because any solution will look like a success for the other party. In addition to an issue of hierarchy between the two, what seems to be relevant here are the emotions that stand in the way of any agreement. This always leads to conflict.

Proof of this are the words of an officer of the Pompeian army, named Labienus, who at one point in the negotiations said: “Stop talking about peace, for there can be no peace for us unless Caesar’s head is brought to us” (III.20).

It seems clear that there is an emotional problem and that the declared aim of one side is the death of Julius Caesar. In this case, there is no ZOPA. No agreement is possible if one side only wants Caesar’s death to make peace. The other side’s alternative is to fight and defend Julius Caesar’s life.

Pompey’s end also teaches us about strategy. His armies were defeated by Julius Caesar’s armies and set sail for Syria. There he sought help from Ptolemy, king of Egypt, who was at loggerheads with his sister Cleopatra, who later had a relationship with Julius Caesar that has been mythologised. Out of fear of the threat he posed or out of contempt for misfortune, Ptolemy’s advisors agreed to answer Pompey kindly in public and secretly sent two emissaries to kill him (III.104).

This story between Julius Caesar and Pompey can make us reflect on some aspects: a) On the need to establish a Zone of Possible Agreement (ZOPA) according to the BATNA of the parties, their Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement. The key to negotiating power is to have a good BATNA, a good alternative to negotiate; b) Proper management of emotions. They should not be an objective, in themselves, of the negotiation; c) Approach of third parties when their impartiality of judgement is guaranteed.

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Francisco Suárez, on the just cause 

Francisco Suárez is the greatest exponent of 16th-century scholastic philosophy in Spain. He was born in Granada in 1548 and died in Lisbon in 1617. He was a philosopher, theologian, and jurist. He was Jesuit (1564) and he studied in Salamanca and taught theology in Segovia (1571), Valladolid (1576), and Rome (1580). He was Professor of Theology at the Universities of Alcalá (1585) and Salamanca (1593), and in 1597 he went to Coimbra, where he had to take another doctorate in Theology to be able to teach. His works include Metaphysical Disputations/ Disputaciones metafísicas, which was very successful in his time, based on classical and scholastic authors.

This will be followed by a discussion of Francisco Suárez’s just cause theory of war, as reflected in his essay War, Intervention, International Peace/Guerra, intervención, paz internacional, in the style of Estrategia Minerva Blog. 

What are the just titles of war according to natural reason?

“No war can be just unless there is a legitimate and necessary cause. The conclusion is certain and evident. Now this just cause and sufficient reason for war is a grave injury already consummated which can neither be avenged nor otherwise redressed” (Francisco Suárez, Guerra, intervención, paz internacional, IV.1).

Bobbio recalls that the positions that tend to justify all wars are called warmongering; those that tend not to justify any are included in active pacifism and the intermediate ones that approve some and condemn others are just war theories. Precisely, Suárez’s approach is to specify the assumptions under which a war would be just.  

Bobbio affirms two fundamental principles: “the certainty of the criteria for judgement and the impartiality of the judge”.  He concludes that neither of these two principles is respected in the declaration and conduct of a war (Norberto Bobbio, El problema de la guerra y las vías de la paz).

Francisco Suárez’s doctrine of war is that it is only just as an ultima ratio, when other means of compensation, redress, or restoration are not available in cases of of grave injury. It is interesting to think that Clausewitz, the great theorist of strategy, said that “war is a mere continuation of politics by other means”. Strategy and negotiation must be elements that minimise the negative consequences of war. In other words, war, as a bad outcome, can help the parties to move strategically to avoid it.

“Not just any cause is sufficient to justify war, but only that cause which is grave and proportionate to the damage of war. It would be against natural reason to inflict very serious damage for a slight injury. Nor can the judge punish all kinds of offences, but only those which offend against the general peace and the good of the State” (Francisco Suárez, Guerra, intervención, paz internacional, IV.2).

It is associated with prudence, and a principle of justice, that the just cause of war must be serious and proportionate to its damage. However, this is not always the case.  

“Various kinds of injury are the cause of just war; these may be grouped into three chapters. First, when the prince seizes the property of another and refuses to restore it. Second, when without reasonable cause he denies the common rights of peoples, such as the right of transit on public roads and international trade. Thirdly, a grave injury to reputation or honour. These injuries are also sufficient cause for war when they are inflicted on the sovereign himself or on his subjects, for the prince is the guardian of the State and of the citizens” (Francisco Suárez, Guerra, intervención, paz internacional, IV.3).

Translated into more contemporary language, the first scenario would be that of territorial disputes between two States over a particular territory, where issues such as sovereignty, territorial integrity, etc. are mixed. This is a classic source of conflict, which can be handled diplomatically, although it sometimes ends in war.

The second scenario would be a serious violation of human rights, here there would be questions such as whether the issue of interference in internal affairs, whether democracy can be exported or universal jurisdiction of human rights. It could be argued that there are universal, regional and state systems to protect human rights, with many mechanisms for conflict resolution, although in the end a defensive war to protect human rights may be justified.

The third case of serious injury to reputation or honour would not currently be grounds for just cause for war, as there are other mechanisms for protection.  Instead, social networks have popularised the cancel culture, where people are denigrated for their actions or opinions considered politically incorrect.

“The war of the people against their sovereign is not intrinsically evil, even if it is aggressive; the other conditions of just war must, however, be fulfilled for it to be honest. This conclusion is only reached if the prince is a tyrant. It can happen in two ways: first, if the prince is a tyrant in terms of his dominion and power; second, if he is a tyrant only in terms of the way he rules.” (Francisco Suárez, Guerra, intervención, paz internacional, VIII.2).

This distinction of Suárez would be a precedent for the notions established by Max Weber as legitimacy in origin and legitimacy in exercise when dealing with the analysis of power. These words on the conditions of just war against the tyrant follow the medieval tradition of justifying tyrannicide, but give broader coverage by including this struggle within the types of just war.

In the first place, the tyrant is, Suárez clarifies, the one “who obtains the government of a State against the Law, especially if he rules it without justice and according to his will”. Secondly, the tyrant is he “who abuses his power, superiority or force in any concept or matter, or who simply imposes that power and superiority to an extraordinary degree”.

Just war would be a mechanism for protection against the abuse of power. Is war the best mechanism for that purpose? Constitutionalism had that very aim, which looks to counterbalance the different powers. However, there are conceptions of the separation of powers in democratic societies about who should have the last word on the most controversial issues and about whether all issues can be put to a vote. 

As Foucault put it, “politics is the continuation of war by other means”. The growing political polarisation is worrying. Carl Schmitt argued that politics is about benefiting your friends and prejudicing your enemies. This is known as the friend/enemy dialectic. Considering political adversaries as enemies is the first step to strong polarisation, civil conflict, and disunity. Let us hope that politics will find the best means and strategies for a better future and few, if any, just cause for war.

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Thucydides, the negotiating power in the Melian dialogue

In the work History of the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides narrates the conflicts that took place in Ancient Greece between the polis of Athens and Sparta. He highlights the famous Melian dialogue in which the Athenians -who held an empire- and the Melians -who inhabited the island of Milos- discuss their future relationship.

This dialogue is characterised by the Melians appealing to arguments of justice, equality and neutrality, while the Athenians use the threat of force and unequal resources. It would be an example, among the classics, of what is called real politik.

The Athenians distinguish between arguments of justice -between equals – and appeals to force -between the powerful and the weak-. The Athenians assert that “justice prevails in the human race in circumstances of equality, and that the powerful do what their strength permits and the weak yield to them” (V.89). So  according to the Athenians, the Melians must yield.

The Melians attempt to deliberate, advocating a position of neutrality between Sparta and Athens, but offering friendship. The Melians argue “would you not agree that, remaining neutral, we should be your friends rather than your enemies, but not allies of either side” (V.94).

In a typical response of political realism, the Athenians set their priorities in the relationship with the Melians: 1.- Hatred/Vassalage; 2.- Enmity; 3.- Friendship/Neutrality. Allowing an island to be neutral and friendly is a bad example for the interests of the Athenian empire. From this perspective, the Athenians assert that “your enmity does not harm us so much as your friendship, which is to our vassals a manifest sign of our weakness, while your hatred is a sign of our power” (V.95).

The Athenians’ argument is an appeal to power and force. They do not try to convince the Melians of the advantages of accepting their position. Rather, they make a serious threat, which given the context must have been credible. The Athenians argue that “this is not a contest for you to measure courage on equal terms so as not to suffer dishonour, but the deliberation is rather about your salvation, which consists in not standing up to those who are much stronger” (V.101).

The response of the Melians is to relativise the power of the other side and give more value to the alternative of a confrontation than that of surrender. The Melians assert that “wars present vicissitudes that are more evenly shared than the disproportion of forces would suggest. For us to give in immediately holds out no hope, whereas by giving ourselves up to action there is still hope of standing” (V.102).

This Melian dialogue allows us to address the question of bargaining power. In particular, according to the terminology of the Harvard Method in Getting to yes, from Fisher and Ury, on BATNA. The key element of negotiations is what is the Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement –BATNA-. What is relevant is to identify this BATNA and use it as the yardstick to measure any possible negotiating outcome.

The BATNA marks the worst acceptable outcome of the negotiation. The red line where it is better not to give in. The key is that the better BATNA you have, the more bargaining power a party has. If a party has a strong alternative, it will be able to make greater demands of the other party.

I will now analyse the Melian Dialogue from the perspective of the bargaining power of the parties. The Athenians consider their BATNA to be high because they are powerful and strong. This means that they can conquer the city despite the will of the Melians. The alternatives are the surrender of the Melians or their military defeat.

The Melians try to deliberate and convince the Athenians in terms of equality and justice. Their BATNA is an alliance with Sparta to protect them from Athens. Their alternatives are a lonely and heroic war, an alliance with Sparta, surrender to Athens or compromise with Athens.

From the point of view of strategy, the Athenians failed because they only threatened with force, but did not try to convince the other side of the advantages of being allies. They sought a relationship of vassalage and wanted to impose it through force. The negotiation was about whether they would have to fight to achieve their goals. From today’s perspective, it would be better to have allies than forced vassals.

From the Melians’ point of view, the alternative to negotiating is to ally more strongly with Sparta. The problem with this negotiation is that the alternatives they propose are voluntary surrender or military defeat. These terms are unacceptable to the Melians. The way to improve BATNA is to consolidate and make credible the possible alternatives, particularly the alliance with Sparta. It should also try to deliberate and convince the other side on a principled basis.

Thucydides himself recounts that Athens finally carried out its threat. From this perspective, “the Athenians executed all the Melians of virile age who fell into their hands and reduced the children and women to slavery” (V.116). The Meliansdialogue does not have a happy ending. The powerful wins by making good on their threat to use force. The lesson, from strategy, is that negotiations should enable parties to improve their bargaining power and better results be obtained, in the long run, from principled and convincing arguments.

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Breviary for politicians

We continue with the series dedicated to handbooks. This time it is dedicated to Breviary for politicians, published in 1684, attributed to Cardinal Mazarin, or someone close to him. Jules Mazarin was born in Pescina, Italy, in 1602 and died in Vincennes, France, in 1661. He was an Italian cardinal, without being ordained a priest, in the service of the French monarchy who exercised power in the early years of the reign of Louis XIV. He was a politician, diplomat, military officer, and adviser to Louis XIV, and he was responsible – as Prime Minister – for laying the foundations for making France a great European power.

For those interested in politics and strategy, and somewhat mythomaniacal, it is noteworthy that the historical figure who supported and turned Cardinal Mazarin into a statesman was the famous Cardinal Richelieu, whom he replaced in office. Both are presumed to be clever and astute, as well as efficient and reasonable in leading government. Machiavelli‘s pragmatic approach and political realism influence this Breviary for politicians.

The following is a commentary on passages from Cardinal Mazarin’s Breviary for politicians in the style of Estrategia Minerva Blog. It is worth noting that it follows the edition of this work by María Blanco entitled La política del disimulo. Cómo descubrir las artimañas del poder con Mazarino, of Editorial Rosamerón, which includes the essay of the editor.

Gaining esteem and fame 

“Never forget that anyone is liable to spread rumours about you if you have behaved – or spoken – too freely or rudely in his presence. In this matter, do not trust servants or pages. People look at an isolated incident to generalise; they take advantage of it to spread your bad reputation” (Cardenal Mazarino, Breviario para políticos). 

It is excellent advice to be cautious when speaking and be wary of who might be listening. Rumour-mongers/moral lordscan use past confidences to destroy your image. Your public reputation may be based on a hoax a thousand times repeated. According to the Spanish Royal Academy of Language, a hoax is “false news propagated for some purpose”. It is better to be prudent and leave hoaxes and rumours to others.

“Feign modesty, candour, kindness and perfect equanimity. Be grateful, congratulate, show yourself available, even to those who have done nothing to deserve it” (Cardenal Mazarino, Breviario para políticos). 

If you ever have a responsibility, exercising it with moderation, equanimity, and a willingness to serve the public is essential. Your character must adapt to the circumstances and cultivate, in addition to prudence, the Aristotelian virtues of temperance, justice and courage.

“Refrain from intervening in discussions where opposing points of view clash unless you are absolutely sure you are right and can prove it” (Cardenal Mazarino, Breviario para políticos).  

There are two pernicious tendencies: civil war/factionalism that seeks to divide society into irreconcilable camps and want-to-be-right-about-everything. If one is in a position of authority, it is crucial to make dissent and unity compatible.

Gaining each other’s favour 

“Avoid easy promises and granting too many permissions. Be difficult to deceive and circumspect in giving your opinion. But once given, do not change it” (Cardenal Mazarino, Breviario para políticos).

The ideal is to become reliable, credible, and a source of legitimacy. This is a departure from the Machiavellian approach, where the prince would always find an excuse not to keep his word. I disagree with Mazarin that one should never change one’s mind. In some situations, it is wise to rectify.

Avoid hatred 

“If you are relieved of your duties at any time, publicly express your satisfaction, even your gratitude to those who have given you back the peace and quiet to which you aspired so much. Find the most convincing arguments for those listening to you: in this way, you will avoid adding sarcasm to disgrace” (Cardenal Mazarino, Breviario para políticos).

It is relevant in this life to do things with elegance and fair play, even if it is not fashionable or in style. If your public responsibilities end, it is good to look to the future and not to hold grudges from the past. There should be an art and science for resigning and leaving office, which should include, in addition to good manners, always avoiding criticism, especially of superiors, and easing the way for those to come.

Acquiring wisdom 

“In most circumstances, it is better to stand still, to listen to the advice of another and to ponder it long and hard. Do not overestimate the extent of either your words or your actions, and do not take up matters that are useless to you now or later. Do not meddle in other people’s affairs” (Cardenal Mazarino, Breviario para políticos).  

A Spanish politician had responsibilities at different levels of public administration. He made his strategy for handling issues, especially the most complex ones, famous, and his secret was to let time pass. As incredible as it may seem, many issues have been found to be solved in this way before being considered again. 

Another great piece of advice is not to interfere in other people’s affairs because there is a very Latin tendency to solve other people’s lives based on one’s own prejudices and stereotypes. 

From the Baroque period, based on the experience of some of the most powerful politicians of the time, Cardinal Mazarin advises, in summary: to be prudent in speaking and not to trust who might be listening; to feign modesty, kindness and equanimity; to exercise any responsibility with moderation and a desire for public service; and to refrain from intervening in discussions with opposing points of view unless one is sure of being right and can prove it. Finally, he recommends listening to the advice of others, meditating long and hard, and not meddling in other people’s affairs.

The best reading that can be made of Mazarin’s approach is that it may be suitable for politics as well as for other areas of life.

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Why are there no nuclear wars?

It is not a frequently asked question, and we certainly hope they never happen, but you have not asked yourselves why nuclear wars have not happened? The answer to this disturbing question can be found in Robert Ayson’s book, Thomas Schelling and the Nuclear Age, which explains the ideas of Thomas Schelling, winner of the 2005 Nobel Prize in Economics, who has made significant contributions to the world of strategy and international relations.

In several of his works, Schelling analyses the issue of nuclear armament from the perspective of strategy. His approach is to make international relations, especially military decisions, eminently strategic territory. Lessons can be learned from his contributions for other strategy development and success areas.

According to Schelling, the key concepts to explain the nuclear age are stability and balance of deterrence. The strategy must be aimed at seeking stability between the parties. This is achieved by the balance of deterrence, which is based on two elements: a) a situation in which the disincentives outweigh the incentives for both sides to initiate war; b) it is “stable” when it is reasonably secure against shocks, alarms and disturbances.

Therefore, initiating conflict must be discouraged and unexpected events, such as a surprise attack, must be prevented. Schelling’s lesson in the nuclear age is that the respective incentives and disincentives condition stability.

In his explanation of nuclear strategy, Ayson alludes to Brodie’s work, which provides the key: “Precisely because there is no defence against the atomic bomb, any party, possessing atomic weapons, threatened with attack, has the ability to impose heavy costs on the attacker”.

The state of equilibrium is produced by ‘mutual fear of retaliation’. The costs of all kinds involved in the use of nuclear weapons discourage an attack for fear of a response, in the form of a counterattack, from the other side.

Equilibrium occurs because both sides have disincentives to initiate an attack, and the costs of taking one on by the other side are very high. Special care must be taken to avoid surprise attacks and unexpected situations that can change the equilibrium.

It can be argued that the equilibrium in the nuclear age has aspects that resemble the prisoner’s dilemma. Thus, betrayals by the players have a very high cost for both sides because there is a response rule in the form of a nuclear counterattack. As Poundstone explains, nuclear war would be a case of simultaneous and mutual bombing. As early as 1945, Senator Brien McMahon said: “If there is a nuclear Pearl Harbor, there will not be a jury of statesmen left to study the case” (Poundstone, The Prisoner’s Dilemma).

Schelling’s approach focuses on the role of stability and negotiation in the nuclear age. We could draw some conclusions from his approach: the best strategy is the one that seeks stability, which is guaranteed if the disincentives to conflict are greater than the incentives; the balance of deterrence is produced by fear of retaliation by the other side, which comes at significant cost; the best alternative to an endless arms race is negotiation.

In other words, stability is ensured by the parties’ disincentives to conflict and fear of retaliation, which entails high costs. By discouraging conflict, equilibrium is achieved.

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Montaigne, on barbarism

Michel Eyquem, Monsieur de Montaigne, was born in Périgueux, France, in 1533 and died in Bordeaux, France, in 1592. He was a writer whose fundamental works are the Essays (1580 and 1588). Before writing them, he travelled and obtained material for his work. The essays deal with various topics such as religion, politics and philosophy. Their approach seeks to fight against prejudices and dogmatisms and to encourage open minds and intellectual lucidity. These essays can be seen as an invitation for dialogue, critique and thinking.

The following are some excerpts, which we have translated, from Montaigne’s Essays with comments in the style of the Minerva Strategy Blog.

“I would excuse our people for having no other standard or rule of perfection than their own habits and customs; for it is a general vice not only of the vulgar, but of almost all men, to confine their gaze to the sphere in which they were born”(Cap. XLIX ”De las costumbres antiguas” en Montaigne, Ensayos).

This is linked to the strength of localisms, which give an unusual moral weight to the place of one’s birth. Specifically, this passage from Montaigne alludes to ethnocentrism, which William Graham Sumner defines in his book Folkways (1906) as “is the technical name for this view of things in which one’s own group is the center of everything, and all others are scaled and rated with reference to it “.

Ethnocentrism conceives that the values of the group set the standard of what is human and outside the group, differences occur as stigmas. Procrustean bed versus heterodoxy by combining the identity/alterity binomial.

“There is nothing barbarous or savage in that nation, according to what I have been told, but that everyone considers barbarous what does not belong to his own customs. Indeed, we seem to have no other view of truth and reason than the model and idea of the opinions and usages of the country in which we are. There is always the perfect religion, the perfect government, the perfect and finished practice of everything” (Cap. XXXI “De los caníbales” en Montaigne, Ensayos).

What is interesting here is to distinguish between critical morality – rational or justified morality – and social morality – the moral values of the majority of society – on the one hand, and the debate between scepticism/relativism versus universalism on the other. It may be argued that Montaigne’s scathing critique of customs, opinions and usages goes against relativism and favours some version of universalist critical morality compatible with a moderate vital scepticism, which is often attributed to the author of the Essays.  

“I consider that there is greater barbarism in eating a living man than in eating the dead, in tearing a still sentient body with tortures and torments, roasting it little by little, giving it to dogs and pigs to bite and tear to pieces (something we have not only read about, but also seen recently, not among old enemies but among neighbours and fellow citizens and, what is worse, under the pretext of piety and religion), than roasting and eating it after death” (Cap. XXXI “De los caníbales” en Montaigne, Ensayos).

In classical Antiquity, the Greeks claimed that they were civilised and their neighbours were barbarians. Thus began a dichotomy that has subsequently had various applications. For example, it played a role in the Valladolid Controversy between Bartolomé de las Casas and Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda. 

In this case, Montaigne asks who is more barbaric, the cannibalistic indigenous peoples he encountered on his travels in Latin America or the Europeans who burned human beings alive in the public square once condemned by the Inquisition. Here it becomes difficult to establish gradualisms or weightings to barbarism.

“We may well call them barbarians, if we consider the rules of reason, but not if we consider ourselves, who surpass them in every kind of barbarism” (Cap. XXXI “De los caníbales” en Montaigne, Ensayos).

In his work on barbarism, Francisco Fernández Buey highlights how historical events in the 20th century in the West have made the notion of barbarism highly topical. He mentions the extermination camps in Nazi Germany such as Auschwitz, the repression of the Stalinist Gulag and the atomic bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

However, this 20th century barbarism incorporates two qualitatively more repulsive and malignant features: “the number of murders without compassion, in a merciless manner, and the coldness and even asepsis with which the acts of barbarism were carried out” (Francisco Fernández Buey, La barbarie. De ellos y de los nuestros).

“Miracles depend on our ignorance of nature, and not on nature’s being; habit dulls the sight of our judgment. Barbarians do not astonish us any more than we astonish them, nor with any more reason: which all would admit if they knew how, after going over these examples, to look at their own and compare them sincerely” (cap. XXIII “De la costumbre y de cómo no se cambia fácilmente una ley recibida” en Montaigne, Ensayos).

Us and the Others, identity and otherness, group dynamics, lead to characterising those who are different as inferior and deviant – with a stigma – and members of the group as normal individuals. The paradox is that, from outside the group, from another group, its members can also be labelled as different, deviant and inferior – with a stigma. It makes sense: moderation, common sense. Keep values such as human rights and the Golden Rule of Humanity in mind on a daily basis.

In the above essay on barbarism, Fernández Buey reflects that “the violence and cruelty of others is always fanaticism and fundamentalism; the violence and cruelty of our own is the explicable passion that always drags human beings along” (Francisco Fernández Buey, La barbarie. De ellos y de los nuestros).

A suggestive contemporary reading of Montaigne can be a clear appeal against sectarianism and polarisation. Traveling, reflecting, fighting prejudice, understanding differences, appreciating human beings, and aiming for an ethical horizon.