Category: Politics

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Juan de Mariana, on tyranny

Juan de Mariana was a prominent theologian, historian, philologist and political philosopher Spanish Jesuit. He was born in Talavera de la Reina (Toledo) in 1536 and died in Toledo in 1624. He studied at various European universities, most notably the University of Alcalá, where he also taught. He became famous with his work “Historia General de España“.

In Political Philosophy, his work Del Rey y de la institución real, of which Rogelio Fernández Delgado, on the website of the Spanish Royal Academy of History, points out that “not only it is considered to be the most notable and daring work of political literature written in Spain, but it has even been compared to El Quijote, in the sense that what Cervantes’ book represents for literature, Juan de Mariana’s work represents for Political Theory.”

The analysis in this post, in the style of Estrategia Minerva, will focus on this work of Political Philosophy by Juan de Mariana, on his characterisation of tyranny and on the controversial question of tyrannicide. This would be the flip side of the question of what virtues a good ruler should have, a classic topic.

Juan de Mariana starts from the famous typology of forms of government, formulated by Aristotle, where monarchy is the government of one in favour of the common good and tyranny, for one’s own benefit, and compares them as follows:

“Even if he starts with good intentions, he falls into all kinds of vices, especially greed, ferocity and avarice. It is proper for a good king to defend innocence, to repress wickedness, to save those in danger, to procure for the republic happiness and every kind of good; But not the tyrannus, who makes his greatest power consist in being able to indulge unrestrainedly in his passions, who thinks no wickedness unseemly, who commits all manner of crimes, destroys the estates of the mighty, violates chastity, kills the good, and comes to the end of his life without there being a single vile deed to which he has not given himself up. He is, moreover, the king who is humble, approachable, accessible, a friend to live under the same right  as his fellow-citizens; and the tyrant, distrustful, medicious, a friend to terrify by the apparatus of his force and his fortune, by the severity of his customs, by the cruelty of the judgments passed by his bloody tribunals”(Juan de Mariana, Del Rey y la institución real, cap. V).

The tyrant commits vile deeds, evils and crimes and falls into greed, ferocity and avarice. A good king defends innocence, happiness, stands against evil and danger, is humble, approachable, and seeks to be governed by the same rules as his fellow citizens.

Although there are certain anachronisms, it is worth considering whether some of today’s rulers fall more under this tyrannical profile or that of the kindly king.

Specifically, on the polemic of tyrannicide, Juan de Mariana states that “not because the citizens cannot gather together should they lack the natural ardour to overthrow serfdom, to avenge the manifest and intolerable evils of the prince, or to repress the attempts that tend to the ruin of the people, such as that of upsetting the religions of the homeland and calling to the kingdom our enemies. I can never believe that he was wrong who, seconding public desires, has in such circumstances made an attempt on the life of his prince”(Juan de Mariana, Del Rey y la institución real, cap. VI).

In this paragraph, tyrannicide is justified. There is a tradition in the History of Ideas in this sense, but here it is made explicit. It can be argued that the murder of a person cannot be the solution to political problems, which have other, more civilised channels and do not require such sacrifices of human life. What also underlies here is the notion of raison d’état, defended by Machiavelli, where illegal or immoral actions would be justified if the state is in danger.  

It is relevant because Thomas Aquinas refers to the fight against tyranny, from more moderate premises and assuming the principle of the lesser evil. Thus, he states: “the tyrannical regime is not just, since it is not ordered to the common good, but to the particular good of the one who holds power, as Aristotle proves in Politics. Hence, the disturbance of this regime does not have the character of sedition, unless the regime of the tyrant is altered in such a disorderly way that the tyrannised multitude suffers greater detriment than with the tyrannical regime” (Tomás de Aquino, Suma Teológica II-II, c. 43).

Juan de Mariana insists on the lawfulness of the right of resistance to illegitimate authority, in these terms: “but when there is no more hope, when the sanctity of religion and the health of the kingdom are already endangered, who will be so lacking in reason as not to confess that it is lawful to shake tyranny with the force of law, with the laws, with arms?” (Juan de Mariana, Del Rey y la institución real, cap. VI).

This connects with ideas of the Enlightenment thinkers, where power is based on a covenant and if one party – the ruler – does not comply with it, the other party – the people – has the right to resist that ruler and his rules. In Locke‘s formulation, the legitimacy of power is based on the tacit consent of the people. These theories of the Social Contract are conditional, the agreement must be fulfilled to achieve legitimacy. Otherwise, it would be justified to react to the injustice of tyranny.

On the duty of the ruler to obey the law, Juan de Mariana states “let the prince finally know that the sacrosanct laws on which public health rests will only be stable if he himself sanctions them by his example. He must lead such a life that he never allows himself or anyone else to have more power than the laws, for since they contain what is lawful, it is indispensable that he who violates them should depart from probity and justice, which is granted to no one, least of all to the king, who must use all his power to sanction equity and to vindicate crime, always having in both things his understanding and his care” (Juan de Mariana, Del Rey y la institución real, cap. IX).

The ruler must comply with the laws he promotes. Later, this is considered one of the key principles on which the Rule of Law is based. Beyond the merely legal sphere, the current demands of accountability require those in power exemplarity—they are references or role models for society—and coherence—harmony between public statements and private behaviours-.

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Machiavelic ethical model

There is a new approach that is called the Machiavelic ethical model, which is an extreme and particular version of the consequentialist ethical model. It is inspired by the work of Niccolò Machiavelli . It is curious how a term Machiavellianism has emerged from a thinker that the Spanish Royal Academy of Language defined as “a way of proceeding with cunning, duplicity and perfidy”. Machiavelli has not had much good press, but the Machiavelic ethical method is more common than it seems.

Machiavelli’s best-known motto is the end justifies the means but this attribution is not entirely accurate because the phrase does not appear in any of his works. However, in The Prince , he states:”(…) and in the actions of all men, and especially of princes, which it is not prudent to challenge, one judges by the result. For that reason, let a prince have the credit of conquering and holding his state, the means will always be considered honest”. (Machiavelli, The Prince, XVIII).

The Machiavelic ethical model affirms, as a fundamental rule, the desire for success and the ends chosen are more important than the means. However, that does not mean that behaviour must automatically be immoral. The Prince is a treatise on human nature, from which we can learn that the prince if he wants to achieve success, must be duplicitous and cover his tracks.

This may involve an apparent adherence to values, but ultimately being pragmatic. In one of the best-known passages, Machiavelli asks “in what way a prince must keep his word” and offers an answer that is in his line: “a wise lord cannot, nor ought be to, keep faith when such observance may be turned against him, and when the reasons that caused him to pledge it exist no longer. If men were entirely good this precept would not hold, but because they are bad, and will not keep faith with you, you are not bound to observe it with them. Nor will there ever be waiting to a prince legitimate reasons to excuse nonobservance” (Machiavelli, The Prince, XVIII).

From the deontological ethical model, it could be argued that promises should always be kept and the truth always told. If we analyse the scenario according to Machiavelli, there are three circumstances that make it advisable not to keep a promise: a) The consequences of the promise have changed over time; b) The reasons for the promise no longer exist; c) The other person will not keep their word with you. The second reason is the strongest and could be invoked if the reasons for the promise really no longer exist. The first should have been adequately foreseen and for the third, many people will honour their promises.

There are several interpretations of Machiavelli. The Machiavelic version of Machiavelli sees Machiavelli as a diabolical, immoral, anti-Christian author who justifies any action to achieve his goals. The republican version of Machiavelli states that he was a patriot, that he wanted to defend the State above all and that he considered that the Prince should have civil and political virtues and not religious ones.

For this reason, some consider him to be the founder of Political Science, because he considers that politics has its own rules distinct from ethics and religion.

From a strategic point of view, Machiavelli offers interesting readings, doubts and reflections. For example, we find this interesting advice for strategists: “It is necessary to be a fox to discover the snares and a lion to terrify the wolves” (Machiavelli,The Prince, XVIII). But perhaps the key element in strategy is how to act in the face of someone Machiavelic.The first and most difficult task will be to identify him because, as Aranguren states, “the first thing to do is to identify him.  a self-confessed Machiavellianism would be annulled as such: to be effective it has to be hypocritical and pay tribute to virtue” (Aranguren, José Luis, Ética y Política)

The strategist must be vigilant and, for example, establish mechanisms for impartial verification of the different operations. Someone seeking success, feigning conformity, does not keep their word. Strategies must be developed to prevent such situations. Machiavelli points out that if we learn from the qualities of the fox and the lion, we can get closer to success.

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Kissinger, the global negotiator

From John F. Kennedy until recently, every U.S. president has sought the counsel of Henry Kissinger (1923-2023), along with CEOs and political leaders from around the world. His views on foreign policy, State affairs, and world order have been much discussed. However, his remarkable world record as a negotiator has largely gone unnoticed, leading James K. Sebenius, Nicholas Burns and Robert H. Mnookin to author the book Kissinger, the Negotiator. Lessons from Dealmaking at the Highest Level. Sebenius is a professor with the Harvard Negotiation Project and wrote the book 3-d Negotiation: Powerful Tools to Change the Game in Your Most Important Deals.

Some negotiators prefer strategy and the big picture, whilst others focus on the emotion and empathy, and specific points. Few combine both positions. Sebenius et al. examine Kissinger’s uniquely developed ability to focus on a broader perspective. They characterise his approach as strategic, realistic, prone to change the game, and agile in multi-party situations.

Many people believe that negotiation is simply bargaining; it is not unlike a bazaar, where one person makes an extremely high offer and the counterpart keeps offering the same. Concessions are made gradually with the goal of bringing the parties to a final agreement. Kissinger characterised and criticised this standard approach to negotiation early in his career and later this was reflected in his negotiations: There is no point in moderating offers if the agreement is normally between two starting positions. Effective negotiation would propose a much more radical starting point than one is willing to accept. The more outrageous the initial offer, the clearer the idea of what one “really” wants to be considered a compromise.

Kissinger advised convincing the other side of one’s own underlying objectives and interests rather than exaggerating tactics. He argued that failure to do so hinders effective negotiation. In general negotiations, Kissinger expressed, “I made a considerable effort to leave no doubt of our fundamental approach. Only romantics think they can prevail in a negotiation by trickery: only pedants believe in the advantage of obfuscation. In a society of sovereign states, an agreement will only hold if all parties consider it in their interest. They must have  a sense of participation in the result. The art of diplomacy is not to outsmart the other side, but to convince it either of  common interest or of penalties if an impasse continues”. He continued “The wise diplomat understands that he cannot afford to trick his opponent; in the long run a reputation for reliability and fairness is an important assets. The same negotiators meet over and over again: their ability to deal with one another is undermined if a diplomat acquires a reputation of evasion or duplicity”. 

It is evident that the realist in Henry Kissinger values actions and results rather than words: “Statesmen value the steadiness and reliability in a partner, not the restless quest for even-new magic formulas”.  This brings us closer to a virtuous model, to maintain stable relationships over time, based on trust and reputation, than the Machiavellian model of short-term results.

Analysing the negotiations in which Kissinger was involved, the best contribution to more than 130 meetings between China and the United States in Warsaw was when an ambiguous and elegant formula that both parties could live with was achieved. This enabled the United States and China to cooperate on many other relevant issues. The crucial sentence is as follows:

“The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either sides of the Taiwan Straits maintain that there is but one China. The United States Government does not challenge that position.”

Just words? Hardly. There have been countless examples of such creatively ambiguous formulations of Kissinger negotiations. The common denominator is always face-saving formulations, but they result in both sides declaring victory and being able to move forward from previous deadlocks.

In some cases, however, no word of the agreement may be too costly to pronounce or formalise in writing. These are tacit agreements. However, the constructively proposed agreement may be unacceptable if enforced.  

These tacit agreements, in general, can be useful when there is a group of stakeholders, or a powerful audience, internal or external, that opposes a formal agreement and can impose costs on a negotiator who agrees to them.  Without many of the possible costs, a tacit agreement can be based on the desired content, irrespective of its form.

Constructive ambiguity and tacit agreements have a privileged place in the tactical toolkit of Kissinger, the global negotiator.