Golden Rule of Humanity

Oscar Pérez de la Fuente

Universidad Carlos III de Madrid

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3708-846X

Abstract

This article examines the Golden Rule of Humanity as a cross-cultural moral principle and analyses its meaning through its relation to reciprocity, empathy, and practical moral judgment. It begins by situating the Golden Rule within attempts to identify a minimum common denominator of human morality, including the 1993 Declaration Toward a Global Ethic. The discussion distinguishes between the positive and negative formulations of the Golden Rule and argues that both rely on expectations of reciprocity rather than guaranteed responses. The article then contrasts the Golden Rule with the Silver Rule, understood as reciprocity based on past actions, and with the Platinum Rule, which proposes treating others as they wish to be treated. By comparing these three rules, the text highlights the strengths and limitations of each. In particular, it shows that the Golden Rule can be overly agent-centred, since one’s own preferences may not match those of others, while the Platinum Rule may become excessively demanding. The article concludes that reciprocity remains the key ethical concept and that moral interaction requires communication to clarify expectations, interests, and the appropriate terms of mutual treatment in pluralistic societies today.

Keywords: Golden Rule, reciprocity, atruism, expectative, TITforTAT

ISSN: 3127-3408

https://doi.org/10.67647/minervastrategy.2024.18

There have been some attempts to find the moral norms that are repeated across societies, such as the minimum common denominator of human morality. It is remarkable to note how principles are repeated throughout religions and moral codes. One such attempt was the Declaration for a World Ethic, adopted by the World Parliament of Religions and agreed upon in Chicago in 1993.

The Golden Rule of Humanity is one of the central principles on which this Declaration is based and has two forms. A positive one states that do unto others as you would have done unto you. This deserves some thought. Some see it as a further application of the logical principle of consistency—a way of being consistent with others and yourself. However, things are often more complex.

In a way, the Golden Rule is based on a future expectation that others will act in the same way as you, which is linked to the spirit of reciprocity. However, it is an expectation that does not have to be fulfilled. The other party should realise that you are following the Golden Rule. In other words, you are someone with an expectation of reciprocity.

The Golden Rule has a negative formulation that states do not do unto others what you would not want done unto you. This implies not doing harm if you do not want to be harmed. In this case, the future expectation is that others will not harm you somehow because you have not harmed them. It seems that social cooperation is based on this kind of expectation. However, someone may not reciprocate and not meet these expectations.

Therefore, some advocate that in the face of the good intentions of the Golden Rule, a Silver Rule should be upheld, which states that you treat others as others treat you. This rule is based strictly on reciprocity, not expectations. It is Axelrod‘s solution to the Prisoner’s Dilemma from TIT for TAT. Or known as an ‘eye for an eye’. The explanation is that someone who used the Golden Rule in the prisoner’s dilemma would get good results initially but would be exploited by someone who opted for betrayal. The TIT for TAT rule rewards or punishes based on the specific behaviour of others.

The conclusion is that, although they are linked, the Silver Rule is the reverse of the Golden Rule. The Golden Rule is based on a reciprocity of expectations, and the Silver Rule is based on a reciprocity of actions. The Golden Rule is based on the future, and the Silver Rule is based on the past.

It is often said that the Golden Rule is also a commitment to empathy, to ‘putting oneself in the other shoes’. This is a highly relevant ethical principle. However, on closer examination, the Golden Rule would be based on the false assumption that we all have the same tastes and needs.

If I have a vegetarian friend and I love meat, the way to treat him as I would like to be treated would be to prepare a big meat feast for him. But he won’t like it, he won’t appreciate it, and he will even get upset. This Golden Rule seems to be agent-centred, where the agent determines what is right. However, while it may be appropriate at times, it does not always work, so some advocate for a Platinum Rule.

The Platinum Rule states you should treat others as they would like to be treated. This rule holds that we should act towards others based on their interests or tastes, for example, my vegetarian friend would have a wonderful salad.

The problem with the Platinum Rule is that the tastes and interests of others are also particular, which can sometimes lead to paradoxical situations, such as whether someone is an addict or a masochist. This Rule is more demanding than the Golden Rule and the Silver Rule. It is an altruistic view that can become heroic.

The key is reciprocity. If my vegetarian friend wants to thank me for the salad, the Golden Rule leads him to prepare a gazpacho and the Platinum Rule to cook a sirloin steak. That is why it is essential to inform each other and to be able to clarify the terms of reciprocity.

The Golden Rule is a moral principle reflected in many of humanity’s religious and secular texts. It is a good principle for judging moral actions and is based on expectations, the future, and the spirit of reciprocity. The main criticism is that the agent is shown as the criterion of moral correctness.

References

Gensler, Harry J. (2013), Ethics and the Golden Rule, New York, London: Routledge.

Parliament of World’s Religions (1993), Declaration Toward a Global Ethic, Chicago, 4 September 1993. Available: https://www.weltethos.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/Decl_english.pdf (last visit: 26 May 2026).

Virtuous ethical model

Oscar Pérez de la Fuente

Universidad Carlos III de Madrid

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3708-846X

Abstract

This paper examines the virtuous ethical model as a framework for understanding moral action and its relevance to strategic practice. Drawing on the Aristotelian tradition, virtue ethics is presented as an approach that focuses not primarily on rules or consequences, but on the character of the agent and the cultivation of stable dispositions toward excellence. The discussion clarifies the distinction between religious virtues and classical ethical virtues, highlighting prudence, courage, justice, and temperance as central elements of moral formation. Special attention is given to the educational dimension of virtue ethics: individuals become virtuous through the repeated practice of virtuous actions, so learning and experience are essential to ethical development. The paper also stresses the contextual and pluralist character of this model, while rejecting relativism by affirming that some forms of conduct can never count as virtues. From the perspective of strategy, three Aristotelian ideas are especially significant: the doctrine of the mean, the value of experience, and prudence understood as practical wisdom. The conclusion is that the strategist’s path to excellence depends on moderation, reflective judgment, and the disciplined acquisition of virtuous habits.

Keywords: virtue, middle ground, academic Philosophy

ISSN: 3127-3408

https://doi.org/10.67647/minervastrategy.2024.16

The last model I will discuss is the virtuous ethical model, which comprises a few principles. First, to know the right action in a situation, one must think how a virtuous person would act. Second, a virtuous person is one who possesses virtues. Third, virtues are habits or dispositions that forge the character of human beings and show the excellence of a specific practice.

There is confusion about the language of virtues in the religious and ethical approaches. The virtues of the Christian religion are faith, hope, and charity. However, the approach to virtue ethics predates Christianity and is identified with the work of AristotleNicomachean Ethics (2004), which considers prudence, courage, justice, and temperance as virtues.

The educational component in virtue ethics is relevant. One becomes virtuous by acting virtuously. Or, to put it another way, one’s character becomes virtuous by repeating virtuous habits. This is why this model is so essential in education and why virtues, in general terms, can be learned.

But what is a virtue? This ethical model is more flexible than the deontological model. The virtuous ethical model is more contextualist and pluralist. Everyone can find their own models of excellence -virtues- and try to act following them. Nevertheless, not everything can be a virtue; it is not a relativistic approach. Some behaviours are closer to vices than virtues and, although there is a contextualist component, some clear cases cannot be virtues. Evil, murder or envy can never be considered virtues.

What are the virtues of a strategist? From what we have seen so far, virtues are learned by behaving virtuously, and there is a contextual element where everyone finds their own models of excellence, but with some limits. Aristotle claimed there to be at least three exciting perspectives on virtues: a) The law of the ‘middle ground’; b) The importance of experience; c) The virtue of prudence as practical wisdom. These will now be applied to the strategist perspective. 

A virtue is the middle ground between two extremes or vices, one by defect and the other by excess. This is basically what the law of the ‘middle ground’ holdsIt is a call for moderation in various actionsThe analysis that can be made is that given specific objectives, one should determine which actions are virtuous -within the middle ground- and which are excessive -by default or excess-.

The virtue ethics approach places great importance on experience. By learning to be virtuous, we learn the virtues of strategy. The best way to learn from the right foundations is through experience. In practice, everyone finds their models of excellence, which allows us to see that virtues depend on context. Experience also allows us to assess whether we are really dealing with a virtue or an excess.

Of all the virtues, Aristotle highlights prudence, which he considers to be synonymous of practical wisdom. He refers to the word phronesis as the central virtue of human beings. For strategists, prudence is also a central virtue. Prudence means constantly weighing up all alternatives, considering the various opportunity costs, promoting impartial testing methods, using third parties or experts and, above all, thinking through -and not rushing into- different transactions.

From the virtuous ethical model, we can conclude that the virtues of the strategist can be learned, that one becomes virtuous by acting virtuously, that experience teaches us the way, that a balance must be made to find virtues and excesses. The virtues are in moderation and, finally, that the central virtue for strategists is prudence, which is practical wisdom. The path to virtue is an apprenticeship towards excellence based on experience and prudence. Do we dare to walk it?

References

Aristotle (2004), Nichomachean Ethics, London, New York: Penguin Books, trans J.A.K. Thomson.

Machiavelic ethical model

Oscar Pérez de la Fuente

Universidad Carlos III de Madrid

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3708-846X

Abstract

This article examines the Machiavelic ethical model as an extreme and distinctive version of consequentialism inspired by Niccolò Machiavelli’s political thought. It argues that this model places success at the centre of moral evaluation and gives priority to ends over means, while not necessarily endorsing immorality in every case. Drawing mainly on The Prince, the analysis revisits the widespread association between Machiavelli and the idea that the end justifies the means, clarifying that this formula does not literally appear in his work, even though related arguments can be found in his reflections on power, prudence, and political survival. The text explores Machiavelli’s treatment of promises, truthfulness, and strategic deception, identifying the circumstances in which breaking one’s word may be considered advisable within this framework. It also contrasts the Machiavelic perspective with deontological ethics and reviews competing interpretations of Machiavelli, from the image of an immoral thinker to that of a republican theorist and founder of political science. Finally, the article considers the strategic implications of confronting Machiavelic actors in public and institutional life.

Keywords: political realism, machiavelism, the ens justifes the means

ISSN: 3127-3408

https://doi.org/10.67647/minervastrategy.2024.14

There is a new approach that is called the Machiavelic ethical model, which is an extreme and particular version of the consequentialist ethical model. It is inspired by the work of Niccolò Machiavelli . It is curious how a term Machiavellianism has emerged from a thinker that the Spanish Royal Academy of Language defined as “a way of proceeding with cunning, duplicity and perfidy”. Machiavelli has not had much good press, but the Machiavelic ethical method is more common than it seems.

Machiavelli’s best-known motto is the end justifies the means but this attribution is not entirely accurate because the phrase does not appear in any of his works. However, in The Prince , he states:”(…) :”(…) When they are weighing up what someone has achieved -and this is particularly true with rulers, who can be held to account- people look at the end result. So if a leader does what it takes to win power and keep it, his method will always be reckoned honourable and widely praised”. (Machiavelli, 2009, 71, chap. XVIII).

The Machiavelic ethical model affirms, as a fundamental rule, the desire for success and the ends chosen are more important than the means. However, that does not mean that behaviour must automatically be immoral. The Prince is a treatise on human nature, from which we can learn that the prince if he wants to achieve success, must be duplicitous and cover his tracks.

This may involve an apparent adherence to values, but ultimately being pragmatic. In one of the best-known passages, Machiavelli asks “in what way a prince must keep his word” and offers an answer that is in his line: “”A sensible leader cannot and must not keep his word it by doing so he puts himself at risk, and if the reasons that made him give his word in the first place and no longer valid. If all men were good, this would be bad advice, but since they are a sad lot and won’t be keeping their promises to you, you hardly need to keep yours to them. Anyway, a ruler will never be short of good reasons to explain away a broken promise” (Machiavelli, 2009, 68-69, chap. XVIII).

From the deontological ethical model, it could be argued that promises should always be kept and the truth always told. If we analyse the scenario according to Machiavelli, there are three circumstances that make it advisable not to keep a promise: a) The consequences of the promise have changed over time; b) The reasons for the promise no longer exist; c) The other person will not keep their word with you. The second reason is the strongest and could be invoked if the reasons for the promise really no longer exist. The first should have been adequately foreseen and for the third, many people will honour their promises.

There are several interpretations of Machiavelli. The Machiavelic version of Machiavelli sees Machiavelli as a diabolical, immoral, anti-Christian author who justifies any action to achieve his goals. The republican version of Machiavelli states that he was a patriot, that he wanted to defend the State above all and that he considered that the Prince should have civil and political virtues and not religious ones.

For this reason, some consider him to be the founder of Political Science, because he considers that politics has its own rules distinct from ethics and religion.

From a strategic point of view, Machiavelli offers interesting readings, doubts and reflections. For example, we find this interesting advice for strategists: “you have to play the fox to set the snares and the lion to scare off the wolves” (Machiavelli, 2009, 69, chap.  XVIII). But perhaps the key element in strategy is how to act in the face of someone Machiavelic.The first and most difficult task will be to identify him because, as Aranguren states, “the first thing to do is to identify him.  a self-confessed Machiavellianism would be annulled as such: to be effective it has to be hypocritical and pay tribute to virtue” (Aranguren, 1999, 75-76).

The strategist must be vigilant and, for example, establish mechanisms for impartial verification of the different operations. Someone seeking success, feigning conformity, does not keep their word. Strategies must be developed to prevent such situations. Machiavelli points out that if we learn from the qualities of the fox and the lion, we can get closer to success.

References

Aranguren, José Luis L. (1999), Ética y política, Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva.

Machiavelli, Nicolò (2009), The Prince, London, New York: Penguin Books, trans: Tim Parks.

Consequentialist ethical model

Oscar Pérez de la Fuente

Universidad Carlos III de Madrid

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3708-846X

Abstract

This article examines the consequentialist ethical model, which judges actions by their outcomes and aims at achieving the best consequences. It contrasts this approach with deontological ethics and identifies utilitarianism as its most influential form, especially through the principle of seeking the greatest happiness for the greatest number. The text argues that consequentialism has shaped modern economic thought, particularly through the model of homo economicus, where rationality is understood as the maximisation of a single variable such as utility, welfare, or money. Against this reductionist view, the article questions whether moral reasoning can be limited to outcome calculation alone. Through examples such as torture in emergency cases, market exchanges involving kidneys, surrogacy, pollution, residency, or nationality, it explores the moral limits of treating all values as commensurable. Drawing on Sandel and the idea of weak-sense incommensurability, the article defends a plural and complex understanding of human goods. It concludes that while anticipating consequences is a necessary part of prudence and strategy, ethical judgment must consider multiple values that cannot be reduced to a single measurable standard.

Keywords: consequentialism, utilitarianism, incommensurability

ISSN: 3127-3408

https://doi.org/10.67647/minervastrategy.2024.12

The consequentialist ethical model, which considers that ethics’ objective is to achieve the best consequences, opposes the deontological ethical model. There are several types of consequentialist ethics, the best-known of which is utilitarianism. It famously formulates that ethics should seek the greatest happiness for the greatest number.

Utilitarianism affirms that a variable must be maximised, whether happiness, utility, pleasure or well-being. It appeared in the Anglo-Saxon context at the time of industrialisation, where there was great optimism in applying the methods of the pure sciences to the Social Sciences. Utilitarianism assumes that ethics can be reduced to a variable, and its maximisation, and that this variable can be known. This is gauged using a mechanism similar to a happiness machine, which measures how happy people are.

This may sound strange, but to an economist, this sounds familiar. The model of man on which traditional economic theory is based states that rationality is the maximisation of a variable. That model is known as homo economicusThis view adopts utilitarianism and, in general, the consequentialist approach as its undisputed premise.

Is strategy not to correctly match means and ends? Anticipating the consequences of our actions is part of any strategy. However, the question is whether consequences can be the only decision-making criterion. Let’s imagine a case where we have a terrorist in custody; who knows where a bomb is going to explode in a central place in two hours. The consequentialist question would be: is it morally justified to torture this terrorist to prevent the bomb from exploding? I have asked my students many times about this textbook ethical scenario. The answers are divided between more deontological or consequentialist students.

Since the happiness machine does not exist, economists inspired by utilitarianism sometimes tend to consider money as the variable to be maximised. This approach can be contrasted with a more robust ethical view that affirms that human goods are plural and complex. Michael Sandel offers an example of this argument in his book What Money Cannot Buy. Moral limits of the market (2012), where he gives examples of the moral limits of the market. Relationships of friendship and love are never, or should never be, reduced to monetary terms. But beyond that, is it morally justified to sell a kidney? To be a surrogate? Can everything be bought and sold? Is it justifiable to pollute in exchange for money? Is it lawful to buy residency or nationality?

This phenomenon alluded to by Sandel is technically called weak-sense incommensurability and means that values cannot be reduced to a single variable. In general, the cases allude to reducing everything to monetary terms. Values are more plural, and human beings are more complex.

Perhaps a more complete evaluation of the ends should be made from the strategy point of view. Creating a plan to maximise one variable may cause one to lose sight of other goods involved. Agreement may arise precisely because the parties have different interests. But those interests need to be explored.

Anticipating the consequences of actions is a matter of prudence. Strategy seeks victory, but this does not always come from maximising a single variable. Life is more plural and complex.

References


Mill, John Stuart (2015), “Utilitarianism” in Mill, John Stuart, On Liberty, Utilitarianism, and Other Essays, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 115-180.

Sandel, Michael J. (2012), What money can’t buy : the moral limits of markets, New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

Deontological ethical model

Oscar Pérez de la Fuente

Carlos III University of Madrid

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3708-846X

Abstract

This text examines the deontological ethical model as a duty-based approach to moral reasoning and highlights its relevance for strategic action. It begins by distinguishing deontology as professional ethics from deontology as a philosophical theory centred on obligations. The discussion then focuses on the latter, presenting it as an alternative to consequentialist ethics, which evaluates actions by their outcomes. The paradigm case is the moral philosophy of Immanuel Kant, especially the categorical imperative in its different formulations: universal law, respect for humanity as an end in itself, and reciprocity expressed in the Golden Rule. From this perspective, moral worth depends on acting according to principles that can be universally justified, rather than on achieving advantageous consequences. The text also explores the strategic implications of this model, particularly in relation to promise-keeping, truth-telling, and the credibility of commitments and threats. At the same time, it notes important criticisms of rigorism and legalism, suggesting that experience and context may justify limited exceptions to general rules. Overall, the deontological model is presented as a demanding yet valuable framework whose principles can orient action, establish moral limits, and support cooperative social relations.

Keywords: deontologist, keeping promises, telling the truth

ISSN: 3127-3408

https://doi.org/10.67647/minervastrategy.2024.10

Before delving into more strategic content, I will dedicate a series of posts to various ethical models. These models are used to judge our actions and can also inspire multiple strategies. The first ethical model is the deontological model.

First, it is necessary to clarify its meaning to avoid confusion. There are two meanings for the term ‘deontology’. The first has to do with professional ethics, which is related to the set of values and rules that regulate the practice of a profession and that are sometimes set out in a code of ethics, as in the case of doctors, lawyers, journalists, etc… The second is related to an ethical approach that is based on duties.  

I will explain this second meaning in this post. The deontological ethical model, based on duties, often contrasts with the consequentialist ethical model, which is based on consequences. More precisely, the deontological model is based on the individual’s duty to act according to the correct principle or value.

The paradigm of the deontological ethical model is the philosophy of Immanuel Kant and is usually exemplified in the formulations of the categorical imperative. Thus, it is stated, “act only on a maxim you can also will to become a universal law” (Kant, 2019, 35). This seems an essential moral principle, but some argue it is empty. With sufficient skill, the universal law can be turned into unacceptable claims. Let’s see how this mechanism works. If someone wants to use hate language against minorities, it seems that this could not be universalised. However, if someone advocated positive discrimination policies, could they be universalised? Some might argue that it does not make hate speech but that the principle of universalisation is the freedom of expression of people with their own pride.

Behind the categorical imperative lies the Golden Rule of Humanity, which has strategic significance and holds “treat others as you would like to be treated yourself”. It is a rule based on reciprocity, but unlike the an eye for an eye, it is not a rule of response to an attack but anticipates a cooperative attitude, which implies putting oneself in the other person’s shoes. Some studies indicate that this long-term cooperative attitude is the one that yields the best results.

Another formulation of the categorical imperative is to “”Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or anyone else’s, never merely as a mean, but also always as an end” (Kant, 2019, 42).  This shows how the deontological ethical model is a maximal ethics. Others connect this view with the notion of human dignity. From the perspective of strategy, it could be said that this is a commendable statement of principles, but that human relations move between cooperation and competition. The strategy should enhance the cooperative elements and diminish the competitive aspects to achieve specific objectives.

This ethical deontological model is legalistic, rigorist, not based on experience, rational, and universally applicable. Two maxims defended by this model are of particular strategic importance. The first is that promises must always be kept. In the U.S., some journalists go to prison for not revealing their sources in court. Their promise of confidentiality is stronger than the legal duty to testify. Keeping promises is a good ethical principle, and society relies heavily on the expectation that promises will be kept. Objections may come from the Machiavellian ethical model, where keeping one’s word is not always the best solution. The deontological model holds that commitments should always be honoured, regardless of the circumstances. The strategy should prevent being exploited by those who claim commitments and then do not want to fulfil them.

The other maxim of the ethical deontological model with strategic interest is that the truth must always be told. First, a distinction should be made between not telling the whole truth and lying. Second, the strategic use of threats assumes they must be credible to be effective. The ethical deontological model holds that the truth must always be told, even if it harms the speaker. In such cases, the best strategy is silence. Or as Wittgenstein said “what cannot be spoken about, it is better to remain silent about”.

The deontological ethical model is a morally demanding proposal; it could be described as rigorist. It is based on universally valid principles not based on experience. It can function as a mechanism to make commitments and threats solid and credible. However, the strategy learns from experience. Thus, there may be special situations where exceptions to the general principles can be made, provided they are adequately justified.

Principles and values are guides for action that occasionally mark the limits where one should not go. The ethics of duties should allow for a flexible application, not an absolute one. Arguably, this flexibility reflects the spirit of Kant, but it is closer to life.

References

Kant, Inmanuel (2019), Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, Oxford: Oxford University Press, trans. Christopher Bennet et al.

Thomas More, Comfort against Tribulation

Oscar Pérez de la Fuente

Carlos III University of Madrid

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3708-846X

Abstract

This article examines Thomas More’s A Dialogue of Comfort against Tribulation in light of the historical circumstances of its composition and its continuing relevance for ethical reflection. Written while More was imprisoned in the Tower of London after refusing to acknowledge Henry VIII as Supreme Head of the Church of England, the work emerges as both a spiritual meditation and a moral response to adversity. The paper analyses several key passages through the lens of the Minerva Strategy, focusing on themes such as pride, the importance of circumstance in judgment, the value of reputation, the dangers of flattery, the meaning of authority, and the role of the will in confronting hardship. More’s reflections are shown to offer not only a religious interpretation of suffering but also broader philosophical insights into law, ethics, and human relations. Special attention is given to the contemporary resonance of these ideas in professional and social contexts marked by misinformation, vanity, and uncritical obedience. The article argues that More’s text provides a rich framework for understanding integrity, humility, and moral resilience in times of crisis.

Keywords: ethics, good will, public positions, integrity, virtue

ISSN: 3127-3408

https://doi.org/10.67647/minervastrategy.2024.03

In 1534, Thomas More (1478-1535), well-known author of the work Utopia and defender of Catholic orthodoxy against Luther and other writers, was captured in the Tower of London by the Thames after refusing the oath that King Henry VIII demanded from his subjects to grant him the title of Supreme Head of the Church of England. After 14 months, on  1 July 1535, he was put on trial and sentenced to death, and executed in the morning of 6 July.

Thomas More wrote several works during those months, including A Dialogue on Comfort against Tribulation (2014), in which he stands firm in his convictions that have led him to the Tower of London, where he has lost his position and may lose his life. It is a book that makes many religious references and can be seen as an exercise in affirmation in the face of hard times. It also provides recommendations and great wisdom, which will be analysed below with the focus of the Minerva Strategy.

“But this arrow of pride, fly it never so high in the clouds, and be the man that it carrieth up so high never so joyful thereof… yet let him remember… that be this arrow never so light, it hath yet a heavy iron head… and therefore, fly it never so high… down must it needs come and on the ground must it light… and falleth, sometimes, not in a very clean place… but the pride turneth into rebuke and shame, and there is then all the glory gone” (More, 2014, II.16).

The Spanish Royal Academy of Language defines pride as “haughtiness and disordered appetite to be preferred to others”, while it can also be defined as “satisfaction and conceit by the contemplation of one’s own prerogatives with contempt for others”. Pride is a bad strategy because it can ruin interpersonal relationships, cause a lack of empathy and make it difficult to learn.

In some contexts and sectors, this human attitude is encouraged that avoids putting oneself in the other’s place and is the opposite of humility. It can be considered an obstacle to the good management of emotions and good relationships with others.

“Hard is it, Cousin, in many manner things, to bid or forbid, affirm or deny, reprove or allow, a matter nakedly proposed and put forth; or precisely to say “This thing is good,” or “This thing is naught,” without consideration of the circumstances” (More, 2014, II.17).

This recalls Ortega y Gasset’s famous phrase “Yo soy yo y mi circunstancia” (I am I and my circumstance) found in his work Meditaciones del Quijote – Meditations on the Quijote, published in 1914. The complete sentence, which is often quoted incompletely, is: “I am I and my circumstance, and if I do not save her, I do not save myself”. With this phrase, Ortega means that we cannot achieve fulfillment as individuals if we do not engage with our environment and strive to improve it.


In the case of Thomas More, it refers to the level of ethics and Law, which must take into account the circumstances of the particular case. This is related to the dichotomy between universalism and particularism, as well as the importance of the possibility that general solutions can be reinterpreted according to new circumstances.

“We shall yet, Cousin, consider in these outward “goods of fortune,”  as richesse… good name… honest estimation… honorable fame, and authority— in all these things we shall, I say, consider… that either we love them and set by them as things commodious unto us for the state and condition of this present life… or else as things that we purpose by the good use thereof to make them matter of our merit, with God’s help, in the life after to come. Let us, then, first consider them as things set by and beloved for the pleasure and commodity of them for this present life” (More, 2014, III.9).

In today’s digital age, it is possible to reinterpret the good name, honour and honourable fame. It is necessary to reconceptualise the terms private, public and intimate. However, it seems that slander, disinformation, rumors and fake news are gaining ground. The worst thing is that there seems to be no standards for verifying news and everything goes.More than ever, Philosophy is necessary

“And into this pleasant frenzy of much foolish vainglory be there some men brought sometimes by such as themselves do, in a manner, hire to flatter them, and would not be content if a man should do otherwise…but would be right angry, not only if a man told them truth when they do naught indeed… but also if they praise it but slenderly.” (More, 2014, III.10).

It is common to find professional sycophants who constantly praise everything they receive from their superiors. A minimum level of politeness and courtesy is granted to avoid ungratefulness. However, in professional contexts, it is good to be able to express critical views. If one is a boss, it is important to empower others in a positive way and never denigrate or humiliate them.

“Let us now consider in like wise what great worldly wealth ariseth unto men by great offices, rooms, and authority—to those worldly-disposed people, I say, that desire them for no better purpose” (More, 2014, III.11).

Thomas More played significant roles in England during the reign of Henry VIII, who  chose to establish the Church of England and separate from the Catholic Church for his own benefit. Thomas More chose to remain true to his beliefs, leave his offices and disobey the sovereign. More’s hierarchy of values and the importance he places on office explain this.

“The greatest grief that is in bondage or captivity is this, as I trow: that we be forced to do such labor as with our good will we would not. But then against that grief Seneca teacheth us a good remedy: “Semper da operam ne quid invitus facias”—“Endeavor thyself evermore that thou do nothing against thy will. . . . But that thing that we see we shall needs do… let us use always… to put our good will thereto” (More, 2014, III.18).

This point is fundamental in Thomas More’s tragedy, but it can also have a significant impact in professional and personal contexts. On the one hand, extremely unjust actions can be opposed, which is a classic theme in the Philosophy of Law. Nevertheless, there are many things that we do not want to do, and paradoxically to his story, Moro advises that we put our good will to do them. It is a way to overcome tribulation.

References

More, Thomas (2014), A Dialogue of Comfort against Tribulation, Englisn version, available:

https://thomasmorestudies.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/DialogueComfort2014-etext.pdf

(last visit: 26 May 2026).Moro, Tomás (2022), “Un diálogo sobre la fortaleza contra la tribulación” en Moro, Tomás, La otra Libertad. Escritos en prisión (1534-1535), Madrid: Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos, Alvaro Silva (ed.).