Tag: Principled negotiation

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3-D Negotiation

Oscar Pérez de la Fuente

Universidad Carlos III de Madrid

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3708-846X

Abstract

This text presents key ideas from David A. Lax and James K. Sebenius’s 3-D Negotiation framework, which views negotiation as the interaction of three simultaneous dimensions: tactics at the table, deal design that uncovers true economic and non-economic interests, and the broader setup that shapes the situation off the table. Focusing on interests is central to this approach because stated positions often mask implicit goals, constraints, and concerns. The discussion highlights perspective-taking, careful assessment of one’s own priorities, and the use of classic tools such as BATNA and ZOPA, while warning against reducing analysis to a single distributive variable such as price. The text also identifies wider contextual factors that influence outcomes, including relationships, emotions, and cultural orientations toward either results or relationships. It stresses the role of the “social contract” or spirit of the agreement in establishing expectations, trust, and conflict-resolution norms, and it notes how process choices and tactics (e.g., anchoring) can distort results. Finally, it addresses ethical tensions in negotiating behaviour through deontological, consequentialist, Machiavellian, and virtue-based lenses, and it concludes with four practices to safeguard interests: ask and probe, map interests using public information, leverage internal sources, and consult knowledgeable advisers.

Keywords: principled egotiation, BATNA/ZOPA, Deal design, emotions, tactics

Professors David A. Lax and James K. Sebenius, who are involved in the Harvard University Negotiation Project, in their book 3-D Negotiation. Powerful Tools to Change the Game in Your Most Important Deals (2006) offer new perspectives when it comes to conducting negotiations.

According to this approach, negotiations should be understood as three-dimensional, with three elements occurring more or less simultaneously throughout the actual negotiation. These dimensions are: a) Tactics, which involve persuasive manoeuvres and give-and-take. It is worth noting that poor tactics can ruin a negotiation; b) Deal design: beyond the obvious, this involves uncovering the parties’ true economic and non-economic interests; and c) Setup: off the table, which shapes and reshapes the situation (Lax, Sebenius, 2006, 9). . 

Below, we will examine the topic of exploring interests from the perspective of the Minerva Strategy Blog.

Lax and Sebenius begin by defining interest as whatever you care about that is potentially at stake in the outcome (Lax, Sebenius, 2006, 76).  Their entire approach is based on the observation that the interests stated at the negotiating table are one thing, whereas the parties’ actual or implicit interests are quite another, whether or not these have been clearly articulated. 

When exploring these interests (whether explicit or implicit) in the handling of information about the other party, it is essential to practice, at various stages of the negotiation process, the exercise of putting oneself in the other person’s shoes. It’s also vital for oneself or the negotiating team to calmly assess the true interests at stake: what one wants from the negotiation, what could be gained, and what could be lost. In the standard terminology of Negotiation Theory, what is the best alternative to a no-deal outcome (BATNA), and how is the Zone of Possible Agreement (ZOPA) established between the parties? 

However, Lax and Sebenius’s emphasis on the importance of (actual) interests within the framework of three-dimensional negotiation highlights the fact that focusing all one’s attention in negotiations on linear distributive dimensions—such as price negotiation—can cause one to lose sight of a range of potentially richer interests.

From this perspective, analysing BATNA and ZOPA can be useful tools, but not by focusing on a single variable; rather, by taking into account all the factors at play within the negotiating context.  

In many negotiations, relationships are a key factor to bear in mind. Sometimes, emotions guide the parties’ behaviour, and such feelings can distort certain expectations. On other occasions, poor or mediocre results are accepted simply to maintain the relationship. On this point, Lax and Sebenius distinguish between countries that focus on relationships—such as those in Southern Europe and Latin America—and others that focus on results, such as Anglo-Saxon and Northern European countries  (Lax, Sebenius, 2006, 74). 

Another factor to bear in mind is the social contract; beyond its strictly economic dimension, this governs people’s expectations regarding the nature, scope and duration of the agreement, the process to be followed, and the way in which unforeseen events are handled. As Lax and Sebenius state, it is “the spirit of the agreement.” It is important to clearly understand this broad framework to avoid conflicts or to resolve them without too much difficulty. It is about establishing relationships within a framework of trust, within the framework of a shared negotiating culture, where the obligations of the parties and the usual way of resolving potential conflicts are clearly established (Lax, Sebenius, 2006, 74).

The third factor is the process itself. Certain negotiation processes often influence the outcome, and sometimes negotiators employ tricks and tactics, such as anchoring. These tactics can be particularly detrimental to one of the parties, who must be able to identify them and defend their position, especially when they are unaware of these strategies or lack experience in negotiation scenarios. Another important point is to distinguish the negotiating table from the wider negotiating context. It is usually easier to make progress in negotiations in informal settings (Lax, Sebenius, 2006, 75).    

Finally, one factor to bear in mind is ethics. Certain aspects of some negotiations may be morally controversial; for example, some negotiating tactics that involve withholding or manipulating information from the other party. From an ethical standpoint, the response will differ between the deontological model, with its duty to always tell the truth; the consequentialist model, which advocates the greatest happiness for the greatest number of people; the Machiavellian model, focused on success; and the virtuous model, which proposes acting as a virtuous person would in that situation  (Lax, Sebenius, 2006, 75).

Lax and Sebenius argue that we should not confuse negotiating positions with a broader set of actual interests, and they propose four practices that will help you safeguard your interests:

–Ask, listen and probe

Information about the other party’s interests is essential. The best way to get this is to listen carefully and gauge how they might respond to the negotiation map’s options. 

–Use public sources to map interests

When important decisions need to be made, it is advisable to consult public records and the relevant institutions to gather objective information. Having reports from independent bodies and other credible sources of information is also beneficial.

–Tap internal sources

Naturally, if you can obtain firsthand information from someone who understands the other party’s interests, this can be particularly useful. It is also important to have information about the negotiator and the people involved, as well as their explicit, implicit and underlying interests.

–Tap knowledgeable advisers

In complex business situations, people often turn to professionals such as lawyers or intermediaries. Lax and Sebenius recommend asking them about their experience in such situations. Perhaps this is because – as Aristotle pointed out many centuries ago – experience can help one to better understand a particular situation (Lax, Sebenius, 2006, 77-79).

References

Lax, David A., Sebenius, James K. (2006), 3-D Negotiation. Powerful Tools to Change the Game in Your Most Important Deals, Boston, Mass.: Harvard Business School Press. 

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How to negotiate rationally in an irrational world

Oscar Pérez de la Fuente

Universidad Carlos III de Madrid

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3708-846X

Abstract

This paper reviews and contextualises Deepak Malhotra and Max H. Bazerman’s chapter “How to negotiate rationally in an irrational world” from Negotiation Genius, highlighting how psychological biases shape bargaining outcomes even among skilled negotiators. Framed as an analysis for the Minerva Strategy Blog, the text distinguishes biases of the mind (e.g., fixed-pie assumptions, attention to dazzling attributes, and non-rational escalation of commitment) from biases of the heart (e.g., conflicting motivations, egocentricity, overconfidence, irrational optimism, and regret aversion). Drawing on Daniel Kahneman’s dual-process theory, it argues that effective negotiators should shift from intuitive, automatic “System 1” responses to deliberate “System 2” reasoning when stakes are high. Practical recommendations include creating explicit System 2 checklists, avoiding negotiations under time pressure and ultimatum tactics, and spreading complex bargaining across multiple sessions to reduce improvisation and error. The paper also stresses learning through analogies by studying multiple negotiations simultaneously and focusing on underlying principles rather than details, echoing the Harvard Method’s emphasis on interests over positions. Finally, it addresses interacting with others’ biases by anticipating their consequences, encouraging less biased decision criteria, and systematically verifying counterpart information to maintain rational judgment in imperfect contexts.

Keywords: bias, emotions, information, interests, positions, ultimatums

Deepak Malhotra  and  Max H. Bazerman are professors at Harvard University and authors of the book  Negotiation Genius: How to Overcome Obstacles and Achieve Brilliant Results at the Bargaining Table and Beyond (2013). This work is particularly interesting because, in addition to using common tools and concepts from Negotiation Theory, delves into the field of emotions, approaching negotiation processes from the perspective of Psychology. 

Specifically, one of the most relevant parts of the book is the analysis of biases in negotiation. Biases occur in the heart and mind and “affect even the best and brightest”  (Malhotra, Bazerman, 2013, 197). Malhotra and Bazerman study: fixed-size pie bias, dazzling attributes bias, non-rational escalation of commitments bias as biases of the mind; conflicting motivations, egocentricity, overconfidence and irrational optimism, regret aversion as biases of the heart.

Below, we will analyse the chapter “How to negotiate rationally in an irrational world”, where these authors explain how to deal with the biases of the heart and mind in negotiation contexts, from the perspective of Minerva Strategy Blog.

Strategy 1 on how to deal with your own biases states: “Think according to system 2″ (Malhotra, Bazerman, 2013, 199). . The Nobel Prize in Economics Daniel Kahneman  In his work Thinking, Fast and Slow, he has analysed certain phenomena concerning the influence of Psychology in Economics, such as anchorage.  

System 1, which corresponds to intuition, is generally fast and automatic, without the implicit and emotional effort with which we make most decisions in our lives. System 2 corresponds to reasoned thinking, is slower, requires effort, and is explicit and logical. You could say that we generally have “autopilot” in system 1, and if something does not work, system 2 kicks in.

The first recommendation in this strategy is: “Make a list for System 2” (Malhotra, Bazerman, 2013, 200).  Important decisions, therefore, in the business world should be made by System 2. In other words, they should be carefully considered, properly thought through, weighing up the various scenarios and values at stake. Do not be swayed by first impressions, impulses, or emotions, which are implicit in biases. Skilful management of these biases can be part of the business practices and tricks of the other party.

The second tip states: “Avoid negotiating under time pressure” “(Malhotra, Bazerman, 2013, 200-201). Time management is crucial in many negotiations. It is important to know how to deal with ultimatums, which, in many cases, are just another negotiating tactic. The key is that, with less time, it will be more difficult to properly analyse the negotiating map. 

The third recommendation states: “Spread negotiations over multiple sessions” (Malhotra, Bazerman, 2013, 202). . To avoid unpredictability and improvisation in decision-making, it is beneficial to be able to negotiate over several sessions, allowing all relevant issues to be addressed from different angles with certainty. 

Strategy 2, on how to deal with your own biases, states: “Learn by using analogies” “(Malhotra, Bazerman, 2013, 202).  Experience is a source of knowledge; you learn from your mistakes. The authors summarise this approach by stating that “the key is to figure out how to extract principles from experiences and examples”. Precedents for a similar situation should be taken into account and their relevance in the course of events should be assessed. 

The first tip in this strategy 2 is: “Study multiple negotiations simultaneously” (Malhotra, Bazerman, 2013, 204). It is useful to learn about various strategies and negotiation frameworks similar to the one you are involved in. It is also beneficial, in light of this information, to map out various negotiation scenarios, with the possible outcomes for the parties involved.

The second recommendation states: “Focus on principles, not details” (Malhotra, Bazerman, 2013, 205). The important thing is to identify the interests involved and what might be the best way to satisfy them for both parties. This is the most genuine area of negotiation, which reminds me of the principle of the Harvard Method: Focus on interests, not positions.

Strategy 3 on how to deal with your own biases states: “Adopt the outsider’s perspective”. The parties are sometimes so involved in a negotiation that the intervention of an impartial third party is necessary. This is even institutionalised in the form of negotiation mediators. Or, in some regulated cases, the parties may submit their case to arbitration by a third party.

Strategy 1 for dealing with other people’s biases states: “Incorporate the consequences of others’ biases into your strategy” ” (Malhotra, Bazerman, 2013, 205). . At this point, Malhotra and Bazerman seem to be saying that if others act on biases of the heart or mind, that is to say if they are irrational, we should build our strategies to take advantage of this in business interactions.

Strategy 2 for dealing with other people’s biases states:  “Help others apply less biased criteria” (Malhotra, Bazerman, 2013, 212). One thing you can share with the other party is the lesson of making decisions within a reasonable time frame, after conducting a thorough analysis, without emotional constraints, and detecting negotiating tactics and tricks.  

Strategy 3 for dealing with other people’s biases says, “Weigh up the information provided by others” (Malhotra, Bazerman, 2013, 214). Relevant data provided by the other party in business contexts should be routinely checked. A typical example is the price of an item for rent or sale. It is advisable to find out the market price of that item, whether for rent or sale, and compare it with the offer made. Some people complain about the purpose of these checks, as if they were a sign of a lack of trust. They simply seek to avoid bias in the negotiation because, as Malhotra and Bazerman argue, we seek to negotiate rationally in an irrational world. 

References

Kahneman, Daniel (2011), Thinking fast and slow, New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. 

Malhotra, Deepak, Bazerman, Max H. (2013), El negociador genial. Cómo obtener grande resultados en la mesa de negociación y más allá, Barcelona: Ediciones Urano, trans: María Isabel Merino Sánchez.

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The power of empathy

Oscar Pérez de la Fuente

Universidad Carlos III de Madrid

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3708-846X

Abstract

This paper examines the strategic value of empathy in difficult negotiations, drawing on Deepak Malhotra’s discussion of “The Power of Empathy” and situating it within a broader framework of negotiation methods associated with the Harvard Negotiation Project. Rather than treating empathy as a purely moral stance, the analysis presents it as an information‑gathering and option‑expanding tool: understanding the other party’s constraints, identity-linked drivers, and perceptions can reveal hidden interests and unlock agreements that preserve dignity while improving outcomes. The paper contrasts practical “rules” for interpersonal conduct—golden, silver, and bronze—as different strategic postures for managing reciprocity and potential exploitation. It then explores a central tension in bargaining between strategic flexibility and credibility, highlighting how negotiators can design proposals that allow counterparts to “save face” without sacrificing intelligent solutions. Finally, the text considers the role of threats and ultimatums, arguing that reframing and integrating them into a wider negotiation structure can reduce escalation and keep channels open. Throughout, the paper emphasizes trilateral thinking: third parties frequently shape interests, alternatives, and perceived power, and empathetic analysis should extend to these external influences. The overall contribution is a concise, strategy-oriented interpretation of empathy as a mechanism for diagnosing conflict dynamics and enlarging the set of viable, durable settlements.

Keywords: empathy, negotiation, credibility, flexibility, positions, interests

The Harvard Negotiation Project at the Harvard Business School has developed a   Negotiation Method, the principles of which are explained in the best-selling book  Getting to Yes. How to negotiate without giving in, by Robert Fisher and William Ury. Another Harvard professor, Deepak Malhotra, has a book entitled Negotiating the Impossible. How to break deadlocks and resolve ugly conflicts (without money or muscle) , where he analyses how they act in the context of complicated negotiations. 

Below, we will analyse some of Malhotra’s advice in the section of his book on complex negotiations, ‘The Power of Empathy’, from the perspective of the Minerva Strategy Blog.

Empathy expands the set of options you have for resolving the conflict. The better you understand the other side’s perspective, the more likely you are to find a solution (Malhotra, 2016, 128)..

Empathy is often understood as putting oneself in another’s situation.  The  Golden Rule  maintains that “treat others as you would like to be treated.” A good exercise is to ask yourself: if I were in the other person’s situation, how would I like to be treated and how would I behave? This rule is fine, but it should include safeguards to prevent exploitation. The Silver Rule states: “Do not do unto others what you would not have them do unto you.” This would be a practical application of empathy. However, ultimately, there is the Bronze Rule: “Do unto others as others do unto you.” This would be an extreme form of reciprocity and, at times, the mere possibility of applying this Bronze Rule may have strategic value.

Empathy is needed most with people who seem to deserve it least. The more intolerable their behaviour, the greater the potential benefit of understanding it (Malhotra, 2016, 128)..

There may be individuals with challenging personalities or who find themselves in complicated situations, or who may behave unusually due to cultural, religious, gender, disability, or other identity factors.

The relevant issue is that, in business contexts, information about the parties’ backgrounds is key. This data can help explain certain behaviours and attitudes, and/or justify each party’s actions and action plan from their point of view. This exercise in understanding the other party can be useful, as it can highlight differences in interests, assessments or perceptions that may be of strategic interest.

There is almost always a trade-off between maintaining strategic flexibility and safeguarding credibility (Malhotra, 2016, 130).

The term trade-off is used in economics as a synonym for compromise, referring to a situation in which gains are made on one side, but losses are incurred on the other. 

Credibility is the degree to which others believe that we will follow through on our commitments. From the deontological ethical model, Kant is the ultimate example of credibility, as he maintained that promises must always be kept. Strategic flexibility is the option to change one’s mind if continuing with previous commitments seems unwise. In the Machiavelic ethical model, Machiavelli is the paradigm of strategic flexibility; for example, in chapter XVIII of The Prince, he analyses whether the prince should keep his word. 

Typically, Malhotra asserts, we want as much credibility as possible while maintaining flexibility. However, if we invest more in strategic flexibility, we typically have less credibility, and vice versa. 

Don’t force people to choose between doing what is smart and what save face (Malhotra, 2016, 132)..

A first rule of negotiation, linked to empathy, is that proposals for agreement and subsequent negotiations should be framed so that one party is trying to “save face” for the other. In other words, consider the specific consequences the proposed deal will have for the other party. But here, Malhotra, in line with the Harvard Negotiation Project, goes further and calls for the other party to be provided with an intelligent solution. This means the other party must also consider it a good agreement. 

Ignore ultimatums. The more attention you give to them, the harder it will be for the other side to back down if the situation changes (Malhotra, 2016, 145).

Ultimatums can be seen as threats. A distinction should be made between business threats and real threats. The former plays a strategic role in negotiation, and the key is their credibility in the eyes of the other party. Real threats will entail a specific response, with negative consequences, towards certain behaviours. Malhora’s advice is to ignore ultimatums and threats and reformulate them so they can be incorporated into the broader negotiating framework. 

Think trilaterally: evaluate how third parties influence or alter the interests, constraints, and alternatives of those at the table (Malhotra, 2016, 161).

In certain negotiations, the weight and influence of third parties are very present, conditioning the entire negotiating framework, whether in terms of interests, communication between the parties, or perception. A key point from this perspective is the real power of third parties in the framework, development, and agreement of the negotiation, and the type of link that connects the other negotiating party and the third party. If the real power and influence of the third party are strong, there is no doubt that we must think trilaterally; even if they are somewhat weaker, it is worth considering the third party’s power and influence in favour of our cause. 

References

Malhotra, Deepak (2016), Negotiating the Impossible. How to Break Deadlocks and Resolve Ugly Conflicts (Without Monet or Muscle), Oakland: Bernett-Koehler  Published.

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The Power of a Positive No

Oscar Pérez de la Fuente

Carlos III University of Madrid

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3708-846X

Abstract

This paper examines William Ury’s The Power of a Positive No (2008) and its contribution to negotiation theory and interpersonal communication. The central argument is that saying no effectively is not an act of rejection alone, but a disciplined practice that balances personal interests, legitimate power, and the preservation of relationships. Ury shows that people often respond to difficult situations by accommodating, attacking, or avoiding, yet these reactions rarely produce constructive outcomes. As an alternative, he proposes the framework of the “positive No,” structured as “Yes! No. Yes?”: the first yes affirms one’s core interests, the no sets a clear boundary, and the second yes opens the way to a respectful and workable agreement. The analysis also highlights the importance of developing a strong Plan B, or BATNA, as a source of positive power in negotiation. Additional emphasis is placed on brainstorming alternatives, building supportive coalitions, anticipating the other party’s moves, and assessing worst-case scenarios. Overall, the book presents a practical method for defending one’s rights and interests while sustaining dialogue and cooperation.

Keywords: principled, negotiation, emotions, interests, positions,

After his work Getting Past No (1997), William Ury wrote another work entitled The Power of a Positive No (2008). In this new original book, he explains how to face one of the most challenging things we must do every day: to say no to people who work with us, who we love, and with whom we have relationships of various kinds. As Ury says: “No is the biggest challenge today” (Ury, 2008, 10).

The analysis in this book starts from the consideration that: “It may not be the most important word in our vocabulary, but it is the hardest to say well”. The special idiosyncrasy of this term is linked to the inherent tension between exercising your power and tending your relationship. Thus, in certain situations, Ury describes three common ways out:

a) Accommodate: say-yes-when-you-want-to-say-no (Ury, 2008, 11). This is especially frequent when we want to maintain the personal relationship by making concessions.

b) Attacking: be-passive-aggressive-when-saying-no (Ury, 2008, 12). It is the opposite of accommodating. It is about using power without any consideration for the relationship. It is linked to anger or rage.

c) Avoidance: we-say-no-absolutely-nothing (Ury, 2008, 13). In these cases, communication and relationships are suspended. It is a way of coping with problems by avoiding people.

As can be imagined, these three ways out do not lead to success, and Ury’s proposal in this book is to affirm a positive No. Then the author summarises his formula: “A positive No is a Yes! No. Yes? The first Yes expresses your interests, the Noaffirms your power, and the second Yes strengthens your relationship. A positive No balances power and relationship in service of your interests (Ury, 2008, 17).

The first Yes could be seen as internally focused – the assertion of one’s own interests – and the second Yes is externally focused -an invitation to the other to come to an agreement that satisfies those interests-. In this post, I will focus on the elements that give power to your No.

Saying No is not easy. Ury suggests that positive power must be developed, which is achieved by having a plan B. It is a matter of considering the worst-case scenario and seeing the possibilities one would have to achieve one’s objectives (Ury, 2008, 61-63).

Plan B is also called BATNA (Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement). It is not an option to an agreement but an alternative to the agreement, a course of action that can be taken independently of the agreement with the other party. A better BATNA gives more bargaining power. A plan B is positive power; it does not mean punishing the other party. It is a strategic element that can condition the negotiation and must be considered.

The key question, then, is how to strengthen your plan B. One element that can help is brainstorming, where you use your imagination to develop various possible solutions without looking at their feasibility. Alternatives to a given situation should be carefully considered. These may include a) Do it yourself: achieve your goals by your own means without going to the other party; b) Run away: sometimes a possible way out is to end the relationship; c) Third party: sometimes the intervention of a third party as an intermediary is positive (Ury, 2008, 64-65).

Along with building a powerful No, Ury recommends “building a winning coalition”. In each situation, allies with similar interests should be sought, and a common action plan can be addressed.

The key to the various interactions is information, especially about the interests and opinions of the other party. Ury advises, “anticipate the other’s next move”. Foreseeing likely courses of action and possible responses is strategically relevant. Anticipation gives a strategic advantage to the foresighted (Ury, 2008, 66-68).

From this perspective, Ury argues that one should consider the worst-case scenario. It would be to put yourself in the position of checking what you could lose in the negotiation, on the one hand, and what plan B or BATNA is, on the other hand.

In conclusion, Ury reaffirms your decision to decide No in three questions: “Do you have the interest? Do you have the power? Do you have the right?” (Ury, 2008, 71). This point must be complemented with other negotiating elements, allowing you to reach efficient and intelligent agreements, from different interactions, based on building a positive No.

References

Ury, William (1997), Supere el No. Cómo negociar con personas que adoptan posiciones inflexibles, Barcelona: Ediciones Gestión 2000, trad. Adriana de Hassan. (original title: Gettig past No, 1991)

Ury, William (2008), The Power of a Positive No. How To Say No & Still Get to Yes, London: Hodder & Stoughton.

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Getting Past No

Oscar Pérez de la Fuente

Carlos III University of Madrid

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3708-846X

Abstract

This paper examines key ideas from William Ury’s Getting Past No, a practical extension of the Harvard negotiation approach for dealing with difficult situations. Rather than focusing on “difficult people” as fixed types, Ury reframes negotiation problems as situations shaped by emotions, positions, dissatisfaction, and power. The discussion centres on the first and most immediate obstacle in negotiation: one’s own reaction. The text explains how common impulses such as counterattacking, yielding, or breaking off relations usually worsen outcomes or reduce bargaining power. As an alternative, Ury proposes the technique of “going to the balcony,” a metaphor for stepping back mentally, regulating emotions, and observing the interaction with detachment. The paper also reviews three manipulative tactics frequently used in hard bargaining: the stone wall, attacks, and trickery. For each, it highlights the importance of recognition, emotional control, independent verification of facts, and careful analysis of the other party’s interests. Overall, the article argues that successful negotiation depends less on immediate reaction than on strategic patience, self-awareness, and disciplined thinking, which together make constructive and intelligent agreement more likely in difficult contexts.

Keywords: principled negotiation, cooperative agreements, stratagems, tactics

The Harvard negotiation method is explained in the famous book Getting to Yes, to which I have dedicated several posts. One of its authors, William Ury, elaborated on some of its concepts more specifically in his book Getting Past No (1997), , which has a very descriptive subtitle: Negotiating with difficult situations. From the outset Ury makes clear that it is not about negotiating with difficult people, but rather about how to negotiate in difficult situations.

In this post I will analyse some of the techniques in this book, as being able to identify them is the first step to act accordingly and counter their effect.

In Getting Past No, Ury proposes an insight strategy that addresses five elements: a) One’s reaction; b) The emotions of others; c) The position of others; d) The discontent of others; e) The power of others (Ury 1997, 24-25). The book is devoted to each of these elements. Here I will focus on the first, self-reaction.

The natural reactions to an attack by another person are to counterattack, to give in or to break off relations. The first option -counter-attacking- means responding on the same level as the other party and is usually negative and can lead to relationships becoming entrenched, especially when they become a succession of emails of grievances. The second option -giving in- means limiting bargaining power by maintaining a good personal relationship and can sometimes lead to some form of exploitation. Breaking off relations, the third option, is a radical way out of certain dissatisfactions in the relationship and, in most situations, is not justified.

In the face of these natural reactions, Ury proposes Don’t react: go to the balcony (Ury 1997, 45).  This means that in negotiations, it is good to analyse situations from a distance, as if you were something unconnected. It is important to eliminate the emotional element that is implicit in all negotiations. In this regard, Ury says that getting on the balcony means letting go of natural impulses and emotions. If, during a negotiation, an emotional outburst occurs, it is advisable to let the emotions flow and, when appropriate, pick up where the meeting left off.

One of the basic functions of learning strategy, which underlies the spirit of the Minerva Strategy Blog, is to know how to identify the tactics of the other party, especially if they have a component of stratagem, deception, simulation, etc. It is important to know strategy so as not to be exploited by people who use tricks that are not what they seem.

An important step in dismantling such a tactic is to identify it and to reveal, during the negotiation, that it is being used. The first tactic Ury talks about is the stone wall. This tactic consists in not giving in. It involves conveying to the other party the firm conviction that there is no alternative to the proposed solution. It is an inflexible form of negotiation, which does not allow any kind of concession.

The way to go against the stone wall is to identify the tactic and conduct a thorough analysis of the interests and needs of the other side (Ury 1997, 52). For this analysis it is necessary to have your own statements and unbiased sources of information. The classic example is the purchase and sale of a flat, where, in addition to the information from the sellers, it is good to check the average price of the properties in the area with another agency.

The second stratagem is attacks, which is made up of pressure tactics designed to intimidate or make a party feel uncomfortable that will eventually lead them to give in (Ury 1997, 52-53). The most common is the threat where a negative consequence is presented if the alternative of not giving in is followed. The way to dismantle these threats is to analyse their credibility and act accordingly. Threats are sometimes made strategically without a real will to carry them out, only to change the will of the other party.

The third stratagem is trickery, which is a tactic aimed at deceiving a party (Ury 1997, 53). In these cases, biased or false information is often given. In the context of negotiations, the habit of impartial fact-checking is important and should not be seen as a symptom of mistrust, but as a professional way of proceeding.

Ury’s advice is that it is relevant to identify these tactics when they are used, but also not to be certain, but to see them as clues about the attitude and style of the other party.

It is also important to analyse yourself. This means that it is necessary to know one’s own emotions, and sometimes our facial gestures or body position can be more illustrative of our thoughts than we think. It is important to control emotions when dealing with relevant issues and especially that these emotions do not condition the final outcome.

In the context of negotiations, Ury advises on certain occasions to pause and be quiet. The pause can be used to step onto the balcony and take a distance. It can also serve to separate oneself from emotions and impulses. However, it is important to keep quiet because in these informal pauses a lot of information and even concessions are often offered to the other party.

Ury says to take time to think (Ury 1997, 56). It is relevant to analyse the various alternatives and the pros and cons of the various options in the negotiation. The joint and divergent interests of the parties should be explored because sometimes people with different interests can reach intelligent and cooperative agreements for both parties.

In the following passage, Ury advises against haste when it comes to important decisions (Ury 1997, 60). Major decisions require time, analysis, expert advice, and weighing up the advantages and disadvantages. It is not good to rush into something important, although it is also true that you should not let a good opportunity slip through your fingers. But we will only know that it is a good opportunity after having analysed other alternatives.

In short, Ury says that our natural impulse in the face of a difficult situation or person is to react, but that is also the worst mistake we can make. Instead of losing your temper or trying to get even, focus on getting what you want.

References

Ury, William (1997), Supere el No. Cómo negociar con personas que adoptan posiciones inflexibles, Barcelona: Ediciones Gestión 2000, trad. Adriana de Hassan. (original title: Gettig past No, 1991)

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Julius Caesar, Zone of Possible Agreement (ZOPA) in Civil War

Oscar Pérez de la Fuente

Carlos III University of Madrid

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3708-846X

Abstract

This paper examines Julius Caesar’s account of the Roman civil war through the lens of negotiation theory, especially the Zone of Possible Agreement (ZOPA). Drawing on passages from Civil War, it analyses the peace proposals exchanged between Caesar and Pompey and evaluates whether their respective Best Alternatives to a Negotiated Agreement (BATNAs) allowed any realistic settlement. Pompey’s proposal required Caesar to withdraw and disarm while his opponents continued mobilising, creating an imbalance that made agreement irrational from Caesar’s perspective. Caesar’s later proposal, by contrast, rested on relative parity and third-party arbitration by the Senate and Roman people, suggesting that negotiations become viable when both sides perceive similar levels of strength and uncertainty. The analysis also shows how non-material factors, particularly pride, reputation, and hostile emotions, narrowed or eliminated the ZOPA. Pompey’s refusal to accept terms that might appear to benefit Caesar, and the explicit desire among some supporters for Caesar’s death, reveal how personal animosity can override strategic calculation. The case illustrates that successful negotiation depends not only on balanced alternatives, but also on emotional management and legitimate, impartial mediation.

Keywords: diplomacy, just war, principled negotiation, emotion, interests, positions 

In a book entitled Civil War (2011), Julius Caesar narrates the political and military conflicts with the Roman Senate and especially with his rival Pompey. These led to a veritable civil war between contending groups looking to seize power.

In this post, I will analyse the successive peace proposals made by Julius Caesar and Pompey, through the lens of ZOPA analysis. The Zone of Possible Agreement – known as ZOPA – is a frame of reference that is relevant to any negotiation. It is defined between the parties’ two BATNAs. That is, between each player’s Best Alternatives to a Negotiated Agreement -BATNA-. Another way of expressing this is to define the ZOPA as the margin between the two reserve prices of each party. In other words, the minimum prices that the parties are willing to accept in a negotiation.

In the work Civil War, the author describes how the conflicts for power in Rome arose. He explains that Pompey made Julius Caesar the following proposal: “Caesar should return to Gaul, withdraw from Rimini, discharge his armies; if he met these terms, Pompey would go to Hispania. Until there was assurance that Caesar would do what he had promised, the consuls and Pompey would not cease levying levies” (Julio César, 2011, 74-75, I.10).

The analysis from ZOPA is that the parties’ BATNAs do not allow for a deal on these terms. The proposed deal is that Julius Caesar must withdraw and disarm while his adversaries continue to arm. Julius Caesar would rather fight with his present forces than disarm. Pompey concedes to go to Hispania but only after he has assembled  the troops. The agreement is unbalanced in terms of the strategic relevance of the concessions between the parties. Therefore, the party that is asked to make a greater effort – to disarm – will easily find a better alternative to the proposed agreement.

Events progressed and it was now Julius Caesar who made a proposal to Pompey for a peace agreement, on the following terms: “that they should cause no more harm to themselves or to the Republic. They themselves were already enough proof, by their own disasters, of how much power fortune has in war. This was the only occasion to treat of peace, so long as both were confident of their strength, and their power was considered equal; if fortune helped only a little to one of the two, he who considered himself superior would not admit of terms for peace, nor consider himself satisfied with a part in which he trusted to possess all.

Since he had not been able to reach an agreement before, the terms for peace had to be requested in Rome from the Senate and the Roman people” (Julio César, 2011, 186-187, III. 10)

This agreement is based on equality of forces and uses the figure of an arbitration by the Senate. It is interesting the reflection that Julius Caesar makes where equality of forces is more favourable to peace, while if one party is more fortunate in combat, it will seek to defeat the other in battle.

What Julius Caesar means is that agreement is possible if the two sides have similar BATNAs. If one side has a very good BATNA – it has a good chance of winning the war – there is no possibility of agreement. The Zone of Potential Agreement -ZOPA- will expand with the uncertainty of the final outcome from two medium BATNAs.

Turning to a third party to settle a dispute is a legitimate, and widely used, way to do so, as long as its impartiality of judgement is guaranteed.

To Julius Caesar’s proposal of peace, Pompey’s reply was: “What does life or the city matter to me if it is to be believed that I have it for Caesar’s benefit; this belief cannot be erased, since it will be believed that by him I have been restored to Italy, when I came out” (Julio César, 2011, 192, III.18).

Here it is worth remembering Fisher and Ury’s rule “Separate the persons from the problem“. One party does not want to enter into a agreement because any solution will look like a success for the other party. In addition to an issue of hierarchy between the two, what seems to be relevant here are the emotions that stand in the way of any agreement. This always leads to conflict.

Proof of this are the words of an officer of the Pompeian army, named Labienus, who at one point in the negotiations said: “Stop talking about peace, for there can be no peace for us unless Caesar’s head is brought to us” (Julio César, 2011, 194, III.20).

It seems clear that there is an emotional problem and that the declared aim of one side is the death of Julius Caesar. In this case, there is no ZOPA. No agreement is possible if one side only wants Caesar’s death to make peace. The other side’s alternative is to fight and defend Julius Caesar’s life.

Pompey’s end also teaches us about strategy. His armies were defeated by Julius Caesar’s armies and set sail for Syria. There he sought help from Ptolemy, king of Egypt, who was at loggerheads with his sister Cleopatra, who later had a relationship with Julius Caesar that has been mythologised. Out of fear of the threat he posed or out of contempt for misfortune, Ptolemy’s advisors agreed to answer Pompey kindly in public and secretly sent two emissaries to kill him (Julio César, 2011, 259, III.104).

This story between Julius Caesar and Pompey can make us reflect on some aspects: a) On the need to establish a Zone of Possible Agreement (ZOPA) according to the BATNA of the parties, their Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement. The key to negotiating power is to have a good BATNA, a good alternative to negotiate; b) Proper management of emotions. They should not be an objective, in themselves, of the negotiation; c) Approach of third parties when their impartiality of judgement is guaranteed.

References

Julio César (2011), Guerra civil, Madrid: Gredos, trans Julio Calonge.

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Thucydides, the negotiating power in the Melian dialogue

Oscar Pérez de la Fuente

Carlos III University of Madrid

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3708-846X

Abstract

This paper examines the Melian Dialogue in Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War through the lens of negotiation theory and bargaining power. It argues that the exchange between Athens and Melos is not only a classic statement of political realism, but also a revealing case study in asymmetric negotiation. The Athenians frame the discussion in terms of power, necessity, and strategic credibility, rejecting appeals to justice except among equals. The Melians, by contrast, defend neutrality, hope, and the possibility of external support, especially from Sparta. Using the concept of BATNA (Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement), the paper analyzes how each side assesses its alternatives and how those assessments shape the negotiation. Athens possesses a stronger BATNA because it can impose its will through military force, while Melos depends on uncertain alliances and resistance. Nevertheless, the paper contends that Athenian strategy is limited, since coercion secures submission but not durable cooperation. The conclusion is that the dialogue illustrates a central lesson of negotiation: bargaining power depends on credible alternatives, but long-term outcomes are often improved by persuasion, legitimacy, and principled agreement rather than force alone.

Keywords: bargaining power, force, neutrality, principled negotiation, BATNA

In the work History of the Peloponnesian War (2013), Thucydides narrates the conflicts that took place in Ancient Greece between the polis of Athens and Sparta. He highlights the famous Melian dialogue in which the Athenians -who held an empire- and the Melians -who inhabited the island of Milos- discuss their future relationship.

This dialogue is characterised by the Melians appealing to arguments of justice, equality and neutrality, while the Athenians use the threat of force and unequal resources. It would be an example, among the classics, of what is called real politik.

The Athenians distinguish between arguments of justice -between equals – and appeals to force -between the powerful and the weak-. The Athenians assert that “justice prevails in the human race in circumstances of equality, and that the powerful do what their strength permits and the weak yield to them” (Tucídides, 2013, 388, V.89). So  according to the Athenians, the Melians must yield.

The Melians attempt to deliberate, advocating a position of neutrality between Sparta and Athens, but offering friendship. The Melians argue “would you not agree that, remaining neutral, we should be your friends rather than your enemies, but not allies of either side” (Tucídides, 2013, 389, V.94).

In a typical response of political realism, the Athenians set their priorities in the relationship with the Melians: 1.- Hatred/Vassalage; 2.- Enmity; 3.- Friendship/Neutrality. Allowing an island to be neutral and friendly is a bad example for the interests of the Athenian empire. From this perspective, the Athenians assert that “your enmity does not harm us so much as your friendship, which is to our vassals a manifest sign of our weakness, while your hatred is a sign of our power” (Tucídides, 2013, 389, V.95).

The Athenians’ argument is an appeal to power and force. They do not try to convince the Melians of the advantages of accepting their position. Rather, they make a serious threat, which given the context must have been credible. The Athenians argue that “this is not a contest for you to measure courage on equal terms so as not to suffer dishonour, but the deliberation is rather about your salvation, which consists in not standing up to those who are much stronger” (Tucídides, 2013, 390, V.101).

The response of the Melians is to relativise the power of the other side and give more value to the alternative of a confrontation than that of surrender. The Melians assert that “wars present vicissitudes that are more evenly shared than the disproportion of forces would suggest. For us to give in immediately holds out no hope, whereas by giving ourselves up to action there is still hope of standing” (Tucídides, 2013, 390, V.102).

This Melian dialogue allows us to address the question of bargaining power. In particular, according to the terminology of the Harvard Method in Getting to yes, from Fisher and Ury, on BATNA. The key element of negotiations is what is the Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement –BATNA-. What is relevant is to identify this BATNA and use it as the yardstick to measure any possible negotiating outcome.

The BATNA marks the worst acceptable outcome of the negotiation. The red line where it is better not to give in. The key is that the better BATNA you have, the more bargaining power a party has. If a party has a strong alternative, it will be able to make greater demands of the other party.

I will now analyse the Melian Dialogue from the perspective of the bargaining power of the parties. The Athenians consider their BATNA to be high because they are powerful and strong. This means that they can conquer the city despite the will of the Melians. The alternatives are the surrender of the Melians or their military defeat.

The Melians try to deliberate and convince the Athenians in terms of equality and justice. Their BATNA is an alliance with Sparta to protect them from Athens. Their alternatives are a lonely and heroic war, an alliance with Sparta, surrender to Athens or compromise with Athens.

From the point of view of strategy, the Athenians failed because they only threatened with force, but did not try to convince the other side of the advantages of being allies. They sought a relationship of vassalage and wanted to impose it through force. The negotiation was about whether they would have to fight to achieve their goals. From today’s perspective, it would be better to have allies than forced vassals.

From the Melians’ point of view, the alternative to negotiating is to ally more strongly with Sparta. The problem with this negotiation is that the alternatives they propose are voluntary surrender or military defeat. These terms are unacceptable to the Melians. The way to improve BATNA is to consolidate and make credible the possible alternatives, particularly the alliance with Sparta. It should also try to deliberate and convince the other side on a principled basis.

Thucydides himself recounts that Athens finally carried out its threat. From this perspective, “the Athenians executed all the Melians of virile age who fell into their hands and reduced the children and women to slavery” ((Tucídides, 2013, 394, V.116). The Melians dialogue does not have a happy ending. The powerful wins by making good on their threat to use force. The lesson, from strategy, is that negotiations should enable parties to improve their bargaining power and better results be obtained, in the long run, from principled and convincing arguments.

References

Tucídides (2013) Historia de la Guerra del Peloponeso, Barcelona: Crítica, trans. Francisco Rodríguez Adrados.

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The strategy of conflict

Oscar Pérez de la Fuente

Carlos III University of Madrid

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3708-846X

Abstract

This article examines Thomas Schelling’s The Strategy of Conflict as a landmark contribution to the analysis of international relations, negotiation, and strategic behaviour. Published in 1960, the book introduced an innovative use of game theory to explain situations in which adversaries are neither locked in absolute opposition nor united by complete cooperation, but instead operate under conditions of mutual dependence. The text highlights Schelling’s distinction between pure conflict, pure cooperation, and mixed conflict-cooperation scenarios, arguing that most human interactions belong to the third category. In such contexts, rational actors seek outcomes that protect their interests while taking account of the choices and expectations of others. Special attention is given to Schelling’s redefinition of strategy as the exploitation of potential force rather than its direct application, a perspective that underpins his influential theory of deterrence. The article also stresses the broader relevance of his framework beyond military affairs, showing its usefulness for politics, business, and everyday decision-making. Ultimately, Schelling’s concept of interdependent decision theory offers a powerful lens for understanding conflict as a negotiable and strategically managed social relationship.

Keywords: diplomacy, detrrence, game theory, interests, positions

In 1960, the economist Thomas Schelling published his work The Strategy of Conflict with a hitherto unusual approach that opened new horizons. His approach was a new analysis of international relations and other areas, applying game theory methods, a part of Economics that carries out simulations of simple games with two or more participants based on the theory of rational choice.

One of the most interesting points of the book is the conceptual material it leaves  to the reader, which allows for multiple applications. Thus, it describes three types of scenarios: pure conflict, pure cooperation, and conflict/cooperation.

Situations of pure conflict would occur if the interests of the antagonists were completely opposed, only “in the case of war, but of a war tending to the total extermination of the enemy.” Situations of pure cooperation are presented as curious exercises in coordination without communication between the parties. For example, where would you meet someone in Madrid – or London or New York- who has received the same instruction, with whom you cannot communicate. Or imagine that you will win 100 euros if you write down on a piece of paper the way to share it out that matches the other party, where communication is impossible.

Schelling’s message is that most scenarios between human beings are ones of cooperation and conflict where there is a common interest and mutual dependence between the parties. Conflict management is sought with mutually acceptable solutions for mutual interests. Hence, the author concludes that most conflict situations are negotiationable scenarios.

The change brought about by this book is its new approach to strategy as applied to international relations and military issues. Thus, strategy does not refer to “the efficient application of force, but to the exploitation of potential force”. This means that the role of armies has an eminently strategic, rather than a purely combative, significance. On another level, this means that victory does not lie in the hand-to-hand combat of the respective forces, but rather in the expectations of the parties and the possibility of respective influence.

From this perspective, Schelling devotes his attention to the notion of “deterrence” as an important element of international relations. He states that an important distinction must be made here between the application of force and the threat of force. Deterrence relates to the exploitation of potential force. Its purpose is to persuade a potential enemy that it is in its own interest to avoid certain courses of action.

The conclusion is that it is not the use of military force, but the threat – serious and credible – of the use of force that would deter the other side from acting. Here would be the paradox that this theory of deterrence is “a theory of the skillful non-use of military force, for which something more than purely military ingenuity is needed”. That is the way to develop strategy as an art and science and to transform some views on international relations and the role of armies. But it would also have applications in business, politics and even everyday life.

In a passage from his book, Schelling offers a definition of strategy based on several elements:

a) it presupposes the existence of a conflict; b) but assumes a common interest of both adversaries; c) it assumes a rational mode of behaviour; d) it focuses on the fact that what appears to each participant as the best course of action depends on what the other does; e) “strategic behaviour” attempts to influence the other’s decisions by acting on their expectations of how the other’s behaviour relates to their own (Schelling, 1980).

How to manage conflict? It seems that this is something we must all deal with in the various spheres of life. In The Strategy of Conflict, Schelling offers a view that was innovative for its time, constructing an analytical framework, based on game theory, to deal with international relations, and at one point he proposes various names for this theory, such as precarious association theory or incomplete antagonism theory.  Perhaps the most successful one is what he called interdependent decision theory. This is the key to the strategy of conflict.

References

Schelling, Thomas (1980), The Strategy of Conflict, Cambridge, Mass. London: Harvard University.

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Start with no

Oscar Pérez de la Fuente

Carlos III University of Madrid

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3708-846X

Abstract

This article examines Jim Camp’s negotiation theory as presented in Start with No and considers its relevance from the perspective of the Minerva Strategy Blog. In contrast to approaches centred on win-win outcomes, Camp argues that effective negotiation begins with a clear and constructive “no,” which clarifies positions, reduces illusions, and creates a more realistic basis for dialogue. The text analyses several core elements of Camp’s framework: the central role of emotions in decision-making, the need to manage one’s own emotional responses while interpreting those of the other party, and the importance of separating personal approval from professional outcomes. It also highlights Camp’s criticism of excessive concessions made to preserve relationships, as well as his emphasis on accountability, learning from failure, and strengthening decision-making through discipline and self-confidence. Rather than treating negotiation as a space for harmony at all costs, Camp presents it as a disciplined process aimed at effective and productive results. The article concludes that his method, though counter-intuitive in relation to dominant models, offers a strategic and realistic perspective in which a constructive refusal can become the starting point for better decisions and more successful negotiations.

Keywords: emotions, merits, principles negotiation, constructive no

Approaches based on win-win negotiations, where the parties seeks an agreement that is beneficial for everyone, have been prevalent. Sometimes, however, the art and science of negotiation can lead to other paths. This is the case of Jim Camp, who is known for his books on negotiation, for being a coach, and for his reputation as a fearsome negotiator.

His most famous work , Start with No. The Negotiating Tools That the Pros Don’t Want You to Know (2026), where he deploys a series of principles, values and techniques that, somewhat counter-intuitively in the face of specific dominant approaches, seek to situate the coordinates of negotiations to seek effective and productive results.

Below, we will discuss some of his ideas from the perspective of the Minerva Strategy Blog.

“In a negotiation, decisions are one hundred per cent emotional (…) Negotiations and even decision-making start with emotions. Emotions run rampant, they are at the root of our initial decision, they are not to be trusted, and they can even be destructive, but they do not have the last word. My system considers them for what they are and works with them, not against them. My system teaches you to move from the emotions that never close the deal, all the way to the decisions that do close the deal” (Camp, 2026, 47, 48-49). 

Emotions in negotiation are a classic topic. Camp says that in Japan, where negotiation is considered an art, it is said that decisions should be made with the stomach, never with the heart or the head. This could be a grave mistake: it is good to know that emotions influence the negotiation scenario, especially from the other party. However, it often has dire consequences when the emotional factor is decisive. The prudent thing to do is to moderate and control one’s own emotions and to analyse and know the other party’s emotions. 

“Negotiations start with a “no”, no “maybe”, let alone “yes”, but with a firm and resounding “no”. In any negotiation, this is the key word I want to hear; all of the above is nothing more than window dressing” (Camp, 2026, 49). 

This is Jim Camp’s top piece of advice: start the negotiation with a “no.” Other possibilities are a waste of time or a way of harbouring illusions that do not prosper. This initial “no” is an open door to justify one’s own positions and to continue discussions. It could be considered a constructive “no”.

“For fear of breaking the relationship with the opponent in the negotiation, the colleague did not want to be too demanding. He didn’t want to hurt his feelings by telling him, “If you don’t sign the contract, there will be no show.” Because of his deep desire for approval, he couldn’t see the real problem with the negotiation” (Camp, 2026, 62-63). 

How many times are we forced to make concessions to save the relationship? Negotiations are not territories to seek personal approval, but there are people with great strategic eagerness, where preserving their relationship in good conditions implies making concessions on the line they mark. Jim Camp’s advice is to clearly separate the outcome of negotiations from the quality of personal relationships.

“Every reader can think of a case where they have chosen an obnoxious but effective person over someone likeable but ineffective. What does friendship have to do with doing good business or making good decisions? Absolutely nothing. And as we’ll see below, I always propose and practice respectful and polite agreements with the adversary” (Camp, 2026, 65).  

Here again, the emotions linked to the particularism of how we human beings relate to one another return. This reflection by Camp highlights that professional decisions are made based on bonds of friendship rather than on objective criteria. Human, all too human. It is desirable in professional environments to value the merits of people, regardless of the emotions they may provoke.

“Take responsibility for bad decisions, learn from them, know failure and move forward because you are one decision away from getting back on track. To take on this attitude and approach takes great discipline and a lot of self-confidence because hitting the nail on the head is important to all of us. It is a powerful need and like all needs to be overcome” (Camp, 2026, 67).

There is a growing interest in accountability, which can mean: explaining one’s actions, justifying them and being sanctioned or rewarded. This is a recommendable exercise, especially regarding decisions in the public sector. From a strategic point of view, a future victory can emerge from a failure. For this to be possible, it is crucial to learn from the circumstances, approaches and dynamics that have made this situation possible and emerge stronger. The word crisis in Greek means “to separate”, “to judge”, “to decide”. A crisis has to serve to improve the decision criteria in the future.

“If you can’t take “no,” you’ll burn a lot of bridges and find no way out of a lot of negotiations. Nothing –absolutely nothing– is as important in a successful negotiation as making it clear from the get-go that “no” is a perfectly acceptable answer in any deal” (Camp, 2026, 69).

The feared negotiator, Jim Camp, insists on starting negotiations with a “no”, because he: does not seek to save the relationship, knows how to manage his own and other peoples’ emotions, does not get carried away by particularistic ties, promotes efficiency, learns from failures and operates from a constructive “no”, to continue negotiating.

References

Camp, Jim (2026), Empieza con un no, Barcelona: Ediciones Obelisco, trans. Daniel Aldea (original title: Start with no. The Negotiations Tools that The Pros don’t Want you to Know, 2002).

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Managing negotiations: arguing better 

Oscar Pérez de la Fuente

Carlos III University of Madrid

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3708-846X

Abstract

This paper reviews the chapter on “arguing better” from Managing Negotiations: How to Get a Better Deal by Gavin Kennedy, John Benson, and John McMillan, highlighting negotiation as a mixed process of cooperation and conflict in which parties seek outcomes they cannot obtain alone. The discussion explains how this stage is shaped by the interaction between interests, rights, emotions, and persuasion, and links it to key concepts such as BATNA and the Zone of Possible Agreement (ZOPA). The text emphasises that effective negotiation requires more than defending positions; it depends on managing communication in a way that reduces tension and prevents escalation. In this regard, the authors distinguish between destructive behaviours—such as interrupting, blaming, sarcasm, and threats—and constructive practices, including active listening, asking open questions, clarifying positions, summarising issues, and giving informative feedback. These strategies help negotiators uncover priorities, test commitment, and avoid misunderstandings that can block agreement. Overall, the chapter presents argument not as a purely confrontational exchange, but as a disciplined and strategic phase in which respectful dialogue improves mutual understanding and increases the likelihood of reaching better negotiated outcomes.

Keywords: principled negotiation, arguing, emotions

A common topic on negotiation courses is the appropriate combination of emotions, tactics, and interests. Sometimes, an idealised and overly collaborative image of negotiation situations is presented when, actually, it is essential to deal with emotional tensions and, in particular, to avoid being manipulated by the other party. Gavin Kennedy, John Benson, and John McMillan approach their book Managing Negotiations: How to Get a Better Deal  (1988) from this “realistic” perspective, where a chapter is devoted to the negotiation stage of arguing better.

The authors start by asserting that people negotiate because they have or believe they have a conflict of rights or interests with the other party. Most negotiation scenarios occur in mixed situations of cooperation and conflict, in which the parties want something from the other party that they cannot achieve on their own. This defines the Zone of Possible Agreement -ZOPA- between the parties’ BATNAs -Best Alternative to Not Negotiating-.

People with different interests argue. When interests close to their heart are threatened, most people know how to argue, and even anyone can become emotional. It is for this reason that we should be concerned about those who avoid speaking up because little or nothing of what they value has been threatened. While some people say they don’t have to argue, others admit they must debate or discuss. This is enough.

Regardless of their name, Kennedy, Benson, and McMillan have chosen to call this phase of negotiation argument.Opening, Presentation, and Exchange are alternative ways of describing this stage. However, the authors opt for the term argument since it indicates that both parties are involved. Although the word usually suggests emotional conflict, it can also mean a rational presentation of the reason for doing or not doing something.

Each side gives reasons why they believe something is necessary or attempts to show by reasoning why something is true. They will discuss these conclusions and try to persuade each other through reasoning.

Improving behaviour

Eliminating the habit of interrupting your opponent from your behaviour is one of the most straightforward and most beneficial steps to improve your negotiating performance. People who interrupt someone are essentially telling them to “shut up.” (“You can’t talk while I’m interrupting you”) (Kennedy, Benson, McMillan, 1998, 54). Naturally, the person receiving this message resents it, and before long, there is shouting between some parties during the negotiation; shouting, including insults, can be expected. The other is treated without respect.

Negative discussions reinforce your opponent’s initial inhibitions, which prevent avenues of negotiation from opening and sometimes prevent agreement on an issue, even if the deal is beneficial to both parties.

Constructive behaviour

The remedy is quite simple: Listen more than you talk. Now, that’s easier said than done. However, this alone is not enough. Positive listening behaviour must be matched by positive speaking behaviour. When speaking, be sure to use time effectively. One way to do this is to ask open-ended questions for your opponent to explain and develop their case.

Your opponent is not prepared to explain everything to you, nor can he be willing to explain anything about his limit position. He will try to accept that his opening position is his limit (Kennedy, Benson, McMillan, 1998, 57). As a result, parties who are in an opening position can easily get into a useless and fruitless conversation. You should not focus too much on the issue on the opening positions. Therefore, as much as possible, let us know your position through questions of clarification and explanation. For more information, you may inadvertently disclose your commitment to your position and the likely routes you are preparing to move forward.

Synthesising is always beneficial, especially when the issues are numerous and complex. It also eliminates confusion and negative arguments. “Let’s summarise what you are asking” is a positive action and helps refocus negotiations (Kennedy, Benson, McMillan, 1998, 58). No matter how absurd or ambitious your demands are, it gives the opponent the feeling that they are at least being listened to with respect.

Constructive feedback

Your answer to the other side is what your opponent can do for you. It is to give your opponent information about your position. If you have extracted data from your opponent in the way suggested above, you can better respond to his position and explain yours.

Settings for an argument:

Avoid:

Interrupting, pointing out, attacking, blaming, being too smart, talking too much, shouting, sarcasm, threats.

Practice:

Listening, clarifying questions, summarising issues as a matter of fact.

Asking to justify your case point by point means being attentive to the signs.

Not being committed to your proposal and your explanations.

Testing your commitment to your position-analysing clues about your priorities.

Seeking and giving information – be wary of unintentional signals (Kennedy, Benson, McMillan, 1998, 62).

To successfully manage negotiations, it is essential to anticipate and prepare for the argument or dispute stage, where the parties present and discuss their rationale, interests and positions to persuade each other. Avoiding attitudes that can hinder effective communication and instead encourage constructive behaviours is crucial. Doing so allows you to negotiate and discuss more effectively, leading to better outcomes.

References

Kennedy, Gavin, Benson, John, McMillan, John (1988), Managing Negotiations. How to get a better deal, London: Hutchinson.