Category: Peace and War

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Why are there no nuclear wars?

It is not a frequently asked question, and we certainly hope they never happen, but you have not asked yourselves why nuclear wars have not happened? The answer to this disturbing question can be found in Robert Ayson’s book, Thomas Schelling and the Nuclear Age, which explains the ideas of Thomas Schelling, winner of the 2005 Nobel Prize in Economics, who has made significant contributions to the world of strategy and international relations.

In several of his works, Schelling analyses the issue of nuclear armament from the perspective of strategy. His approach is to make international relations, especially military decisions, eminently strategic territory. Lessons can be learned from his contributions for other strategy development and success areas.

According to Schelling, the key concepts to explain the nuclear age are stability and balance of deterrence. The strategy must be aimed at seeking stability between the parties. This is achieved by the balance of deterrence, which is based on two elements: a) a situation in which the disincentives outweigh the incentives for both sides to initiate war; b) it is “stable” when it is reasonably secure against shocks, alarms and disturbances.

Therefore, initiating conflict must be discouraged and unexpected events, such as a surprise attack, must be prevented. Schelling’s lesson in the nuclear age is that the respective incentives and disincentives condition stability.

In his explanation of nuclear strategy, Ayson alludes to Brodie’s work, which provides the key: “Precisely because there is no defence against the atomic bomb, any party, possessing atomic weapons, threatened with attack, has the ability to impose heavy costs on the attacker”.

The state of equilibrium is produced by ‘mutual fear of retaliation’. The costs of all kinds involved in the use of nuclear weapons discourage an attack for fear of a response, in the form of a counterattack, from the other side.

Equilibrium occurs because both sides have disincentives to initiate an attack, and the costs of taking one on by the other side are very high. Special care must be taken to avoid surprise attacks and unexpected situations that can change the equilibrium.

It can be argued that the equilibrium in the nuclear age has aspects that resemble the prisoner’s dilemma. Thus, betrayals by the players have a very high cost for both sides because there is a response rule in the form of a nuclear counterattack. As Poundstone explains, nuclear war would be a case of simultaneous and mutual bombing. As early as 1945, Senator Brien McMahon said: “If there is a nuclear Pearl Harbor, there will not be a jury of statesmen left to study the case” (Poundstone, The Prisoner’s Dilemma).

Schelling’s approach focuses on the role of stability and negotiation in the nuclear age. We could draw some conclusions from his approach: the best strategy is the one that seeks stability, which is guaranteed if the disincentives to conflict are greater than the incentives; the balance of deterrence is produced by fear of retaliation by the other side, which comes at significant cost; the best alternative to an endless arms race is negotiation.

In other words, stability is ensured by the parties’ disincentives to conflict and fear of retaliation, which entails high costs. By discouraging conflict, equilibrium is achieved.

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The strategy of conflict

In 1960, the economist Thomas Schelling published his work The Strategy of Conflict with a hitherto unusual approach that opened new horizons. His approach was a new analysis of international relations and other areas, applying game theory methods, a part of Economics that carries out simulations of simple games with two or more participants based on the theory of rational choice.

One of the most interesting points of the book is the conceptual material it leaves  to the reader, which allows for multiple applications. Thus, it describes three types of scenarios: pure conflict, pure cooperation, and conflict/cooperation.

Situations of pure conflict would occur if the interests of the antagonists were completely opposed, only “in the case of war, but of a war tending to the total extermination of the enemy.” Situations of pure cooperation are presented as curious exercises in coordination without communication between the parties. For example, where would you meet someone in Madrid – or London or New York- who has received the same instruction, with whom you cannot communicate. Or imagine that you will win 100 euros if you write down on a piece of paper the way to share it out that matches the other party, where communication is impossible.

Schelling’s message is that most scenarios between human beings are ones of cooperation and conflict where there is a common interest and mutual dependence between the parties. Conflict management is sought with mutually acceptable solutions for mutual interests. Hence, the author concludes that most conflict situations are negotiationable scenarios.

The change brought about by this book is its new approach to strategy as applied to international relations and military issues. Thus, strategy does not refer to “the efficient application of force, but to the exploitation of potential force”. This means that the role of armies has an eminently strategic, rather than a purely combative, significance. On another level, this means that victory does not lie in the hand-to-hand combat of the respective forces, but rather in the expectations of the parties and the possibility of respective influence.

From this perspective, Schelling devotes his attention to the notion of “deterrence” as an important element of international relations. He states that an important distinction must be made here between the application of force and the threat of force. Deterrence relates to the exploitation of potential force. Its purpose is to persuade a potential enemy that it is in its own interest to avoid certain courses of action.

The conclusion is that it is not the use of military force, but the threat – serious and credible – of the use of force that would deter the other side from acting. Here would be the paradox that this theory of deterrence is “a theory of the skillful non-use of military force, for which something more than purely military ingenuity is needed”. That is the way to develop strategy as an art and science and to transform some views on international relations and the role of armies. But it would also have applications in business, politics and even everyday life.

In a passage from his book, Schelling offers a definition of strategy based on several elements:

a) it presupposes the existence of a conflict; b) but assumes a common interest of both adversaries; c) it assumes a rational mode of behaviour; d) it focuses on the fact that what appears to each participant as the best course of action depends on what the other does; e) “strategic behaviour” attempts to influence the other’s decisions by acting on their expectations of how the other’s behaviour relates to their own (Thomas Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict).

How to manage conflict? It seems that this is something we must all deal with in the various spheres of life. In The Strategy of Conflict, Schelling offers a view that was innovative for its time, constructing an analytical framework, based on game theory, to deal with international relations, and at one point he proposes various names for this theory, such as precarious association theory or incomplete antagonism theory.  Perhaps the most successful one is what he called interdependent decision theory. This is the key to the strategy of conflict.

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Bartolomé de las Casas, apology for peace

Bartolomé de las Casas (1484-1566) was a Spanish Dominican friar, writer and missionary known for defending the rights of the indigenous peoples of America during the Spanish colonisation period. He had a somewhat self-taught education, oriented towards Theology, Philosophy and Law. He went to the Indies in 1502, ten years after the discovery of America, in La Española, Santo Domingo. He was ordained a priest in 1512 and was the first to do so in the New World. He later became bishop of Chiapas, Mexico.

The controversy with Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda (1550) on the status of indigenous people and the lawfulness of war is famous. Las Casas was a pioneer in thinking about human rights and social justice. In this controversy, Bartolomé de las Casas provides some arguments for abstaining from war and on equality, which will be discussed below in the style of Estrategia Minerva.

“In the first place, because, between two evils, if one cannot be avoided, the lesser should be chosen, according to right reason”(Bartolomé de las Casas, Apología, cap. 40).

A distinction must be made between the doctrine of the lesser evil and the doctrine of the double effect. According to the former, the option that produces the worst consequences must be avoided at all cost. According to the second, when a given action is performed, there are unintended negative consequences in addition to the intended ones, which are positive. Applying the double effect assumes that the good produced by this action is greater than the evil.  

The relationship between the lesser evil and rationality is fundamental. Rationality provides the tools and analytical framework necessary to apply the lesser evil principle effectively.

“In the second place, it is manifest that more innocent people will perish in this way than those we are trying to free. Moreover, by a very strict negative precept, we are forbidden in any case to kill the innocent” (Bartolomé de las Casas, Apología, cap. 40).

Innocent people, in this context, are those who do not actively participate in combat. If self-defence is usually justified under just war theories, it does not extend to innocent people.

“Third, because in war, the innocent cannot be distinguished from the guilty”(Bartolomé de las Casas, Apología, cap. 40).

War is defined in one of its meanings by the Spanish Royal Academy as “armed struggle between two or more nations or between sides of the same nation”. They are usually brutal, violent situations that involve suffering and pain, damage and victims on both sides. Las Casas’ reflection is along the lines of recalling that, in these situations of armed conflict, the nuances and differences are difficult to define, especially between combatants and innocent people. The consequences in personal and material terms are often terrible.

In the final part of his work Apología, Bartholomé de las Casas argues: “the Indians are our brothers for whom Christ gave his life. Why do we persecute them without having deserved such a thing with inhuman cruelty?”(Bartolomé de las Casas, Apología, cap. 63).

Facing his opponent, Ginés de Sepúlveda, in the Valladolid Controversy, Bartholomew de las Casas maintains that the indigenous are brothers of the Europeans. This, far from being an improvised principle in the face of the new situation, is at the core of Christianity. In the Epistle to the Galatians, St. Paul writes: “There is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither slave nor free, nor is there male nor female; for you are all one in Christ Jesus” (Galatians 3:28). This message of equality was a novelty in Antiquity and continues to be so today and had as its antecedent the Stoics.

The best-known work of Bartolomé de las Casas is “Brevísima relación de la destrucción de las Indias/A Very Brief Recital of the Destruction of the Indies “, published in 1552. This book had a significant impact in Europe and helped to generate a debate on the human rights of indigenous people. It is an invitation to consider otherness and rethink one’s assumptions. To be authentic, we must start with the assumption of differences, starting from the equality of human beings.

“If this is done, I am convinced that they will embrace the evangelical doctrine, for they are neither fools nor barbarians, but of innate sincerity, simple, modest, meek and, finally, such that I am sure that there are no other people more disposed of than they to embrace the Gospel, which once received by them, it is admirable with what piety, ardour, faith and charity they fulfil the precepts of Christ and venerate the sacraments; For they are docile and ingenious, and in skill and natural endowments they surpass many people of the known world (…)” (Bartolomé de las Casas, Apología, cap. 63).

Underlying Las Casas’ message is the notion of equal human dignity, the basis of human rights. A common criticism of this author is that he did not extend this concept to black people. His views need to be appropriately contextualised historically and not read from the postmodernism of some views.

Mestizaje/Mixed-race and syncretism could be vindicated from the approach close to Bartolomé de las Casas. Racists of all stripes are afraid of mixing, and what has characterised the most genuine view of Latin American history is precisely mestizaje, which is something to celebrate. Syncretism, as a fusion of cultures and/or religions, is also something positive to learn from. It can enhance the best energies of society, but as is often the case in identity politics, it can be approached in a divisive and exclusionary manner. In the face of this risk, Bartolomé de las Casas launched a universal message of equal human dignity and fraternity as the engine of social progress.

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Francisco de Vitoria, on just war

One of the prominent figures in the Spanish Renaissance was Francisco de Vitoria (1483-1546). He was a Spanish Dominican, renewer of Theology and promoter of the Salamanca School of Natural Law. He is considered the founder of the science of International Law and the notion of human rights. One of the most relevant political philosophers of the 20th century, John Rawls, in his book entitled Law of Peoples and the Idea of Public Reason revisited quotes De Vitoria and, from a liberal conception, adheres to his just war theory. 

Precisely Francisco de Vitoria addresses this classic theme in his essay entitled ” Sobre el derecho de Guerra”/ On the law of war when he asks: “What can be the reason and cause of a just war?” We will address this question below, based on this author, from the perspective of Minerva Strategy Blog.

De Vitoria’s first approach to answering this question states that “diversity of religion is not sufficient cause for a just war.” And he justifies himself with that “even if the faith has been announced to the barbarians with sufficient signs of probability and they have not wanted to accept it, it is not, for that reason, lawful to persecute them with war and strip them of their goods” (Francisco de Vitoria, Sobre los indios, II.15).

Francisco de Vitoria was a professor at the University of Salamanca and his lectures, or relections, on various topics of interest have come down to us to this day. Specifically, the full title of the one dedicated to the notion of just war is entitled: ” Sobre el derecho de guerra de los españoles sobre los bárbaros”/On the law of war of the Spaniards over the barbarians. Contrary to what the black legend on the Spanish colonisation of Latin America claims, the School of Salamanca laid the foundations for human rights and the rules of International Law. And, as has been seen, De Vitoria did not justify war for diversity of religion.  

Another issue addressed by Francisco de Vitoria is that “it is not a just cause of a war to intend to expand dominions” and he argues: “this proposition is too evident to need to be demonstrated. For otherwise there would always be just cause for any of the belligerent wars, and so all would be innocent” (Francisco de Vitoria, Sobre el derecho de guerra, III.11).

The history of mankind contains many examples of rulers who have had expansionist policies beyond their borders.  The results of these offensive wars are part of History and memory. This would not be a justified strategy under current International Law, nor as a cost/benefit analysis in the medium and long term.

Francisco de Vitoria continues “neither is it just cause of a war to the prince’s own glory nor any other particular profit of the prince” and he states that “this proposition is also evident, for the prince must order to the common good of the Republic, both war and peace, and he cannot invest public funds in his own glory, in his own profit, much less expose his subjects to danger. The difference between the legitimate king and a tyrant lies in that the tyrant orders the government to his own interest and profit, while the king orders it to the public good, as Aristotle says” (Francisco de Vitoria, Sobre el derecho de guerra, III.12).

If the ruler wages war for his private benefit, he becomes a tyrant, as Aristotle argued in his work Politics. There the Stagirite philosopher proposed a classic typology of forms of government, where he distinguishes those leaders who promote the common good in their government actions -monarchy, aristocracy, politeia– and those who act for their own benefit or that of their own group -tyranny, oligarchy, democracy-. It is interesting because issues of accountability have been identified ever since the first book written on Political Science, which deals especially with issues of classical democracy in the polis of Athens.

The affirmative answer to the question posed by De Vitoria is the following: “the only just cause for waging war is the injury received” and he affirms that “in addition, offensive war is made to avenge an injury and to reprimand the enemies, as has already been said. But there can be no revenge where there has not preceded an injury and a fault. Therefore the conclusion is evident” (Francisco de Vitoria, Sobre el derecho de guerra, III.13).

Here we get to the heart of Francisco de Vitoria’s argument: defensive war, self-defence, is justified. Bobbio affirms: “it is lawful to repel violence with violence.” The Italian author asks himself: “But does the strategy of atomic war still allow us to maintain the distinction between offensive and defensive war?” (Norberto Bobbio, El problema de la guerra y las vías de la paz). De Vitoria did not speak of preventive wars, but in the answer to Bobbio it is worth analising whether a preventive war is justified in the face of a relevant threat. Situations of strategic funanbulism in scenarios of nuclear deterrence are placed in this risk analysis.

Francisco de Vitoria adds: “an injury of any gravity is not enough to make war”. He clarifies that “this proposition is proved because it is not even lawful to impose such serious penalties as death, exile or confiscation of goods on one’s own subjects for any fault. Now, since all the things that are done in war are grave and even atrocious, such as slaughter, arson, devastation, it is not lawful to punish with war those who have committed slight offences, since the measure of punishment must be in accordance with the gravity of the crime” (Francisco de Vitoria, Sobre el derecho de guerra, III.14).

The key to self-defence is proportionality. Thomas Aquinas already defended it by “moderating the defence according to the needs of the threatened security” (Thomas Aquinas, Suma Theologica, II-II, q. 64,a. 7, c). It is in that passage of the Theological Summa, where the theory of the double effect is formulated: an act has two effects, one intentional -preserving life- and another not, which would be incidental -the death of the aggressor-. The key for Thomas Aquinas is that the act be proportionate to its end.

An application of the doctrine of double effect is proposed by Rawls, when he states that civilian casualties are prohibited except insofar as they are the indirect and unintended result of a legitimate attack against a military target (Rawls, Law of Peoples and the Idea of Public Reason revisited).

The just war theory in Francisco de Vitoria is a classic in the reflection on public affairs. As a good classic, it allows more current re-readings and, as Italo Calvino said, it can be conceived as a talisman, a compass on which to orient oneself when approaching the territories of peace and war.