Category: Negotiation

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Never Split the Difference

Oscar Pérez de la Fuente

Carlos III University of Madrid

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3708-846X

Abstract

This paper reviews Chris Voss’s Never Split the Difference through the lens of the Minerva Strategy Blog, contrasting the “art” of negotiation derived from hostage-crisis practice with the “science” of negotiation associated with the Harvard Negotiation Project. It highlights how Voss challenges rational-actor assumptions by foregrounding empathy, emotional attachment, and perception management as decisive factors in bargaining. Central to the analysis is Voss’s claim that eliciting “that’s right” signals genuine understanding and can unlock cooperative behaviour more effectively than a simple “yes” or “you’re right.” The discussion also examines Voss’s scepticism toward “middle ground” compromises, juxtaposing this stance with standard negotiation concepts such as BATNA and reservation thresholds. Additional attention is given to time pressure and deadlines as drivers of impulsive concessions, and to emotionally loaded terms—especially “fair”—as rhetorical devices that shift leverage by forcing defensive reactions. Finally, the paper considers “anchoring” as a method for shaping the counterpart’s reality by setting extreme reference points that make subsequent offers appear reasonable. Overall, the text presents Voss’s techniques as a pragmatic, psychologically informed toolkit that complements, and sometimes conflicts with, orthodox negotiation theory.

Keywords: empathy, negotiation tactics, anchoring, BATNA

In the opening pages of the book Never Split the Difference. Negotiating as if your life depended on it, the author, Chris Voss, is set to meet with several professors from the Harvard Negotiation Project. Chris Voss was a local police officer who had been promoted to the FBI and was part of a team that used hostage negotiation techniques. He embodied the art of negotiation, which is the practical application of various techniques and principles to strategic scenarios. The Harvard Negotiation Project represents the science of negotiation, where categories, terminology and analysis are established and based on certain assumptions, such as the idea that human beings are rational. 

Below, I will analyse Chris Voss’s book Never Split the Difference. Negotiating as if your life depended on it from the perspective of the Minerva Strategy Blog. It is remarkable because the Spanish title translation of this book is slightly different: Breaking Through the ‘No’ Barrier. 9 principles for negotiation as if your life depended on it. This implies some different nuances from languages perspective.

In the chapter Trigger the Two Words That Immediately Transform Any Negotiation, Voss carries out an analytical exercise in which he links the positive affirmation of empathy with the emotions and emotional attachment involved. He states: “Creating unconditional positive regard opens the door to a changing thought and behaviours. Humans have an innate urge toward socially constructive behaviour. The more a person feels understood, and positively affirmed in that understanding, the more likely that urge for constructive behaviour will take hold” (Voss, 2016, 112).

In short, when someone feels understood, they adopt a more constructive attitude. The conclusion is that the key words in any negotiation scenario are ‘that’s right’. Voss adds, “’That is right’ is better than “yes”. Strive for it. Reaching ‘that’s right’ in a negotiation creates breakthroughs.” But he clarifies that a ‘that’s right’ is not a ‘yes’ or a ‘you’re right’ (Voss, 2016, 112)

In the chapter entitled Bend Their Reality, Voss focuses on the topic of true interests and how differing perceptions and signals can sometimes distort approaches in negotiation scenarios. It is interesting because Voss’s views stem from the art of negotiation and his professional experience in FBI negotiation teams, and some of them are at odds with what is usually said in the science of negotiation.

It is one thing for the parties to make statements in formal settings, but quite another to understand their true interests. Before entering into negotiations, it is important to be clear about one’s own interests and to have the best possible information about the other party’s interests. It is also important to be clear about the best strategy for mutually defending the interests of both parties or, at least, the best way to reconcile them.

In another part of the book, Voss states: “Splitting the difference of wearing one black and one brown shoe, so don’t compromise. Meeting halfway often leads to bad deals for both sides.” (Voss, 2016, 139)

The middle ground is usually seen as an impartial basis for reaching an agreement. Before any negotiation begins, each party must be clear about: a) what their best alternative to negotiation (BATNA) is; b) what their satisfaction threshold is, or their specific minimum and maximum objectives in the negotiation. Negotiating involves giving something up to obtain, in return, something desired. It is a kind of transaction. To this end, information regarding the interests and expectations of both parties is key. This is what the science of negotiation would say; however, as we have seen, the art of negotiation is wary of middle ground.  

Later, in Never Split the Difference, we read that the looming deadline urges people to try to wrap up negotiations as quickly as possible and to act impulsively in ways that go against their own interests.

Ultimatums and deadlines are sometimes a negotiation tactic or gambit. On other occasions, they provide a good excuse to move the negotiation forward. Here, Voss warns us about the tendency to make concessions—which would otherwise not be made—under the influence of these time-sensitive circumstances. One must remain vigilant and know not to give in on points previously deemed non-negotiable.  

Voss also argues that the ‘J-bomb’—the term ‘fair’—is a concept with great emotional impact for people, who often use it to put the other party on the defensive and force them to make concessions. If the other party drops that bomb, don’t fall into the trap. Instead, ask them why they claim you are being unfair to them (Voss, 2016, 139).

Another negotiation tactic or gambit involves manipulating the perceptions and emotions of the parties by using emotionally charged terms such as fair, objective, impartial, neutral, etc. Although this may be a good way of reaching agreements in this manner, it is always worth analysing who stands to lose and who stands to gain from the application of these ‘abstract’ criteria, which are presented as magic potions for solving problems. 

In another passage of the book Never Split the Difference, Voss states that it is possible to shape the other party’s reality by setting their starting point. Before making an offer, you can emotionally anchor their mindset by making them believe they are about to receive a terrible offer. When the time comes to put a figure on the table, you set an extreme benchmark to make the ‘real’ offer seem more reasonable, or you offer a range to appear less aggressive. The true value of anything depends on the perspective from which it is viewed (Voss, 2016, 139).

References

Voss, Chris, Raz, Tahl (2016), Never split the difference. Negotiating as if your life depended on it, Harper Collins Publishers, Kindle edition. 

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3-D Negotiation

Oscar Pérez de la Fuente

Universidad Carlos III de Madrid

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3708-846X

Abstract

This text presents key ideas from David A. Lax and James K. Sebenius’s 3-D Negotiation framework, which views negotiation as the interaction of three simultaneous dimensions: tactics at the table, deal design that uncovers true economic and non-economic interests, and the broader setup that shapes the situation off the table. Focusing on interests is central to this approach because stated positions often mask implicit goals, constraints, and concerns. The discussion highlights perspective-taking, careful assessment of one’s own priorities, and the use of classic tools such as BATNA and ZOPA, while warning against reducing analysis to a single distributive variable such as price. The text also identifies wider contextual factors that influence outcomes, including relationships, emotions, and cultural orientations toward either results or relationships. It stresses the role of the “social contract” or spirit of the agreement in establishing expectations, trust, and conflict-resolution norms, and it notes how process choices and tactics (e.g., anchoring) can distort results. Finally, it addresses ethical tensions in negotiating behaviour through deontological, consequentialist, Machiavellian, and virtue-based lenses, and it concludes with four practices to safeguard interests: ask and probe, map interests using public information, leverage internal sources, and consult knowledgeable advisers.

Keywords: principled egotiation, BATNA/ZOPA, Deal design, emotions, tactics

Professors David A. Lax and James K. Sebenius, who are involved in the Harvard University Negotiation Project, in their book 3-D Negotiation. Powerful Tools to Change the Game in Your Most Important Deals (2006) offer new perspectives when it comes to conducting negotiations.

According to this approach, negotiations should be understood as three-dimensional, with three elements occurring more or less simultaneously throughout the actual negotiation. These dimensions are: a) Tactics, which involve persuasive manoeuvres and give-and-take. It is worth noting that poor tactics can ruin a negotiation; b) Deal design: beyond the obvious, this involves uncovering the parties’ true economic and non-economic interests; and c) Setup: off the table, which shapes and reshapes the situation (Lax, Sebenius, 2006, 9). . 

Below, we will examine the topic of exploring interests from the perspective of the Minerva Strategy Blog.

Lax and Sebenius begin by defining interest as whatever you care about that is potentially at stake in the outcome (Lax, Sebenius, 2006, 76).  Their entire approach is based on the observation that the interests stated at the negotiating table are one thing, whereas the parties’ actual or implicit interests are quite another, whether or not these have been clearly articulated. 

When exploring these interests (whether explicit or implicit) in the handling of information about the other party, it is essential to practice, at various stages of the negotiation process, the exercise of putting oneself in the other person’s shoes. It’s also vital for oneself or the negotiating team to calmly assess the true interests at stake: what one wants from the negotiation, what could be gained, and what could be lost. In the standard terminology of Negotiation Theory, what is the best alternative to a no-deal outcome (BATNA), and how is the Zone of Possible Agreement (ZOPA) established between the parties? 

However, Lax and Sebenius’s emphasis on the importance of (actual) interests within the framework of three-dimensional negotiation highlights the fact that focusing all one’s attention in negotiations on linear distributive dimensions—such as price negotiation—can cause one to lose sight of a range of potentially richer interests.

From this perspective, analysing BATNA and ZOPA can be useful tools, but not by focusing on a single variable; rather, by taking into account all the factors at play within the negotiating context.  

In many negotiations, relationships are a key factor to bear in mind. Sometimes, emotions guide the parties’ behaviour, and such feelings can distort certain expectations. On other occasions, poor or mediocre results are accepted simply to maintain the relationship. On this point, Lax and Sebenius distinguish between countries that focus on relationships—such as those in Southern Europe and Latin America—and others that focus on results, such as Anglo-Saxon and Northern European countries  (Lax, Sebenius, 2006, 74). 

Another factor to bear in mind is the social contract; beyond its strictly economic dimension, this governs people’s expectations regarding the nature, scope and duration of the agreement, the process to be followed, and the way in which unforeseen events are handled. As Lax and Sebenius state, it is “the spirit of the agreement.” It is important to clearly understand this broad framework to avoid conflicts or to resolve them without too much difficulty. It is about establishing relationships within a framework of trust, within the framework of a shared negotiating culture, where the obligations of the parties and the usual way of resolving potential conflicts are clearly established (Lax, Sebenius, 2006, 74).

The third factor is the process itself. Certain negotiation processes often influence the outcome, and sometimes negotiators employ tricks and tactics, such as anchoring. These tactics can be particularly detrimental to one of the parties, who must be able to identify them and defend their position, especially when they are unaware of these strategies or lack experience in negotiation scenarios. Another important point is to distinguish the negotiating table from the wider negotiating context. It is usually easier to make progress in negotiations in informal settings (Lax, Sebenius, 2006, 75).    

Finally, one factor to bear in mind is ethics. Certain aspects of some negotiations may be morally controversial; for example, some negotiating tactics that involve withholding or manipulating information from the other party. From an ethical standpoint, the response will differ between the deontological model, with its duty to always tell the truth; the consequentialist model, which advocates the greatest happiness for the greatest number of people; the Machiavellian model, focused on success; and the virtuous model, which proposes acting as a virtuous person would in that situation  (Lax, Sebenius, 2006, 75).

Lax and Sebenius argue that we should not confuse negotiating positions with a broader set of actual interests, and they propose four practices that will help you safeguard your interests:

–Ask, listen and probe

Information about the other party’s interests is essential. The best way to get this is to listen carefully and gauge how they might respond to the negotiation map’s options. 

–Use public sources to map interests

When important decisions need to be made, it is advisable to consult public records and the relevant institutions to gather objective information. Having reports from independent bodies and other credible sources of information is also beneficial.

–Tap internal sources

Naturally, if you can obtain firsthand information from someone who understands the other party’s interests, this can be particularly useful. It is also important to have information about the negotiator and the people involved, as well as their explicit, implicit and underlying interests.

–Tap knowledgeable advisers

In complex business situations, people often turn to professionals such as lawyers or intermediaries. Lax and Sebenius recommend asking them about their experience in such situations. Perhaps this is because – as Aristotle pointed out many centuries ago – experience can help one to better understand a particular situation (Lax, Sebenius, 2006, 77-79).

References

Lax, David A., Sebenius, James K. (2006), 3-D Negotiation. Powerful Tools to Change the Game in Your Most Important Deals, Boston, Mass.: Harvard Business School Press. 

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Weighing anchor

Oscar Pérez de la Fuente

Universidad Carlos III de Madrid

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3708-846X

Abstract

This text examines the role of cognitive biases—especially the anchoring effect—in decision-making and negotiations, drawing on Daniel Kahneman’s work Thinking, Fast and Slow. Kahneman distinguishes between two mental systems: System 1, which operates quickly, automatically, and with little effort, and System 2, which is slower, deliberate, and engaged in complex reasoning. Most everyday judgments rely on System 1, while System 2 intervenes mainly when difficulties arise. Because System 1 tends to accept suggestions without careful scrutiny, people are vulnerable to systematic errors, particularly when an initial value frames subsequent estimates. The anchoring effect is illustrated through experiments in which arbitrary numbers influenced participants’ estimates, such as the percentage of African nations in the UN or Gandhi’s age at death. These examples show how an irrelevant reference point can shape beliefs by prompting selective retrieval of compatible evidence (priming), leading System 1 to construct a coherent but biased interpretation. In negotiations, anchoring commonly appears through the first offer, which can strongly condition concessions and final outcomes, especially when negotiations start from a written draft. The text argues that negotiators should remain alert to unjustified anchors, respond to extreme first offers with minimal counteroffers, and use the pace of concessions to infer each party’s reserve price, ultimately “weighing anchor” with realistic proposals.

Keywords: anchor, emotions, first offer, positions

Much could be said about the influence of emotions in negotiations, and effective management is advisable. There are several psychological factors that affect  Economy. Daniel Kahneman is a psychologist with dual American and Israeli nationality, who won the Nobel Prize in Economics in 2002. His approach focuses on how the way we perceive, and process information, influences our decision-making more than it seems.

In his work Thinking, fast and slow (2011), Kahneman begins by distinguishing between two systems that operate in our brain: he calls the first one the automatic system and the second one the effortful system. System 1 operates quickly and automatically, with little or no effort and without a sense of voluntary control. System 2 focuses attention on demanding mental activities, including complex calculations.

System 2 operations are often associated with the subjective experience of acting, choosing, and concentrating. Systems 1 and 2 are always active while we are awake. System 1 acts automatically, and System 2 is normally in a comfortable, low-effort mode in which only a fraction of its capacity is occupied.

When System 1 encounters a difficulty, it calls on System 2 to suggest a more detailed and precise procedure that can solve the problem. You could say that human beings function on autopilot based on System 1, but if something does not add up, they turn to System 2. (Kahneman, 2011, 80-81)..

From this perspective, Kahneman concludes that the best we can do is to reach a compromise: learn to recognise situations in which mistakes are likely and strive to avoid major mistakes when important things are at stake.

Kahneman’s book explains various unique phenomena that occur due to the synergy or lack of coordination between System 1 and System 2. One of these phenomena, which is undoubtedly of interest in the field of negotiations, is the effect of anchoring.

One of Kahneman’s experiments with his students involved using a wheel of fortune numbered from 1 to 100. This wheel was rigged and only stopped at 10 and 65. The number on the wheel of fortune was noted down. He then asked the students two questions:

Is the percentage of African nations among United Nations (UN) members greater or less than the number just written?

What is the estimated percentage of African nations in the UN? (Kahneman, 2011, 119).

When the wheel of fortune landed on 10, the average response regarding the percentage of African countries in the UN was 25%. However, when the wheel of fortune landed on 65, the average response regarding the percentage of African countries was 45%.

This is the anchor effect. The number given when the question is asked conditions the result, anchoring it. However, this phenomenon has no logical explanation, unless we resort to the explanation of autopilot and the relationships between System 1 and System 2.

Another experiment proposed by Kanheman was based on the following questions:

Was Gandhi approximately one hundred and forty-four years old when he died?

How old was Gandhi when he died? (Kahneman, 2011, 122).

It is obvious that Gandhi did not live to be 144 years old, but the outcome of this question is conditioned by that figure. It is significantly different than if the question were whether he was more or less than 35 years old when he died, which may seem surprising.

This anchoring effect is linked to the priming effect, where compatible evidence is selectively elicited. In this way, System 1 does everything it can to construct a world in which the anchor is the true world. It is one of the manifestations of associative coherence that Kahneman studies in his book.

What is the relevance of anchoring in the context of negotiations? The classic form of the anchoring effect in this area is the first offer. In many cases, the outcome of a negotiation is conditioned by the amount of the first offer. If someone makes an initial offer of 200, it would seem difficult to justify making a counteroffer of 15. But why shouldn’t this counteroffer be made?

The first offer anchors the various concessions made by the parties. This is particularly clear when the first offer consists of the clauses of a written contract draft. If negotiations take place based on the proposed wording, the negotiation will have been anchored and will be better focused for the party making this first offer.

A phenomenon linked to anchoring, which can provide key information in a negotiation, is the pace of concessions. If A’s first offer is 200 and B’s counteroffer is 100, A’s next offer will give us information about their reserve price, depending on whether their next offer is 150 or, conversely, 190. If their subsequent pace of concessions is 10 or 50.

The anchor effect is something that can be explained by the interrelation between System 1 and System 2. In other words, because autopilot is engaged and we do not carefully analyse each and every statement that is processed daily. This power of suggestion of anchoring is unjustified, and one must be especially alert in negotiation contexts, as it is a way of gaining positions and focusing on the interests of one party. The best response to an exorbitant first offer is a minimal counteroffer and, from there, to begin negotiating. The pace of concessions by each party will provide information about their respective reserve prices. When faced with negotiation anchors, it is best to weigh anchor with a realistic counteroffer.

References

Kahneman, Daniel (2011), Thinking fast and slow, New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. 

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How to negotiate rationally in an irrational world

Oscar Pérez de la Fuente

Universidad Carlos III de Madrid

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3708-846X

Abstract

This paper reviews and contextualises Deepak Malhotra and Max H. Bazerman’s chapter “How to negotiate rationally in an irrational world” from Negotiation Genius, highlighting how psychological biases shape bargaining outcomes even among skilled negotiators. Framed as an analysis for the Minerva Strategy Blog, the text distinguishes biases of the mind (e.g., fixed-pie assumptions, attention to dazzling attributes, and non-rational escalation of commitment) from biases of the heart (e.g., conflicting motivations, egocentricity, overconfidence, irrational optimism, and regret aversion). Drawing on Daniel Kahneman’s dual-process theory, it argues that effective negotiators should shift from intuitive, automatic “System 1” responses to deliberate “System 2” reasoning when stakes are high. Practical recommendations include creating explicit System 2 checklists, avoiding negotiations under time pressure and ultimatum tactics, and spreading complex bargaining across multiple sessions to reduce improvisation and error. The paper also stresses learning through analogies by studying multiple negotiations simultaneously and focusing on underlying principles rather than details, echoing the Harvard Method’s emphasis on interests over positions. Finally, it addresses interacting with others’ biases by anticipating their consequences, encouraging less biased decision criteria, and systematically verifying counterpart information to maintain rational judgment in imperfect contexts.

Keywords: bias, emotions, information, interests, positions, ultimatums

Deepak Malhotra  and  Max H. Bazerman are professors at Harvard University and authors of the book  Negotiation Genius: How to Overcome Obstacles and Achieve Brilliant Results at the Bargaining Table and Beyond (2013). This work is particularly interesting because, in addition to using common tools and concepts from Negotiation Theory, delves into the field of emotions, approaching negotiation processes from the perspective of Psychology. 

Specifically, one of the most relevant parts of the book is the analysis of biases in negotiation. Biases occur in the heart and mind and “affect even the best and brightest”  (Malhotra, Bazerman, 2013, 197). Malhotra and Bazerman study: fixed-size pie bias, dazzling attributes bias, non-rational escalation of commitments bias as biases of the mind; conflicting motivations, egocentricity, overconfidence and irrational optimism, regret aversion as biases of the heart.

Below, we will analyse the chapter “How to negotiate rationally in an irrational world”, where these authors explain how to deal with the biases of the heart and mind in negotiation contexts, from the perspective of Minerva Strategy Blog.

Strategy 1 on how to deal with your own biases states: “Think according to system 2″ (Malhotra, Bazerman, 2013, 199). . The Nobel Prize in Economics Daniel Kahneman  In his work Thinking, Fast and Slow, he has analysed certain phenomena concerning the influence of Psychology in Economics, such as anchorage.  

System 1, which corresponds to intuition, is generally fast and automatic, without the implicit and emotional effort with which we make most decisions in our lives. System 2 corresponds to reasoned thinking, is slower, requires effort, and is explicit and logical. You could say that we generally have “autopilot” in system 1, and if something does not work, system 2 kicks in.

The first recommendation in this strategy is: “Make a list for System 2” (Malhotra, Bazerman, 2013, 200).  Important decisions, therefore, in the business world should be made by System 2. In other words, they should be carefully considered, properly thought through, weighing up the various scenarios and values at stake. Do not be swayed by first impressions, impulses, or emotions, which are implicit in biases. Skilful management of these biases can be part of the business practices and tricks of the other party.

The second tip states: “Avoid negotiating under time pressure” “(Malhotra, Bazerman, 2013, 200-201). Time management is crucial in many negotiations. It is important to know how to deal with ultimatums, which, in many cases, are just another negotiating tactic. The key is that, with less time, it will be more difficult to properly analyse the negotiating map. 

The third recommendation states: “Spread negotiations over multiple sessions” (Malhotra, Bazerman, 2013, 202). . To avoid unpredictability and improvisation in decision-making, it is beneficial to be able to negotiate over several sessions, allowing all relevant issues to be addressed from different angles with certainty. 

Strategy 2, on how to deal with your own biases, states: “Learn by using analogies” “(Malhotra, Bazerman, 2013, 202).  Experience is a source of knowledge; you learn from your mistakes. The authors summarise this approach by stating that “the key is to figure out how to extract principles from experiences and examples”. Precedents for a similar situation should be taken into account and their relevance in the course of events should be assessed. 

The first tip in this strategy 2 is: “Study multiple negotiations simultaneously” (Malhotra, Bazerman, 2013, 204). It is useful to learn about various strategies and negotiation frameworks similar to the one you are involved in. It is also beneficial, in light of this information, to map out various negotiation scenarios, with the possible outcomes for the parties involved.

The second recommendation states: “Focus on principles, not details” (Malhotra, Bazerman, 2013, 205). The important thing is to identify the interests involved and what might be the best way to satisfy them for both parties. This is the most genuine area of negotiation, which reminds me of the principle of the Harvard Method: Focus on interests, not positions.

Strategy 3 on how to deal with your own biases states: “Adopt the outsider’s perspective”. The parties are sometimes so involved in a negotiation that the intervention of an impartial third party is necessary. This is even institutionalised in the form of negotiation mediators. Or, in some regulated cases, the parties may submit their case to arbitration by a third party.

Strategy 1 for dealing with other people’s biases states: “Incorporate the consequences of others’ biases into your strategy” ” (Malhotra, Bazerman, 2013, 205). . At this point, Malhotra and Bazerman seem to be saying that if others act on biases of the heart or mind, that is to say if they are irrational, we should build our strategies to take advantage of this in business interactions.

Strategy 2 for dealing with other people’s biases states:  “Help others apply less biased criteria” (Malhotra, Bazerman, 2013, 212). One thing you can share with the other party is the lesson of making decisions within a reasonable time frame, after conducting a thorough analysis, without emotional constraints, and detecting negotiating tactics and tricks.  

Strategy 3 for dealing with other people’s biases says, “Weigh up the information provided by others” (Malhotra, Bazerman, 2013, 214). Relevant data provided by the other party in business contexts should be routinely checked. A typical example is the price of an item for rent or sale. It is advisable to find out the market price of that item, whether for rent or sale, and compare it with the offer made. Some people complain about the purpose of these checks, as if they were a sign of a lack of trust. They simply seek to avoid bias in the negotiation because, as Malhotra and Bazerman argue, we seek to negotiate rationally in an irrational world. 

References

Kahneman, Daniel (2011), Thinking fast and slow, New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. 

Malhotra, Deepak, Bazerman, Max H. (2013), El negociador genial. Cómo obtener grande resultados en la mesa de negociación y más allá, Barcelona: Ediciones Urano, trans: María Isabel Merino Sánchez.

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The power of empathy

Oscar Pérez de la Fuente

Universidad Carlos III de Madrid

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3708-846X

Abstract

This paper examines the strategic value of empathy in difficult negotiations, drawing on Deepak Malhotra’s discussion of “The Power of Empathy” and situating it within a broader framework of negotiation methods associated with the Harvard Negotiation Project. Rather than treating empathy as a purely moral stance, the analysis presents it as an information‑gathering and option‑expanding tool: understanding the other party’s constraints, identity-linked drivers, and perceptions can reveal hidden interests and unlock agreements that preserve dignity while improving outcomes. The paper contrasts practical “rules” for interpersonal conduct—golden, silver, and bronze—as different strategic postures for managing reciprocity and potential exploitation. It then explores a central tension in bargaining between strategic flexibility and credibility, highlighting how negotiators can design proposals that allow counterparts to “save face” without sacrificing intelligent solutions. Finally, the text considers the role of threats and ultimatums, arguing that reframing and integrating them into a wider negotiation structure can reduce escalation and keep channels open. Throughout, the paper emphasizes trilateral thinking: third parties frequently shape interests, alternatives, and perceived power, and empathetic analysis should extend to these external influences. The overall contribution is a concise, strategy-oriented interpretation of empathy as a mechanism for diagnosing conflict dynamics and enlarging the set of viable, durable settlements.

Keywords: empathy, negotiation, credibility, flexibility, positions, interests

The Harvard Negotiation Project at the Harvard Business School has developed a   Negotiation Method, the principles of which are explained in the best-selling book  Getting to Yes. How to negotiate without giving in, by Robert Fisher and William Ury. Another Harvard professor, Deepak Malhotra, has a book entitled Negotiating the Impossible. How to break deadlocks and resolve ugly conflicts (without money or muscle) , where he analyses how they act in the context of complicated negotiations. 

Below, we will analyse some of Malhotra’s advice in the section of his book on complex negotiations, ‘The Power of Empathy’, from the perspective of the Minerva Strategy Blog.

Empathy expands the set of options you have for resolving the conflict. The better you understand the other side’s perspective, the more likely you are to find a solution (Malhotra, 2016, 128)..

Empathy is often understood as putting oneself in another’s situation.  The  Golden Rule  maintains that “treat others as you would like to be treated.” A good exercise is to ask yourself: if I were in the other person’s situation, how would I like to be treated and how would I behave? This rule is fine, but it should include safeguards to prevent exploitation. The Silver Rule states: “Do not do unto others what you would not have them do unto you.” This would be a practical application of empathy. However, ultimately, there is the Bronze Rule: “Do unto others as others do unto you.” This would be an extreme form of reciprocity and, at times, the mere possibility of applying this Bronze Rule may have strategic value.

Empathy is needed most with people who seem to deserve it least. The more intolerable their behaviour, the greater the potential benefit of understanding it (Malhotra, 2016, 128)..

There may be individuals with challenging personalities or who find themselves in complicated situations, or who may behave unusually due to cultural, religious, gender, disability, or other identity factors.

The relevant issue is that, in business contexts, information about the parties’ backgrounds is key. This data can help explain certain behaviours and attitudes, and/or justify each party’s actions and action plan from their point of view. This exercise in understanding the other party can be useful, as it can highlight differences in interests, assessments or perceptions that may be of strategic interest.

There is almost always a trade-off between maintaining strategic flexibility and safeguarding credibility (Malhotra, 2016, 130).

The term trade-off is used in economics as a synonym for compromise, referring to a situation in which gains are made on one side, but losses are incurred on the other. 

Credibility is the degree to which others believe that we will follow through on our commitments. From the deontological ethical model, Kant is the ultimate example of credibility, as he maintained that promises must always be kept. Strategic flexibility is the option to change one’s mind if continuing with previous commitments seems unwise. In the Machiavelic ethical model, Machiavelli is the paradigm of strategic flexibility; for example, in chapter XVIII of The Prince, he analyses whether the prince should keep his word. 

Typically, Malhotra asserts, we want as much credibility as possible while maintaining flexibility. However, if we invest more in strategic flexibility, we typically have less credibility, and vice versa. 

Don’t force people to choose between doing what is smart and what save face (Malhotra, 2016, 132)..

A first rule of negotiation, linked to empathy, is that proposals for agreement and subsequent negotiations should be framed so that one party is trying to “save face” for the other. In other words, consider the specific consequences the proposed deal will have for the other party. But here, Malhotra, in line with the Harvard Negotiation Project, goes further and calls for the other party to be provided with an intelligent solution. This means the other party must also consider it a good agreement. 

Ignore ultimatums. The more attention you give to them, the harder it will be for the other side to back down if the situation changes (Malhotra, 2016, 145).

Ultimatums can be seen as threats. A distinction should be made between business threats and real threats. The former plays a strategic role in negotiation, and the key is their credibility in the eyes of the other party. Real threats will entail a specific response, with negative consequences, towards certain behaviours. Malhora’s advice is to ignore ultimatums and threats and reformulate them so they can be incorporated into the broader negotiating framework. 

Think trilaterally: evaluate how third parties influence or alter the interests, constraints, and alternatives of those at the table (Malhotra, 2016, 161).

In certain negotiations, the weight and influence of third parties are very present, conditioning the entire negotiating framework, whether in terms of interests, communication between the parties, or perception. A key point from this perspective is the real power of third parties in the framework, development, and agreement of the negotiation, and the type of link that connects the other negotiating party and the third party. If the real power and influence of the third party are strong, there is no doubt that we must think trilaterally; even if they are somewhat weaker, it is worth considering the third party’s power and influence in favour of our cause. 

References

Malhotra, Deepak (2016), Negotiating the Impossible. How to Break Deadlocks and Resolve Ugly Conflicts (Without Monet or Muscle), Oakland: Bernett-Koehler  Published.

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The best strategy is to prevent stratagems

Oscar Pérez de la Fuente

Universidad Carlos III de Madrid

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3708-846X

Abstract

This essay clarifies the ethical boundary between strategy and stratagem by revisiting strategy’s military origins and its contemporary use in business, politics, and everyday life. Strategy is presented as the art and science of planning and selecting appropriate means to achieve a goal, while stratagem is distinguished as a ruse in war and, outside that context, as cunning or deceptive artifice. The discussion asks why deception can appear more legitimate in war, noting the high cost of defeat and the prevalence of zero-sum logics, and contrasts this with the mixed landscape of cooperation and conflict in ordinary life. Against this backdrop, four ethical models are used to evaluate when, if ever, stratagems are acceptable. A deontological approach rejects deception on principle, emphasizing truth-telling and promise-keeping. Consequentialism permits stratagems only insofar as outcomes justify them, but highlights their instability over time as discovery becomes likely. Machiavellianism treats success as the supreme rule and relies on simulation and dissimulation, yet faces the same temporal risk of exposure. Virtue ethics takes an ambivalent, moderation-based stance, allowing limited cunning only when it can plausibly align with virtuous character. The overall conclusion is cautionary: a robust strategy should minimise dependence on stratagems.

Keywords: strategy, stratagem, consequantialist ethical model, deontological ethical model, Machiavelian ethical model, virtuous ethical model

Strategy has military origins, where a series of skills and abilities were required to organise operations aimed at achieving victory for armies. Nowadays, strategy is discussed in relation to a myriad of topics that, on the surface, seem to have little to do with its military background. Perhaps what they have in common is that the need to be strategic stems from the cost of losing, which can sometimes be unbearable. In other words, strategy arises because we seek the best and most suitable means to guarantee the end goal, whether it be military victory or success in business, politics, or life.

In previous posts, I have analysed four ethical models associated with strategy: deontological, consequentialist, Machiavellian, and virtuous. It is time to take stock. To do so, I will draw on the distinction between strategy and stratagem.

There are several possible definitions of the first term, depending on the field (military, business, politics, game theory, etc.). I will adopt a definition that serves explanatory purposes. Strategy is the art and science of developing a plan and choosing the appropriate means to achieve the proposed goals.

On the other hand, the Spanish Royal Academy of Language defines stratagem as, in its first meaning, “a ruse of war” and, in its second meaning, “cunning, pretence and artful deception”. As can be seen, stratagem also has a military origin. The term “ruse” is defined by the Spanish Royal Academy of Language as “a device, a means skilfully and cleverly employed to achieve some end”.

One possible conclusion seems to be that, according to these definitions, skilful and cunningly employed device is more justified in war than in other areas. In other words, a stratagem in a military context is a ruse and, outside that context, it is artful deception.  The answer may lie in the fact that the objective of war is victory, but if it is not successful, military defeat and its dire consequences ensue. Also, because in military terms, we often talk about enemies and consider scenarios that economists refer to as zero-sum: what they lose, we gain, and vice versa.

Life is richer in nuances than war. People find themselves in situations of cooperation and conflict and develop their life plans to achieve their professional or personal goals. I mentioned in a previous post that we are all philosophers—we ask ourselves questions, we define our alpha and omega—and that we would be better off if we were all strategists. What role do stratagems play?

Here we will see the functionality of the ethical models analysed in previous posts. The deontological strategist condemns the use of stratagems because they have an element of deception. The two maxims of the deontological model are to always tell the truth and keep promises. We should walk a fine line to use a stratagem that complies with these two maxims and leads to success.

The consequentialist strategist evaluates actions based on their results or on the maximisation of a chosen variable – well-being, utility, money, happiness, etc. According to this model, stratagems will be valid depending on the consequences they produce. The key question is whether an artificial deception can be stable over time. A distinction should be made between interactions that occur once or over a longer period or are lifelong. The use of stratagems does not last over time because it increases the risk of being discovered and, therefore, would no longer produce the desired consequences.

The Machiavellian strategist is a specialist in stratagems, but authentic Machiavellianism consists precisely in not being noticed. Their vision is an art of simulation and dissimulation, the highest rule of which is the desire for success. The means are appropriate if they achieve the ends proposed. The Machiavellian strategist makes abundant use of cunning and pretence to achieve their goals. However, like the consequentialist, the passage of time increases the risk that their true actions and intentions may be discovered.

The virtuous strategist has an ambivalent position on stratagems. They can develop skills and dispositions that shape their character and involve pretence or cunning, but within known limits. According to the law of the middle term, virtue lies in moderation, never in excess. Furthermore, according to this view, not everything can be called a virtue; it is a pluralistic view, but not a relativistic one.

In summary, the deontological strategist condemns stratagems; the consequentialist strategist values stratagems based on the consequences they produce, fearing discovery over time; the Machiavellian strategist habitually uses stratagems while pretending not to; and the virtuous strategist may use stratagems, in moderation, but only if they can be considered virtues.

After these reflections, it can be said that the best strategy is to be wary of stratagems.

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Strategic tightrope walking

Oscar Pérez de la Fuente

Universidad Carlos III de Madrid

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3708-846X

Abstract

This paper examines the strategic logic of “tightrope walking” (brinkmanship) as analysed by Dixit and Nalebuff, using the Cuban Missile Crisis as an illustrative case. It reconstructs how the United States’ decision to impose a naval blockade deliberately introduced a controlled risk of escalation that was intended to reshape Soviet expectations without making an unconditional, fully committed threat. The discussion highlights the central trade-off of the tactic: increasing the probability of an accidental or uncontrolled catastrophe in order to reduce the probability that the opponent initiates or sustains a harmful course of action. The analysis emphasises the role of credibility, signalling, and risk management in calibrating a threat that is “large enough to be effective but small enough to be credible.” The paper also clarifies how tightrope walking differs from, yet resembles, the game-theoretic “chicken” dilemma: both feature escalating danger and interdependent outcomes, but brinkmanship relies on manipulating perceived thresholds and the opponent’s aversion to avoidable disaster. Finally, the paper notes that controlling risk is not merely tactical; it may require altering the underlying game through institutional or strategic changes that lower the incentives to approach the brink.

Keywords: strategic tightrope walking, salami tactic, risk, diplomacy, nuclear deterrence, chicken game

United States President John F. Kennedy declared a naval blockade in Cuba on 22 October 1962, after a week of internal deliberations. The Soviet Union could have reacted to this action by increasing the risk of nuclear conflict to critical levels, which Kennedy believed had a one-third to one-half chance of occurring. After days of tension, statements, and clandestine talks, Khrushchev chose to avoid direct confrontation, withdrawing the missiles from Cuba and returning them to the Soviet Union. This was done in exchange for a promise from the United States to withdraw its missiles from Turkey in the near future. Khrushchev chose to back down after considering the possibility of a nuclear catastrophe (Dixit, Nalebuff, 1991, 225).

Dixit and Nalebuff, in their works Thinking Strategically (1991) and The Art of Strategy (2010), examine this historical event and explore the idea of strategic tightrope walking. This tactic is based on deliberately creating a risk that is sufficiently intolerable for the opponent that they are induced to eliminate it, thereby complying with our wishes. This is a technique that requires skilful use of credibility and proper risk management, as one might expect, but it can also be a very effective strategy for achieving predetermined goals. 

The classic example of strategic tightrope walking has been the Cold War and the use of nuclear deterrence. To prevent the Soviets from launching a conventional attack against Europe or the United States, it is necessary to expose them to the possibility that the conflict will escalate and a nuclear exchange will occur. The Soviets would proceed more slowly if the risk of pursuing that course increased. The United States and the Soviets would likely offer mutual concessions, despite running a greater risk of escalation.

The increased probability of a conventional conflict escalating should be offset by the decreased probability of initiating a war. If Khrushchev considered the level of risk unacceptable, the use of strategic tightrope walking will be successful. It would have allowed Kennedy to choose a larger threat that is large enough to be effective but small enough to be credible.

Like any other strategic move, its aim is to alter the opponent’s expectations to influence their actions. Therefore, strategic tightrope walking is a type of qualified threat. To use this tactic successfully, it is necessary to understand its distinctive characteristics.

Dixit and Nalebuff ask: First, why not threaten the opponent with the certainty of a terrible outcome, rather than the lesser risk of it happening? Second, how do you determine whether the risk will materialise? Third, what is the appropriate level of risk? (Dixit and Nalebuff, 1991, 228).

Strategic tightrope walking is the tactic of pushing your opponent to the brink of catastrophe to make them back down. This is an extreme application of the Silver Rule: do not do unto others what you would not have them do unto you. The individual eventually gives in to your tactic because they do not want to cause an avoidable disaster.

This strategic tightrope walking bears a resemblance to the chicken game dilemma. In game theory, the chicken game dilemma arises when two drivers are travelling in opposite directions at high speed towards the same point on the same road. Each driver is aware of their car’s reaction time and turning radius, which are assumed to be identical for both competitors. Each must decide when the time comes to swerve. This decision must be made without considering the other driver’s decision, as it is irrevocable. One opponent’s quick decision cannot affect the other.

This chicken dilemma is based on a scenario where there is increasing risk and an outcome that is interdependent on the other player’s decisions in relation to one’s own decisions.  This increasing risk, if both players fail to change their attitude, could lead, in the worst-case scenario, to a collision between the two vehicles, with fatal consequences.

It seems that strategic tightrope walking is an initially more cautious approach, which considers all possible scenarios and selects the one that presents the least risk. In chicken games, with the same game structure, the outcome is uncertain and depends on how the other driver acts compared to the driver in question. The crucial question is: who is the first to give way?

Let us imagine a fragile seven-party agreement, with disparate and even conflicting interests and idiosyncrasies, with another negotiator who holds a position of power—which depends on maintaining this fragile agreement. Here, strategic tightrope walking—and the parties’ risk management—would be combined with the salami tactic. With the threat that the pact will end, one party obtains a concession, with each slice it cuts, no matter how small, having the potential to be the last straw. The key to making this type of threat credible is that none of the parties has exact knowledge of where the dividing line lies.

Strategic tightrope walking involves not only creating a risk, but also carefully keeping the level of that risk under control. Reaching this conclusion does not mean that one must accept the situation and accept the risk of nuclear war. To reduce the risk, it is necessary to address the problem at a more fundamental level, that is, to change the game.

References

Dixit, Avinash, Nalebuff, Barry J. (1991), Pensar estratégicamente, Barcelona: Antoni Bosch editor, trans: Ana Varela, Alicia Valls.

Dixit, Avinash, Nalebuff, Barry J. (2010), El arte de la estrategia, Barcelona: Antoni Bosch editor.

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More negotiation gambits and tactics

Previously, I analysed the following negotiation gambits and tactics: shot gun, off-limits, tough guy, nice guy, Russian Front. The analysis of these situations, which involve a change in perception in a negotiation context, sometimes including manipulation, is based on the book Managing Negotiations: How to Get a Better Deal, by Gavin Kennedy, John Benson, and John McMillan. Below, I will analyse other negotiation gambits and tactics:

Sell cheap, become famous

One way of formulating this tactic could be: “We are making you a cheap offer that will greatly enhance your company’s image, as you will benefit from being a supplier to an international, million-dollar company like ours. Think about how much good us as a customer on your client list having will do for your future sales.”

This trick is used at all levels and in all areas of life. Companies do not advertise their jobs with “low salaries”; they talk about “good prospects”; buyers talk about possible “future orders”; interns, who are paid very little, are commonly appealed to by the prestige of the company they work for. Sometimes these promises are, however, not always true. If you believe them, you will accept them, but often it is important to acknowledge what it is: a trick to sell something cheaper.

Salami

Salami comes in thin slices and is not eaten all at once. This is the intention behind this particular tactic. It suggests that something is better postponed at different times to make it more digestible than applying it all at once. It offers the possibility of introducing certain changes into agreements gradually, over a relatively long period of time. In this way, it is understood that there will be less resistance from those affected.

The demands of the mandate

Third-party negotiators are bound by their mandate. This usually takes the form of  “I have been instructed to obtain this amount and I am mandated not to give in until I get it.” This tactic is very common. For example, when someone says they must consult with their partner about a decision regarding a property or rent. Or a lawyer representing a client who is inflexible on certain positions. Or when a board implements shareholders’ resolutions. This becomes a negotiating trick when such a mandate is an excuse to improve certain positions in the negotiation and may in fact be the widest room for manoeuvre.

Veiled threats

Threats of sanctions can be very risky. They raise the emotional temperature. “Are you threatening me?” is a sure sign that what you are saying makes you the antagonist. “Of course not” is the expected response if you are trying to warn them of the consequences of bringing themselves into your disapproval. There are two useful ways to effectively use a threat of punishment:

First, the consequences of disagreeing are these, but neither of us wants to see them as a threat. How can we avoid it? Here it depends on where you stand. Zone of Possible Agreement -ZOPA-, which defines the negotiation panorama. The Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement – BATNA- of each party’s  ability to seek an agreement more easily implies how credible the threat of breaking it is.

Second, you make the sanction credible: “…we naturally do not want to require this component, as our engineers are currently investigating an alternative method that appears to be marginally cheaper…” In threats, credibility is key, and this is often linked to the strength of the BATNA. If you have a stronger alternative, it is very likely that you will not end up agreeing, and/or you can threaten to break off negotiations and demand better terms.

Connecting

Your opponent may start negotiations with you in a weak position on some issues, so their best approach is to try to connect these issues where they are weak with other issues where they are strong. For example, you may be prepared to discuss late payments of your invoices, but the other party wants to talk about the poor quality of the components you sent last week. Connecting issues in this way involves linking one issue to another and making them unacceptable together. Thus, a certain clause in the contract at the price you are asking for becomes extremely difficult to accept. If you have chosen the right clause — preferably a non-negotiable issue — it is quite likely that the price will move. If the price is firm, then you will have to revisit the clause.

Yes, but…

The “Yes, but…” tactic consists of saying, “Yes, we agree with what you are offering, but we have this other problem that we need to resolve before we can agree to everything.” The other problem is a new issue that has not been evaluated previously. This can lead to certain risks, such as affecting the patience of the losing party and suffering allegations of bad faith or of dealing with negotiators who are not serious. To avoid the “Yes, but…” tactic, all conditional proposals should be made, all objections should be kept open, and for each new option proposed, use a “No, but…” in reply: “We cannot accept these new conditions, but if you insist, we will have to rethink the terms of the entire negotiation…”

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Negotiation gambits and tactics

The Spanish Royal Academy of Language defines tactics as: “method or system for executing or achieving something” while gambit is defined as: “ruse or trap used to achieve an end”. It seems that the use of tactics would be something proper to any strategy: putting in place the means to achieve a certain end. Tricks are more morally controversial, because in the means used, directly or indirectly, there may be a certain element of deception or manipulation of perceptions.

On the ethical assessment of business tactics and tricks, reference can be made to the more general debate on whether the ‘end justifies the means’ along the lines of Machiavelli. Regarding their strategic use, the first point is that one must be aware of these tactics–gambits to be able to identify them correctly. Secondly, one must know how to react properly to dismantle these negotiation tactics and tricks, as they are a way of gaining an advantage over the other party by manipulating their perceptions and expectations.

In the book Managing negotiations. How to get a better deal, Gavin Kennedy, John Benson, John McMillan offer an extensive catalogue of these negotiation tactics or tricks:

Shot gun

This negotiation tactic consists of using adherence to the conditions of the other party, at a certain point, as an inexcusable condition for continuing negotiations, or even relations between the parties. Kennedy, Benson and McMillan give an example of the shot gun tactic:

“Unless you do not agree immediately to… we are not prepared to discuss anything else” (often accompanied by a sanction threat).

Your opponent is forcing you to abandon some position you hold, as well as weakening your ability to extract concessions from him -from that position- in areas that you -in fact- can negotiate. Your opponent asks for immediate adherence to his negotiating approach. For example, in the insistence of a precondition for negotiation where the highest principle is at stake: “There is no negotiation with the Arab States unless they recognise the State of Israel” or vice versa, “…the State of Palestine”.

Your answer is conditioned by the balance of power. Large companies or banks often use this tactic when dealing with their customers, where we are in a market of free competition, but individually operate with adhesion contracts. To be able to react to this tactic, it must be determined whether the claims of the other party correspond to a real position of power in the strategic scenario of the situation.

Off-limits

In formal relationships it is not uncommon for the parties to specify the extent and nature of the limits to which they agree to adhere. In this context, it is not unusual to see the “off-limits” tactic used in the following formulation:

“The issue of …, is, as far as we are concerned, non-negotiable” (often accompanied by a reference to the items that are negotiable).

This is relevant, for example, in negotiations where there are ideological elements, with emotive connotations of great impact, which are set as insurmountable limits to sit down to talk or start – or break off – a negotiation. There is another strategic element, which has to do with why the parties are negotiating and whether they could achieve their objectives unilaterally. This is known as the dimensions of BATNA. We are usually in situations of interdependence, where there are complex relationships between the parties.

The way to deal with this “off-limits” tactic is to go little by little, dealing with other issues: “let’s leave this aside, let’s talk about other issues”. At the right moment, know how to summarise the relevant elements that made up the initial proposal.

Tough guy, nice guy

This tactic has been seen many times in the movies, in the interrogation of suspects by the police, where one has an antagonistic role and the other a cooperative role. In the negotiation tactic, your opponent opens with a very hard line on the subject, they may even allude to the threat of sanctions. They are accompanied by another member of their team (sometimes they may even play both roles), who expresses a more reasonable point of view compared to the first speaker, although this ‘reasonableness’ may still be unacceptable to you.

This is one of the oldest tactics and is usually successful, although it has its risks. It is a way of manipulating perceptions, where it is clearly a trick or tactic agreed by the other party from the outset. The first thing is to know how to identify it when it is being used in a negotiation, and to know how to react strategically to obtain the best possible result.

Russian Front

This is an adaptation of the tough guy, nice guy gambit, using alternative proposals rather than alternative styles of presentation. Your opponent is offered two choices, one of them worse (for them) than the other. They are intimidated into accepting the other offer, to avoid the one that is horrible (‘anything, but don’t send me to the Russian Front’). The chances of success depend on the credibility of the alternatives.

Your opponent may introduce a proposal that is totally unacceptable to you, but you believe that he intends to force you to implement it. You then feel lucky to escape the possibility -which was credible to you- that you could have been on the Russian Front.

Since this is a tactic or gambit, perhaps there is no such Russian Front and the chosen option, which also seemed unacceptable to you at first, is the coveted victory in one of your opponent’s positions. One way to deal with this tactic is to use the discarding of extreme options as a form of mutual exchange in the negotiating space.

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The Power of a Positive No

After his work Getting Past No, William Ury wrote another work entitled The Power of a Positive No. In this new original book, he explains how to face one of the most challenging things we must do every day: to say no to people who work with us, who we love, and with whom we have relationships of various kinds. As Ury says: “No is the biggest challenge today”.

The analysis in this book starts from the consideration that: “It may not be the most important word in our vocabulary, but it is the hardest to say well”. The special idiosyncrasy of this term is linked to the inherent tension between exercising your power and tending your relationship. Thus, in certain situations, Ury describes three common ways out:

a) Accommodate: say-yes-when-you-want-to-say-no. This is especially frequent when we want to maintain the personal relationship by making concessions.

b) Attacking: be-passive-aggressive-when-saying-no. It is the opposite of accommodating. It is about using power without any consideration for the relationship. It is linked to anger or rage.

c) Avoidance: we-say-no-absolutely-nothing. In these cases, communication and relationships are suspended. It is a way of coping with problems by avoiding people.

As can be imagined, these three ways out do not lead to success, and Ury’s proposal in this book is to affirm a positive No. Then the author summarises his formula: “A positive No is a Yes! No. Yes? The first Yes expresses your interests, the Noaffirms your power, and the second Yes strengthens your relationship. A positive No balances power and relationship in service of your interests.

The first Yes could be seen as internally focused – the assertion of one’s own interests – and the second Yes is externally focused -an invitation to the other to come to an agreement that satisfies those interests-. In this post, I will focus on the elements that give power to your No.

Saying No is not easy. Ury suggests that positive power must be developed, which is achieved by having a plan B. It is a matter of considering the worst-case scenario and seeing the possibilities one would have to achieve one’s objectives.

Plan B is also called BATNA (Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement). It is not an option to an agreement but an alternative to the agreement, a course of action that can be taken independently of the agreement with the other party. A better BATNA gives more bargaining power. A plan B is positive power; it does not mean punishing the other party. It is a strategic element that can condition the negotiation and must be considered.

The key question, then, is how to strengthen your plan B. One element that can help is brainstorming, where you use your imagination to develop various possible solutions without looking at their feasibility. Alternatives to a given situation should be carefully considered. These may include a) Do it yourself: achieve your goals by your own means without going to the other party; b) Run away: sometimes a possible way out is to end the relationship; c) Third party: sometimes the intervention of a third party as an intermediary is positive.

Along with building a powerful No, Ury recommends “building a winning coalition”. In each situation, allies with similar interests should be sought, and a common action plan can be addressed.

The key to the various interactions is information, especially about the interests and opinions of the other party. Ury advises, “anticipate the other’s next move”. Foreseeing likely courses of action and possible responses is strategically relevant. Anticipation gives a strategic advantage to the foresighted.

From this perspective, Ury argues that one should consider the worst-case scenario. It would be to put yourself in the position of checking what you could lose in the negotiation, on the one hand, and what plan B or BATNA is, on the other hand.

In conclusion, Ury reaffirms your decision to decide No in three questions: “Do you have the interest? Do you have the power? Do you have the right?” This point must be complemented with other negotiating elements, allowing you to reach efficient and intelligent agreements, from different interactions, based on building a positive No.