Tag: Academic Philosophy

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Virtuous ethical model

The last model I will discuss is the virtuous ethical model, which comprises a few principles. First, to know the right action in a situation, one must think how a virtuous person would act. Second, a virtuous person is one who possesses virtues. Third, virtues are habits or dispositions that forge the character of human beings and show the excellence of a specific practice.

There is confusion about the language of virtues in the religious and ethical approaches. The virtues of the Christian religion are faith, hope, and charity. However, the approach to virtue ethics predates Christianity and is identified with the work of Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, which considers prudence, courage, justice, and temperance as virtues.

The educational component in virtue ethics is relevant. One becomes virtuous by acting virtuously. Or, to put it another way, one’s character becomes virtuous by repeating virtuous habits. This is why this model is so essential in education and why virtues, in general terms, can be learned.

But what is a virtue? This ethical model is more flexible than the deontological model. The virtuous ethical model is more contextualist and pluralist. Everyone can find their own models of excellence -virtues- and try to act following them. Nevertheless, not everything can be a virtue; it is not a relativistic approach. Some behaviours are closer to vices than virtues and, although there is a contextualist component, some clear cases cannot be virtues. Evil, murder or envy can never be considered virtues.

What are the virtues of a strategist? From what we have seen so far, virtues are learned by behaving virtuously, and there is a contextual element where everyone finds their own models of excellence, but with some limits. Aristotle claimed there to be at least three exciting perspectives on virtues: a) The law of the ‘middle ground’; b) The importance of experience; c) The virtue of prudence as practical wisdom. These will now be applied to the strategist perspective. 

A virtue is the middle ground between two extremes or vices, one by defect and the other by excess. This is basically what the law of the ‘middle ground’ holds. It is a call for moderation in various actions. The analysis that can be made is that given specific objectives, one should determine which actions are virtuous -within the middle ground- and which are excessive -by default or excess-.

The virtue ethics approach places great importance on experience. By learning to be virtuous, we learn the virtues of strategy. The best way to learn from the right foundations is through experience. In practice, everyone finds their models of excellence, which allows us to see that virtues depend on context. Experience also allows us to assess whether we are really dealing with a virtue or an excess.

Of all the virtues, Aristotle highlights prudence, which he considers to be synonymous of practical wisdom. He refers to the word phronesis as the central virtue of human beings. For strategists, prudence is also a central virtue. Prudence means constantly weighing up all alternatives, considering the various opportunity costs, promoting impartial testing methods, using third parties or experts and, above all, thinking through -and not rushing into- different transactions.

From the virtuous ethical model, we can conclude that the virtues of the strategist can be learned, that one becomes virtuous by acting virtuously, that experience teaches us the way, that a balance must be made to find virtues and excesses. The virtues are in moderation and, finally, that the central virtue for strategists is prudence, which is practical wisdom. The path to virtue is an apprenticeship towards excellence based on experience and prudence. Do we dare to walk it?

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Consequentialist ethical model

The consequentialist ethical model, which considers that ethics’ objective is to achieve the best consequences, opposes the deontological ethical model. There are several types of consequentialist ethics, the best-known of which is utilitarianism. It famously formulates that ethics should seek the greatest happiness for the greatest number.

Utilitarianism affirms that a variable must be maximised, whether happiness, utility, pleasure or well-being. It appeared in the Anglo-Saxon context at the time of industrialisation, where there was great optimism in applying the methods of the pure sciences to the Social Sciences. Utilitarianism assumes that ethics can be reduced to a variable, and its maximisation, and that this variable can be known. This is gauged using a mechanism similar to a happiness machine, which measures how happy people are.

This may sound strange, but to an economist, this sounds familiar. The model of man on which traditional economic theory is based states that rationality is the maximisation of a variable. That model is known as homo economicus. This view adopts utilitarianism and, in general, the consequentialist approach as its undisputed premise.

Is strategy not to correctly match means and ends? Anticipating the consequences of our actions is part of any strategy. However, the question is whether consequences can be the only decision-making criterion. Let’s imagine a case where we have a terrorist in custody; who knows where a bomb is going to explode in a central place in two hours. The consequentialist question would be: is it morally justified to torture this terrorist to prevent the bomb from exploding? I have asked my students many times about this textbook ethical scenario. The answers are divided between more deontological or consequentialist students.

Since the happiness machine does not exist, economists inspired by utilitarianism sometimes tend to consider money as the variable to be maximised. This approach can be contrasted with a more robust ethical view that affirms that human goods are plural and complex. Michael Sandel offers an example of this argument in his book What Money Cannot Buy, where he gives examples of the moral limits of the market. Relationships of friendship and love are never, or should never be, reduced to monetary terms. But beyond that, is it morally justified to sell a kidney? To be a surrogate? Can everything be bought and sold? Is it justifiable to pollute in exchange for money? Is it lawful to buy residency or nationality?

This phenomenon alluded to by Sandel is technically called weak-sense incommensurability and means that values cannot be reduced to a single variable. In general, the cases allude to reducing everything to monetary terms. Values are more plural, and human beings are more complex.

Perhaps a more complete evaluation of the ends should be made from the strategy point of view. Creating a plan to maximise one variable may cause one to lose sight of other goods involved. Agreement may arise precisely because the parties have different interests. But those interests need to be explored.

Anticipating the consequences of actions is a matter of prudence. Strategy seeks victory, but this does not always come from maximising a single variable. Life is more plural and complex.

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Bartolomé de las Casas, apology for peace

Bartolomé de las Casas (1484-1566) was a Spanish Dominican friar, writer and missionary known for defending the rights of the indigenous peoples of America during the Spanish colonisation period. He had a somewhat self-taught education, oriented towards Theology, Philosophy and Law. He went to the Indies in 1502, ten years after the discovery of America, in La Española, Santo Domingo. He was ordained a priest in 1512 and was the first to do so in the New World. He later became bishop of Chiapas, Mexico.

The controversy with Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda (1550) on the status of indigenous people and the lawfulness of war is famous. Las Casas was a pioneer in thinking about human rights and social justice. In this controversy, Bartolomé de las Casas provides some arguments for abstaining from war and on equality, which will be discussed below in the style of Estrategia Minerva.

“In the first place, because, between two evils, if one cannot be avoided, the lesser should be chosen, according to right reason”(Bartolomé de las Casas, Apología, cap. 40).

A distinction must be made between the doctrine of the lesser evil and the doctrine of the double effect. According to the former, the option that produces the worst consequences must be avoided at all cost. According to the second, when a given action is performed, there are unintended negative consequences in addition to the intended ones, which are positive. Applying the double effect assumes that the good produced by this action is greater than the evil.  

The relationship between the lesser evil and rationality is fundamental. Rationality provides the tools and analytical framework necessary to apply the lesser evil principle effectively.

“In the second place, it is manifest that more innocent people will perish in this way than those we are trying to free. Moreover, by a very strict negative precept, we are forbidden in any case to kill the innocent” (Bartolomé de las Casas, Apología, cap. 40).

Innocent people, in this context, are those who do not actively participate in combat. If self-defence is usually justified under just war theories, it does not extend to innocent people.

“Third, because in war, the innocent cannot be distinguished from the guilty”(Bartolomé de las Casas, Apología, cap. 40).

War is defined in one of its meanings by the Spanish Royal Academy as “armed struggle between two or more nations or between sides of the same nation”. They are usually brutal, violent situations that involve suffering and pain, damage and victims on both sides. Las Casas’ reflection is along the lines of recalling that, in these situations of armed conflict, the nuances and differences are difficult to define, especially between combatants and innocent people. The consequences in personal and material terms are often terrible.

In the final part of his work Apología, Bartholomé de las Casas argues: “the Indians are our brothers for whom Christ gave his life. Why do we persecute them without having deserved such a thing with inhuman cruelty?”(Bartolomé de las Casas, Apología, cap. 63).

Facing his opponent, Ginés de Sepúlveda, in the Valladolid Controversy, Bartholomew de las Casas maintains that the indigenous are brothers of the Europeans. This, far from being an improvised principle in the face of the new situation, is at the core of Christianity. In the Epistle to the Galatians, St. Paul writes: “There is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither slave nor free, nor is there male nor female; for you are all one in Christ Jesus” (Galatians 3:28). This message of equality was a novelty in Antiquity and continues to be so today and had as its antecedent the Stoics.

The best-known work of Bartolomé de las Casas is “Brevísima relación de la destrucción de las Indias/A Very Brief Recital of the Destruction of the Indies “, published in 1552. This book had a significant impact in Europe and helped to generate a debate on the human rights of indigenous people. It is an invitation to consider otherness and rethink one’s assumptions. To be authentic, we must start with the assumption of differences, starting from the equality of human beings.

“If this is done, I am convinced that they will embrace the evangelical doctrine, for they are neither fools nor barbarians, but of innate sincerity, simple, modest, meek and, finally, such that I am sure that there are no other people more disposed of than they to embrace the Gospel, which once received by them, it is admirable with what piety, ardour, faith and charity they fulfil the precepts of Christ and venerate the sacraments; For they are docile and ingenious, and in skill and natural endowments they surpass many people of the known world (…)” (Bartolomé de las Casas, Apología, cap. 63).

Underlying Las Casas’ message is the notion of equal human dignity, the basis of human rights. A common criticism of this author is that he did not extend this concept to black people. His views need to be appropriately contextualised historically and not read from the postmodernism of some views.

Mestizaje/Mixed-race and syncretism could be vindicated from the approach close to Bartolomé de las Casas. Racists of all stripes are afraid of mixing, and what has characterised the most genuine view of Latin American history is precisely mestizaje, which is something to celebrate. Syncretism, as a fusion of cultures and/or religions, is also something positive to learn from. It can enhance the best energies of society, but as is often the case in identity politics, it can be approached in a divisive and exclusionary manner. In the face of this risk, Bartolomé de las Casas launched a universal message of equal human dignity and fraternity as the engine of social progress.

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Deontological ethical model

Before delving into more strategic content, I will dedicate a series of posts to various ethical models. These models are used to judge our actions and can also inspire multiple strategies. The first ethical model is the deontological model.

First, it is necessary to clarify its meaning to avoid confusion. There are two meanings for the term ‘deontology’. The first has to do with professional ethics, which is related to the set of values and rules that regulate the practice of a profession and that are sometimes set out in a code of ethics, as in the case of doctors, lawyers, journalists, etc… The second is related to an ethical approach that is based on duties.  

I will explain this second meaning in this post. The deontological ethical model, based on duties, often contrasts with the consequentialist ethical model, which is based on consequences. More precisely, the deontological model is based on the individual’s duty to act according to the correct principle or value.

The paradigm of the deontological ethical model is the philosophy of Immanuel Kant and is usually exemplified in the formulations of the categorical imperative. Thus, it is stated, “behave in such a way that your maxim of action becomes a universal law”. This seems an essential moral principle, but some argue it is empty. With sufficient skill, the universal law can be turned into unacceptable claims. Let’s see how this mechanism works. If someone wants to use hate language against minorities, it seems that this could not be universalised. However, if someone advocated positive discrimination policies, could they be universalised? Some might argue that it does not make hate speech but that the principle of universalisation is the freedom of expression of people with their own pride.

Behind the categorical imperative lies the Golden Rule of Humanity, which has strategic significance and holds “treat others as you would like to be treated yourself”. It is a rule based on reciprocity, but unlike the an eye for an eye, it is not a rule of response to an attack but anticipates a cooperative attitude, which implies putting oneself in the other person’s shoes. Some studies indicate that this long-term cooperative attitude is the one that yields the best results.

Another formulation of the categorical imperative is to “always treat every human being as an end in himself, never as a means”. This shows how the deontological ethical model is a maximal ethics. Others connect this view with the notion of human dignity. From the perspective of strategy, it could be said that this is a commendable statement of principles, but that human relations move between cooperation and competition. The strategy should enhance the cooperative elements and diminish the competitive aspects to achieve specific objectives.

This ethical deontological model is legalistic, rigorist, not based on experience, rational, and universally applicable. Two maxims defended by this model are of particular strategic importance. The first is that promises must always be kept. In the U.S., some journalists go to prison for not revealing their sources in court. Their promise of confidentiality is stronger than the legal duty to testify. Keeping promises is a good ethical principle, and society relies heavily on the expectation that promises will be kept. Objections may come from the Machiavellian ethical model, where keeping one’s word is not always the best solution. The deontological model holds that commitments should always be honoured, regardless of the circumstances. The strategy should prevent being exploited by those who claim commitments and then do not want to fulfil them.

The other maxim of the ethical deontological model with strategic interest is that the truth must always be told. First, a distinction should be made between not telling the whole truth and lying. Second, the strategic use of threats assumes they must be credible to be effective. The ethical deontological model holds that the truth must always be told, even if it harms the speaker. In such cases, the best strategy is silence. Or as Wittgenstein said “what cannot be spoken about, it is better to remain silent about”.

The deontological ethical model is a morally demanding proposal; it could be described as rigorist. It is based on universally valid principles not based on experience. It can function as a mechanism to make commitments and threats solid and credible. However, the strategy learns from experience. Thus, there may be special situations where exceptions to the general principles can be made, provided they are adequately justified.

Principles and values are guides for action that occasionally mark the limits where one should not go. The ethics of duties should allow for a flexible application, not an absolute one. Arguably, this flexibility reflects the spirit of Kant, but it is closer to life.

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Francisco de Vitoria, on just war

One of the prominent figures in the Spanish Renaissance was Francisco de Vitoria (1483-1546). He was a Spanish Dominican, renewer of Theology and promoter of the Salamanca School of Natural Law. He is considered the founder of the science of International Law and the notion of human rights. One of the most relevant political philosophers of the 20th century, John Rawls, in his book entitled Law of Peoples and the Idea of Public Reason revisited quotes De Vitoria and, from a liberal conception, adheres to his just war theory. 

Precisely Francisco de Vitoria addresses this classic theme in his essay entitled ” Sobre el derecho de Guerra”/ On the law of war when he asks: “What can be the reason and cause of a just war?” We will address this question below, based on this author, from the perspective of Minerva Strategy Blog.

De Vitoria’s first approach to answering this question states that “diversity of religion is not sufficient cause for a just war.” And he justifies himself with that “even if the faith has been announced to the barbarians with sufficient signs of probability and they have not wanted to accept it, it is not, for that reason, lawful to persecute them with war and strip them of their goods” (Francisco de Vitoria, Sobre los indios, II.15).

Francisco de Vitoria was a professor at the University of Salamanca and his lectures, or relections, on various topics of interest have come down to us to this day. Specifically, the full title of the one dedicated to the notion of just war is entitled: ” Sobre el derecho de guerra de los españoles sobre los bárbaros”/On the law of war of the Spaniards over the barbarians. Contrary to what the black legend on the Spanish colonisation of Latin America claims, the School of Salamanca laid the foundations for human rights and the rules of International Law. And, as has been seen, De Vitoria did not justify war for diversity of religion.  

Another issue addressed by Francisco de Vitoria is that “it is not a just cause of a war to intend to expand dominions” and he argues: “this proposition is too evident to need to be demonstrated. For otherwise there would always be just cause for any of the belligerent wars, and so all would be innocent” (Francisco de Vitoria, Sobre el derecho de guerra, III.11).

The history of mankind contains many examples of rulers who have had expansionist policies beyond their borders.  The results of these offensive wars are part of History and memory. This would not be a justified strategy under current International Law, nor as a cost/benefit analysis in the medium and long term.

Francisco de Vitoria continues “neither is it just cause of a war to the prince’s own glory nor any other particular profit of the prince” and he states that “this proposition is also evident, for the prince must order to the common good of the Republic, both war and peace, and he cannot invest public funds in his own glory, in his own profit, much less expose his subjects to danger. The difference between the legitimate king and a tyrant lies in that the tyrant orders the government to his own interest and profit, while the king orders it to the public good, as Aristotle says” (Francisco de Vitoria, Sobre el derecho de guerra, III.12).

If the ruler wages war for his private benefit, he becomes a tyrant, as Aristotle argued in his work Politics. There the Stagirite philosopher proposed a classic typology of forms of government, where he distinguishes those leaders who promote the common good in their government actions -monarchy, aristocracy, politeia– and those who act for their own benefit or that of their own group -tyranny, oligarchy, democracy-. It is interesting because issues of accountability have been identified ever since the first book written on Political Science, which deals especially with issues of classical democracy in the polis of Athens.

The affirmative answer to the question posed by De Vitoria is the following: “the only just cause for waging war is the injury received” and he affirms that “in addition, offensive war is made to avenge an injury and to reprimand the enemies, as has already been said. But there can be no revenge where there has not preceded an injury and a fault. Therefore the conclusion is evident” (Francisco de Vitoria, Sobre el derecho de guerra, III.13).

Here we get to the heart of Francisco de Vitoria’s argument: defensive war, self-defence, is justified. Bobbio affirms: “it is lawful to repel violence with violence.” The Italian author asks himself: “But does the strategy of atomic war still allow us to maintain the distinction between offensive and defensive war?” (Norberto Bobbio, El problema de la guerra y las vías de la paz). De Vitoria did not speak of preventive wars, but in the answer to Bobbio it is worth analising whether a preventive war is justified in the face of a relevant threat. Situations of strategic funanbulism in scenarios of nuclear deterrence are placed in this risk analysis.

Francisco de Vitoria adds: “an injury of any gravity is not enough to make war”. He clarifies that “this proposition is proved because it is not even lawful to impose such serious penalties as death, exile or confiscation of goods on one’s own subjects for any fault. Now, since all the things that are done in war are grave and even atrocious, such as slaughter, arson, devastation, it is not lawful to punish with war those who have committed slight offences, since the measure of punishment must be in accordance with the gravity of the crime” (Francisco de Vitoria, Sobre el derecho de guerra, III.14).

The key to self-defence is proportionality. Thomas Aquinas already defended it by “moderating the defence according to the needs of the threatened security” (Thomas Aquinas, Suma Theologica, II-II, q. 64,a. 7, c). It is in that passage of the Theological Summa, where the theory of the double effect is formulated: an act has two effects, one intentional -preserving life- and another not, which would be incidental -the death of the aggressor-. The key for Thomas Aquinas is that the act be proportionate to its end.

An application of the doctrine of double effect is proposed by Rawls, when he states that civilian casualties are prohibited except insofar as they are the indirect and unintended result of a legitimate attack against a military target (Rawls, Law of Peoples and the Idea of Public Reason revisited).

The just war theory in Francisco de Vitoria is a classic in the reflection on public affairs. As a good classic, it allows more current re-readings and, as Italo Calvino said, it can be conceived as a talisman, a compass on which to orient oneself when approaching the territories of peace and war.

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All Individuals are philosophers, but do they all employ strategy?

Each of us is a philosopher. This may well come as a surprise and is an unusual statement to make because people rarely discuss Philosophy only at surface level.

It is important to differentiate between academic Philosophy and Philosophy as a way of life. Generally, the first is considered a complicated realm reserved for specialists. While the second asserts that “everyone is a philosopher.” The key in Philosophy consists in the question “Why?” Curiosity constitutes typical philosophical attitude and helps to understand concepts. Almost everyone has this interest. Every individual has their own truth, which is a compass for living one’s life.

Now, however, comes the second aspect: are we all strategists? Typically, associating strategy with human behaviour carries negative ethical implications. This, however, becomes considerably more complex on closer inspection. Strategy refers to the appropriate alignment between means and ends. Strategos commanded the military forces inside the polis of ancient Greece. The initial definition of strategy is a military concept and has evolved from game theory into corporate or political strategy.

Determining objectives using a strategy entails formulating a plan that elucidates the interdependence of actions among the specified components and references to situations of cooperation and/or conflict. The History of Ideas contains corporate, political, and personal insights pertinent to the study of strategy. We hope that these concepts will be further developed. Welcome to Minerva Strategy Blog!