Tag: Principled negotiation

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Julius Caesar, Zone of Possible Agreement (ZOPA) in Civil War

In a book entitled Civil War, Julius Caesar narrates the political and military conflicts with the Roman Senate and especially with his rival Pompey. These led to a veritable civil war between contending groups looking to seize power.

In this post, I will analyse the successive peace proposals made by Julius Caesar and Pompey, through the lens of ZOPA analysis. The Zone of Possible Agreement – known as ZOPA – is a frame of reference that is relevant to any negotiation. It is defined between the parties’ two BATNAs. That is, between each player’s Best Alternatives to a Negotiated Agreement -BATNA-. Another way of expressing this is to define the ZOPA as the margin between the two reserve prices of each party. In other words, the minimum prices that the parties are willing to accept in a negotiation.

In the work Civil War, the author describes how the conflicts for power in Rome arose. He explains that Pompey made Julius Caesar the following proposal: “Caesar should return to Gaul, withdraw from Rimini, discharge his armies; if he met these terms, Pompey would go to Hispania. Until there was assurance that Caesar would do what he had promised, the consuls and Pompey would not cease levying levies” (I.10).

The analysis from ZOPA is that the parties’ BATNAs do not allow for a deal on these terms. The proposed deal is that Julius Caesar must withdraw and disarm while his adversaries continue to arm. Julius Caesar would rather fight with his present forces than disarm. Pompey concedes to go to Hispania but only after he has assembled  the troops. The agreement is unbalanced in terms of the strategic relevance of the concessions between the parties. Therefore, the party that is asked to make a greater effort – to disarm – will easily find a better alternative to the proposed agreement.

Events progressed and it was now Julius Caesar who made a proposal to Pompey for a peace agreement, on the following terms: “that they should cause no more harm to themselves or to the Republic. They themselves were already enough proof, by their own disasters, of how much power fortune has in war. This was the only occasion to treat of peace, so long as both were confident of their strength, and their power was considered equal; if fortune helped only a little to one of the two, he who considered himself superior would not admit of terms for peace, nor consider himself satisfied with a part in which he trusted to possess all.

Since he had not been able to reach an agreement before, the terms for peace had to be requested in Rome from the Senate and the Roman people” (III. 10). (III. 10)

This agreement is based on equality of forces and uses the figure of an arbitration by the Senate. It is interesting the reflection that Julius Caesar makes where equality of forces is more favourable to peace, while if one party is more fortunate in combat, it will seek to defeat the other in battle.

What Julius Caesar means is that agreement is possible if the two sides have similar BATNAs. If one side has a very good BATNA – it has a good chance of winning the war – there is no possibility of agreement. The Zone of Potential Agreement -ZOPA- will expand with the uncertainty of the final outcome from two medium BATNAs.

Turning to a third party to settle a dispute is a legitimate, and widely used, way to do so, as long as its impartiality of judgement is guaranteed.

To Julius Caesar’s proposal of peace, Pompey’s reply was: “What does life or the city matter to me if it is to be believed that I have it for Caesar’s benefit; this belief cannot be erased, since it will be believed that by him I have been restored to Italy, when I came out” (III.18).

Here it is worth remembering Fisher and Ury’s rule “Separate the persons from the problem“. One party does not want to enter into a agreement because any solution will look like a success for the other party. In addition to an issue of hierarchy between the two, what seems to be relevant here are the emotions that stand in the way of any agreement. This always leads to conflict.

Proof of this are the words of an officer of the Pompeian army, named Labienus, who at one point in the negotiations said: “Stop talking about peace, for there can be no peace for us unless Caesar’s head is brought to us” (III.20).

It seems clear that there is an emotional problem and that the declared aim of one side is the death of Julius Caesar. In this case, there is no ZOPA. No agreement is possible if one side only wants Caesar’s death to make peace. The other side’s alternative is to fight and defend Julius Caesar’s life.

Pompey’s end also teaches us about strategy. His armies were defeated by Julius Caesar’s armies and set sail for Syria. There he sought help from Ptolemy, king of Egypt, who was at loggerheads with his sister Cleopatra, who later had a relationship with Julius Caesar that has been mythologised. Out of fear of the threat he posed or out of contempt for misfortune, Ptolemy’s advisors agreed to answer Pompey kindly in public and secretly sent two emissaries to kill him (III.104).

This story between Julius Caesar and Pompey can make us reflect on some aspects: a) On the need to establish a Zone of Possible Agreement (ZOPA) according to the BATNA of the parties, their Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement. The key to negotiating power is to have a good BATNA, a good alternative to negotiate; b) Proper management of emotions. They should not be an objective, in themselves, of the negotiation; c) Approach of third parties when their impartiality of judgement is guaranteed.

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Thucydides, the negotiating power in the Melian dialogue

In the work History of the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides narrates the conflicts that took place in Ancient Greece between the polis of Athens and Sparta. He highlights the famous Melian dialogue in which the Athenians -who held an empire- and the Melians -who inhabited the island of Milos- discuss their future relationship.

This dialogue is characterised by the Melians appealing to arguments of justice, equality and neutrality, while the Athenians use the threat of force and unequal resources. It would be an example, among the classics, of what is called real politik.

The Athenians distinguish between arguments of justice -between equals – and appeals to force -between the powerful and the weak-. The Athenians assert that “justice prevails in the human race in circumstances of equality, and that the powerful do what their strength permits and the weak yield to them” (V.89). So  according to the Athenians, the Melians must yield.

The Melians attempt to deliberate, advocating a position of neutrality between Sparta and Athens, but offering friendship. The Melians argue “would you not agree that, remaining neutral, we should be your friends rather than your enemies, but not allies of either side” (V.94).

In a typical response of political realism, the Athenians set their priorities in the relationship with the Melians: 1.- Hatred/Vassalage; 2.- Enmity; 3.- Friendship/Neutrality. Allowing an island to be neutral and friendly is a bad example for the interests of the Athenian empire. From this perspective, the Athenians assert that “your enmity does not harm us so much as your friendship, which is to our vassals a manifest sign of our weakness, while your hatred is a sign of our power” (V.95).

The Athenians’ argument is an appeal to power and force. They do not try to convince the Melians of the advantages of accepting their position. Rather, they make a serious threat, which given the context must have been credible. The Athenians argue that “this is not a contest for you to measure courage on equal terms so as not to suffer dishonour, but the deliberation is rather about your salvation, which consists in not standing up to those who are much stronger” (V.101).

The response of the Melians is to relativise the power of the other side and give more value to the alternative of a confrontation than that of surrender. The Melians assert that “wars present vicissitudes that are more evenly shared than the disproportion of forces would suggest. For us to give in immediately holds out no hope, whereas by giving ourselves up to action there is still hope of standing” (V.102).

This Melian dialogue allows us to address the question of bargaining power. In particular, according to the terminology of the Harvard Method in Getting to yes, from Fisher and Ury, on BATNA. The key element of negotiations is what is the Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement –BATNA-. What is relevant is to identify this BATNA and use it as the yardstick to measure any possible negotiating outcome.

The BATNA marks the worst acceptable outcome of the negotiation. The red line where it is better not to give in. The key is that the better BATNA you have, the more bargaining power a party has. If a party has a strong alternative, it will be able to make greater demands of the other party.

I will now analyse the Melian Dialogue from the perspective of the bargaining power of the parties. The Athenians consider their BATNA to be high because they are powerful and strong. This means that they can conquer the city despite the will of the Melians. The alternatives are the surrender of the Melians or their military defeat.

The Melians try to deliberate and convince the Athenians in terms of equality and justice. Their BATNA is an alliance with Sparta to protect them from Athens. Their alternatives are a lonely and heroic war, an alliance with Sparta, surrender to Athens or compromise with Athens.

From the point of view of strategy, the Athenians failed because they only threatened with force, but did not try to convince the other side of the advantages of being allies. They sought a relationship of vassalage and wanted to impose it through force. The negotiation was about whether they would have to fight to achieve their goals. From today’s perspective, it would be better to have allies than forced vassals.

From the Melians’ point of view, the alternative to negotiating is to ally more strongly with Sparta. The problem with this negotiation is that the alternatives they propose are voluntary surrender or military defeat. These terms are unacceptable to the Melians. The way to improve BATNA is to consolidate and make credible the possible alternatives, particularly the alliance with Sparta. It should also try to deliberate and convince the other side on a principled basis.

Thucydides himself recounts that Athens finally carried out its threat. From this perspective, “the Athenians executed all the Melians of virile age who fell into their hands and reduced the children and women to slavery” (V.116). The Meliansdialogue does not have a happy ending. The powerful wins by making good on their threat to use force. The lesson, from strategy, is that negotiations should enable parties to improve their bargaining power and better results be obtained, in the long run, from principled and convincing arguments.

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The strategy of conflict

In 1960, the economist Thomas Schelling published his work The Strategy of Conflict with a hitherto unusual approach that opened new horizons. His approach was a new analysis of international relations and other areas, applying game theory methods, a part of Economics that carries out simulations of simple games with two or more participants based on the theory of rational choice.

One of the most interesting points of the book is the conceptual material it leaves  to the reader, which allows for multiple applications. Thus, it describes three types of scenarios: pure conflict, pure cooperation, and conflict/cooperation.

Situations of pure conflict would occur if the interests of the antagonists were completely opposed, only “in the case of war, but of a war tending to the total extermination of the enemy.” Situations of pure cooperation are presented as curious exercises in coordination without communication between the parties. For example, where would you meet someone in Madrid – or London or New York- who has received the same instruction, with whom you cannot communicate. Or imagine that you will win 100 euros if you write down on a piece of paper the way to share it out that matches the other party, where communication is impossible.

Schelling’s message is that most scenarios between human beings are ones of cooperation and conflict where there is a common interest and mutual dependence between the parties. Conflict management is sought with mutually acceptable solutions for mutual interests. Hence, the author concludes that most conflict situations are negotiationable scenarios.

The change brought about by this book is its new approach to strategy as applied to international relations and military issues. Thus, strategy does not refer to “the efficient application of force, but to the exploitation of potential force”. This means that the role of armies has an eminently strategic, rather than a purely combative, significance. On another level, this means that victory does not lie in the hand-to-hand combat of the respective forces, but rather in the expectations of the parties and the possibility of respective influence.

From this perspective, Schelling devotes his attention to the notion of “deterrence” as an important element of international relations. He states that an important distinction must be made here between the application of force and the threat of force. Deterrence relates to the exploitation of potential force. Its purpose is to persuade a potential enemy that it is in its own interest to avoid certain courses of action.

The conclusion is that it is not the use of military force, but the threat – serious and credible – of the use of force that would deter the other side from acting. Here would be the paradox that this theory of deterrence is “a theory of the skillful non-use of military force, for which something more than purely military ingenuity is needed”. That is the way to develop strategy as an art and science and to transform some views on international relations and the role of armies. But it would also have applications in business, politics and even everyday life.

In a passage from his book, Schelling offers a definition of strategy based on several elements:

a) it presupposes the existence of a conflict; b) but assumes a common interest of both adversaries; c) it assumes a rational mode of behaviour; d) it focuses on the fact that what appears to each participant as the best course of action depends on what the other does; e) “strategic behaviour” attempts to influence the other’s decisions by acting on their expectations of how the other’s behaviour relates to their own (Thomas Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict).

How to manage conflict? It seems that this is something we must all deal with in the various spheres of life. In The Strategy of Conflict, Schelling offers a view that was innovative for its time, constructing an analytical framework, based on game theory, to deal with international relations, and at one point he proposes various names for this theory, such as precarious association theory or incomplete antagonism theory.  Perhaps the most successful one is what he called interdependent decision theory. This is the key to the strategy of conflict.

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Start with no

Approaches based on win-win negotiations, where the parties seeks an agreement that is beneficial for everyone, have been prevalent. Sometimes, however, the art and science of negotiation can lead to other paths. This is the case of Jim Camp, who is known for his books on negotiation, for being a coach, and for his reputation as a fearsome negotiator.

His most famous work , Start with No. The Negotiating Tools That the Pros Don’t Want You to Know, where he deploys a series of principles, values and techniques that, somewhat counter-intuitively in the face of specific dominant approaches, seek to situate the coordinates of negotiations to seek effective and productive results.

Below, we will discuss some of his ideas from the perspective of the Minerva Strategy Blog.

“In a negotiation, decisions are one hundred per cent emotional (…) Negotiations and even decision-making start with emotions. Emotions run rampant, they are at the root of our initial decision, they are not to be trusted, and they can even be destructive, but they do not have the last word. My system considers them for what they are and works with them, not against them. My system teaches you to move from the emotions that never close the deal, all the way to the decisions that do close the deal” (Jim Camp, Start with no). 

Emotions in negotiation are a classic topic. Camp says that in Japan, where negotiation is considered an art, it is said that decisions should be made with the stomach, never with the heart or the head. This could be a grave mistake: it is good to know that emotions influence the negotiation scenario, especially from the other party. However, it often has dire consequences when the emotional factor is decisive. The prudent thing to do is to moderate and control one’s own emotions and to analyse and know the other party’s emotions. 

“Negotiations start with a “no”, no “maybe”, let alone “yes”, but with a firm and resounding “no”. In any negotiation, this is the key word I want to hear; all of the above is nothing more than window dressing” (Jim Camp, Start with no). 

This is Jim Camp’s top piece of advice: start the negotiation with a “no.” Other possibilities are a waste of time or a way of harbouring illusions that do not prosper. This initial “no” is an open door to justify one’s own positions and to continue discussions. It could be considered a constructive “no”.

“For fear of breaking the relationship with the opponent in the negotiation, the colleague did not want to be too demanding. He didn’t want to hurt his feelings by telling him, “If you don’t sign the contract, there will be no show.” Because of his deep desire for approval, he couldn’t see the real problem with the negotiation” (Jim Camp, Start with no). 

How many times are we forced to make concessions to save the relationship? Negotiations are not territories to seek personal approval, but there are people with great strategic eagerness, where preserving their relationship in good conditions implies making concessions on the line they mark. Jim Camp’s advice is to clearly separate the outcome of negotiations from the quality of personal relationships.

“Every reader can think of a case where they have chosen an obnoxious but effective person over someone likeable but ineffective. What does friendship have to do with doing good business or making good decisions? Absolutely nothing. And as we’ll see below, I always propose and practice respectful and polite agreements with the adversary” (Jim Camp,Start with no). 

Here again, the emotions linked to the particularism of how we human beings relate to one another return. This reflection by Camp highlights that professional decisions are made based on bonds of friendship rather than on objective criteria. Human, all too human. It is desirable in professional environments to value the merits of people, regardless of the emotions they may provoke.

“Take responsibility for bad decisions, learn from them, know failure and move forward because you are one decision away from getting back on track. To take on this attitude and approach takes great discipline and a lot of self-confidence because hitting the nail on the head is important to all of us. It is a powerful need and like all needs to be overcome” (Jim Camp, Start with no).

There is a growing interest in accountability, which can mean: explaining one’s actions, justifying them and being sanctioned or rewarded. This is a recommendable exercise, especially regarding decisions in the public sector. From a strategic point of view, a future victory can emerge from a failure. For this to be possible, it is crucial to learn from the circumstances, approaches and dynamics that have made this situation possible and emerge stronger. The word crisis in Greek means “to separate”, “to judge”, “to decide”. A crisis has to serve to improve the decision criteria in the future.

“If you can’t take “no,” you’ll burn a lot of bridges and find no way out of a lot of negotiations. Nothing –absolutely nothing– is as important in a successful negotiation as making it clear from the get-go that “no” is a perfectly acceptable answer in any deal” (Jim Camp, Start with no). 

The feared negotiator, Jim Camp, insists on starting negotiations with a “no”, because he: does not seek to save the relationship, knows how to manage his own and other peoples’ emotions, does not get carried away by particularistic ties, promotes efficiency, learns from failures and operates from a constructive “no”, to continue negotiating.

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Managing negotiations: arguing better 

A common topic on negotiation courses is the appropriate combination of emotions, tactics, and interests. Sometimes, an idealised and overly collaborative image of negotiation situations is presented when, actually, it is essential to deal with emotional tensions and, in particular, to avoid being manipulated by the other party. Gavin Kennedy, John Benson, and John McMillan approach their book Managing Negotiations: How to Get a Better Deal from this “realistic” perspective, where a chapter is devoted to the negotiation stage of arguing better.

The authors start by asserting that people negotiate because they have or believe they have a conflict of rights or interests with the other party. Most negotiation scenarios occur in mixed situations of cooperation and conflict, in which the parties want something from the other party that they cannot achieve on their own. This defines the Zone of Possible Agreement -ZOPA- between the parties’ BATNAs -Best Alternative to Not Negotiating-.

People with different interests argue. When interests close to their heart are threatened, most people know how to argue, and even anyone can become emotional. It is for this reason that we should be concerned about those who avoid speaking up because little or nothing of what they value has been threatened. While some people say they don’t have to argue, others admit they must debate or discuss. This is enough.

Regardless of their name, Kennedy, Benson, and McMillan have chosen to call this phase of negotiation argument.Opening, Presentation, and Exchange are alternative ways of describing this stage. However, the authors opt for the term argument since it indicates that both parties are involved. Although the word usually suggests emotional conflict, it can also mean a rational presentation of the reason for doing or not doing something.

Each side gives reasons why they believe something is necessary or attempts to show by reasoning why something is true. They will discuss these conclusions and try to persuade each other through reasoning.

Improving behaviour

Eliminating the habit of interrupting your opponent from your behaviour is one of the most straightforward and most beneficial steps to improve your negotiating performance. People who interrupt someone are essentially telling them to “shut up.” (“You can’t talk while I’m interrupting you”). Naturally, the person receiving this message resents it, and before long, there is shouting between some parties during the negotiation; shouting, including insults, can be expected. The other is treated without respect.

Negative discussions reinforce your opponent’s initial inhibitions, which prevent avenues of negotiation from opening and sometimes prevent agreement on an issue, even if the deal is beneficial to both parties.

Constructive behaviour

The remedy is quite simple: Listen more than you talk. Now, that’s easier said than done. However, this alone is not enough. Positive listening behaviour must be matched by positive speaking behaviour. When speaking, be sure to use time effectively. One way to do this is to ask open-ended questions for your opponent to explain and develop their case.

Your opponent is not prepared to explain everything to you, nor can he be willing to explain anything about his limit position. He will try to accept that his opening position is his limit. As a result, parties who are in an opening position can easily get into a useless and fruitless conversation. You should not focus too much on the issue on the opening positions. Therefore, as much as possible, let us know your position through questions of clarification and explanation. For more information, you may inadvertently disclose your commitment to your position and the likely routes you are preparing to move forward.

Synthesising is always beneficial, especially when the issues are numerous and complex. It also eliminates confusion and negative arguments. “Let’s summarise what you are asking” is a positive action and helps refocus negotiations. No matter how absurd or ambitious your demands are, it gives the opponent the feeling that they are at least being listened to with respect.

Constructive feedback

Your answer to the other side is what your opponent can do for you. It is to give your opponent information about your position. If you have extracted data from your opponent in the way suggested above, you can better respond to his position and explain yours.

Settings for an argument:

Avoid:

Interrupting, pointing out, attacking, blaming, being too smart, talking too much, shouting, sarcasm, threats.

Practice:

Listening, clarifying questions, summarising issues as a matter of fact.

Asking to justify your case point by point means being attentive to the signs.

Not being committed to your proposal and your explanations.

Testing your commitment to your position-analysing clues about your priorities.

Seeking and giving information – be wary of unintentional signals.

To successfully manage negotiations, it is essential to anticipate and prepare for the argument or dispute stage, where the parties present and discuss their rationale, interests and positions to persuade each other. Avoiding attitudes that can hinder effective communication and instead encourage constructive behaviours is crucial. Doing so allows you to negotiate and discuss more effectively, leading to better outcomes.

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Insisting on using objective criteria

The fourth rule of Fisher and Ury’s Harvard Negotiation Project Method is based on the relevance of principled agreements and not giving in to pressure. Negotiations should be arenas for developing good arguments, and negotiators should be open to reason but closed to threats.

In the book Getting Yes. How to negotiate without giving in, Fisher and Ury establish that negotiations aim to reach intelligent and fair agreements, and a good way to achieve this is to turn to established principles, precedents, or community practices. These have an unusual power of attraction when the parties must reach an agreement.

There are two questions to ask at this point: “How do you develop objective criteria?” and second, “How do you use them in negotiation?” On the first question, Fisher and Ury consider that objective criteria need to be independent of what each party wants to achieve and need to be legitimate and practical. These criteria would fulfil an anchoring function in the negotiation, and their legitimacy would be independent of the parties.

Here, it is worth reflecting on what the philosopher Jon Elster has called the civilising force of hypocrisy, where the most powerful party defends arguments with the language of impartiality, where, in fact, it appeals to its own interests. Elster believes that, despite everything, this exercise of turning arguments into the language of fairness favours minorities.

The Harvard Method of Negotiation holds that each issue should be framed as a joint search for an objective criterion. To achieve this impartiality of the method, it is crucial to insist on sharing the search. The classic example is two people who want to share a cake. The unbiased method is for one to split the cake and the other to choose the piece they like best. This guarantees agreement with the final split.

Negotiations tend to be more complex and usually incorporate the price dimension. In the joint search for an objective criterion, a relevant question may be asked about the theory behind the price. In sales and purchases, the price theory is usually based on the various alternative offers and demands on the market, in addition to the specific proposal of the other party. This increases or decreases the parties’ bargaining power and gives arguments for their possible demands.

What is relevant is to build a scope for deliberation with the other party to see the arguments for or against each possibility. Fisher and Ury recommend “reason and be open to reasoning about which principles are more appropriate”. Talking about principles, which underlie positions, has greater persuasive power. Negotiators must be open to reasoned persuasion on the merits of each view.

This approach to reaching intelligent and impartial agreements is an attractive alternative to negotiations based on positions, threats or misinformation. Fisher and Ury argue that “never yield to pressure, only to principle.” The best way to get the other party to do something is not by forcing them, but by convincing them with good arguments in what sense the required action is also in their interest.

From this perspective, negotiations are areas of persuasion that would be based on the combination of two premises: a) Being open to reason; b) Insistence on a solution based on an objective criterion.

This is the last rule of the Harvard Method of Negotiation. Fisher and Ury’s approach allows negotiations to be approached from a constructive and cooperative point of view, where it is considered that reaching a good agreement is a joint task of both parties where the various possibilities should be explored well and on the arguments behind the interests of the parties deliberated. Sometimes, obtaining the yes is not a conquest in enemy territory but a more cooperative task to lay the foundations of mutual benefits.

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Inventing options for mutual benefit

In the third rule of the Harvard Negotiation Method, Fisher and Ury propose, on the one hand, exploring the various possibilities that may arise and, on the other hand, making the common interests explicit. The authors’ first piece of advice is to “expand the pie before dividing it”.

In the face of this rule that demands “inventing options for mutual benefit,” some obstacles in the form of attitudes or inertia inhibit the creative process of inventing multiple options. The first is premature judgment when negotiators with tunnel vision focus on specific options. The second is the search for a single answer, where it is taken for granted that each situation has only one possible solution. The third is to assume that the pie is fixed and the only variable is to share it when there may be situations where the pie increases to benefit both parties. The fourth is to think that “solving your problem is your problem”, where the issue is that the negotiation is approached from a competitive view between the parties and the cooperative aspects are forgotten. It is possible to increase mutual benefit from the cooperative approach by analysing the various options.

Faced with this scenario, in which the various possibilities of negotiations are not taken advantage of, Fisher and Ury propose multiple solutions. The main approach is to consider that negotiations have a creative component where the act of inventing options has to be separated from the act of judging them. This can be achieved by brainstorming, a process where the parties meet and openly and uninhibitedly put forward all possible options. It is a process where creativity counts and where there is a rule of non-criticism. Afterwards, it is necessary to evaluate and decide whether to incorporate the multiple options into the negotiation.

By following these steps, negotiation is transformed into a creative and cooperative process of finding the best mutually beneficial solutions. Ways must be invented to make the decision easy for both parties. It is sometimes forgotten that negotiations occur because the parties have common interests. Most of the time, these common interests remain implicit. The Harvard Negotiation Method states that these common interests must be made explicit and insists upon as a productive basis for negotiation.

On the other hand, the differences in interests of the parties have great strategic power for the smooth course of negotiations. In particular, there may be situations where an issue is of great interest to you and of little importance to the other party or vice versa. This can lead to a compromise agreement. It is precisely the exploration of differing interests that can be the key to a successful negotiation.

Negotiations occur in scenarios of cooperation and conflict between human beings. One party wants something from the other and vice versa. One way to approach negotiation is as a competition between adversaries who are jockeying for positions. Fisher and Ury propose a method for seeking intelligent agreements through a creative process of inventing multiple options for mutual benefit. Parties may have partly common and partly divergent interests. Insisting on shared interests and creatively managing differing interests is the best way to find an agreement that is best for both parties. Negotiating well also means being creative.

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Focus on interest, not positions

The second rule of the Harvard Negotiation Method states: focus on interests, not positions. We often find ourselves in situations that become endless, where the parties argue hard about one or two variables. Each party sets its positions there, and each concession has been made after hard work. There may be more rigid or flexible negotiators, but Fisher and Ury propose that the approach of these negotiations is not the most appropriate.

The authors of Getting to Yes. How to negotiate without giving in consider that rather than focusing the negotiations on positions, it is smarter to analyse the parties’ interests and look for a solution that satisfies both parties. Human beings have diverse interests that are not usually on the surface of the terms of a negotiation. In addition, the interests of different people are multiple and diverse, which can be especially relevant in negotiations.

The same object can have a very different utility depending on each person’s interests. Although negotiations usually stay on the surface, in the discussion from positions that seem irreconcilable, reluctant to make mutual concessions. The key is to stop and analyse our interests in that negotiation and, especially, what the other party’s interests are. Here, you should pay attention to all the torrents of information we can obtain from issues that are unimportant, such as informal conversations, body language, impartial data checks, etc.

The Harvard method believes that negotiation should focus on interests, and the way to bring them out is to ask the question, “Why?” This forces each side to justify its points of view. This effort can bear fruit if, in this way, the interests underlying the positions held are ultimately appealed to. Moreover, the negotiation must focus on those interests to be an intelligent agreement.

In the second instance, Fisher and Ury propose to ask: “Why not?”. Here, the parties must justify why their choices are better than the other party’s and in what way. They must develop the convincing power of their proposals and try to show their advantages. This question also serves to explore the interests of each party.

Negotiation occurs because of common interests, although there may also be divergent ones. When undertaking a negotiation, it is essential to know the other party’s true interests. It is also relevant when making an offer to analyse what it entails for you and whether it meets your interests. Sometimes, the solution can reasonably meet the interests of both parties. But when making an offer, the need to save face with the other party must always be present. In other words, it helps to justify the final result.

If the agreements are very disproportionate, they may not be stable over time. This would mean they do not reflect to one of the interests of one of the parties.

In this Harvard Method rule, Fisher and Ury advise, “Make a list of interests”. The usual focus of negotiations is often placed on seeking concessions on one variable, usually monetary. But we lose sight of the interests, which may be diverse and may require different accommodations. It would be interesting to explore the underlying interests in the negotiations to make them explicit because, on many occasions, the shared and divergent interests may show that we are facing an interdependent decision: to get something, we need the other party, and the other party needs us to get something, often something different.

Human beings have diverse interests, and we seek to satisfy them through our life plan. Negotiations, which can be professional negotiations that also encompass everyday life, are a way to find cooperative agreements with others, and success can come from knowing how to explore mutual and divergent interests. It is a way to focus negotiations on interests and reach intelligent agreements.