Tag: Emotions

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3-D Negotiation

Professors David A. Lax and James K. Sebenius, who are involved in the Harvard University Negotiation Project, in their book 3-D Negotiation. Powerful Tools to Change the Game in Your Most Important Deals offer new perspectives when it comes to conducting negotiations.

According to this approach, negotiations should be understood as three-dimensional, with three elements occurring more or less simultaneously throughout the actual negotiation. These dimensions are: a) Tactics, which involve persuasive manoeuvres and give-and-take. It is worth noting that poor tactics can ruin a negotiation; b) Deal design: beyond the obvious, this involves uncovering the parties’ true economic and non-economic interests; and c) Setup: off the table, which shapes and reshapes the situation. 

Below, we will examine the topic of exploring interests from the perspective of the Minerva Strategy Blog.

Lax and Sebenius begin by defining interest as “whatever you care about that is potentially at stake in the outcome.” Their entire approach is based on the observation that the interests stated at the negotiating table are one thing, whereas the parties’ actual or implicit interests are quite another, whether or not these have been clearly articulated. 

When exploring these interests (whether explicit or implicit) in the handling of information about the other party, it is essential to practice, at various stages of the negotiation process, the exercise of putting oneself in the other person’s shoes. It’s also vital for oneself or the negotiating team to calmly assess the true interests at stake: what one wants from the negotiation, what could be gained, and what could be lost. In the standard terminology of Negotiation Theory, what is the best alternative to a no-deal outcome (BATNA), and how is the Zone of Possible Agreement (ZOPA) established between the parties? 

However, Lax and Sebenius’s emphasis on the importance of (actual) interests within the framework of three-dimensional negotiation highlights the fact that focusing all one’s attention in negotiations on linear distributive dimensions—such as price negotiation—can cause one to lose sight of a range of potentially richer interests.

From this perspective, analysing BATNA and ZOPA can be useful tools, but not by focusing on a single variable; rather, by taking into account all the factors at play within the negotiating context.  

In many negotiations, relationships are a key factor to bear in mind. Sometimes, emotions guide the parties’ behaviour, and such feelings can distort certain expectations. On other occasions, poor or mediocre results are accepted simply to maintain the relationship. On this point, Lax and Sebenius distinguish between countries that focus on relationships—such as those in Southern Europe and Latin America—and others that focus on results, such as Anglo-Saxon and Northern European countries. 

Another factor to bear in mind is the social contract; beyond its strictly economic dimension, this governs people’s expectations regarding the nature, scope and duration of the agreement, the process to be followed, and the way in which unforeseen events are handled. As Lax and Sebenius state, it is “the spirit of the agreement.” It is important to clearly understand this broad framework to avoid conflicts or to resolve them without too much difficulty. It is about establishing relationships within a framework of trust, within the framework of a shared negotiating culture, where the obligations of the parties and the usual way of resolving potential conflicts are clearly established.

The third factor is the process itself. Certain negotiation processes often influence the outcome, and sometimes negotiators employ tricks and tactics, such as anchoring. These tactics can be particularly detrimental to one of the parties, who must be able to identify them and defend their position, especially when they are unaware of these strategies or lack experience in negotiation scenarios. Another important point is to distinguish the negotiating table from the wider negotiating context. It is usually easier to make progress in negotiations in informal settings.  

Finally, one factor to bear in mind is ethics. Certain aspects of some negotiations may be morally controversial; for example, some negotiating tactics that involve withholding or manipulating information from the other party. From an ethical standpoint, the response will differ between the deontological model, with its duty to always tell the truth; the consequentialist model, which advocates the greatest happiness for the greatest number of people; the Machiavellian model, focused on success; and the virtuous model, which proposes acting as a virtuous person would in that situation.

Lax and Sebenius argue that we should not confuse negotiating positions with a broader set of actual interests, and they propose four practices that will help you safeguard your interests:

–Ask, listen and probe

Information about the other party’s interests is essential. The best way to get this is to listen carefully and gauge how they might respond to the negotiation map’s options. 

–Use public sources to map interests

When important decisions need to be made, it is advisable to consult public records and the relevant institutions to gather objective information. Having reports from independent bodies and other credible sources of information is also beneficial.

–Tap internal sources

Naturally, if you can obtain firsthand information from someone who understands the other party’s interests, this can be particularly useful. It is also important to have information about the negotiator and the people involved, as well as their explicit, implicit and underlying interests.

–Tap knowledgeable advisers

In complex business situations, people often turn to professionals such as lawyers or intermediaries. Lax and Sebenius recommend asking them about their experience in such situations. Perhaps this is because – as Aristotle pointed out many centuries ago – experience can help one to better understand a particular situation.

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Weighing anchor

Much could be said about the influence of emotions in negotiations, and effective management is advisable. There are several psychological factors that affect  Economy. Daniel Kahneman is a psychologist with dual American and Israeli nationality, who won the Nobel Prize in Economics in 2002. His approach focuses on how the way we perceive, and process information, influences our decision-making more than it seems.

In his work Thinking, fast and slow, Kahneman begins by distinguishing between two systems that operate in our brain: he calls the first one the automatic system and the second one the effortful system. System 1 operates quickly and automatically, with little or no effort and without a sense of voluntary control. System 2 focuses attention on demanding mental activities, including complex calculations.

System 2 operations are often associated with the subjective experience of acting, choosing, and concentrating. Systems 1 and 2 are always active while we are awake. System 1 acts automatically, and System 2 is normally in a comfortable, low-effort mode in which only a fraction of its capacity is occupied.

When System 1 encounters a difficulty, it calls on System 2 to suggest a more detailed and precise procedure that can solve the problem. You could say that human beings function on autopilot based on System 1, but if something does not add up, they turn to System 2.

From this perspective, Kahneman concludes that the best we can do is to reach a compromise: learn to recognise situations in which mistakes are likely and strive to avoid major mistakes when important things are at stake.

Kahneman’s book explains various unique phenomena that occur due to the synergy or lack of coordination between System 1 and System 2. One of these phenomena, which is undoubtedly of interest in the field of negotiations, is the effect of anchoring.

One of Kahneman’s experiments with his students involved using a wheel of fortune numbered from 1 to 100. This wheel was rigged and only stopped at 10 and 65. The number on the wheel of fortune was noted down. He then asked the students two questions:

Is the percentage of African nations among United Nations (UN) members greater or less than the number just written?

What is the estimated percentage of African nations in the UN?

When the wheel of fortune landed on 10, the average response regarding the percentage of African countries in the UN was 25%. However, when the wheel of fortune landed on 65, the average response regarding the percentage of African countries was 45%.

This is the anchor effect. The number given when the question is asked conditions the result, anchoring it. However, this phenomenon has no logical explanation, unless we resort to the explanation of autopilot and the relationships between System 1 and System 2.

Another experiment proposed by Kanheman was based on the following questions:

Was Gandhi approximately one hundred and forty-four years old when he died?

How old was Gandhi when he died?

It is obvious that Gandhi did not live to be 144 years old, but the outcome of this question is conditioned by that figure. It is significantly different than if the question were whether he was more or less than 35 years old when he died, which may seem surprising.

This anchoring effect is linked to the priming effect, where compatible evidence is selectively elicited. In this way, System 1 does everything it can to construct a world in which the anchor is the true world. It is one of the manifestations of associative coherence that Kahneman studies in his book.

What is the relevance of anchoring in the context of negotiations? The classic form of the anchoring effect in this area is the first offer. In many cases, the outcome of a negotiation is conditioned by the amount of the first offer. If someone makes an initial offer of 200, it would seem difficult to justify making a counteroffer of 15. But why shouldn’t this counteroffer be made?

The first offer anchors the various concessions made by the parties. This is particularly clear when the first offer consists of the clauses of a written contract draft. If negotiations take place based on the proposed wording, the negotiation will have been anchored and will be better focused for the party making this first offer.

A phenomenon linked to anchoring, which can provide key information in a negotiation, is the pace of concessions. If A’s first offer is 200 and B’s counteroffer is 100, A’s next offer will give us information about their reserve price, depending on whether their next offer is 150 or, conversely, 190. If their subsequent pace of concessions is 10 or 50.

The anchor effect is something that can be explained by the interrelation between System 1 and System 2. In other words, because autopilot is engaged and we do not carefully analyse each and every statement that is processed daily. This power of suggestion of anchoring is unjustified, and one must be especially alert in negotiation contexts, as it is a way of gaining positions and focusing on the interests of one party. The best response to an exorbitant first offer is a minimal counteroffer and, from there, to begin negotiating. The pace of concessions by each party will provide information about their respective reserve prices. When faced with negotiation anchors, it is best to weigh anchor with a realistic counteroffer.

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How to negotiate rationally in an irrational world

Deepak Malhotra  and  Max H. Bazerman are professors at Harvard University and authors of the book  Negotiation Genius: How to Overcome Obstacles and Achieve Brilliant Results at the Bargaining Table and Beyond. This work is particularly interesting because, in addition to using common tools and concepts from Negotiation Theory, delves into the field of emotions, approaching negotiation processes from the perspective of Psychology. 

Specifically, one of the most relevant parts of the book is the analysis of biases in negotiation. Biases occur in the heart and mind and “affect even the best and brightest”. Malhotra and Bazerman study: fixed-size pie bias, dazzling attributes bias, non-rational escalation of commitments bias as biases of the mind; conflicting motivations, egocentricity, overconfidence and irrational optimism, regret aversion as biases of the heart.

Below, we will analyse the chapter “How to negotiate rationally in an irrational world”, where these authors explain how to deal with the biases of the heart and mind in negotiation contexts, from the perspective of Minerva Strategy Blog.

Strategy 1 on how to deal with your own biases states: “Think according to system 2″. The Nobel Prize in Economics Daniel Kahneman  In his work Thinking, Fast and Slow, he has analysed certain phenomena concerning the influence of Psychology in Economics, such as anchorage.  

System 1, which corresponds to intuition, is generally fast and automatic, without the implicit and emotional effort with which we make most decisions in our lives. System 2 corresponds to reasoned thinking, is slower, requires effort, and is explicit and logical. You could say that we generally have “autopilot” in system 1, and if something does not work, system 2 kicks in.

The first recommendation in this strategy is: “Make a list for System 2”.  Important decisions, therefore, in the business world should be made by System 2. In other words, they should be carefully considered, properly thought through, weighing up the various scenarios and values at stake. Do not be swayed by first impressions, impulses, or emotions, which are implicit in biases. Skilful management of these biases can be part of the business practices and tricks of the other party.

The second tip states: “Avoid negotiating under time pressure“. Time management is crucial in many negotiations. It is important to know how to deal with ultimatums, which, in many cases, are just another negotiating tactic. The key is that, with less time, it will be more difficult to properly analyse the negotiating map. 

The third recommendation states: “Spread negotiations over multiple sessions”. To avoid unpredictability and improvisation in decision-making, it is beneficial to be able to negotiate over several sessions, allowing all relevant issues to be addressed from different angles with certainty. 

Strategy 2, on how to deal with your own biases, states: “Learn by using analogies”. Experience is a source of knowledge; you learn from your mistakes. The authors summarise this approach by stating that “the key is to figure out how to extract principles from experiences and examples”. Precedents for a similar situation should be taken into account and their relevance in the course of events should be assessed. 

The first tip in this strategy 2 is: “Study multiple negotiations simultaneously”. It is useful to learn about various strategies and negotiation frameworks similar to the one you are involved in. It is also beneficial, in light of this information, to map out various negotiation scenarios, with the possible outcomes for the parties involved.

The second recommendation states: “Focus on principles, not details”. The important thing is to identify the interests involved and what might be the best way to satisfy them for both parties. This is the most genuine area of negotiation, which reminds me of the principle of the Harvard Method: Focus on interests, not positions.

Strategy 3 on how to deal with your own biases states: “Adopt the outsider’s perspective”. The parties are sometimes so involved in a negotiation that the intervention of an impartial third party is necessary. This is even institutionalised in the form of negotiation mediators. Or, in some regulated cases, the parties may submit their case to arbitration by a third party.

Strategy 1 for dealing with other people’s biases states: “Incorporate the consequences of others’ biases into your strategy”. At this point, Malhotra and Bazerman seem to be saying that if others act on biases of the heart or mind, that is to say if they are irrational, we should build our strategies to take advantage of this in business interactions.

Strategy 2 for dealing with other people’s biases states:  “Help others apply less biased criteria”. One thing you can share with the other party is the lesson of making decisions within a reasonable time frame, after conducting a thorough analysis, without emotional constraints, and detecting negotiating tactics and tricks.  

Strategy 3 for dealing with other people’s biases says, “Weigh up the information provided by others”. Relevant data provided by the other party in business contexts should be routinely checked. A typical example is the price of an item for rent or sale. It is advisable to find out the market price of that item, whether for rent or sale, and compare it with the offer made. Some people complain about the purpose of these checks, as if they were a sign of a lack of trust. They simply seek to avoid bias in the negotiation because, as Malhotra and Bazerman argue, we seek to negotiate rationally in an irrational world. 

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The Power of a Positive No

After his work Getting Past No, William Ury wrote another work entitled The Power of a Positive No. In this new original book, he explains how to face one of the most challenging things we must do every day: to say no to people who work with us, who we love, and with whom we have relationships of various kinds. As Ury says: “No is the biggest challenge today”.

The analysis in this book starts from the consideration that: “It may not be the most important word in our vocabulary, but it is the hardest to say well”. The special idiosyncrasy of this term is linked to the inherent tension between exercising your power and tending your relationship. Thus, in certain situations, Ury describes three common ways out:

a) Accommodate: say-yes-when-you-want-to-say-no. This is especially frequent when we want to maintain the personal relationship by making concessions.

b) Attacking: be-passive-aggressive-when-saying-no. It is the opposite of accommodating. It is about using power without any consideration for the relationship. It is linked to anger or rage.

c) Avoidance: we-say-no-absolutely-nothing. In these cases, communication and relationships are suspended. It is a way of coping with problems by avoiding people.

As can be imagined, these three ways out do not lead to success, and Ury’s proposal in this book is to affirm a positive No. Then the author summarises his formula: “A positive No is a Yes! No. Yes? The first Yes expresses your interests, the Noaffirms your power, and the second Yes strengthens your relationship. A positive No balances power and relationship in service of your interests.

The first Yes could be seen as internally focused – the assertion of one’s own interests – and the second Yes is externally focused -an invitation to the other to come to an agreement that satisfies those interests-. In this post, I will focus on the elements that give power to your No.

Saying No is not easy. Ury suggests that positive power must be developed, which is achieved by having a plan B. It is a matter of considering the worst-case scenario and seeing the possibilities one would have to achieve one’s objectives.

Plan B is also called BATNA (Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement). It is not an option to an agreement but an alternative to the agreement, a course of action that can be taken independently of the agreement with the other party. A better BATNA gives more bargaining power. A plan B is positive power; it does not mean punishing the other party. It is a strategic element that can condition the negotiation and must be considered.

The key question, then, is how to strengthen your plan B. One element that can help is brainstorming, where you use your imagination to develop various possible solutions without looking at their feasibility. Alternatives to a given situation should be carefully considered. These may include a) Do it yourself: achieve your goals by your own means without going to the other party; b) Run away: sometimes a possible way out is to end the relationship; c) Third party: sometimes the intervention of a third party as an intermediary is positive.

Along with building a powerful No, Ury recommends “building a winning coalition”. In each situation, allies with similar interests should be sought, and a common action plan can be addressed.

The key to the various interactions is information, especially about the interests and opinions of the other party. Ury advises, “anticipate the other’s next move”. Foreseeing likely courses of action and possible responses is strategically relevant. Anticipation gives a strategic advantage to the foresighted.

From this perspective, Ury argues that one should consider the worst-case scenario. It would be to put yourself in the position of checking what you could lose in the negotiation, on the one hand, and what plan B or BATNA is, on the other hand.

In conclusion, Ury reaffirms your decision to decide No in three questions: “Do you have the interest? Do you have the power? Do you have the right?” This point must be complemented with other negotiating elements, allowing you to reach efficient and intelligent agreements, from different interactions, based on building a positive No.

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Julius Caesar, Zone of Possible Agreement (ZOPA) in Civil War

In a book entitled Civil War, Julius Caesar narrates the political and military conflicts with the Roman Senate and especially with his rival Pompey. These led to a veritable civil war between contending groups looking to seize power.

In this post, I will analyse the successive peace proposals made by Julius Caesar and Pompey, through the lens of ZOPA analysis. The Zone of Possible Agreement – known as ZOPA – is a frame of reference that is relevant to any negotiation. It is defined between the parties’ two BATNAs. That is, between each player’s Best Alternatives to a Negotiated Agreement -BATNA-. Another way of expressing this is to define the ZOPA as the margin between the two reserve prices of each party. In other words, the minimum prices that the parties are willing to accept in a negotiation.

In the work Civil War, the author describes how the conflicts for power in Rome arose. He explains that Pompey made Julius Caesar the following proposal: “Caesar should return to Gaul, withdraw from Rimini, discharge his armies; if he met these terms, Pompey would go to Hispania. Until there was assurance that Caesar would do what he had promised, the consuls and Pompey would not cease levying levies” (I.10).

The analysis from ZOPA is that the parties’ BATNAs do not allow for a deal on these terms. The proposed deal is that Julius Caesar must withdraw and disarm while his adversaries continue to arm. Julius Caesar would rather fight with his present forces than disarm. Pompey concedes to go to Hispania but only after he has assembled  the troops. The agreement is unbalanced in terms of the strategic relevance of the concessions between the parties. Therefore, the party that is asked to make a greater effort – to disarm – will easily find a better alternative to the proposed agreement.

Events progressed and it was now Julius Caesar who made a proposal to Pompey for a peace agreement, on the following terms: “that they should cause no more harm to themselves or to the Republic. They themselves were already enough proof, by their own disasters, of how much power fortune has in war. This was the only occasion to treat of peace, so long as both were confident of their strength, and their power was considered equal; if fortune helped only a little to one of the two, he who considered himself superior would not admit of terms for peace, nor consider himself satisfied with a part in which he trusted to possess all.

Since he had not been able to reach an agreement before, the terms for peace had to be requested in Rome from the Senate and the Roman people” (III. 10). (III. 10)

This agreement is based on equality of forces and uses the figure of an arbitration by the Senate. It is interesting the reflection that Julius Caesar makes where equality of forces is more favourable to peace, while if one party is more fortunate in combat, it will seek to defeat the other in battle.

What Julius Caesar means is that agreement is possible if the two sides have similar BATNAs. If one side has a very good BATNA – it has a good chance of winning the war – there is no possibility of agreement. The Zone of Potential Agreement -ZOPA- will expand with the uncertainty of the final outcome from two medium BATNAs.

Turning to a third party to settle a dispute is a legitimate, and widely used, way to do so, as long as its impartiality of judgement is guaranteed.

To Julius Caesar’s proposal of peace, Pompey’s reply was: “What does life or the city matter to me if it is to be believed that I have it for Caesar’s benefit; this belief cannot be erased, since it will be believed that by him I have been restored to Italy, when I came out” (III.18).

Here it is worth remembering Fisher and Ury’s rule “Separate the persons from the problem“. One party does not want to enter into a agreement because any solution will look like a success for the other party. In addition to an issue of hierarchy between the two, what seems to be relevant here are the emotions that stand in the way of any agreement. This always leads to conflict.

Proof of this are the words of an officer of the Pompeian army, named Labienus, who at one point in the negotiations said: “Stop talking about peace, for there can be no peace for us unless Caesar’s head is brought to us” (III.20).

It seems clear that there is an emotional problem and that the declared aim of one side is the death of Julius Caesar. In this case, there is no ZOPA. No agreement is possible if one side only wants Caesar’s death to make peace. The other side’s alternative is to fight and defend Julius Caesar’s life.

Pompey’s end also teaches us about strategy. His armies were defeated by Julius Caesar’s armies and set sail for Syria. There he sought help from Ptolemy, king of Egypt, who was at loggerheads with his sister Cleopatra, who later had a relationship with Julius Caesar that has been mythologised. Out of fear of the threat he posed or out of contempt for misfortune, Ptolemy’s advisors agreed to answer Pompey kindly in public and secretly sent two emissaries to kill him (III.104).

This story between Julius Caesar and Pompey can make us reflect on some aspects: a) On the need to establish a Zone of Possible Agreement (ZOPA) according to the BATNA of the parties, their Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement. The key to negotiating power is to have a good BATNA, a good alternative to negotiate; b) Proper management of emotions. They should not be an objective, in themselves, of the negotiation; c) Approach of third parties when their impartiality of judgement is guaranteed.

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Put yourself in your shoes: from self-criticism to self-understanding

Most books on negotiation tend to focus on the fact that the key to success lies in knowing the other party’s intentions, true interests, and even any details that provide some information about the other party. This is why it is crucial to know how to listen and to develop emotional intelligence techniques as the basis for a good strategy. 

However, it is no less true that knowing one’s own values and knowing how to manage one’s reactions are essential elements of a negotiation strategy. It is precisely this shift towards one’s own expectations and perspectives that is the focus of the book Getting Yes with Yourself (and other worthy opponents) by William Ury. 

This author is co-founder of the Harvard Negotiation Project and, previously, he had written, together with Roger Fisher, the world-famous negotiation manual entitled Getting to Yes. The Art of Negotiating Without Giving In. Following on from this famous manual, he reflects on his new work on focusing on the agent’s perspective, expectations, and reactions rather than the other party with whom he interacts to achieve his objectives.

After all, negotiation is an exercise of influence in which you try to change another person’s perspective. The first step, Ury explains, in achieving this goal is to understand where their opinions come from. However, putting yourself in someone else’s shoes can be very difficult, especially in a conflict or negotiation. Different cultures and religions have moral precepts based on reciprocity, altruism, and otherness, such as the Golden Rule of Humanity. 

There is a crucial, often overlooked, preliminary move that can help us clarify both what we want and what the other person wants. That move is to put ourselves first. Listening to ourselves can reveal what we really want while clearing our minds and allowing us to listen to other people and understand what they really want.

Putting yourself in your shoes may look strange at first glance, because, after all, aren’t you already in your shoes? But doing it properly is not as easy as it might seem, because our natural tendency is to judge ourselves critically and to ignore or reject parts of ourselves.

According to Ury, there are three actions that can help us: first, see ourselves from the balcony; second, go deeper and listen empathetically to our underlying feelings and what they are really telling us; and third, go even deeper and discover our needs.

Look at yourself from the balcony

In his lectures and writings, Ury emphasises the idea of going out on the balcony. The balcony is a metaphor for a place of perspective, tranquillity, self-control, and calm. We are all actors on the stage of life, so balconies are places from which we can see the whole play and develop with greater clarity to observe ourselves. It is important to go out on the balcony at any time, especially before, during and after a problematic conversation or negotiation. This is really relevant for better management of emotions in negotiations.

Empathetic listening

Empathy and sympathy are always confused, but they are different. Sympathy is feeling sorry for a person’s situation, but not necessarily understanding it. Empathy, however, means understanding what it feels like to be in that situation.


Listening to oneself with empathy is on a deeper level than observing. Observing means seeing from the outside, while listening means feeling from the inside. Observing gives you a distant view, while listening gives you an intimate understanding.

In this regard, Ury uses this image: When I do my daily exercise each morning, I imagine sitting at a kitchen table to understand and then use the intensity of these feelings. Every thought or emotion related to the family, such as anxiety, fear or shame, is displayed. I offer them a fictitious seat and so I have learned to welcome everyone. I would like to treat them like my old friends or acquaintances. Like a whole table in the kitchen. I listen to the free dialogue of thoughts and feelings.

This image of the kitchen table implies that we must know how to listen to our feelings and give them a place, but the essential thing is to know how to manage emotions properly. This sometimes means balancing emotions and reasons. 

Uncover your needs

Ury argues that we can question ourselves about what is not suitable for us. In what aspects of our lives are we not completely happy or fulfilled? Does work, money, family, relationships, health, or general well-being matter? Is it normal to experience feelings of anxiety, fear, anger, or sadness when your needs are not met? What do you want most? What are your primary motivations? The better you understand your needs, the more likely you are to be able to meet them. 

As simple and natural as it sounds, putting yourself in your place – in your shoes– to see yourself from the balcony, to listen to yourself with empathy, and to discover your underlying needs are often difficult tasks. The path from self-criticism to self-understanding requires constant effort.

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Start with no

Approaches based on win-win negotiations, where the parties seeks an agreement that is beneficial for everyone, have been prevalent. Sometimes, however, the art and science of negotiation can lead to other paths. This is the case of Jim Camp, who is known for his books on negotiation, for being a coach, and for his reputation as a fearsome negotiator.

His most famous work , Start with No. The Negotiating Tools That the Pros Don’t Want You to Know, where he deploys a series of principles, values and techniques that, somewhat counter-intuitively in the face of specific dominant approaches, seek to situate the coordinates of negotiations to seek effective and productive results.

Below, we will discuss some of his ideas from the perspective of the Minerva Strategy Blog.

“In a negotiation, decisions are one hundred per cent emotional (…) Negotiations and even decision-making start with emotions. Emotions run rampant, they are at the root of our initial decision, they are not to be trusted, and they can even be destructive, but they do not have the last word. My system considers them for what they are and works with them, not against them. My system teaches you to move from the emotions that never close the deal, all the way to the decisions that do close the deal” (Jim Camp, Start with no). 

Emotions in negotiation are a classic topic. Camp says that in Japan, where negotiation is considered an art, it is said that decisions should be made with the stomach, never with the heart or the head. This could be a grave mistake: it is good to know that emotions influence the negotiation scenario, especially from the other party. However, it often has dire consequences when the emotional factor is decisive. The prudent thing to do is to moderate and control one’s own emotions and to analyse and know the other party’s emotions. 

“Negotiations start with a “no”, no “maybe”, let alone “yes”, but with a firm and resounding “no”. In any negotiation, this is the key word I want to hear; all of the above is nothing more than window dressing” (Jim Camp, Start with no). 

This is Jim Camp’s top piece of advice: start the negotiation with a “no.” Other possibilities are a waste of time or a way of harbouring illusions that do not prosper. This initial “no” is an open door to justify one’s own positions and to continue discussions. It could be considered a constructive “no”.

“For fear of breaking the relationship with the opponent in the negotiation, the colleague did not want to be too demanding. He didn’t want to hurt his feelings by telling him, “If you don’t sign the contract, there will be no show.” Because of his deep desire for approval, he couldn’t see the real problem with the negotiation” (Jim Camp, Start with no). 

How many times are we forced to make concessions to save the relationship? Negotiations are not territories to seek personal approval, but there are people with great strategic eagerness, where preserving their relationship in good conditions implies making concessions on the line they mark. Jim Camp’s advice is to clearly separate the outcome of negotiations from the quality of personal relationships.

“Every reader can think of a case where they have chosen an obnoxious but effective person over someone likeable but ineffective. What does friendship have to do with doing good business or making good decisions? Absolutely nothing. And as we’ll see below, I always propose and practice respectful and polite agreements with the adversary” (Jim Camp,Start with no). 

Here again, the emotions linked to the particularism of how we human beings relate to one another return. This reflection by Camp highlights that professional decisions are made based on bonds of friendship rather than on objective criteria. Human, all too human. It is desirable in professional environments to value the merits of people, regardless of the emotions they may provoke.

“Take responsibility for bad decisions, learn from them, know failure and move forward because you are one decision away from getting back on track. To take on this attitude and approach takes great discipline and a lot of self-confidence because hitting the nail on the head is important to all of us. It is a powerful need and like all needs to be overcome” (Jim Camp, Start with no).

There is a growing interest in accountability, which can mean: explaining one’s actions, justifying them and being sanctioned or rewarded. This is a recommendable exercise, especially regarding decisions in the public sector. From a strategic point of view, a future victory can emerge from a failure. For this to be possible, it is crucial to learn from the circumstances, approaches and dynamics that have made this situation possible and emerge stronger. The word crisis in Greek means “to separate”, “to judge”, “to decide”. A crisis has to serve to improve the decision criteria in the future.

“If you can’t take “no,” you’ll burn a lot of bridges and find no way out of a lot of negotiations. Nothing –absolutely nothing– is as important in a successful negotiation as making it clear from the get-go that “no” is a perfectly acceptable answer in any deal” (Jim Camp, Start with no). 

The feared negotiator, Jim Camp, insists on starting negotiations with a “no”, because he: does not seek to save the relationship, knows how to manage his own and other peoples’ emotions, does not get carried away by particularistic ties, promotes efficiency, learns from failures and operates from a constructive “no”, to continue negotiating.

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Managing negotiations: arguing better 

A common topic on negotiation courses is the appropriate combination of emotions, tactics, and interests. Sometimes, an idealised and overly collaborative image of negotiation situations is presented when, actually, it is essential to deal with emotional tensions and, in particular, to avoid being manipulated by the other party. Gavin Kennedy, John Benson, and John McMillan approach their book Managing Negotiations: How to Get a Better Deal from this “realistic” perspective, where a chapter is devoted to the negotiation stage of arguing better.

The authors start by asserting that people negotiate because they have or believe they have a conflict of rights or interests with the other party. Most negotiation scenarios occur in mixed situations of cooperation and conflict, in which the parties want something from the other party that they cannot achieve on their own. This defines the Zone of Possible Agreement -ZOPA- between the parties’ BATNAs -Best Alternative to Not Negotiating-.

People with different interests argue. When interests close to their heart are threatened, most people know how to argue, and even anyone can become emotional. It is for this reason that we should be concerned about those who avoid speaking up because little or nothing of what they value has been threatened. While some people say they don’t have to argue, others admit they must debate or discuss. This is enough.

Regardless of their name, Kennedy, Benson, and McMillan have chosen to call this phase of negotiation argument.Opening, Presentation, and Exchange are alternative ways of describing this stage. However, the authors opt for the term argument since it indicates that both parties are involved. Although the word usually suggests emotional conflict, it can also mean a rational presentation of the reason for doing or not doing something.

Each side gives reasons why they believe something is necessary or attempts to show by reasoning why something is true. They will discuss these conclusions and try to persuade each other through reasoning.

Improving behaviour

Eliminating the habit of interrupting your opponent from your behaviour is one of the most straightforward and most beneficial steps to improve your negotiating performance. People who interrupt someone are essentially telling them to “shut up.” (“You can’t talk while I’m interrupting you”). Naturally, the person receiving this message resents it, and before long, there is shouting between some parties during the negotiation; shouting, including insults, can be expected. The other is treated without respect.

Negative discussions reinforce your opponent’s initial inhibitions, which prevent avenues of negotiation from opening and sometimes prevent agreement on an issue, even if the deal is beneficial to both parties.

Constructive behaviour

The remedy is quite simple: Listen more than you talk. Now, that’s easier said than done. However, this alone is not enough. Positive listening behaviour must be matched by positive speaking behaviour. When speaking, be sure to use time effectively. One way to do this is to ask open-ended questions for your opponent to explain and develop their case.

Your opponent is not prepared to explain everything to you, nor can he be willing to explain anything about his limit position. He will try to accept that his opening position is his limit. As a result, parties who are in an opening position can easily get into a useless and fruitless conversation. You should not focus too much on the issue on the opening positions. Therefore, as much as possible, let us know your position through questions of clarification and explanation. For more information, you may inadvertently disclose your commitment to your position and the likely routes you are preparing to move forward.

Synthesising is always beneficial, especially when the issues are numerous and complex. It also eliminates confusion and negative arguments. “Let’s summarise what you are asking” is a positive action and helps refocus negotiations. No matter how absurd or ambitious your demands are, it gives the opponent the feeling that they are at least being listened to with respect.

Constructive feedback

Your answer to the other side is what your opponent can do for you. It is to give your opponent information about your position. If you have extracted data from your opponent in the way suggested above, you can better respond to his position and explain yours.

Settings for an argument:

Avoid:

Interrupting, pointing out, attacking, blaming, being too smart, talking too much, shouting, sarcasm, threats.

Practice:

Listening, clarifying questions, summarising issues as a matter of fact.

Asking to justify your case point by point means being attentive to the signs.

Not being committed to your proposal and your explanations.

Testing your commitment to your position-analysing clues about your priorities.

Seeking and giving information – be wary of unintentional signals.

To successfully manage negotiations, it is essential to anticipate and prepare for the argument or dispute stage, where the parties present and discuss their rationale, interests and positions to persuade each other. Avoiding attitudes that can hinder effective communication and instead encourage constructive behaviours is crucial. Doing so allows you to negotiate and discuss more effectively, leading to better outcomes.

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Separate people from the problem

The Harvard Negotiation Project is a practice-oriented academic initiative at Harvard University that looks to provide negotiation resources for practitioners. The star of this project is Fisher and Ury’s book Getting to Yes. Negotiating an agreement without giving in. This book offers a negotiation method with concrete rules from an alternative approach, focusing on critical aspects of any negotiation.      

The first rule of this method is to separate people from the problem. In many negotiations, human relationships, emotions, and cultural differences are relevant to understanding how events unfold. Sometimes, these elements are more decisive for the outcome than the actual subject matter of the negotiation. Sometimes, even people are the problem that prevents the negotiation process from proceeding or makes it very difficult.   

The role of emotions in negotiations is a variable to be considered and can be of crucial relevance. Fisher and Ury highlight that negotiators are, first and foremost, people, which will inevitably have implications on the process, for example, when handling their emotions or the cultural or social differences that may arise.  

Sometimes, the best way to manage a negotiation involving emotional issues is to put them politely out in the open. From there, an honest relationship can be built that deals with the actual subject of the negotiation. On other occasions, some people make concessions just to maintain their good personal relationship with the other party. In such cases, the object of negotiating the relationship between the parties must be clearly defined to affirm the legitimacy of this separation without affecting the personal relationship. Otherwise, one party may think that the other is taking advantage.

Another piece of advice from Fisher and Ury is to put yourself in the other person’s shoes. This is a crucial element of negotiations because we learn from imagining ourselves in the circumstances in which the other party is placed, which allows us to predict their future actions. This exercise is particularly suitable for situations with differences between the parties. These differences will play a role – implicitly or explicitly – in the negotiations.  

One of the implications of this exercise of putting oneself in the other’s shoes is to analyse how the other party saves face. That is, whether the offer or the terms of the negotiation allow the other party a good solution compatible with their values or reasonable expectations. The parties must explain and justify the result obtained from the negotiation. An intelligent negotiator must, therefore, be concerned about how the other party saves face, and this implies having internalised their point of view.      

Another perspective offered by Fisher and Ury is to consider the concerns of the other party. The parties have different interests, concerns and priorities; perhaps there is room for negotiation. Moreover, exploring these differences may be yield benefit. It is necessary to address the other party’s concerns, even if they are not directly related to the main object of negotiation.  

Separating people from the problem is a key principle in negotiations. It involves recognising that we are human beings and that there are aspects of the relationships between the parties that can influence the outcome. People should not be the problem but part of the solution.