Tag: Academic Philosophy

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Diego de Saavedra Fajardo, Political enterprises (II)

Oscar Pérez de la Fuente

Carlos III University of Madrid

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3708-846X

Abstract

The text presents Diego de Saavedra Fajardo (1584–1648) as a diplomat and political thinker, and discusses passages from Volume II of Empresas políticas, a work intended to provide guidance on the exercise of power. Drawing on various quotations, it discusses classic issues in public ethics. Firstly, it warns of the danger that those in office may be motivated by a desire for profit: unlike market logic, accountability, transparency, budgetary rigour and the management of conflicts of interest must take precedence in public administration. Secondly, the political responsibility of the ruler is emphasised: even if he delegates to capable ministers, he cannot wash his hands of affairs, and must resign when he loses confidence or when he fails in his duty of oversight or in the selection of subordinates (culpa in vigilando and culpa in eligendo). The text also places Saavedra within an elitist tradition that is wary of the fickleness of the ‘common people’, linking this to contemporary critiques of videocracy and social media, and raises the risk of a more sophisticated form of digital demagoguery. Finally, a strategic guideline is proposed: prudence in deliberation, skill in execution and perseverance in conclusion, combining Machiavellian pragmatism and Aristotelian moderation.

Keywords: technological demagoguery, resignation or dismissal, elitism, prudence, legal liability, political accountability

Diego de Saavedra Fajardo was a Spanish political writer, literary critic, poet, philosopher, and jurist, who was born in Algezares in 1584 and died in Madrid in 1648. I recently dedicated a post to his essay Empresas políticas/Political enterprises, a monumental work comprising four volumes and 100 enterprises, as the subtitle suggests. These books bring together the advice of a diplomat by profession on how to exercise political power effectively. 

Below, excerpts from volume II of the book by Diego de Saavedra Fajardo, Empresas políticas o Idea de un príncipe político cristiano representada en cien empresas/Political Enterprises or Idea of a Christian political prince represented in hundred enterprises, will be discussed in the style of Minerva Strategy Blog.

“Those who are very keen on aggrandising themselves and amassing their fortune are dangerous in positions of power. Although some seek merit and glory, and these are always worthy ministers, many consider it safer to build their fortunes on riches, and not to keep the reward and satisfaction of their services in the hands of the prince, who is almost always ungrateful to those who deserve it most” (Saavedra Fajardo, 1958, 15). 

The pursuit of profit is often cited as the driving force behind the private sector. Adam Smith’s invisible hand and Mandeville’s fable of the bees, with varying degrees of intensity and nuance, argue that private vices such as greed, luxury, the pursuit of profit and envy lead to positive public consequences such as wealth, efficiency and free competition. However, as Saavedra Fajardo contends in this passage, it is not appropriate for the pursuit of profit to be the goal of those with responsibilities in the public sector. Politics is legitimised in such a way that those in power are accountable, which must be characterised by transparency, rigour in public budget, and adequate management of conflicts of interest. 

“But even when necessity compels the prince to do so, he must not live carelessly and detached from affairs, even if he has very capable and loyal ministers. For the body of the States is like natural beings who, lacking the inner warmth of the soul, no remedies or efforts are sufficient to maintain or sustain them so that they do not decay. The prince is the soul of his republic, and for it to live, he must in some way attend to its members and organs” (Saavedra Fajardo, 1958, 54).  

With due regard for contextual differences, in these lines, Saavedra Fajardo alludes, in an incipient way, to the notion of political responsibility. In legal responsibility, if someone commits a crime and is convicted by a judge, they must then serve a sentence, which may consist of imprisonment, a fine or barred from exercising political rights. In political responsibility, if someone has a public position and has committed acts that warrant serious reproach that lead to the loss of the trust of the person who appointed them, they must resign. Resignation or dismissal is the sanction for political responsibility. In addition, the ruler is politically responsible if he has not properly supervised his subordinates –culpa in vigilando– or if he appointed someone and was negligent in not realising how manifestly unsuitable his candidate was for the position –culpa in eligendo-. It is noteworthy that the responsibility of those in power goes beyond merely not committing crimes and, in serious cases, if political responsibility is exercised, the best course of action is to leave public office.

“The strings of this harp of the kingdom are the people. Their nature is monstrous in every way and uneven, fickle and varied. They are governed by appearances without going deeper. They consult rumours. It is poor in means and counsel, unable to distinguish the false from the true; always inclined towards the worst. At any given moment, it is dressed in two contrary affections. But it is led more by them than by reason, more by impetus than by prudence, more by shadows than by truth” (Saavedra Fajardo, 1958,  122-123). 

There has been an elitist tradition in the History of Ideas since Plato. Sartori expressed some misgivings in Homo Videns about videocracy and how the criterion for choosing candidates in political parties was to look for actors or sports stars because they were already famous, because they appeared on television. Umberto Eco criticised social media because it had given a voice to the uninformed who previously hardly anyone listened to. In the digital age, the key is whether the manipulation of people by demagogues becomes even more sophisticated, camouflaged by technological advances.

“Three things are required in resolutions: prudence to deliberate them, skill to arrange them, and perseverance to complete them. All the work and enthusiasm in their principles would be in vain if we were to overlook (as often happens) the ends. With both anchors, it is necessary that prudence secure them” (Saavedra Fajardo, 1958, 140).

This seems like an interesting approach to establishing a strategy. Two sources of inspiration can be identified: Machiavelli and Aristotle. On the one hand, Saavedra Fajardo’s words reveal pragmatism and a matching of means to ends, sometimes referred to as efficiency, which aligns with some of Machiavelli’s writings. On the other hand, there is an emphasis on prudence, which Aristotle considered the virtue of virtues, focusing on practical rationality and aiming at the ends of human beings, happiness or human flourishing. Virtues, according to the Aristotelian perspective, arise as a middle ground between vices, one by default and the other by excess. An appeal to moderation as a guide for human life. 

References

Saavedra Fajardo, Diego de (1958), Empresas políticas o Idea de un príncipe político cristiano representada en cien empresas, vol. III, Madrid: Espasa Calpe, edición y notas de Vicente García de Diego.

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Tommaso Campanella, The City of the Sun

Oscar Pérez de la Fuente

Carlos III University of Madrid

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3708-846X

Abstract

This text provides a contextual introduction and a critical commentary on Tommaso Campanella’s The City of the Sun(1602). After situating the author (1568–1639) within the context of criticism of Scholastic Aristotelianism and noting the episode of the 1599 uprising and his prolonged imprisonment, significant excerpts from the work are presented to discuss its utopian and communitarian proposal. The first theme is the defence of collective labour and the community of goods, set against private property, which Aristotle justifies on the grounds of generosity and the reduction of conflict. The second theme addresses one of the most controversial passages: the community of women oriented towards procreation, in dialogue with the Platonic discussion of the family and the Aristotelian critique of the dissolution of parental responsibilities. The third strand deals with hospitality and the process of integrating foreigners, interpreted as a precursor to Kantian hospitality and as a point of comparison with contemporary debates on immigration and citizenship. Finally, institutional aspects (magistrates, the council, the lottery) and the legal aspiration for few, brief and clear laws are examined, linking them to current issues of legitimacy, decision-making and biases (including algorithmic ones). Taken together, the utopia functions as a critical mirror of the present.

Keywords: utopia, communism, platonism

Tommaso Campanella (Stilo, Italy, 1568-Paris, 1639). Italian philosopher. In 1586, he entered a Dominican convent, where he studied Philosophy. With the impact of the works of Telesius’ naturalistic philosophy, Campanella became one of the critics of Aristotle’s ideas, as the scholastics presented it at the time.

In 1599, he led a rural insurrection with the aim of establishing a theocratic republic, for which he was subjected to several ecclesiastical trials and sentenced to life imprisonment, from which he was finally released in 1634 by the Pope Urban VIII. Campanella was imprisoned for 27 years, during which time he wrote his famous work The City of the Sun, in which he expressed his desire for a utopian communist regime. Campanella’s communist ideals were strongly influenced by Plato.

Below is a commentary of excerpts from Tomasso Campanella’s The City of the Sun (2001) in the style of the Minerva Blog Strategy.

Advantages of collective work

“They say, moreover, that grinding poverty renders men worthless, cunning, sulky, thievish, insidious, vagabonds, liars, false witnesses, etc.; and that wealth makes them insolent, proud, ignorant, traitors, assumers of what they know not, deceivers, boasters, wanting in affection, slanderers, etc. But with them all the rich and poor together make up the community. They are rich because they want nothing, poor because they possess nothing; and consequently they are not slaves to circumstances, but circumstances serve them” (Campanella, 2001).

In the Platonic conception of society, guardians should not own “land, houses, and currency” (Plato, 2012, 120-121, 416d)  because these evils are greater. Against this approach, Aristotle, in his work Politics, defends private property based on several arguments. The first is generosity, since “doing a kindness and giving some help to friends, or guests, or comrades, and such kindness and help become possible only when property is privately owned” (Aristotle, 2009,  47-48, 1263b40).  He also argues that greater conflicts derive from common property and that, if it were really a good solution, it would not have gone so unnoticed.

Discussion about the community of women 

“Love is foremost in attending to the charge of the race. He sees that men and women are so joined together, that they bring forth the best offspring. Indeed, they laugh at us who exhibit a studious care for our breed of horses and dogs, but neglect the breeding of human beings” (Campanella, 2001). 

This is one of the most controversial points of Plato’s approach: how he (does not) conceive of the family. For example, he asserts that the children of guardians are to be raised and educated by the State and has an ambivalent position on the status of women. From other assumptions, Aristotle defends the family and criticises the Platonic approach since “every citizen will have a thousand sons; they will not be the sons of each citizen individually: any son whatever will be equally the son of any father whatever. The result will be that all will equally neglect them” (Aristóteles, 2009, 42, 1261b32).

Hospitality

“To strangers they are kind and polite; they keep them for three days at the public expense; after they have first washed their feet, they show them their city and its customs, and they honor them with a seat at the Council and public table, and there are men whose duty it is to take care of and guard the guests. But if strangers should wish to become citizens of their State, they try them first for a month on a farm, and for another month in the city, then they decide concerning them, and admit them with certain ceremonies and oaths”(Campanella, 2001).  

This is a precedent for the notion of hospitality that Kant invoked centuries later. Nowadays, it seems that elementary notions that are at the foundation of human rights are questioned and become target issues of political debate, locally and globally. One such issue of relevance is how societies welcome/integrate/accommodate their immigrants. Here we see how in the 16th-century utopia, Campanella provided an inclusive mechanism for acquiring citizenship. Does it still sound like utopia today?

Again, with more details on the election of magistrates, the government, and the Council.

“They do not use lots unless when they are altogether doubtful how to decide. The eight magistrates under Hoh, Power, Wisdom, and Love are changed according to the wish of the people, but the first four are never changed, unless they, taking counsel with themselves, give up the dignity of one to another, whom among them they know to be wiser, more renowned, and more nearly perfect. And then they are obedient and honorable, since they yield willingly to the wiser man and are taught by him. This, however, rarely happens” (Campanella, 2001).

Leaving the most difficult choices to the randomness of a lottery does not seem the most appropriate. Although current trends advocate leaving some decisions to AI algorithms, which are biased, stereotyped, and not necessarily neutral in terms of human rights.

It is commendably “utopian,” in this City of the Sun, that top leaders decide themselves when to leave office and “willingly retire to those who are wiser than they are and learn from them.” It seems to be a carbon copy of the present times…

Laws and judgement 

“They have but few laws, and these short and plain, and written upon a flat table and hanging to the doors of the temple, that is between the columns” (Campanella, 2001).

 The utopia in the legal world is that laws should be few, short, and plain. This would help to bring law and judicial decisions closer to non-experts. The great thing about the legal method is that it makes it possible to deal with various strategies of the parties in a process and to justify the final decision by means of legal arguments. Law is conceived as an interpretative activity, where the power of conviction of each party becomes relevant.

The City of the Sun, by Tommaso Campanella, aims to criticise its present and future through utopian rhetoric, based on ideas that cannot be found anywhere, yet their power of conviction is the horizon that we can focus on (or not) when you look in front of the mirror. 

References

Aristotle (2009), Politics, Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, trans. Ernest Barker.

Campanella, Tomaso (2001), The City of the Sun, The Project Gutemberg, available:

https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/2816/pg2816-images.html (last visit: 17-5-26).

Plato (2012), Republic, London, New York: Penguin Books, trans. Christhopher Rowe.

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Montaigne, on barbarism

Oscar Pérez de la Fuente

Carlos III University of Madrid

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3708-846X

Abstract

This text offers an annotated reading of passages from Michel de Montaigne’s Essays focusing on the notion of ‘barbarism’ and its philosophical and political-moral implications. Drawing on passages concerning customs, ethnocentrism and the comparison between “our own people” and “the others”, the commentary highlights Montaigne’s critique of localist prejudice and the uncritical identification of truth, reason and the customs of one’s own country. The analysis distinguishes between social morality and critical morality, and situates the discussion within the debate between relativism and universalism, suggesting that Montaigne’s irony and vital scepticism do not lead to strong relativism, but rather to a call for evaluation criteria more demanding than mere tradition. The text also revisits the author’s provocative inversion—the possibility that the West might exceed in barbarity those it calls barbarians—and connects it with modern historical examples (Auschwitz, the Gulag, Hiroshima and Nagasaki) to demonstrate the concept’s contemporary relevance. Overall, it proposes reading Montaigne as an invitation to moderation, to a comparative examination of one’s own practices, and to an ethical horizon of coexistence in the face of sectarianism and polarisation.

Keywords: barbarism, ethnocentrism, against dogmatism, against prejudice

Michel Eyquem, Monsieur de Montaigne, was born in Périgueux, France, in 1533 and died in Bordeaux, France, in 1592. He was a writer whose fundamental works are the Essays (1580 and 1588). Before writing them, he travelled and obtained material for his work. The essays deal with various topics such as religion, politics and philosophy. Their approach seeks to fight against prejudices and dogmatisms and to encourage open minds and intellectual lucidity. These essays can be seen as an invitation for dialogue, critique and thinking.

The following are some excerpts, which we have translated, from Montaigne’s Essays with comments in the style of the Minerva Strategy Blog.

“I would excuse our people for having no other standard or rule of perfection than their own habits and customs; for it is a general vice not only of the vulgar, but of almost all men, to confine their gaze to the sphere in which they were born” (Montaigne, 2003, 317 chap. XLIX ”De las costumbres antiguas” ).

This is linked to the strength of localisms, which give an unusual moral weight to the place of one’s birth. Specifically, this passage from Montaigne alludes to ethnocentrism, which William Graham Sumner defines in his book Folkways (2008) as “is the technical name for this view of things in which one’s own group is the center of everything, and all others are scaled and rated with reference to it “.

Ethnocentrism conceives that the values of the group set the standard of what is human and outside the group, differences occur as stigmas. Procrustean bed versus heterodoxy by combining the identity/alterity binomial.

“There is nothing barbarous or savage in that nation, according to what I have been told, but that everyone considers barbarous what does not belong to his own customs. Indeed, we seem to have no other view of truth and reason than the model and idea of the opinions and usages of the country in which we are. There is always the perfect religion, the perfect government, the perfect and finished practice of everything” (Montaigne, 2003, 233, chap. XXXI “De los caníbales”). 

What is interesting here is to distinguish between critical morality – rational or justified morality – and social morality – the moral values of the majority of society – on the one hand, and the debate between scepticism/relativism versus universalism on the other. It may be argued that Montaigne’s scathing critique of customs, opinions and usages goes against relativism and favours some version of universalist critical morality compatible with a moderate vital scepticism, which is often attributed to the author of the Essays.  

“I consider that there is greater barbarism in eating a living man than in eating the dead, in tearing a still sentient body with tortures and torments, roasting it little by little, giving it to dogs and pigs to bite and tear to pieces (something we have not only read about, but also seen recently, not among old enemies but among neighbours and fellow citizens and, what is worse, under the pretext of piety and religion), than roasting and eating it after death” (Montaigne, 2003, 237, cap. XXXI “De los caníbales”).

In classical Antiquity, the Greeks claimed that they were civilised and their neighbours were barbarians. Thus began a dichotomy that has subsequently had various applications. For example, it played a role in the Valladolid Controversy between Bartolomé de las Casas and Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda. 

In this case, Montaigne asks who is more barbaric, the cannibalistic indigenous peoples he encountered on his travels in Latin America or the Europeans who burned human beings alive in the public square once condemned by the Inquisition. Here it becomes difficult to establish gradualisms or weightings to barbarism.

“We may well call them barbarians, if we consider the rules of reason, but not if we consider ourselves, who surpass them in every kind of barbarism” Montaigne, 2003, 237-238, cap. XXXI “De los caníbales”). 

In his work on barbarism, Francisco Fernández Buey highlights how historical events in the 20th century in the West have made the notion of barbarism highly topical. He mentions the extermination camps in Nazi Germany such as Auschwitz, the repression of the Stalinist Gulag and the atomic bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

However, this 20th century barbarism incorporates two qualitatively more repulsive and malignant features: “the number of murders without compassion, in a merciless manner, and the coldness and even asepsis with which the acts of barbarism were carried out” (Fernández Buey, 1995, 159). 

“Miracles depend on our ignorance of nature, and not on nature’s being; habit dulls the sight of our judgment. Barbarians do not astonish us any more than we astonish them, nor with any more reason: which all would admit if they knew how, after going over these examples, to look at their own and compare them sincerely” (Montaigne, 2003, 152, cap. XXIII “De la costumbre y de cómo no se cambia fácilmente una ley recibida”).

Us and the Others, identity and otherness, group dynamics, lead to characterising those who are different as inferior and deviant – with a stigma – and members of the group as normal individuals. The paradox is that, from outside the group, from another group, its members can also be labelled as different, deviant and inferior – with a stigma. It makes sense: moderation, common sense. Keep values such as human rights and the Golden Rule of Humanity in mind on a daily basis.

In the above essay on barbarism, Fernández Buey reflects that “the violence and cruelty of others is always fanaticism and fundamentalism; the violence and cruelty of our own is the explicable passion that always drags human beings along” (Fernández Buey, 1995, 187).

A suggestive contemporary reading of Montaigne can be a clear appeal against sectarianism and polarisation. Traveling, reflecting, fighting prejudice, understanding differences, appreciating human beings, and aiming for an ethical horizon.

References

Fernández Buey, Francisco (1995), La barbarie. De ellos y de los nuestros, Barcelona: Paidós.

Montaigne, Michel de (2003), Ensayos completos, Madrid: Cátedra, trad. Almudena Montojo.

Summer, William Graham (2008), Folkways. A Study of the Sociological Importance of Usages, Manners, Customs, Mores, and Morals, The Project Gutemberg. Available:

https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/24253 (last visit 17-5-26).

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Virtuous ethical model

Oscar Pérez de la Fuente

Universidad Carlos III de Madrid

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3708-846X

Abstract

This paper examines the virtuous ethical model as a framework for understanding moral action and its relevance to strategic practice. Drawing on the Aristotelian tradition, virtue ethics is presented as an approach that focuses not primarily on rules or consequences, but on the character of the agent and the cultivation of stable dispositions toward excellence. The discussion clarifies the distinction between religious virtues and classical ethical virtues, highlighting prudence, courage, justice, and temperance as central elements of moral formation. Special attention is given to the educational dimension of virtue ethics: individuals become virtuous through the repeated practice of virtuous actions, so learning and experience are essential to ethical development. The paper also stresses the contextual and pluralist character of this model, while rejecting relativism by affirming that some forms of conduct can never count as virtues. From the perspective of strategy, three Aristotelian ideas are especially significant: the doctrine of the mean, the value of experience, and prudence understood as practical wisdom. The conclusion is that the strategist’s path to excellence depends on moderation, reflective judgment, and the disciplined acquisition of virtuous habits.

Keywords: virtue, middle ground, academic Philosophy

The last model I will discuss is the virtuous ethical model, which comprises a few principles. First, to know the right action in a situation, one must think how a virtuous person would act. Second, a virtuous person is one who possesses virtues. Third, virtues are habits or dispositions that forge the character of human beings and show the excellence of a specific practice.

There is confusion about the language of virtues in the religious and ethical approaches. The virtues of the Christian religion are faith, hope, and charity. However, the approach to virtue ethics predates Christianity and is identified with the work of Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics (2004), which considers prudence, courage, justice, and temperance as virtues.

The educational component in virtue ethics is relevant. One becomes virtuous by acting virtuously. Or, to put it another way, one’s character becomes virtuous by repeating virtuous habits. This is why this model is so essential in education and why virtues, in general terms, can be learned.

But what is a virtue? This ethical model is more flexible than the deontological model. The virtuous ethical model is more contextualist and pluralist. Everyone can find their own models of excellence -virtues- and try to act following them. Nevertheless, not everything can be a virtue; it is not a relativistic approach. Some behaviours are closer to vices than virtues and, although there is a contextualist component, some clear cases cannot be virtues. Evil, murder or envy can never be considered virtues.

What are the virtues of a strategist? From what we have seen so far, virtues are learned by behaving virtuously, and there is a contextual element where everyone finds their own models of excellence, but with some limits. Aristotle claimed there to be at least three exciting perspectives on virtues: a) The law of the ‘middle ground’; b) The importance of experience; c) The virtue of prudence as practical wisdom. These will now be applied to the strategist perspective. 

A virtue is the middle ground between two extremes or vices, one by defect and the other by excess. This is basically what the law of the ‘middle ground’ holds. It is a call for moderation in various actions. The analysis that can be made is that given specific objectives, one should determine which actions are virtuous -within the middle ground- and which are excessive -by default or excess-.

The virtue ethics approach places great importance on experience. By learning to be virtuous, we learn the virtues of strategy. The best way to learn from the right foundations is through experience. In practice, everyone finds their models of excellence, which allows us to see that virtues depend on context. Experience also allows us to assess whether we are really dealing with a virtue or an excess.

Of all the virtues, Aristotle highlights prudence, which he considers to be synonymous of practical wisdom. He refers to the word phronesis as the central virtue of human beings. For strategists, prudence is also a central virtue. Prudence means constantly weighing up all alternatives, considering the various opportunity costs, promoting impartial testing methods, using third parties or experts and, above all, thinking through -and not rushing into- different transactions.

From the virtuous ethical model, we can conclude that the virtues of the strategist can be learned, that one becomes virtuous by acting virtuously, that experience teaches us the way, that a balance must be made to find virtues and excesses. The virtues are in moderation and, finally, that the central virtue for strategists is prudence, which is practical wisdom. The path to virtue is an apprenticeship towards excellence based on experience and prudence. Do we dare to walk it?

References

Aristotle (2004), Nichomachean Ethics, London, New York: Penguin Books, trans J.A.K. Thomson.

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Consequentialist ethical model

Oscar Pérez de la Fuente

Universidad Carlos III de Madrid

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3708-846X

Abstract

This article examines the consequentialist ethical model, which judges actions by their outcomes and aims at achieving the best consequences. It contrasts this approach with deontological ethics and identifies utilitarianism as its most influential form, especially through the principle of seeking the greatest happiness for the greatest number. The text argues that consequentialism has shaped modern economic thought, particularly through the model of homo economicus, where rationality is understood as the maximisation of a single variable such as utility, welfare, or money. Against this reductionist view, the article questions whether moral reasoning can be limited to outcome calculation alone. Through examples such as torture in emergency cases, market exchanges involving kidneys, surrogacy, pollution, residency, or nationality, it explores the moral limits of treating all values as commensurable. Drawing on Sandel and the idea of weak-sense incommensurability, the article defends a plural and complex understanding of human goods. It concludes that while anticipating consequences is a necessary part of prudence and strategy, ethical judgment must consider multiple values that cannot be reduced to a single measurable standard.

Keywords: consequentialism, utilitarianism, incommensurability

The consequentialist ethical model, which considers that ethics’ objective is to achieve the best consequences, opposes the deontological ethical model. There are several types of consequentialist ethics, the best-known of which is utilitarianism. It famously formulates that ethics should seek the greatest happiness for the greatest number.

Utilitarianism affirms that a variable must be maximised, whether happiness, utility, pleasure or well-being. It appeared in the Anglo-Saxon context at the time of industrialisation, where there was great optimism in applying the methods of the pure sciences to the Social Sciences. Utilitarianism assumes that ethics can be reduced to a variable, and its maximisation, and that this variable can be known. This is gauged using a mechanism similar to a happiness machine, which measures how happy people are.

This may sound strange, but to an economist, this sounds familiar. The model of man on which traditional economic theory is based states that rationality is the maximisation of a variable. That model is known as homo economicus. This view adopts utilitarianism and, in general, the consequentialist approach as its undisputed premise.

Is strategy not to correctly match means and ends? Anticipating the consequences of our actions is part of any strategy. However, the question is whether consequences can be the only decision-making criterion. Let’s imagine a case where we have a terrorist in custody; who knows where a bomb is going to explode in a central place in two hours. The consequentialist question would be: is it morally justified to torture this terrorist to prevent the bomb from exploding? I have asked my students many times about this textbook ethical scenario. The answers are divided between more deontological or consequentialist students.

Since the happiness machine does not exist, economists inspired by utilitarianism sometimes tend to consider money as the variable to be maximised. This approach can be contrasted with a more robust ethical view that affirms that human goods are plural and complex. Michael Sandel offers an example of this argument in his book What Money Cannot Buy. Moral limits of the market (2012), where he gives examples of the moral limits of the market. Relationships of friendship and love are never, or should never be, reduced to monetary terms. But beyond that, is it morally justified to sell a kidney? To be a surrogate? Can everything be bought and sold? Is it justifiable to pollute in exchange for money? Is it lawful to buy residency or nationality?

This phenomenon alluded to by Sandel is technically called weak-sense incommensurability and means that values cannot be reduced to a single variable. In general, the cases allude to reducing everything to monetary terms. Values are more plural, and human beings are more complex.

Perhaps a more complete evaluation of the ends should be made from the strategy point of view. Creating a plan to maximise one variable may cause one to lose sight of other goods involved. Agreement may arise precisely because the parties have different interests. But those interests need to be explored.

Anticipating the consequences of actions is a matter of prudence. Strategy seeks victory, but this does not always come from maximising a single variable. Life is more plural and complex.

References


Mill, John Stuart (2015), “Utilitarianism” in Mill, John Stuart, On Liberty, Utilitarianism, and Other Essays, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 115-180.

Sandel, Michael J. (2012), What money can’t buy : the moral limits of markets, New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

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Bartolomé de las Casas, apology for peace

Oscar Pérez de la Fuente

Carlos III University of Madrid

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3708-846X

AbstractThis article examines Bartolomé de las Casas’s Apología as an early and powerful defence of peace, equality, and the dignity of Indigenous peoples in the context of the Spanish conquest of the Americas. It focuses on his arguments in the Valladolid controversy against Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda, especially his rejection of war as a legitimate means of domination or conversion. Las Casas maintains, first, that reason requires choosing the lesser evil when harm cannot be entirely avoided; second, that war inevitably destroys more innocent lives than it claims to save; and third, that in armed conflict it is impossible to distinguish reliably between the innocent and the guilty. These claims anticipate later reflections on just war, proportionality, and the protection of non-combatants. The article also highlights the theological and moral foundations of Las Casas’s thought, particularly his insistence that Indigenous peoples are brothers in Christ and possess equal human dignity. In this sense, his work can be read as a significant precursor to modern human rights discourse. Finally, the paper reflects on the contemporary relevance of his universal message of fraternity, equality, and peaceful coexistence in plural and mixed societies

Keywords: equal dignity, peace, syncretism, mestizaje

Bartolomé de las Casas (1484-1566) was a Spanish Dominican friar, writer and missionary known for defending the rights of the indigenous peoples of America during the Spanish colonisation period. He had a somewhat self-taught education, oriented towards Theology, Philosophy and Law. He went to the Indies in 1502, ten years after the discovery of America, in La Española, Santo Domingo. He was ordained a priest in 1512 and was the first to do so in the New World. He later became bishop of Chiapas, Mexico.

The controversy with Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda (1550) on the status of indigenous people and the lawfulness of war is famous. Las Casas was a pioneer in thinking about human rights and social justice. In this controversy, Bartolomé de las Casas provides some arguments for abstaining from war and on equality, which will be discussed below in the style of Estrategia Minerva.

“In the first place, because, between two evils, if one cannot be avoided, the lesser should be chosen, according to right reason” (De las Casas, 1975, 304, cap. 40).

A distinction must be made between the doctrine of the lesser evil and the doctrine of the double effect. According to the former, the option that produces the worst consequences must be avoided at all cost. According to the second, when a given action is performed, there are unintended negative consequences in addition to the intended ones, which are positive. Applying the double effect assumes that the good produced by this action is greater than the evil.  

The relationship between the lesser evil and rationality is fundamental. Rationality provides the tools and analytical framework necessary to apply the lesser evil principle effectively.

“In the second place, it is manifest that more innocent people will perish in this way than those we are trying to free. Moreover, by a very strict negative precept, we are forbidden in any case to kill the innocent” ( De las Casas, 1975, 304, cap. 40).

Innocent people, in this context, are those who do not actively participate in combat. If self-defence is usually justified under just war theories, it does not extend to innocent people.

“Third, because in war, the innocent cannot be distinguished from the guilty” ( De las Casas, 1975, 304, cap. 40).

War is defined in one of its meanings by the Spanish Royal Academy as “armed struggle between two or more nations or between sides of the same nation”. They are usually brutal, violent situations that involve suffering and pain, damage and victims on both sides. Las Casas’ reflection is along the lines of recalling that, in these situations of armed conflict, the nuances and differences are difficult to define, especially between combatants and innocent people. The consequences in personal and material terms are often terrible.

In the final part of his work Apología, Bartholomé de las Casas argues: “the Indians are our brothers for whom Christ gave his life. Why do we persecute them without having deserved such a thing with inhuman cruelty?” ?”( De las Casas, 1975, 393, cap. 63).

Facing his opponent, Ginés de Sepúlveda, in the Valladolid Controversy, Bartholomew de las Casas maintains that the indigenous are brothers of the Europeans. This, far from being an improvised principle in the face of the new situation, is at the core of Christianity. In the Epistle to the Galatians, St. Paul writes: “There is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither slave nor free, nor is there male nor female; for you are all one in Christ Jesus” (Galatians 3:28). This message of equality was a novelty in Antiquity and continues to be so today and had as its antecedent the Stoics.

The best-known work of Bartolomé de las Casas is “Brevísima relación de la destrucción de las Indias/A Very Brief Recital of the Destruction of the Indies “(2017), first published in 1552. This book had a significant impact in Europe and helped to generate a debate on the human rights of indigenous people. It is an invitation to consider otherness and rethink one’s assumptions. To be authentic, we must start with the assumption of differences, starting from the equality of human beings.

“If this is done, I am convinced that they will embrace the evangelical doctrine, for they are neither fools nor barbarians, but of innate sincerity, simple, modest, meek and, finally, such that I am sure that there are no other people more disposed of than they to embrace the Gospel, which once received by them, it is admirable with what piety, ardour, faith and charity they fulfil the precepts of Christ and venerate the sacraments; For they are docile and ingenious, and in skill and natural endowments they surpass many people of the known world (…)” (De las Casas, 1975, 393, cap. 63)

Underlying Las Casas’ message is the notion of equal human dignity, the basis of human rights. A common criticism of this author is that he did not extend this concept to black people. His views need to be appropriately contextualised historically and not read from the postmodernism of some views.

Mestizaje/Mixed-race and syncretism could be vindicated from the approach close to Bartolomé de las Casas. Racists of all stripes are afraid of mixing, and what has characterised the most genuine view of Latin American history is precisely mestizaje, which is something to celebrate. Syncretism, as a fusion of cultures and/or religions, is also something positive to learn from. It can enhance the best energies of society, but as is often the case in identity politics, it can be approached in a divisive and exclusionary manner. In the face of this risk, Bartolomé de las Casas launched a universal message of equal human dignity and fraternity as the engine of social progress.

References

De las Casas, Bartolomé, De Sepúlveda, Ginés (1975), Apología, Madrid: Editora Nacional, Trans. Angel Losada.

De las Casas, Bartolomé (2017), Brevísima relación de la destrucción de Indias, Madrid, Cátedra, André St. Lu (ed.).

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Deontological ethical model

Oscar Pérez de la Fuente

Carlos III University of Madrid

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3708-846X

Abstract

This text examines the deontological ethical model as a duty-based approach to moral reasoning and highlights its relevance for strategic action. It begins by distinguishing deontology as professional ethics from deontology as a philosophical theory centred on obligations. The discussion then focuses on the latter, presenting it as an alternative to consequentialist ethics, which evaluates actions by their outcomes. The paradigm case is the moral philosophy of Immanuel Kant, especially the categorical imperative in its different formulations: universal law, respect for humanity as an end in itself, and reciprocity expressed in the Golden Rule. From this perspective, moral worth depends on acting according to principles that can be universally justified, rather than on achieving advantageous consequences. The text also explores the strategic implications of this model, particularly in relation to promise-keeping, truth-telling, and the credibility of commitments and threats. At the same time, it notes important criticisms of rigorism and legalism, suggesting that experience and context may justify limited exceptions to general rules. Overall, the deontological model is presented as a demanding yet valuable framework whose principles can orient action, establish moral limits, and support cooperative social relations.

Keywords: deontologist, keeping promises, telling the truth

Before delving into more strategic content, I will dedicate a series of posts to various ethical models. These models are used to judge our actions and can also inspire multiple strategies. The first ethical model is the deontological model.

First, it is necessary to clarify its meaning to avoid confusion. There are two meanings for the term ‘deontology’. The first has to do with professional ethics, which is related to the set of values and rules that regulate the practice of a profession and that are sometimes set out in a code of ethics, as in the case of doctors, lawyers, journalists, etc… The second is related to an ethical approach that is based on duties.  

I will explain this second meaning in this post. The deontological ethical model, based on duties, often contrasts with the consequentialist ethical model, which is based on consequences. More precisely, the deontological model is based on the individual’s duty to act according to the correct principle or value.

The paradigm of the deontological ethical model is the philosophy of Immanuel Kant and is usually exemplified in the formulations of the categorical imperative. Thus, it is stated, “act only on a maxim you can also will to become a universal law” (Kant, 2019, 35). This seems an essential moral principle, but some argue it is empty. With sufficient skill, the universal law can be turned into unacceptable claims. Let’s see how this mechanism works. If someone wants to use hate language against minorities, it seems that this could not be universalised. However, if someone advocated positive discrimination policies, could they be universalised? Some might argue that it does not make hate speech but that the principle of universalisation is the freedom of expression of people with their own pride.

Behind the categorical imperative lies the Golden Rule of Humanity, which has strategic significance and holds “treat others as you would like to be treated yourself”. It is a rule based on reciprocity, but unlike the an eye for an eye, it is not a rule of response to an attack but anticipates a cooperative attitude, which implies putting oneself in the other person’s shoes. Some studies indicate that this long-term cooperative attitude is the one that yields the best results.

Another formulation of the categorical imperative is to “”Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or anyone else’s, never merely as a mean, but also always as an end” (Kant, 2019, 42).  This shows how the deontological ethical model is a maximal ethics. Others connect this view with the notion of human dignity. From the perspective of strategy, it could be said that this is a commendable statement of principles, but that human relations move between cooperation and competition. The strategy should enhance the cooperative elements and diminish the competitive aspects to achieve specific objectives.

This ethical deontological model is legalistic, rigorist, not based on experience, rational, and universally applicable. Two maxims defended by this model are of particular strategic importance. The first is that promises must always be kept. In the U.S., some journalists go to prison for not revealing their sources in court. Their promise of confidentiality is stronger than the legal duty to testify. Keeping promises is a good ethical principle, and society relies heavily on the expectation that promises will be kept. Objections may come from the Machiavellian ethical model, where keeping one’s word is not always the best solution. The deontological model holds that commitments should always be honoured, regardless of the circumstances. The strategy should prevent being exploited by those who claim commitments and then do not want to fulfil them.

The other maxim of the ethical deontological model with strategic interest is that the truth must always be told. First, a distinction should be made between not telling the whole truth and lying. Second, the strategic use of threats assumes they must be credible to be effective. The ethical deontological model holds that the truth must always be told, even if it harms the speaker. In such cases, the best strategy is silence. Or as Wittgenstein said “what cannot be spoken about, it is better to remain silent about”.

The deontological ethical model is a morally demanding proposal; it could be described as rigorist. It is based on universally valid principles not based on experience. It can function as a mechanism to make commitments and threats solid and credible. However, the strategy learns from experience. Thus, there may be special situations where exceptions to the general principles can be made, provided they are adequately justified.

Principles and values are guides for action that occasionally mark the limits where one should not go. The ethics of duties should allow for a flexible application, not an absolute one. Arguably, this flexibility reflects the spirit of Kant, but it is closer to life.

References

Kant, Inmanuel (2019), Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, Oxford: Oxford University Press, trans. Christopher Bennet et al.

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Francisco de Vitoria, on just war

Oscar Pérez de la Fuente

Carlos III University of Madrid

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3708-846X

Abstract

This article examines Francisco de Vitoria’s account of just war and its continuing relevance for contemporary debates in international law and political philosophy. Situating Vitoria within the School of Salamanca, the analysis focuses on his central question concerning the legitimate causes of war and reconstructs the normative limits he places on the use of force. The paper argues that, for Vitoria, neither religious difference, imperial expansion, nor the private glory or advantage of rulers can justify war. Rather, the only just cause is an injury received, understood within a framework that also requires prudence and proportionality in both the decision to wage war and the means employed. By relating Vitoria’s position to earlier Thomistic ideas, especially self-defence and the doctrine of double effect, the article highlights the moral constraints governing armed conflict. It also considers the modern reception of Vitoria’s thought, particularly in relation to John Rawls and present discussions of defensive and preventive war. The article concludes that Vitoria’s theory remains a significant resource for thinking about the ethical boundaries of war, the protection of civilians, and the primacy of the common good over reasons of domination or interest.

Keywords: diplomacy, human rights, international Law, just war

One of the prominent figures in the Spanish Renaissance was Francisco de Vitoria (1483-1546). He was a Spanish Dominican, renewer of Theology and promoter of the Salamanca School of Natural Law. He is considered the founder of the science of International Law and the notion of human rights. One of the most relevant political philosophers of the 20th century, John Rawls, in his book entitled Law of Peoples and the Idea of Public Reason revisited quotes De Vitoria 8Rawls, 1999, 103) and, from a liberal conception, adheres to his just war theory. 

Precisely Francisco de Vitoria addresses this classic theme in his essay entitled ” Sobre el derecho de Guerra”/ On the law of war when he asks: “What can be the reason and cause of a just war?” We will address this question below, based on this author, from the perspective of Minerva Strategy Blog.

De Vitoria’s first approach to answering this question states that “diversity of religion is not sufficient cause for a just war.” And he justifies himself with that “even if the faith has been announced to the barbarians with sufficient signs of probability and they have not wanted to accept it, it is not, for that reason, lawful to persecute them with war and strip them of their goods” (De Vitoria, 2021, 118, II.15).

Francisco de Vitoria was a professor at the University of Salamanca and his lectures, or relections, on various topics of interest have come down to us to this day. Specifically, the full title of the one dedicated to the notion of just war is entitled: ” Sobre el derecho de guerra de los españoles sobre los bárbaros”/On the law of war of the Spaniards over the barbarians. Contrary to what the black legend on the Spanish colonisation of Latin America claims, the School of Salamanca laid the foundations for human rights and the rules of International Law. And, as has been seen, De Vitoria did not justify war for diversity of religion.  

Another issue addressed by Francisco de Vitoria is that “it is not a just cause of a war to intend to expand dominions” and he argues: “this proposition is too evident to need to be demonstrated. For otherwise there would always be just cause for any of the belligerent wars, and so all would be innocent” (De Vitoria, 2021, 141, III.11).

The history of mankind contains many examples of rulers who have had expansionist policies beyond their borders.  The results of these offensive wars are part of History and memory. This would not be a justified strategy under current International Law, nor as a cost/benefit analysis in the medium and long term.

Francisco de Vitoria continues “neither is it just cause of a war to the prince’s own glory nor any other particular profit of the prince” and he states that “this proposition is also evident, for the prince must order to the common good of the Republic, both war and peace, and he cannot invest public funds in his own glory, in his own profit, much less expose his subjects to danger. The difference between the legitimate king and a tyrant lies in that the tyrant orders the government to his own interest and profit, while the king orders it to the public good, as Aristotle says” (De Vitoria, 2021, 174, III.12).

If the ruler wages war for his private benefit, he becomes a tyrant, as Aristotle argued in his work Politics. There the Stagirite philosopher proposed a classic typology of forms of government, where he distinguishes those leaders who promote the common good in their government actions -monarchy, aristocracy, politeia– and those who act for their own benefit or that of their own group -tyranny, oligarchy, democracy-. It is interesting because issues of accountability have been identified ever since the first book written on Political Science, which deals especially with issues of classical democracy in the polis of Athens.

The affirmative answer to the question posed by De Vitoria is the following: “the only just cause for waging war is the injury received” and he affirms that “in addition, offensive war is made to avenge an injury and to reprimand the enemies, as has already been said. But there can be no revenge where there has not preceded an injury and a fault. Therefore the conclusion is evident” (De Vitoria, 2021, 175 III.13).

Here we get to the heart of Francisco de Vitoria’s argument: defensive war, self-defence, is justified. Bobbio affirms: “it is lawful to repel violence with violence.” The Italian author asks himself: “But does the strategy of atomic war still allow us to maintain the distinction between offensive and defensive war?” (Bobbio, 1999, 55). De Vitoria did not speak of preventive wars, but in the answer to Bobbio it is worth analising whether a preventive war is justified in the face of a relevant threat. Situations of strategic funanbulism in scenarios of nuclear deterrence are placed in this risk analysis.

Francisco de Vitoria adds: “an injury of any gravity is not enough to make war”. He clarifies that “this proposition is proved because it is not even lawful to impose such serious penalties as death, exile or confiscation of goods on one’s own subjects for any fault. Now, since all the things that are done in war are grave and even atrocious, such as slaughter, arson, devastation, it is not lawful to punish with war those who have committed slight offences, since the measure of punishment must be in accordance with the gravity of the crime” (De Vitoria, 2021, 176, III.14).

The key to self-defence is proportionality. Thomas Aquinas already defended it by “moderating the defence according to the needs of the threatened security” (Thomas Aquinas, Suma Theologica, II-II, q. 64,a. 7, c). It is in that passage of the Theological Summa, where the theory of the double effect is formulated: an act has two effects, one intentional -preserving life- and another not, which would be incidental -the death of the aggressor-. The key for Thomas Aquinas is that the act be proportionate to its end.

An application of the doctrine of double effect is proposed by Rawls, when he states that civilian casualties are prohibited except insofar as they are the indirect and unintended result of a legitimate attack against a military target (Rawls, Law of Peoples and the Idea of Public Reason revisited).

The just war theory in Francisco de Vitoria is a classic in the reflection on public affairs. As a good classic, it allows more current re-readings and, as Italo Calvino said, it can be conceived as a talisman, a compass on which to orient oneself when approaching the territories of peace and war.

References

Bobbio, Norberto (1999), El problema de la guerra y las vías de la paz, Barcelona: Altaya, trans. Jorge Binaghi.

De Vitoria, Francisco (2021), Sobre el poder civil. Sobre los indios. Sobre el derecho de guerra, Madrid: Tecnos, trans. Luis Frayle Delgado

Rawls, John (1999), Law of Peoples and the Idea of Public Reason revisited, Cambridge, Mass., London: Harvard University Press.

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All Individuals are philosophers, but do they all employ strategy?

Each of us is a philosopher. This may well come as a surprise and is an unusual statement to make because people rarely discuss Philosophy only at surface level.

It is important to differentiate between academic Philosophy and Philosophy as a way of life. Generally, the first is considered a complicated realm reserved for specialists. While the second asserts that “everyone is a philosopher.” The key in Philosophy consists in the question “Why?” Curiosity constitutes typical philosophical attitude and helps to understand concepts. Almost everyone has this interest. Every individual has their own truth, which is a compass for living one’s life.

Now, however, comes the second aspect: are we all strategists? Typically, associating strategy with human behaviour carries negative ethical implications. This, however, becomes considerably more complex on closer inspection. Strategy refers to the appropriate alignment between means and ends. Strategos commanded the military forces inside the polis of ancient Greece. The initial definition of strategy is a military concept and has evolved from game theory into corporate or political strategy.

Determining objectives using a strategy entails formulating a plan that elucidates the interdependence of actions among the specified components and references to situations of cooperation and/or conflict. The History of Ideas contains corporate, political, and personal insights pertinent to the study of strategy. We hope that these concepts will be further developed. Welcome to Minerva Strategy Blog!