Francisco de Quevedo, advice on politics and government

Francisco de Quevedo y Villegas was born in Madrid in 1580 and died in Villanueva de los Infantes, Ciudad Real, Spain, in 1645. He distinguished himself as a nobleman, politician and one of the most significant writers of the Baroque period in Spain. He studied Theology at the University of Valladolid, where he became a poet of great renown and wrote in opposition to his contemporary, Luis de Góngora. He cultivated all literary genres, but stood out chiefly for his great mastery of language, including his highly ironic style.
Francisco de Quevedo’s political side is largely unknown to the public.

Below, we will discuss excerpts from his work Política de Dios y gobierno de Cristo, sacada de la Sagrada Escritura para acierto del Rey y reino en sus acciones/ God’s policy and Christ’s rule, drawn from Holy Scripture to guide the King and the kingdom in their actions in the style of the Minerva Strategy Blog.

“No servant, nor minister of the King, is one who displays such grandeur that he is not merely equal to his king, but superior to him; such a man covets the crown; he is a rival for power; a tyrant, raised on the breast of favour, and nourished and grown by the arrogance of ignorance and greed” (Francisco de Quevedo, Política de Dios y gobierno de Cristo, I.XVII).

Envy is a poor guide. In this case, the minister is eager to take the crown and acts with duplicity and disloyalty. Each day has enough trouble of its own, and it is good to know how to fulfil one’s responsibilities at every moment, with diligence, integrity and loyalty. Positions are a learning experience for the future.

It is often said in Spanish, “Do not serve those who have served.” This phrase is attributed to Antonio Cánovas del Castillo and implies a certain notion of elitism, whereby only those of the same standing should be able to hold positions of influence. In my view, it is precisely because one has served that one can set a good example of how to treat a subordinate.

“Reigning is a task; that the duties of a ruler demand more sweat than the plough, and sweat drawn from the very veins; that the crown is a burdensome weight, which wearies the shoulders of the soul before it does the body’s strength; that palaces, for the idle prince, are tombs of a dead life, and for the one who attends to them, a scaffold of a living death—this is affirmed by the glorious memories of those enlightened princes who did not tarnish their legacies, counting among their crowned years not a single hour without labour.” (Francisco de Quevedo, Política de Dios y gobierno de Cristo, II.XIII).

Those who devote themselves to public life should spend their days working, not idling away. This reminds me of a story I heard at the University of Oxford about the scholarship profession being viewed as a kind of priesthood, where academic life demands calling/vocation and total dedication, which is reflected in the personal and formative influence on students that goes beyond simply delivering lectures. Once again, the question arises as to what virtues those in government should have, and what virtues professors should have.

“The foremost virtue of a king is obedience; for, being well aware of the value of temperance and moderation, it enables him to rule with gentleness whilst exercising supreme power. Obedience is no humiliation for monarchs, who, as men of great spirit, recognise their subjection to reason, piety and the Law. He who obeys these rules, rules well, and he who rules without having obeyed them torments rather than governs” (Francisco de Quevedo, Política de Dios y gobierno de Cristo II.XVI).

This is a reflection on Political Philosophy that challenges the notion of unlimited power. It sounds paradoxical to advise the king —the sovereign— on the virtue of obedience, but Quevedo makes it seem reasonable. First, by appealing to temperance and moderation, virtues already highlighted by Aristotle, and, second, by setting reason, piety and the laws as a guide.

That those in power obey the Law is a fundamental principle of the Rule of Law. It is desirable that they act rationally, as it would be hard to accept being ruled by someone like Nero. It would be commendable if they were compassionate, as the plight of the most vulnerable would be taken into account.

“The great and magnanimous King Alfonso of Aragon (whom all nations rightly call the Wise) possessed such learned and unyielding patience that he not only tolerated being defied—as was seen in the case of the soldier who insolently stopped him in public in Naples— but, not content merely to forgive them, he rewarded those who spoke ill of him; nor did he permit others to be spoken of in his presence, as happened with those who remarked on Nicolo Pichinino’s low birth. Not only did he not object to them disobeying him, but he commanded all his advisers not to obey him in matters where he ordered contrary to reason; and to the ministers who were subject to these superiors, he commanded that they should not obey them in matters that were not just” (Francisco de Quevedo, Política de Dios y gobierno de Cristo II.XX).

This reminds me of the Euthyphro dilemma, which Plato first raised. There is a version involving God, which would ask: “Is the good good because God commands it, or does God command it because it is good?”

There is another way of framing this dilemma in terms of the concept of sovereignty, which might be: “A rule is valid because the sovereign authority enacts it —Hobbes, Austin—, or the authority enacts it because it is just —Thomas Aquinas—.”

King Alfonso of Aragon urged people not to obey him in matters that were neither reasonable nor just. It would seem, then, that obedience may involve further considerations beyond mere legal validity. Entire libraries are devoted to debating these issues, which are of interest to the Philosophy of Law. This dilemma is typically addressed from either a formalist or a material perspective.

3-D Negotiation

Professors David A. Lax and James K. Sebenius, who are involved in the Harvard University Negotiation Project, in their book 3-D Negotiation. Powerful Tools to Change the Game in Your Most Important Deals offer new perspectives when it comes to conducting negotiations.

According to this approach, negotiations should be understood as three-dimensional, with three elements occurring more or less simultaneously throughout the actual negotiation. These dimensions are: a) Tactics, which involve persuasive manoeuvres and give-and-take. It is worth noting that poor tactics can ruin a negotiation; b) Deal design: beyond the obvious, this involves uncovering the parties’ true economic and non-economic interests; and c) Setup: off the table, which shapes and reshapes the situation. 

Below, we will examine the topic of exploring interests from the perspective of the Minerva Strategy Blog.

Lax and Sebenius begin by defining interest as “whatever you care about that is potentially at stake in the outcome.” Their entire approach is based on the observation that the interests stated at the negotiating table are one thing, whereas the parties’ actual or implicit interests are quite another, whether or not these have been clearly articulated. 

When exploring these interests (whether explicit or implicit) in the handling of information about the other party, it is essential to practice, at various stages of the negotiation process, the exercise of putting oneself in the other person’s shoes. It’s also vital for oneself or the negotiating team to calmly assess the true interests at stake: what one wants from the negotiation, what could be gained, and what could be lost. In the standard terminology of Negotiation Theory, what is the best alternative to a no-deal outcome (BATNA), and how is the Zone of Possible Agreement (ZOPA) established between the parties? 

However, Lax and Sebenius’s emphasis on the importance of (actual) interests within the framework of three-dimensional negotiation highlights the fact that focusing all one’s attention in negotiations on linear distributive dimensions—such as price negotiation—can cause one to lose sight of a range of potentially richer interests.

From this perspective, analysing BATNA and ZOPA can be useful tools, but not by focusing on a single variable; rather, by taking into account all the factors at play within the negotiating context.  

In many negotiations, relationships are a key factor to bear in mind. Sometimes, emotions guide the parties’ behaviour, and such feelings can distort certain expectations. On other occasions, poor or mediocre results are accepted simply to maintain the relationship. On this point, Lax and Sebenius distinguish between countries that focus on relationships—such as those in Southern Europe and Latin America—and others that focus on results, such as Anglo-Saxon and Northern European countries. 

Another factor to bear in mind is the social contract; beyond its strictly economic dimension, this governs people’s expectations regarding the nature, scope and duration of the agreement, the process to be followed, and the way in which unforeseen events are handled. As Lax and Sebenius state, it is “the spirit of the agreement.” It is important to clearly understand this broad framework to avoid conflicts or to resolve them without too much difficulty. It is about establishing relationships within a framework of trust, within the framework of a shared negotiating culture, where the obligations of the parties and the usual way of resolving potential conflicts are clearly established.

The third factor is the process itself. Certain negotiation processes often influence the outcome, and sometimes negotiators employ tricks and tactics, such as anchoring. These tactics can be particularly detrimental to one of the parties, who must be able to identify them and defend their position, especially when they are unaware of these strategies or lack experience in negotiation scenarios. Another important point is to distinguish the negotiating table from the wider negotiating context. It is usually easier to make progress in negotiations in informal settings.  

Finally, one factor to bear in mind is ethics. Certain aspects of some negotiations may be morally controversial; for example, some negotiating tactics that involve withholding or manipulating information from the other party. From an ethical standpoint, the response will differ between the deontological model, with its duty to always tell the truth; the consequentialist model, which advocates the greatest happiness for the greatest number of people; the Machiavellian model, focused on success; and the virtuous model, which proposes acting as a virtuous person would in that situation.

Lax and Sebenius argue that we should not confuse negotiating positions with a broader set of actual interests, and they propose four practices that will help you safeguard your interests:

Ask, listen and probe

Information about the other party’s interests is essential. The best way to get this is to listen carefully and gauge how they might respond to the negotiation map’s options. 

Use public sources to map interests

When important decisions need to be made, it is advisable to consult public records and the relevant institutions to gather objective information. Having reports from independent bodies and other credible sources of information is also beneficial.

Tap internal sources

Naturally, if you can obtain firsthand information from someone who understands the other party’s interests, this can be particularly useful. It is also important to have information about the negotiator and the people involved, as well as their explicit, implicit and underlying interests.

Tap knowledgeable advisers

In complex business situations, people often turn to professionals such as lawyers or intermediaries. Lax and Sebenius recommend asking them about their experience in such situations. Perhaps this is because – as Aristotle pointed out many centuries ago – experience can help one to better understand a particular situation.

Nelson Mandela, Life, Love, and Courage

Nelson Rolihlahla Mandela was born in Mvezo, South Africa, in 1918, and died in Johannesburg, South Africa, in 2013. A South African activist and politician who led the movements against apartheid and who, after a long struggle and 27 years in prison, presided over the first government, from 1994 until 1999, that respected racial equality, which affected the majority of the Black population.

His negotiations in the early 1990s with South African President F. W. de Klerk helped bring an end to the system of racial segregation known as apartheid in the country and paved the way for a peaceful transition to majority rule. In 1993, Mandela and De Klerk received a joint Nobel Peace Prize for their efforts.

In this series of posts on leadership, we will now examine passages from the book Richard Stengel titled Mandela’s Way. Fifteen Lessons on Life, Love, and Courage, from the style of the Minerva Strategy Blog

“How did his passionate revolutionary become a measured statesman? In prison, he had to temper his responses to everything. There was little a prisoner could control. The only thing you could control – that you had to control – was yourself. There was no room for outbursts or self-indulgence or a lack of discipline. He had no zone of privacy” (Richard Stengel, Mandela’s Way. Fifteen Lessons on Life, Love, and Courage, Introduction).

There is a reference to a shift in Mandela’s character towards moderation as a result of his 27 years in prison. It is difficult to imagine how one might adapt to such a prolonged period of imprisonment and what consequences this has for one’s view of the world. It is certainly worth reflecting on the role of hardship in shaping one’s education and character. Exceptionally difficult situations require the development of coping mechanisms and, in this way, shape one’s character. One becomes virtuous by acting virtuously. The moral habits and dispositions that are forged in the face of adversity will serve as the best reminder, shaping one’s character, that the difficult period has been overcome.

A saying attributed to Aristotle states that ‘the roots of education are bitter, but its fruits are sweet.’ Moderation is linked to the virtues of prudence and temperance. Mandela’s many years in prison transformed him into a moderate statesman, which speaks volumes about his human values. It is his characteristic leadership style. Others, by contrast, would foster division in a spirit of vengeance.

“Most people would say that Nelson Mandela personifies courage. But Mandela himself defines courage in a curious way. He does not see it as innate, as a kind of elixir we can drink, or as something we learned in any conventional way. He sees it as the way we choose to be. None of us is born courageous, we would say; it is all in how we react to different situations” (Richard Stengel, Mandela’s Way. Fifteen Lessons on Life, Love, and Courage, 1).

Courage is demonstrated through actions, not rhetoric. Every biography has examples of courage, even if the events are later disputed. Courage is evident in situations where the decisions involved conflict with one’s own well-being. Being courageous thus becomes the difficult path, and there are usually fewer who choose it.

“He understood that some part – quite a large part – of leadership is symbolic, and he was a splendid symbol. But he knew that he could not always be in front, and that one great goal could die unless he empowered others to lead. In the language of basketball, he wanted the ball, but he understood that he had to pass to others and let them shoot. Mandela genuinely believed in the virtues of the team, and he knew that to get the best out of his own people, he had to make sure that they partook of the glory and, even more important, that they felt they were influencing his decisions” (Richard Stengel, Mandela’s Way. Fifteen Lessons on Life, Love, and Courage, 4).

An essential part of leadership is knowing how to share it, even if that sounds somewhat paradoxical. There are people with vibrant, charismatic and unique personalities, but at the end of the day, we are all human beings, and that means we have limitations and are subject to circumstances. It is good to know how to work as a team and how to delegate. Creating a working culture based on shared values and sharing successes collectively and with those who make decisions, as well as knowing how to take responsibility when something goes wrong.  

“Nelson Mandela is a man of principle – exactly one: equal rights for all, regardless of race, class, or gender. Pretty much everything else is a tactic. It seems like an exaggeration – but to a degree very few people suspect, Mandela is a thoroughgoing pragmatist who was willing to compromise, change, adapt, and refine his strategy as long as it got him to the promised land” (Richard Stengel, Mandela’s Way. Fifteen Lessons on Life, Love, and Courage, 6).

This reminds me of Max Weber’s discussion of ethics and politics. The ethics of conviction is based on ideals and beliefs and applies to everyone. The ethics of responsibility is based on the consequences of actions and is a form of ethics specific to politicians. The question arises as to whether these two forms of ethics are compatible in politics. Nelson Mandela’s approach is that his ethics of conviction lead him to defend equal rights based on the inalienable principle of equal human dignity. At the same time, he advocated an ethics of responsibility, whereby politicians must evaluate their actions in terms of their consequences. And this implies a specific choice between means and ends, a strategy, a key element of political rationality.

Weighing anchor

Much could be said about the influence of emotions in negotiations, and effective management is advisable. There are several psychological factors that affect  Economy. Daniel Kahneman is a psychologist with dual American and Israeli nationality, who won the Nobel Prize in Economics in 2002. His approach focuses on how the way we perceive, and process information, influences our decision-making more than it seems.

In his work Thinking, fast and slowKahneman begins by distinguishing between two systems that operate in our brain: he calls the first one the automatic system and the second one the effortful system. System 1 operates quickly and automatically, with little or no effort and without a sense of voluntary control. System 2 focuses attention on demanding mental activities, including complex calculations.

System 2 operations are often associated with the subjective experience of acting, choosing, and concentrating. Systems 1 and 2 are always active while we are awake. System 1 acts automatically, and System 2 is normally in a comfortable, low-effort mode in which only a fraction of its capacity is occupied.

When System 1 encounters a difficulty, it calls on System 2 to suggest a more detailed and precise procedure that can solve the problem. You could say that human beings function on autopilot based on System 1, but if something does not add up, they turn to System 2.

From this perspective, Kahneman concludes that the best we can do is to reach a compromise: learn to recognise situations in which mistakes are likely and strive to avoid major mistakes when important things are at stake.

Kahneman’s book explains various unique phenomena that occur due to the synergy or lack of coordination between System 1 and System 2. One of these phenomena, which is undoubtedly of interest in the field of negotiations, is the effect of anchoring.

One of Kahneman’s experiments with his students involved using a wheel of fortune numbered from 1 to 100. This wheel was rigged and only stopped at 10 and 65. The number on the wheel of fortune was noted down. He then asked the students two questions:

Is the percentage of African nations among United Nations (UN) members greater or less than the number just written?

What is the estimated percentage of African nations in the UN?

When the wheel of fortune landed on 10, the average response regarding the percentage of African countries in the UN was 25%. However, when the wheel of fortune landed on 65, the average response regarding the percentage of African countries was 45%.

This is the anchor effect. The number given when the question is asked conditions the result, anchoring it. However, this phenomenon has no logical explanation, unless we resort to the explanation of autopilot and the relationships between System 1 and System 2.

Another experiment proposed by Kanheman was based on the following questions:

Was Gandhi approximately one hundred and forty-four years old when he died?

How old was Gandhi when he died?

It is obvious that Gandhi did not live to be 144 years old, but the outcome of this question is conditioned by that figure. It is significantly different than if the question were whether he was more or less than 35 years old when he died, which may seem surprising.

This anchoring effect is linked to the priming effect, where compatible evidence is selectively elicited. In this way, System 1 does everything it can to construct a world in which the anchor is the true world. It is one of the manifestations of associative coherence that Kahneman studies in his book.

What is the relevance of anchoring in the context of negotiations? The classic form of the anchoring effect in this area is the first offer. In many cases, the outcome of a negotiation is conditioned by the amount of the first offer. If someone makes an initial offer of 200, it would seem difficult to justify making a counteroffer of 15. But why shouldn’t this counteroffer be made?

The first offer anchors the various concessions made by the parties. This is particularly clear when the first offer consists of the clauses of a written contract draft. If negotiations take place based on the proposed wording, the negotiation will have been anchored and will be better focused for the party making this first offer.

A phenomenon linked to anchoring, which can provide key information in a negotiation, is the pace of concessions. If A’s first offer is 200 and B’s counteroffer is 100, A’s next offer will give us information about their reserve price, depending on whether their next offer is 150 or, conversely, 190. If their subsequent pace of concessions is 10 or 50.

The anchor effect is something that can be explained by the interrelation between System 1 and System 2. In other words, because autopilot is engaged and we do not carefully analyse each and every statement that is processed daily. This power of suggestion of anchoring is unjustified, and one must be especially alert in negotiation contexts, as it is a way of gaining positions and focusing on the interests of one party. The best response to an exorbitant first offer is a minimal counteroffer and, from there, to begin negotiating. The pace of concessions by each party will provide information about their respective reserve prices. When faced with negotiation anchors, it is best to weigh anchor with a realistic counteroffer.

Diego de Saavedra Fajardo, Political enterprises (II)

Diego de Saavedra Fajardo was a Spanish political writer, literary critic, poet, philosopher, and jurist, who was born in Algezares in 1584 and died in Madrid in 1648. I recently dedicated a post to his essay Empresas políticas/Political enterprises, a monumental work comprising four volumes and 100 enterprises, as the subtitle suggests. These books bring together the advice of a diplomat by profession on how to exercise political power effectively. 

Below, excerpts from volume II of the book by Diego de Saavedra Fajardo, Empresas políticas o Idea de un príncipe político cristiano representada en cien empresas/Political Enterprises or Idea of a Christian political prince represented in hundred enterprises, will be discussed in the style of Minerva Strategy Blog.

“Those who are very keen on aggrandising themselves and amassing their fortune are dangerous in positions of power. Although some seek merit and glory, and these are always worthy ministers, many consider it safer to build their fortunes on riches, and not to keep the reward and satisfaction of their services in the hands of the prince, who is almost always ungrateful to those who deserve it most” (Diego de Saavedra Fajardo, Empresas políticas o Idea de un príncipe político cristiano representada en cien empresas, LIII).

The pursuit of profit is often cited as the driving force behind the private sector. Adam Smith’s invisible hand and Mandeville’s fable of the bees, with varying degrees of intensity and nuance, argue that private vices such as greed, luxury, the pursuit of profit and envy lead to positive public consequences such as wealth, efficiency and free competition. However, as Saavedra Fajardo contends in this passage, it is not appropriate for the pursuit of profit to be the goal of those with responsibilities in the public sector. Politics is legitimised in such a way that those in power are accountable, which must be characterised by transparency, rigour in public budget, and adequate management of conflicts of interest. 

“But even when necessity compels the prince to do so, he must not live carelessly and detached from affairs, even if he has very capable and loyal ministers. For the body of the States is like natural beings who, lacking the inner warmth of the soul, no remedies or efforts are sufficient to maintain or sustain them so that they do not decay. The prince is the soul of his republic, and for it to live, he must in some way attend to its members and organs” (Diego de Saavedra Fajardo, Empresas políticas o Idea de un príncipe político cristiano representada en cien empresas, LVII).

With due regard for contextual differences, in these lines, Saavedra Fajardo alludes, in an incipient way, to the notion of political responsibility. In legal responsibility, if someone commits a crime and is convicted by a judge, they must then serve a sentence, which may consist of imprisonment, a fine or barred from exercising political rights. In political responsibility, if someone has a public position and has committed acts that warrant serious reproach that lead to the loss of the trust of the person who appointed them, they must resign. Resignation or dismissal is the sanction for political responsibility. In addition, the ruler is politically responsible if he has not properly supervised his subordinates –culpa in vigilando– or if he appointed someone and was negligent in not realising how manifestly unsuitable his candidate was for the position –culpa in eligendo-. It is noteworthy that the responsibility of those in power goes beyond merely not committing crimes and, in serious cases, if political responsibility is exercised, the best course of action is to leave public office.

“The strings of this harp of the kingdom are the people. Their nature is monstrous in every way and uneven, fickle and varied. They are governed by appearances without going deeper. They consult rumours. It is poor in means and counsel, unable to distinguish the false from the true; always inclined towards the worst. At any given moment, it is dressed in two contrary affections. But it is led more by them than by reason, more by impetus than by prudence, more by shadows than by truth” (Diego de Saavedra Fajardo, Empresas políticas o Idea de un príncipe político cristiano representada en cien empresas, LXI).

There has been an elitist tradition in the History of Ideas since Plato. Sartori expressed some misgivings in Homo Videns about videocracy and how the criterion for choosing candidates in political parties was to look for actors or sports stars because they were already famous, because they appeared on television. Umberto Eco criticised social media because it had given a voice to the uninformed who previously hardly anyone listened to. In the digital age, the key is whether the manipulation of people by demagogues becomes even more sophisticated, camouflaged by technological advances.

“Three things are required in resolutions: prudence to deliberate them, skill to arrange them, and perseverance to complete them. All the work and enthusiasm in their principles would be in vain if we were to overlook (as often happens) the ends. With both anchors, it is necessary that prudence secure them” (Diego de Saavedra Fajardo, Empresas políticas o Idea de un príncipe político cristiano representada en cien empresas, LXIII).

This seems like an interesting approach to establishing a strategy. Two sources of inspiration can be identified: Machiavelli and Aristotle. On the one hand, Saavedra Fajardo’s words reveal pragmatism and a matching of means to ends, sometimes referred to as efficiency, which aligns with some of Machiavelli’s writings. On the other hand, there is an emphasis on prudence, which Aristotle considered the virtue of virtues, focusing on practical rationality and aiming at the ends of human beings, happiness or human flourishing. Virtues, according to the Aristotelian perspective, arise as a middle ground between vices, one by default and the other by excess. An appeal to moderation as a guide for human life. 

How to negotiate rationally in an irrational world

Deepak Malhotra  and  Max H. Bazerman are professors at Harvard University and authors of the book  Negotiation Genius: How to Overcome Obstacles and Achieve Brilliant Results at the Bargaining Table and Beyond. This work is particularly interesting because, in addition to using common tools and concepts from Negotiation Theory, delves into the field of emotions, approaching negotiation processes from the perspective of Psychology. 

Specifically, one of the most relevant parts of the book is the analysis of biases in negotiation. Biases occur in the heart and mind and “affect even the best and brightest”. Malhotra and Bazerman study: fixed-size pie bias, dazzling attributes bias, non-rational escalation of commitments bias as biases of the mindconflicting motivations, egocentricity, overconfidence and irrational optimism, regret aversion as biases of the heart.

Below, we will analyse the chapter “How to negotiate rationally in an irrational world”, where these authors explain how to deal with the biases of the heart and mind in negotiation contexts, from the perspective of Minerva Strategy Blog.

Strategy 1 on how to deal with your own biases states: “Think according to system 2″. The Nobel Prize in Economics Daniel Kahneman  In his work Thinking, Fast and Slow, he has analysed certain phenomena concerning the influence of Psychology in Economics, such as anchorage.  

System 1, which corresponds to intuition, is generally fast and automatic, without the implicit and emotional effort with which we make most decisions in our lives. System 2 corresponds to reasoned thinking, is slower, requires effort, and is explicit and logical. You could say that we generally have “autopilot” in system 1, and if something does not work, system 2 kicks in.

The first recommendation in this strategy is: “Make a list for System 2”.  Important decisions, therefore, in the business world should be made by System 2. In other words, they should be carefully considered, properly thought through, weighing up the various scenarios and values at stake. Do not be swayed by first impressions, impulses, or emotions, which are implicit in biases. Skilful management of these biases can be part of the business practices and tricks of the other party.

The second tip states: “Avoid negotiating under time pressure“. Time management is crucial in many negotiations. It is important to know how to deal with ultimatums, which, in many cases, are just another negotiating tactic. The key is that, with less time, it will be more difficult to properly analyse the negotiating map. 

The third recommendation states: “Spread negotiations over multiple sessions”. To avoid unpredictability and improvisation in decision-making, it is beneficial to be able to negotiate over several sessions, allowing all relevant issues to be addressed from different angles with certainty. 

Strategy 2, on how to deal with your own biases, states: “Learn by using analogies”. Experience is a source of knowledge; you learn from your mistakes. The authors summarise this approach by stating that “the key is to figure out how to extract principles from experiences and examples”. Precedents for a similar situation should be taken into account and their relevance in the course of events should be assessed. 

The first tip in this strategy 2 is: “Study multiple negotiations simultaneously”. It is useful to learn about various strategies and negotiation frameworks similar to the one you are involved in. It is also beneficial, in light of this information, to map out various negotiation scenarios, with the possible outcomes for the parties involved.

The second recommendation states: “Focus on principles, not details”. The important thing is to identify the interests involved and what might be the best way to satisfy them for both parties. This is the most genuine area of negotiation, which reminds me of the principle of the Harvard Method: Focus on interests, not positions.

Strategy 3 on how to deal with your own biases states: “Adopt the outsider’s perspective”. The parties are sometimes so involved in a negotiation that the intervention of an impartial third party is necessary. This is even institutionalised in the form of negotiation mediators. Or, in some regulated cases, the parties may submit their case to arbitration by a third party.

Strategy 1 for dealing with other people’s biases states: “Incorporate the consequences of others’ biases into your strategy”. At this point, Malhotra and Bazerman seem to be saying that if others act on biases of the heart or mind, that is to say if they are irrational, we should build our strategies to take advantage of this in business interactions.

Strategy 2 for dealing with other people’s biases states:  “Help others apply less biased criteria”. One thing you can share with the other party is the lesson of making decisions within a reasonable time frame, after conducting a thorough analysis, without emotional constraints, and detecting negotiating tactics and tricks.  

Strategy 3 for dealing with other people’s biases says, “Weigh up the information provided by others”. Relevant data provided by the other party in business contexts should be routinely checked. A typical example is the price of an item for rent or sale. It is advisable to find out the market price of that item, whether for rent or sale, and compare it with the offer made. Some people complain about the purpose of these checks, as if they were a sign of a lack of trust. They simply seek to avoid bias in the negotiation because, as Malhotra and Bazerman argue, we seek to negotiate rationally in an irrational world. 

Franklin Roosevelt, adversity and growth

Franklin Delano Roosevelt was born in New York in 1882 and died in Warm Springs, Georgia, in 1945. He served as President of the United States between 1933 and 1945, becoming the country’s 32nd president. He was a distant cousin of former President Theodore Roosevelt and had studied at Harvard, as well as Columbia University, just like him. He was Assistant Secretary of the Navy between 1913 and 1920, but, unlike his predecessor, Franklin joined the Democratic Party.

Franklin Roosevelt was not just another president in the history of the United States. He was not only the president who managed to rescue the North American power from the most serious economic crisis it had ever experienced, following the stock market crash of 1929. He was the only US president to serve four consecutive terms, lead the nation during the Second World War, and steer the national economy into uncharted territory: Keynesianism.

Kearns Goodwin dedicates a chapter to Franklin Roosevelt in his book Leadership in Turbulent Times: Lessons from the Presidents, focusing on his approach to adversity and growth. Excerpts from this chapter will be discussed below in the style of the Minerva Strategy Blog. 

“Roosevelt’s irrepressible optimism, his tendency to expect the best outcome in any circumstance, provided the keystone strength that carried him through this traumatic experience. From the outset, he said an objective: a future in which he would fully recover. Although necessity forced him to modify the timetable for attaining this goal, he never lost his conviction that he would eventually succeed” (Doris Kearns Goodwin, Leadership in Turbulent Times. Lessons from the Presidents).

The previous paragraph must be put into context, as in 1921, Roosevelt contracted an illness that left him permanently paralysed in his legs and confined to a wheelchair. The fact that one of the most powerful men of his time was in a wheelchair can make us reflect on the human condition in terms of mutual vulnerability. I have sometimes argued that we all are in a minority. This means that the experience of discrimination and prejudice in the various dimensions of identity is not alien to human life. In some of these dimensions, people find themselves in the minority and learn what life is like as a left-handed person, a person with dyslexia or an immigrant. The lesson from President Roosevelt is that, in the face of adversity, his strategy was optimism and, from there, a tireless struggle against the circumstances one faces. Indeed, some have seen the meaning of life and the core of human freedom in that struggle.  

“Eleanor, of course, added the most essential dimension to the progressive strain and moral gravity of Franklin Roosevelt’s leadership. “He might have been happier with a wife who was completely uncritical”, she observed in her memoirs, adding, “that I was never able to be”. She was more uncompromising, more straightforward, more deeply involved with activists, whose thoughts challenge conventional boundaries” (Doris Kearns Goodwin, Leadership in Turbulent Times. Lessons from the Presidents).

Eleanor Roosevelt, Franklin Roosevelt’s wife and political and life partner, was an essential ingredient in his success. The symbiosis between constructive criticism and loyalty is a component that guarantees a fruitful relationship. Some interpretations confuse loyalty with submission, while on other occasions, criticism is levelled with the central aim of destroying the other person. Being loyal means knowing how to criticise with empathy, putting yourself in the other person’s shoes, thus strengthening the relationship. However, if the other person, after listening to us, wants to go their own way, loyalty to them means respecting their decision. John Stuart Mill must have felt something similar when he wrote in On Liberty about advising a friend who is heading towards a bridge, that no longer exists, and would cause them to fall.

“After waiting through the winter and spring of 1931 for federal initiatives from President Hoover and the Republican administration, Roosevelt resolved in late summer to “assume leadership for himself and to take action for the state of New York”. He summoned the Republican legislature into an extraordinary session to pass what was considered a radical idea, a state-sponsored comprehensive programme of unemployment insurance. He knew from the start that the Republican majority could block his proposal. Like President Hoover, the state Republican leaders believe that private enterprise, charity, and the local government were the sole institutions capable of meeting the economic challenge. Belief brought from the distant level of the state or federal government, they insisted, would only impair the enterprise of the American people and worsen the problem” (Doris Kearns Goodwin, Leadership in Turbulent Times. Lessons from the Presidents).

One of Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s most significant contributions as President of the United States was the implementation of the Welfare State. This is characterised by the State taking an active role in achieving the well-being of its citizens and ensuring their material equality. Social rights, such as education, healthcare, and social security, are protected.  A few years earlier, during President Theodore Roosevelt’s term, there was a precedent for this approach in the case of Lochner v. New Yorkwhere the State intervened to regulate bakeries’ hours. This was unprecedented in American constitutional history, which was guided by the idea that the State should refrain from intervening in the Economy. Interestingly, the majority of the Supreme Court overturned the regulation based on a formalistic criterion, grounded in strictly legal variables. However, in a dissenting opinion, Justice Holmes applied a finalistic approach, using economic and sociological arguments to support the measure on bakeries’ hours. Years later, the majority of the Supreme Court changed and became favourable to State intervention in the Economy. Here, we might remember Aristotle and say that it is interesting to consider how Law has form and substance.

The power of empathy

The Harvard Negotiation Project at the Harvard Business School has developed a   Negotiation Method, the principles of which are explained in the best-selling book  Getting to Yes. How to negotiate without giving in, by Robert Fisher and William Ury. Another Harvard professor, Deepak Malhotra, has a book entitled Negotiating the Impossible. How to break deadlocks and resolve ugly conflicts (without money or muscle) , where he analyses how they act in the context of complicated negotiations. 

Below, we will analyse some of Malhotra’s advice in the section of his book on complex negotiations, ‘The Power of Empathy’, from the perspective of the Minerva Strategy Blog.

Empathy expands the set of options you have for resolving the conflict. The better you understand the other side’s perspective, the more likely you are to find a solution.

Empathy is often understood as putting oneself in another’s situation.  The  Golden Rule  maintains that “treat others as you would like to be treated.” A good exercise is to ask yourself: if I were in the other person’s situation, how would I like to be treated and how would I behave? This rule is fine, but it should include safeguards to prevent exploitation. The Silver Rule states: “Do not do unto others what you would not have them do unto you.” This would be a practical application of empathy. However, ultimately, there is the Bronze Rule: “Do unto others as others do unto you.” This would be an extreme form of reciprocity and, at times, the mere possibility of applying this Bronze Rule may have strategic value.

Empathy is needed most with people who seem to deserve it least. The more intolerable their behaviour, the greater the potential benefit of understanding it.

There may be individuals with challenging personalities or who find themselves in complicated situations, or who may behave unusually due to cultural, religious, gender, disability, or other identity factors.

The relevant issue is that, in business contexts, information about the parties’ backgrounds is key. This data can help explain certain behaviours and attitudes, and/or justify each party’s actions and action plan from their point of view. This exercise in understanding the other party can be useful, as it can highlight differences in interests, assessments or perceptions that may be of strategic interest.

There is almost always a trade-off between maintaining strategic flexibility and safeguarding credibility.

The term trade-off is used in economics as a synonym for compromise, referring to a situation in which gains are made on one side, but losses are incurred on the other. 

Credibility is the degree to which others believe that we will follow through on our commitments. From the deontological ethical model, Kant is the ultimate example of credibility, as he maintained that promises must always be kept. Strategic flexibility is the option to change one’s mind if continuing with previous commitments seems unwise. In the Machiavelic ethical model, Machiavelli is the paradigm of strategic flexibility; for example, in chapter XVIII of The Prince, he analyses whether the prince should keep his word. 

Typically, Malhotra asserts, we want as much credibility as possible while maintaining flexibility. However, if we invest more in strategic flexibility, we typically have less credibility, and vice versa. 

Don’t force people to choose between doing what is smart and what save face.

A first rule of negotiation, linked to empathy, is that proposals for agreement and subsequent negotiations should be framed so that one party is trying to “save face” for the other. In other words, consider the specific consequences the proposed deal will have for the other party. But here, Malhotra, in line with the Harvard Negotiation Project, goes further and calls for the other party to be provided with an intelligent solution. This means the other party must also consider it a good agreement. 

Ignore ultimatums. The more attention you give to them, the harder it will be for the other side to back down if the situation changes.

Ultimatums can be seen as threats. A distinction should be made between business threats and real threats. The former plays a strategic role in negotiation, and the key is their credibility in the eyes of the other party. Real threats will entail a specific response, with negative consequences, towards certain behaviours. Malhora’s advice is to ignore ultimatums and threats and reformulate them so they can be incorporated into the broader negotiating framework. 

Think trilaterally: evaluate how third parties influence or alter the interests, constraints, and alternatives of those at the table.

In certain negotiations, the weight and influence of third parties are very present, conditioning the entire negotiating framework, whether in terms of interests, communication between the parties, or perception. A key point from this perspective is the real power of third parties in the framework, development, and agreement of the negotiation, and the type of link that connects the other negotiating party and the third party. If the real power and influence of the third party are strong, there is no doubt that we must think trilaterally; even if they are somewhat weaker, it is worth considering the third party’s power and influence in favour of our cause. 

Diego de Saavedra Fajardo, Political enterprises

Diego de Saavedra Fajardo was a Spanish political writer, literary critic, poet, philosopher and jurist, who was born in Algezares in 1584 and died in Madrid in 1648. He was private secretary to Cardinal Gaspar Borja (1606) and Spanish ambassador to the Papal States. He later served as ambassador to Rome (1631), Germany (1632) and Regensburg (1636), and represented Spain at the conferences in Münster (1643).

In his introduction, “To the Reader”, Saavedra Fajardo explains how the work Empresas políticas o Idea de un príncipe político cristiano representada en cien empresas/ (Political Enterprises or Idea of a Christian Political Prince Represented in One Hundred Enterprises) came about in the few spare moments his work as a diplomat allowed him. The intended recipient was none other than the son of Philip IV, Prince Baltasar Carlos, who would never reign in Spain, as he died as a child and who inspired Velázquez’s portrait “Príncipe Baltasar Carlos, a caballo”. This work, which consists of several volumes, follows the political philosophy tradition of giving advice to those in positions of power on how to govern better. 

Bellow, excerpts from the book Empresas políticas o Idea de un príncipe político cristiano representada en cien empresasby Diego de Saavedra Fajardo in the style of Minerva Strategy Blog will be discussed.

“This good education is more necessary for princes than for others, because they are instruments of political happiness and public health. For other people, poor education is detrimental to each individual or to a few; in the prince, it is detrimental to him and to all, because some are offended by it, and others by his example” (Diego de Saavedra Fajardo, Empresas políticas o Idea de un príncipe político cristiano representada en cien empresas, II).

The expression “good manners” can be understood as referring to etiquette or as a path to virtue. If we follow the perspective of manners, it is interesting that Emily Post, in her classic book Etiquette’s Manners for a New World,summarises that, rather than archaic rules, good manners are guidelines for life based on respect, consideration and honesty. 

If we follow the perspective of the path to virtue, good education involves shaping character towards dispositions and habits associated with models of excellence, inherent in the practices of human life. In other words, this approach involves fostering virtues and avoiding vices. 

“A wise prince is the security of his subjects, and an ignorant one is their ruin. From this we can infer how barbaric the judgement of Emperor Lucinius was, who called the sciences a public plague and philosophers and orators the poison of republics. No less barbaric was the rebuke of the Goths to the mother of King Alaric, because she taught him literacy, saying that it made him unfit for political matters” (Diego de Saavedra Fajardo, Empresas políticas o Idea de un príncipe político cristiano representada en cien empresas, IV).

Should politicians be required to have a minimum level of education? Can we be governed by ignorant people? Plato’s Myth of the Cave is at the origin of his political ideas, and among his most famous is the notion of the Philosopher King. This approach has been criticised for its elitism. Aristotle, more moderate, argued that the best government is that of the middle class. Politics has its own rationale for decision-making, and it is good to seek advice from experts. Sophists and philosophers were the first educators of Athenian citizens in democracy. In the face of ignorance, it is advisable to learn how to make the best decisions.

“History is the teacher of true politics, and the best teacher of how to reign for a prince, because it contains the experience of all past governments and the prudence and judgement of those who came before. It is an advisor that is with him at all times. From jurisprudence, the prince takes that part that belongs to government, reading the laws and constitutions of his States that deal with it, which Reason of State found and long use approved” (Diego de Saavedra Fajardo, Empresas políticas o Idea de un príncipe político cristiano representada en cien empresas, IV).

History explains the present. Understanding how things happened in the past and what criteria were involved at a given moment is crucial. That account comes from History for generations who did not directly experience the events. It is regrettable how easy it is to forget the experiences, sufferings and aspirations of past generations. 

“All human actions have some kind of good as their goal, and because we deceive ourselves in our knowledge of it, we err. The greatest quality seems small in our power, and very great in that of others. We are unaware of our own vices and notice them in others. How gigantic the tyrannical inventions of others appear to us! How dwarfed are our own! We consider vices to be virtues, wanting ambition to be greatness of spirit, cruelty to be justice, prodigality to be liberality, recklessness to be courage, without prudence discerning what is honest from what is evil and what is useful from what is harmful. We are deceived by things when we look at them through the lens of our affections or passions; only benefits should be viewed from both sides” (Diego de Saavedra Fajardo, Empresas políticas o Idea de un príncipe político cristiano representada en cien empresas, VII).

Sectarianism and factionalism lead to this double standard. There is no truth or falsehood, good or evil; everything depends on whether the person doing it is one of us. The group strengthens itself with closed-mindedness and dogmatism. It would be desirable to use equanimity and impartiality when judging the qualities of others, leaving tribal emotions aside.

The best strategy is to prevent stratagems

Strategy has military origins, where a series of skills and abilities were required to organise operations aimed at achieving victory for armies. Nowadays, strategy is discussed in relation to a myriad of topics that, on the surface, seem to have little to do with its military background. Perhaps what they have in common is that the need to be strategic stems from the cost of losing, which can sometimes be unbearable. In other words, strategy arises because we seek the best and most suitable means to guarantee the end goal, whether it be military victory or success in business, politics, or life.

In previous posts, I have analysed four ethical models associated with strategy: deontological, consequentialist, Machiavellian, and virtuous. It is time to take stock. To do so, I will draw on the distinction between strategy and stratagem.

There are several possible definitions of the first term, depending on the field (military, business, politics, game theory, etc.). I will adopt a definition that serves explanatory purposes. Strategy is the art and science of developing a plan and choosing the appropriate means to achieve the proposed goals.

On the other hand, the Spanish Royal Academy of Language defines stratagem as, in its first meaning, “a ruse of war” and, in its second meaning, “cunning, pretence and artful deception”. As can be seen, stratagem also has a military origin. The term “ruse” is defined by the Spanish Royal Academy of Language as “a device, a means skilfully and cleverly employed to achieve some end”.

One possible conclusion seems to be that, according to these definitions, skilful and cunningly employed device is more justified in war than in other areas. In other words, a stratagem in a military context is a ruse and, outside that context, it is artful deception.  The answer may lie in the fact that the objective of war is victory, but if it is not successful, military defeat and its dire consequences ensue. Also, because in military terms, we often talk about enemies and consider scenarios that economists refer to as zero-sum: what they lose, we gain, and vice versa.

Life is richer in nuances than war. People find themselves in situations of cooperation and conflict and develop their life plans to achieve their professional or personal goals. I mentioned in a previous post that we are all philosophers—we ask ourselves questions, we define our alpha and omega—and that we would be better off if we were all strategists. What role do stratagems play?

Here we will see the functionality of the ethical models analysed in previous posts. The deontological strategist condemns the use of stratagems because they have an element of deception. The two maxims of the deontological model are to always tell the truth and keep promises. We should walk a fine line to use a stratagem that complies with these two maxims and leads to success.

The consequentialist strategist evaluates actions based on their results or on the maximisation of a chosen variable – well-being, utility, money, happiness, etc. According to this model, stratagems will be valid depending on the consequences they produce. The key question is whether an artificial deception can be stable over time. A distinction should be made between interactions that occur once or over a longer period or are lifelong. The use of stratagems does not last over time because it increases the risk of being discovered and, therefore, would no longer produce the desired consequences.

The Machiavellian strategist is a specialist in stratagems, but authentic Machiavellianism consists precisely in not being noticed. Their vision is an art of simulation and dissimulation, the highest rule of which is the desire for success. The means are appropriate if they achieve the ends proposed. The Machiavellian strategist makes abundant use of cunning and pretence to achieve their goals. However, like the consequentialist, the passage of time increases the risk that their true actions and intentions may be discovered.

The virtuous strategist has an ambivalent position on stratagems. They can develop skills and dispositions that shape their character and involve pretence or cunning, but within known limits. According to the law of the middle term, virtue lies in moderation, never in excess. Furthermore, according to this view, not everything can be called a virtue; it is a pluralistic view, but not a relativistic one.

In summary, the deontological strategist condemns stratagems; the consequentialist strategist values stratagems based on the consequences they produce, fearing discovery over time; the Machiavellian strategist habitually uses stratagems while pretending not to; and the virtuous strategist may use stratagems, in moderation, but only if they can be considered virtues.

After these reflections, it can be said that the best strategy is to be wary of stratagems.