Category: Strategy

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Machiavelli, pragmatism and power

Oscar Pérez de la Fuente

Carlos III University of Madrid

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3708-846X

Abstract

This paper examines Niccolò Machiavelli’s political thought through the lens of pragmatism and strategic power, drawing primarily on The Discourses alongside the more familiar claims associated with The Prince. It outlines how Machiavelli can be read in two registers: as the supposed advocate of ruthless expediency and as a republican thinker concerned with civic virtue and the preservation of the state. The discussion highlights a further, influential interpretation—Machiavelli’s separation of politics from ethics and religion—arguing that political action follows distinct rules shaped by uncertainty, conflict, and changing circumstances. Selected passages from The Discourses are used to illustrate concrete strategic lessons: when to temporize rather than suppress emerging tensions; why agreement is easier on generalities than on particulars; the importance of adapting to the “times” as a condition of continued success; and the claim that defending one’s country may justify extraordinary means when the state itself is at risk. The text also stresses the informational dimension of strategy, including skepticism toward apparent opponent errors and the need for verification mechanisms. Overall, Machiavelli is presented less as a theorist of cynicism than as an analyst of decision-making under pressure, where ends, means, and context must be aligned.

Keywords: political pragmatism, strategy, power

The best-known work by Niccolò Machiavelli is The Prince; however, it is perhaps in this work  The discourses (2003 )that his political ideas are most clearly revealed. Some people see two sides to Machiavelli: a) The Machiavellian Machiavelli of The Prince, where ‘the end justifies the means’; b) The republican Machiavelli of the Discourses, who is a patriot concerned with civic virtues.

Another interesting interpretation of Machiavelli is the view that he was the first to separate politics from ethics and religion. He claims that politics has its own rules, which are different from ethics.

In this post, I have selected several topics addressed by Machiavelli in The discourses, which have an undeniable strategic background and numerous applications.

I.33.- When either within a State or against a State an inconvenience has made headway, the safer course is to temporise, not to supress it (Machiavelli, 2003, 190).

Machiavelli’s advice is that, when a source of conflict arises, one should try to adapt to it rather than confront it head-on. Facing the problem may escalate it, while avoiding it may eventually cause it to fade away for extrinsic or intrinsic reasons.

A well-known Spanish politician often uses this tactic to manage conflicts, although rather than attributing it to his reading of Machiavelli, people tend to put it down to his personality. This strategy has its pros and cons, which should be analysed on a case-by-case basis.

The main concern will be the assets at stake and the potential losses or damage if the conflict succeeds. If the conflict is of minor significance, it may be advisable to avoid it. However, when it comes to matters of vital importance, it is better to confront it, even if this does not always mean launching a direct attack. It does, however, involve a plan of action based on the best strategy available.

I.47.- Though men make mistakes about things in general, they do not make mistakes about the particulars (Machiavelli, 2003, 225).

There is a certain tension between discussions of abstract issues and those concerning specific matters. When it comes to the former, people tend to say a great deal and may even reach a consensus. What Machiavelli points out is that when the discussion turns to specific matters, it becomes more difficult to reach agreement and easier for someone to be misled.

It is worth recalling the rule of the Harvard Method Focus on interests, not positions. Behind individual positions lie underlying interests, and these must be properly explored to reach effective and sensible agreements.

III.9.- That is behoves one to adapt oneself to the times if one wants to enjoy continued good fortune (Machiavelli, 2003, 425).

One definition of intelligence is the ability to adapt to change. Any good strategy is based on the understanding that the current situation is not permanent. The key issue addressed by strategic intelligence is how to manage change in such a way as to achieve the best possible results.

Situations of change often involve tension and uncertainty, but the key is to be clear about the objectives that really matter and to devise an appropriate strategy.

III.41.-The one’s country should be defended whether is entail ignominy or glory, and that it is good to defend it in any way whatsoever (Machiavelli, 2003, 514). 

This would be the version of ‘the end justifies the means’ that appears in The Discourses. If the State is in danger, any means are justified. The statement could be interpreted in a Machiavellian light or, alternatively, as the view of a true patriot. According to the latter interpretation, this would not be applicable to other spheres and could only be applied when the State, as the highest interest, is in danger.

This view of means and ends is characteristic of Machiavelli. But the alignment of means and ends is precisely the key element of strategy. In other posts, I have outlined the deontological, consequentialist, Machiavellian and virtuous ethical models, where each one addresses the ethical dimensions of various strategic approaches. Strategy aims for victory or success, but each ethical model involves a qualitatively different way of achieving it.

III.44.- Results are often obtained by impetuosity and daring which could never have been obtain by ordinary methods (Machiavelli, 2003, 519).

In a dynamic environment, it is crucial to thoroughly evaluate all possibilities, even those that may initially appear improbable. One should aim for the highest possible expectations once the data has been thoroughly and realistically analysed.

It is essential to clearly understand your priorities and what you value. You need to know your desired outcome and the non-negotiable points. Strengths depend on the parties’ needs, which may not always align, and that’s where agreement can be found.

III.48.- When the enemy is seen to be making a big mistake, it should be assumed that it is but an artifice (Machiavelli, 2003, 524).

Having the most and best information about the other party enables one to assess their actions and statements. It is important to understand their intentions, views, and character. One should be wary of the possibility of deception or some other subtle form of pretence. Mechanisms should be established to verify data, statements or assessments impartially. It is necessary to cross-verify accounts between people with differing strategic interests.

Occasionally, some people take these impartial checks as a sign of mistrust. However, one must separate personal relationships from the subject of the negotiation. Verifying the relevant facts is the duty of any good strategist. 

References

Machiavelli, Nicolò (2003), The Discourses, London New York: Penguin Books, trans. Leslie J. Walker. 

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How to negotiate rationally in an irrational world

Oscar Pérez de la Fuente

Universidad Carlos III de Madrid

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3708-846X

Abstract

This paper reviews and contextualises Deepak Malhotra and Max H. Bazerman’s chapter “How to negotiate rationally in an irrational world” from Negotiation Genius, highlighting how psychological biases shape bargaining outcomes even among skilled negotiators. Framed as an analysis for the Minerva Strategy Blog, the text distinguishes biases of the mind (e.g., fixed-pie assumptions, attention to dazzling attributes, and non-rational escalation of commitment) from biases of the heart (e.g., conflicting motivations, egocentricity, overconfidence, irrational optimism, and regret aversion). Drawing on Daniel Kahneman’s dual-process theory, it argues that effective negotiators should shift from intuitive, automatic “System 1” responses to deliberate “System 2” reasoning when stakes are high. Practical recommendations include creating explicit System 2 checklists, avoiding negotiations under time pressure and ultimatum tactics, and spreading complex bargaining across multiple sessions to reduce improvisation and error. The paper also stresses learning through analogies by studying multiple negotiations simultaneously and focusing on underlying principles rather than details, echoing the Harvard Method’s emphasis on interests over positions. Finally, it addresses interacting with others’ biases by anticipating their consequences, encouraging less biased decision criteria, and systematically verifying counterpart information to maintain rational judgment in imperfect contexts.

Keywords: bias, emotions, information, interests, positions, ultimatums

Deepak Malhotra  and  Max H. Bazerman are professors at Harvard University and authors of the book  Negotiation Genius: How to Overcome Obstacles and Achieve Brilliant Results at the Bargaining Table and Beyond (2013). This work is particularly interesting because, in addition to using common tools and concepts from Negotiation Theory, delves into the field of emotions, approaching negotiation processes from the perspective of Psychology. 

Specifically, one of the most relevant parts of the book is the analysis of biases in negotiation. Biases occur in the heart and mind and “affect even the best and brightest”  (Malhotra, Bazerman, 2013, 197). Malhotra and Bazerman study: fixed-size pie bias, dazzling attributes bias, non-rational escalation of commitments bias as biases of the mind; conflicting motivations, egocentricity, overconfidence and irrational optimism, regret aversion as biases of the heart.

Below, we will analyse the chapter “How to negotiate rationally in an irrational world”, where these authors explain how to deal with the biases of the heart and mind in negotiation contexts, from the perspective of Minerva Strategy Blog.

Strategy 1 on how to deal with your own biases states: “Think according to system 2″ (Malhotra, Bazerman, 2013, 199). . The Nobel Prize in Economics Daniel Kahneman  In his work Thinking, Fast and Slow, he has analysed certain phenomena concerning the influence of Psychology in Economics, such as anchorage.  

System 1, which corresponds to intuition, is generally fast and automatic, without the implicit and emotional effort with which we make most decisions in our lives. System 2 corresponds to reasoned thinking, is slower, requires effort, and is explicit and logical. You could say that we generally have “autopilot” in system 1, and if something does not work, system 2 kicks in.

The first recommendation in this strategy is: “Make a list for System 2” (Malhotra, Bazerman, 2013, 200).  Important decisions, therefore, in the business world should be made by System 2. In other words, they should be carefully considered, properly thought through, weighing up the various scenarios and values at stake. Do not be swayed by first impressions, impulses, or emotions, which are implicit in biases. Skilful management of these biases can be part of the business practices and tricks of the other party.

The second tip states: “Avoid negotiating under time pressure” “(Malhotra, Bazerman, 2013, 200-201). Time management is crucial in many negotiations. It is important to know how to deal with ultimatums, which, in many cases, are just another negotiating tactic. The key is that, with less time, it will be more difficult to properly analyse the negotiating map. 

The third recommendation states: “Spread negotiations over multiple sessions” (Malhotra, Bazerman, 2013, 202). . To avoid unpredictability and improvisation in decision-making, it is beneficial to be able to negotiate over several sessions, allowing all relevant issues to be addressed from different angles with certainty. 

Strategy 2, on how to deal with your own biases, states: “Learn by using analogies” “(Malhotra, Bazerman, 2013, 202).  Experience is a source of knowledge; you learn from your mistakes. The authors summarise this approach by stating that “the key is to figure out how to extract principles from experiences and examples”. Precedents for a similar situation should be taken into account and their relevance in the course of events should be assessed. 

The first tip in this strategy 2 is: “Study multiple negotiations simultaneously” (Malhotra, Bazerman, 2013, 204). It is useful to learn about various strategies and negotiation frameworks similar to the one you are involved in. It is also beneficial, in light of this information, to map out various negotiation scenarios, with the possible outcomes for the parties involved.

The second recommendation states: “Focus on principles, not details” (Malhotra, Bazerman, 2013, 205). The important thing is to identify the interests involved and what might be the best way to satisfy them for both parties. This is the most genuine area of negotiation, which reminds me of the principle of the Harvard Method: Focus on interests, not positions.

Strategy 3 on how to deal with your own biases states: “Adopt the outsider’s perspective”. The parties are sometimes so involved in a negotiation that the intervention of an impartial third party is necessary. This is even institutionalised in the form of negotiation mediators. Or, in some regulated cases, the parties may submit their case to arbitration by a third party.

Strategy 1 for dealing with other people’s biases states: “Incorporate the consequences of others’ biases into your strategy” ” (Malhotra, Bazerman, 2013, 205). . At this point, Malhotra and Bazerman seem to be saying that if others act on biases of the heart or mind, that is to say if they are irrational, we should build our strategies to take advantage of this in business interactions.

Strategy 2 for dealing with other people’s biases states:  “Help others apply less biased criteria” (Malhotra, Bazerman, 2013, 212). One thing you can share with the other party is the lesson of making decisions within a reasonable time frame, after conducting a thorough analysis, without emotional constraints, and detecting negotiating tactics and tricks.  

Strategy 3 for dealing with other people’s biases says, “Weigh up the information provided by others” (Malhotra, Bazerman, 2013, 214). Relevant data provided by the other party in business contexts should be routinely checked. A typical example is the price of an item for rent or sale. It is advisable to find out the market price of that item, whether for rent or sale, and compare it with the offer made. Some people complain about the purpose of these checks, as if they were a sign of a lack of trust. They simply seek to avoid bias in the negotiation because, as Malhotra and Bazerman argue, we seek to negotiate rationally in an irrational world. 

References

Kahneman, Daniel (2011), Thinking fast and slow, New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. 

Malhotra, Deepak, Bazerman, Max H. (2013), El negociador genial. Cómo obtener grande resultados en la mesa de negociación y más allá, Barcelona: Ediciones Urano, trans: María Isabel Merino Sánchez.

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The best strategy is to prevent stratagems

Oscar Pérez de la Fuente

Universidad Carlos III de Madrid

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3708-846X

Abstract

This essay clarifies the ethical boundary between strategy and stratagem by revisiting strategy’s military origins and its contemporary use in business, politics, and everyday life. Strategy is presented as the art and science of planning and selecting appropriate means to achieve a goal, while stratagem is distinguished as a ruse in war and, outside that context, as cunning or deceptive artifice. The discussion asks why deception can appear more legitimate in war, noting the high cost of defeat and the prevalence of zero-sum logics, and contrasts this with the mixed landscape of cooperation and conflict in ordinary life. Against this backdrop, four ethical models are used to evaluate when, if ever, stratagems are acceptable. A deontological approach rejects deception on principle, emphasizing truth-telling and promise-keeping. Consequentialism permits stratagems only insofar as outcomes justify them, but highlights their instability over time as discovery becomes likely. Machiavellianism treats success as the supreme rule and relies on simulation and dissimulation, yet faces the same temporal risk of exposure. Virtue ethics takes an ambivalent, moderation-based stance, allowing limited cunning only when it can plausibly align with virtuous character. The overall conclusion is cautionary: a robust strategy should minimise dependence on stratagems.

Keywords: strategy, stratagem, consequantialist ethical model, deontological ethical model, Machiavelian ethical model, virtuous ethical model

Strategy has military origins, where a series of skills and abilities were required to organise operations aimed at achieving victory for armies. Nowadays, strategy is discussed in relation to a myriad of topics that, on the surface, seem to have little to do with its military background. Perhaps what they have in common is that the need to be strategic stems from the cost of losing, which can sometimes be unbearable. In other words, strategy arises because we seek the best and most suitable means to guarantee the end goal, whether it be military victory or success in business, politics, or life.

In previous posts, I have analysed four ethical models associated with strategy: deontological, consequentialist, Machiavellian, and virtuous. It is time to take stock. To do so, I will draw on the distinction between strategy and stratagem.

There are several possible definitions of the first term, depending on the field (military, business, politics, game theory, etc.). I will adopt a definition that serves explanatory purposes. Strategy is the art and science of developing a plan and choosing the appropriate means to achieve the proposed goals.

On the other hand, the Spanish Royal Academy of Language defines stratagem as, in its first meaning, “a ruse of war” and, in its second meaning, “cunning, pretence and artful deception”. As can be seen, stratagem also has a military origin. The term “ruse” is defined by the Spanish Royal Academy of Language as “a device, a means skilfully and cleverly employed to achieve some end”.

One possible conclusion seems to be that, according to these definitions, skilful and cunningly employed device is more justified in war than in other areas. In other words, a stratagem in a military context is a ruse and, outside that context, it is artful deception.  The answer may lie in the fact that the objective of war is victory, but if it is not successful, military defeat and its dire consequences ensue. Also, because in military terms, we often talk about enemies and consider scenarios that economists refer to as zero-sum: what they lose, we gain, and vice versa.

Life is richer in nuances than war. People find themselves in situations of cooperation and conflict and develop their life plans to achieve their professional or personal goals. I mentioned in a previous post that we are all philosophers—we ask ourselves questions, we define our alpha and omega—and that we would be better off if we were all strategists. What role do stratagems play?

Here we will see the functionality of the ethical models analysed in previous posts. The deontological strategist condemns the use of stratagems because they have an element of deception. The two maxims of the deontological model are to always tell the truth and keep promises. We should walk a fine line to use a stratagem that complies with these two maxims and leads to success.

The consequentialist strategist evaluates actions based on their results or on the maximisation of a chosen variable – well-being, utility, money, happiness, etc. According to this model, stratagems will be valid depending on the consequences they produce. The key question is whether an artificial deception can be stable over time. A distinction should be made between interactions that occur once or over a longer period or are lifelong. The use of stratagems does not last over time because it increases the risk of being discovered and, therefore, would no longer produce the desired consequences.

The Machiavellian strategist is a specialist in stratagems, but authentic Machiavellianism consists precisely in not being noticed. Their vision is an art of simulation and dissimulation, the highest rule of which is the desire for success. The means are appropriate if they achieve the ends proposed. The Machiavellian strategist makes abundant use of cunning and pretence to achieve their goals. However, like the consequentialist, the passage of time increases the risk that their true actions and intentions may be discovered.

The virtuous strategist has an ambivalent position on stratagems. They can develop skills and dispositions that shape their character and involve pretence or cunning, but within known limits. According to the law of the middle term, virtue lies in moderation, never in excess. Furthermore, according to this view, not everything can be called a virtue; it is a pluralistic view, but not a relativistic one.

In summary, the deontological strategist condemns stratagems; the consequentialist strategist values stratagems based on the consequences they produce, fearing discovery over time; the Machiavellian strategist habitually uses stratagems while pretending not to; and the virtuous strategist may use stratagems, in moderation, but only if they can be considered virtues.

After these reflections, it can be said that the best strategy is to be wary of stratagems.

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Strategic tightrope walking

Oscar Pérez de la Fuente

Universidad Carlos III de Madrid

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3708-846X

Abstract

This paper examines the strategic logic of “tightrope walking” (brinkmanship) as analysed by Dixit and Nalebuff, using the Cuban Missile Crisis as an illustrative case. It reconstructs how the United States’ decision to impose a naval blockade deliberately introduced a controlled risk of escalation that was intended to reshape Soviet expectations without making an unconditional, fully committed threat. The discussion highlights the central trade-off of the tactic: increasing the probability of an accidental or uncontrolled catastrophe in order to reduce the probability that the opponent initiates or sustains a harmful course of action. The analysis emphasises the role of credibility, signalling, and risk management in calibrating a threat that is “large enough to be effective but small enough to be credible.” The paper also clarifies how tightrope walking differs from, yet resembles, the game-theoretic “chicken” dilemma: both feature escalating danger and interdependent outcomes, but brinkmanship relies on manipulating perceived thresholds and the opponent’s aversion to avoidable disaster. Finally, the paper notes that controlling risk is not merely tactical; it may require altering the underlying game through institutional or strategic changes that lower the incentives to approach the brink.

Keywords: strategic tightrope walking, salami tactic, risk, diplomacy, nuclear deterrence, chicken game

United States President John F. Kennedy declared a naval blockade in Cuba on 22 October 1962, after a week of internal deliberations. The Soviet Union could have reacted to this action by increasing the risk of nuclear conflict to critical levels, which Kennedy believed had a one-third to one-half chance of occurring. After days of tension, statements, and clandestine talks, Khrushchev chose to avoid direct confrontation, withdrawing the missiles from Cuba and returning them to the Soviet Union. This was done in exchange for a promise from the United States to withdraw its missiles from Turkey in the near future. Khrushchev chose to back down after considering the possibility of a nuclear catastrophe (Dixit, Nalebuff, 1991, 225).

Dixit and Nalebuff, in their works Thinking Strategically (1991) and The Art of Strategy (2010), examine this historical event and explore the idea of strategic tightrope walking. This tactic is based on deliberately creating a risk that is sufficiently intolerable for the opponent that they are induced to eliminate it, thereby complying with our wishes. This is a technique that requires skilful use of credibility and proper risk management, as one might expect, but it can also be a very effective strategy for achieving predetermined goals. 

The classic example of strategic tightrope walking has been the Cold War and the use of nuclear deterrence. To prevent the Soviets from launching a conventional attack against Europe or the United States, it is necessary to expose them to the possibility that the conflict will escalate and a nuclear exchange will occur. The Soviets would proceed more slowly if the risk of pursuing that course increased. The United States and the Soviets would likely offer mutual concessions, despite running a greater risk of escalation.

The increased probability of a conventional conflict escalating should be offset by the decreased probability of initiating a war. If Khrushchev considered the level of risk unacceptable, the use of strategic tightrope walking will be successful. It would have allowed Kennedy to choose a larger threat that is large enough to be effective but small enough to be credible.

Like any other strategic move, its aim is to alter the opponent’s expectations to influence their actions. Therefore, strategic tightrope walking is a type of qualified threat. To use this tactic successfully, it is necessary to understand its distinctive characteristics.

Dixit and Nalebuff ask: First, why not threaten the opponent with the certainty of a terrible outcome, rather than the lesser risk of it happening? Second, how do you determine whether the risk will materialise? Third, what is the appropriate level of risk? (Dixit and Nalebuff, 1991, 228).

Strategic tightrope walking is the tactic of pushing your opponent to the brink of catastrophe to make them back down. This is an extreme application of the Silver Rule: do not do unto others what you would not have them do unto you. The individual eventually gives in to your tactic because they do not want to cause an avoidable disaster.

This strategic tightrope walking bears a resemblance to the chicken game dilemma. In game theory, the chicken game dilemma arises when two drivers are travelling in opposite directions at high speed towards the same point on the same road. Each driver is aware of their car’s reaction time and turning radius, which are assumed to be identical for both competitors. Each must decide when the time comes to swerve. This decision must be made without considering the other driver’s decision, as it is irrevocable. One opponent’s quick decision cannot affect the other.

This chicken dilemma is based on a scenario where there is increasing risk and an outcome that is interdependent on the other player’s decisions in relation to one’s own decisions.  This increasing risk, if both players fail to change their attitude, could lead, in the worst-case scenario, to a collision between the two vehicles, with fatal consequences.

It seems that strategic tightrope walking is an initially more cautious approach, which considers all possible scenarios and selects the one that presents the least risk. In chicken games, with the same game structure, the outcome is uncertain and depends on how the other driver acts compared to the driver in question. The crucial question is: who is the first to give way?

Let us imagine a fragile seven-party agreement, with disparate and even conflicting interests and idiosyncrasies, with another negotiator who holds a position of power—which depends on maintaining this fragile agreement. Here, strategic tightrope walking—and the parties’ risk management—would be combined with the salami tactic. With the threat that the pact will end, one party obtains a concession, with each slice it cuts, no matter how small, having the potential to be the last straw. The key to making this type of threat credible is that none of the parties has exact knowledge of where the dividing line lies.

Strategic tightrope walking involves not only creating a risk, but also carefully keeping the level of that risk under control. Reaching this conclusion does not mean that one must accept the situation and accept the risk of nuclear war. To reduce the risk, it is necessary to address the problem at a more fundamental level, that is, to change the game.

References

Dixit, Avinash, Nalebuff, Barry J. (1991), Pensar estratégicamente, Barcelona: Antoni Bosch editor, trans: Ana Varela, Alicia Valls.

Dixit, Avinash, Nalebuff, Barry J. (2010), El arte de la estrategia, Barcelona: Antoni Bosch editor.

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Vicente Montano, Arcane of Princes

Oscar Pérez de la Fuente

Carlos III University of Madrid

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3708-846X

Abstract

Manuel Martín Rodríguez’s preliminary study on Arcano de Príncipes argues, following Cánovas del Castillo and Robert S. Smith, that there is a 17th-century manuscript considered to be a precursor to Malthus. Smith documents that this manuscript, found in the National Library, is not anonymous: it is signed by Captain Vicente Montano and dated 19 September 1681. It is not, however, a demographic treatise, but rather a compilation of political precepts comparable to Machiavelli and Bodin, dedicated to the Duke of Medinaceli, minister to Charles II. Drawing on fragments annotated ‘in the style of Minerva’s Strategy’, several theses are highlighted: the utility of war and provisioning as means to distract and subdue the people (‘bread and circuses’); the advisability of avoiding perpetual provincial governments to reduce resistance and the risks of corruption; and the use of ambiguity and obscure language as a technique of simulation and dissimulation to legitimise decisions without revealing their true aims. Finally, the strategic relationship between war and peace is examined, along with the place of truth in government action, highlighting the Machiavellian logic of the preservation of power.

Keywords: Machiavellianism, bread and circuses, accountability

In Manuel Martín Rodríguez’s preliminary study of the work Arcano de Príncipes /Arcane of Princes in the edition published by the Spanish Centre for Constitutional Studies/Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, it is argued that Cánovas del Castillo was the first to mention an anonymous manuscript that was a true precursor to Malthus (Martín Rodríguez, 1986, XIII).  As Robert S. Smith explains in the article “Spanish Malthusianism in the 17th Century“: “A recent search in the National Library in Madrid has uncovered a manuscript entitled Arcano de Príncipes, which is clearly the work consulted by Cánovas del Castillo, although it is not the copy he used. The manuscript in the National Library bears the name of its author, Captain Vicente Montano, and is dated 19 September 1681″ (Smith, 1955, 351).

Smith adds: “The Arcano de Príncipes is not a treatise on population but rather a compilation of political precepts comparable to the writings of Machiavelli, Bodin and (among Spaniards) Saavedra Fajardo. The essay is dedicated to the Duke of Medinaceli, chamberlain and prime minister of Charles II” (Smith, 1955, 351).  Once again, political philosophers are close to the exercise of power, although they do not wield it, and seek to provide the best advice for the exercise of public responsibilities, a fruitful combination of Theory and Practice.

Next, excerpts from Vicente Montano’s Arcano de Príncipes will be discussed in the style of Estrategia Minerva Blog.

“The surest occupation, and one that brings princes the benefit for which they seek it, is to wage war as soon as the common people begin to discuss the government, for, contenting themselves with talking only about matters pertaining to the public state, they extend their curiosity to abundance, since, once war is waged, they usually buy their daily sustenance, and in this way, having nothing to do but eat, and their thoughts being base and vile, they never raise their spirits to sublime and painful things that might give their princes cause for concern. The satirist Juvenal understood well, in two words, the way to keep it more pleasant, which is to give it bread and festivals, a sentence that applies to all domains” (Montano, 1986, 18).

How beautifully expressed in these lines is the universal principle of “panem et circenses” (bread and circuses)! It seems that in Rome they already knew how to manipulate the people based on their appetites. The incisive point made by Captain Montano is that the way to entertain the people was to wage war, which would greatly occupy their conversations, combined with an abundance of food, resulting in minimal problems for the government. A universal recipe for politics, since Juvenal. 

“The present King of France, having recognised that the perpetual governments enjoyed by the Princes of the blood had at other times served as a support to give greater rigour to the concerns of the Kingdom, has divided the provinces in another way, varying their governors and changing them when he sees fit. The dignitaries of a monarchy should not remain in the government of the provinces for life, because when a new successor is appointed, they find it very difficult to relinquish their command” (Montano, 1986, 46). 

Holding public office for many years gives incumbents a wealth of experience, but, as is often pointed out, there is a greater risk of corruption. If constitutionalism emerged as an approach that sought to affirm that all power had limits in the face of absolutism, democracy implies that public officials must be accountable for their actions. This means explaining the actions taken, justifying them, and being rewarded or punished for them. This is linked to transparency and accountability as inherent characteristics of a democracy of quality.

“There are many traces, maxims, and stratagems that the Prince can use to make the world believe that everything he does is based on reason and justice, without the common people being able to penetrate any of his operations, deceiving even the wisest and most prudent so that they do not recognise the ambiguity of his intentions, however great they may be, dressing his speeches in obscure words and profound concepts, even when he appears to be making himself clearly understood” (Montano, 1986, 52-53). 

This paragraph seems to have been written by Machiavelli, who can be interpreted  in different ways, some more elitist, others more republican. One possible reading is that he recommends that rulers engage in simulation and dissimulation to achieve their predetermined objectives, without any necessary link to morality. This is political rationality, which has its own rules and is autonomous from ethics and religion. In this paragraph of Arcano de Príncipes, we sense the Machiavellian Machiavelli giving stark advice. 

“And except for some ministers of the first rank, who share the burden of government, the rest of the subordinates must live as blind as the lowest common people. However, to completely blindfold the vassals, and make them believe that the Prince is working for their greater good and tranquillity, he must flatter them with the peace they have so desired during the war, without them being able to see through this deception. Having already disturbed the peace by the desire for war, he cannot abandon war for the sake of peace, because in peace the vassals do not die except in accordance with the merits of their crimes, but in war, the innocent and the guilty share the same fate” (Montano, 1986, 53).

Vicente Montano combines two variables: the role of truth in politics and the strategic use of war and peace. As mentioned above, Arcano de Príncipes is in line with Machiavelli’s thought, where political expediency, and among these, the main one of remaining in power, must guide the actions of the ruler, who must publicly maintain an irreproachable and convincing position, the result of hypocrisy towards their true interests. Using war and peace within political calculations is regrettable but common. Wars often cause many casualties and irreparable damage, and it would be desirable for exceptional situations to elicit exceptional responses. However, this point of view is not always shared.  

References

Montano, Vicente (1986), Arcano de príncipes, Madrid: Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, preliminary study of  Manuel Martín Rodríguez.

Smith, Robert S. (1955), “Maltusianismo español del siglo XVII: el Arcano de príncipes de Vicente Montano”, El Trimestre Económico, 22(87), 350–358. Available: https://www.eltrimestreeconomico.com.mx/index.php/te/article/view/2417 (Las visit: 2 May 2026).

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Francisco Suárez, on the just cause 

Oscar Pérez de la Fuente

Carlos III University of Madrid

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3708-846X

Abstract

This paper presents an interpretation of Francisco Suárez’s theory of just war and its relevance to understanding contemporary conflicts. Following a brief biographical and intellectual overview of the author, the text reconstructs the core of his argument: no war can be deemed just without a legitimate cause that is necessary and based on a grave wrong already committed which cannot be redressed by other means. From there, it examines the principle of proportionality—the cause must be grave and proportionate to the foreseeable damages of war—and distinguishes three classical just causes of war: the unjust appropriation of property or territories, the denial of common rights under the ius gentium(transit and trade), and grave injury to honour. The analysis translates these scenarios into contemporary terms (territorial disputes, the protection of human rights and the limits of reputation as a cause for war) and discusses the role of war as a last resort in the face of institutional and diplomatic alternatives. Finally, it addresses the possibility of armed resistance against a tyrant, linking it to debates on the legitimacy of origin and exercise, and concludes with a warning about political polarisation and the need for strategies to prevent the escalation of conflict.

Keywords: just war, proportionality, diplomacy, tyrannicide

Francisco Suárez is the greatest exponent of 16th-century scholastic philosophy in Spain. He was born in Granada in 1548 and died in Lisbon in 1617. He was a philosopher, theologian, and jurist. He was Jesuit (1564) and he studied in Salamanca and taught theology in Segovia (1571), Valladolid (1576), and Rome (1580). He was Professor of Theology at the Universities of Alcalá (1585) and Salamanca (1593), and in 1597 he went to Coimbra, where he had to take another doctorate in Theology to be able to teach. His works include Metaphysical Disputations/ Disputaciones metafísicas, which was very successful in his time, based on classical and scholastic authors.

This will be followed by a discussion of Francisco Suárez’s just cause theory of war, as reflected in his essay War, Intervention, International Peace/Guerra, intervención, paz internacional (1956), in the style of Estrategia Minerva Blog. 

What are the just titles of war according to natural reason?

“No war can be just unless there is a legitimate and necessary cause. The conclusion is certain and evident. Now this just cause and sufficient reason for war is a grave injury already consummated which can neither be avenged nor otherwise redressed” (Suárez, 1956, 75).

Bobbio recalls that the positions that tend to justify all wars are called warmongering; those that tend not to justify any are included in active pacifism and the intermediate ones that approve some and condemn others are just war theories. Precisely, Suárez’s approach is to specify the assumptions under which a war would be just.  

Bobbio affirms two fundamental principles: “the certainty of the criteria for judgement and the impartiality of the judge”.  He concludes that neither of these two principles is respected in the declaration and conduct of a war (Bobbio, 1999, 52).

Francisco Suárez’s doctrine of war is that it is only just as an ultima ratio, when other means of compensation, redress, or restoration are not available in cases of of grave injury. It is interesting to think that Clausewitz, the great theorist of strategy, said that “war is a mere continuation of politics by other means”. Strategy and negotiation must be elements that minimise the negative consequences of war. In other words, war, as a bad outcome, can help the parties to move strategically to avoid it.

“Not just any cause is sufficient to justify war, but only that cause which is grave and proportionate to the damage of war. It would be against natural reason to inflict very serious damage for a slight injury. Nor can the judge punish all kinds of offences, but only those which offend against the general peace and the good of the State” (Suárez, 1965, 76).

It is associated with prudence, and a principle of justice, that the just cause of war must be serious and proportionate to its damage. However, this is not always the case.  

“Various kinds of injury are the cause of just war; these may be grouped into three chapters. First, when the prince seizes the property of another and refuses to restore it. Second, when without reasonable cause he denies the common rights of peoples, such as the right of transit on public roads and international trade. Thirdly, a grave injury to reputation or honour. These injuries are also sufficient cause for war when they are inflicted on the sovereign himself or on his subjects, for the prince is the guardian of the State and of the citizens” (Suárez, 1956, 77). .

Translated into more contemporary language, the first scenario would be that of territorial disputes between two States over a particular territory, where issues such as sovereignty, territorial integrity, etc. are mixed. This is a classic source of conflict, which can be handled diplomatically, although it sometimes ends in war.

The second scenario would be a serious violation of human rights, here there would be questions such as whether the issue of interference in internal affairs, whether democracy can be exported or universal jurisdiction of human rights. It could be argued that there are universal, regional and state systems to protect human rights, with many mechanisms for conflict resolution, although in the end a defensive war to protect human rights may be justified.

The third case of serious injury to reputation or honour would not currently be grounds for just cause for war, as there are other mechanisms for protection.  Instead, social networks have popularised the cancel culture, where people are denigrated for their actions or opinions considered politically incorrect.

“The war of the people against their sovereign is not intrinsically evil, even if it is aggressive; the other conditions of just war must, however, be fulfilled for it to be honest. This conclusion is only reached if the prince is a tyrant. It can happen in two ways: first, if the prince is a tyrant in terms of his dominion and power; second, if he is a tyrant only in terms of the way he rules.” (Suárez, 1956, 126).

This distinction of Suárez would be a precedent for the notions established by Max Weber as legitimacy in origin and legitimacy in exercise when dealing with the analysis of power. These words on the conditions of just war against the tyrant follow the medieval tradition of justifying tyrannicide, but give broader coverage by including this struggle within the types of just war.

In the first place, the tyrant is, Suárez clarifies, the one “who obtains the government of a State against the Law, especially if he rules it without justice and according to his will”. Secondly, the tyrant is he “who abuses his power, superiority or force in any concept or matter, or who simply imposes that power and superiority to an extraordinary degree”.

Just war would be a mechanism for protection against the abuse of power. Is war the best mechanism for that purpose? Constitutionalism had that very aim, which looks to counterbalance the different powers. However, there are conceptions of the separation of powers in democratic societies about who should have the last word on the most controversial issues and about whether all issues can be put to a vote. 

As Foucault put it, “politics is the continuation of war by other means”. The growing political polarisation is worrying. Carl Schmitt argued that politics is about benefiting your friends and prejudicing your enemies. This is known as the friend/enemy dialectic. Considering political adversaries as enemies is the first step to strong polarisation, civil conflict, and disunity. Let us hope that politics will find the best means and strategies for a better future and few, if any, just cause for war.

References

Bobbio, Norberto (1999), El problema de la guerra y las vías de la paz, Barcelona: Altaya, trad. Jorge Binaghi.

Suárez, Francisco (1956), Guerra, intervención y paz internacional, Madrid: Espasa Calpe.

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Thucydides, the negotiating power in the Melian dialogue

Oscar Pérez de la Fuente

Carlos III University of Madrid

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3708-846X

Abstract

This paper examines the Melian Dialogue in Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War through the lens of negotiation theory and bargaining power. It argues that the exchange between Athens and Melos is not only a classic statement of political realism, but also a revealing case study in asymmetric negotiation. The Athenians frame the discussion in terms of power, necessity, and strategic credibility, rejecting appeals to justice except among equals. The Melians, by contrast, defend neutrality, hope, and the possibility of external support, especially from Sparta. Using the concept of BATNA (Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement), the paper analyzes how each side assesses its alternatives and how those assessments shape the negotiation. Athens possesses a stronger BATNA because it can impose its will through military force, while Melos depends on uncertain alliances and resistance. Nevertheless, the paper contends that Athenian strategy is limited, since coercion secures submission but not durable cooperation. The conclusion is that the dialogue illustrates a central lesson of negotiation: bargaining power depends on credible alternatives, but long-term outcomes are often improved by persuasion, legitimacy, and principled agreement rather than force alone.

Keywords: bargaining power, force, neutrality, principled negotiation, BATNA

In the work History of the Peloponnesian War (2013), Thucydides narrates the conflicts that took place in Ancient Greece between the polis of Athens and Sparta. He highlights the famous Melian dialogue in which the Athenians -who held an empire- and the Melians -who inhabited the island of Milos- discuss their future relationship.

This dialogue is characterised by the Melians appealing to arguments of justice, equality and neutrality, while the Athenians use the threat of force and unequal resources. It would be an example, among the classics, of what is called real politik.

The Athenians distinguish between arguments of justice -between equals – and appeals to force -between the powerful and the weak-. The Athenians assert that “justice prevails in the human race in circumstances of equality, and that the powerful do what their strength permits and the weak yield to them” (Tucídides, 2013, 388, V.89). So  according to the Athenians, the Melians must yield.

The Melians attempt to deliberate, advocating a position of neutrality between Sparta and Athens, but offering friendship. The Melians argue “would you not agree that, remaining neutral, we should be your friends rather than your enemies, but not allies of either side” (Tucídides, 2013, 389, V.94).

In a typical response of political realism, the Athenians set their priorities in the relationship with the Melians: 1.- Hatred/Vassalage; 2.- Enmity; 3.- Friendship/Neutrality. Allowing an island to be neutral and friendly is a bad example for the interests of the Athenian empire. From this perspective, the Athenians assert that “your enmity does not harm us so much as your friendship, which is to our vassals a manifest sign of our weakness, while your hatred is a sign of our power” (Tucídides, 2013, 389, V.95).

The Athenians’ argument is an appeal to power and force. They do not try to convince the Melians of the advantages of accepting their position. Rather, they make a serious threat, which given the context must have been credible. The Athenians argue that “this is not a contest for you to measure courage on equal terms so as not to suffer dishonour, but the deliberation is rather about your salvation, which consists in not standing up to those who are much stronger” (Tucídides, 2013, 390, V.101).

The response of the Melians is to relativise the power of the other side and give more value to the alternative of a confrontation than that of surrender. The Melians assert that “wars present vicissitudes that are more evenly shared than the disproportion of forces would suggest. For us to give in immediately holds out no hope, whereas by giving ourselves up to action there is still hope of standing” (Tucídides, 2013, 390, V.102).

This Melian dialogue allows us to address the question of bargaining power. In particular, according to the terminology of the Harvard Method in Getting to yes, from Fisher and Ury, on BATNA. The key element of negotiations is what is the Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement –BATNA-. What is relevant is to identify this BATNA and use it as the yardstick to measure any possible negotiating outcome.

The BATNA marks the worst acceptable outcome of the negotiation. The red line where it is better not to give in. The key is that the better BATNA you have, the more bargaining power a party has. If a party has a strong alternative, it will be able to make greater demands of the other party.

I will now analyse the Melian Dialogue from the perspective of the bargaining power of the parties. The Athenians consider their BATNA to be high because they are powerful and strong. This means that they can conquer the city despite the will of the Melians. The alternatives are the surrender of the Melians or their military defeat.

The Melians try to deliberate and convince the Athenians in terms of equality and justice. Their BATNA is an alliance with Sparta to protect them from Athens. Their alternatives are a lonely and heroic war, an alliance with Sparta, surrender to Athens or compromise with Athens.

From the point of view of strategy, the Athenians failed because they only threatened with force, but did not try to convince the other side of the advantages of being allies. They sought a relationship of vassalage and wanted to impose it through force. The negotiation was about whether they would have to fight to achieve their goals. From today’s perspective, it would be better to have allies than forced vassals.

From the Melians’ point of view, the alternative to negotiating is to ally more strongly with Sparta. The problem with this negotiation is that the alternatives they propose are voluntary surrender or military defeat. These terms are unacceptable to the Melians. The way to improve BATNA is to consolidate and make credible the possible alternatives, particularly the alliance with Sparta. It should also try to deliberate and convince the other side on a principled basis.

Thucydides himself recounts that Athens finally carried out its threat. From this perspective, “the Athenians executed all the Melians of virile age who fell into their hands and reduced the children and women to slavery” ((Tucídides, 2013, 394, V.116). The Melians dialogue does not have a happy ending. The powerful wins by making good on their threat to use force. The lesson, from strategy, is that negotiations should enable parties to improve their bargaining power and better results be obtained, in the long run, from principled and convincing arguments.

References

Tucídides (2013) Historia de la Guerra del Peloponeso, Barcelona: Crítica, trans. Francisco Rodríguez Adrados.

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Breviary for politicians

Oscar Pérez de la Fuente

Carlos III University of Madrid

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3708-846X

Abstract

The text presents and discusses the Breviary for Politicians (1684), attributed to Cardinal Jules Mazarin or his circle. Mazarin (1602–1661), an Italian cardinal in the service of the French monarchy, played a decisive role in the early years of Louis XIV’s reign and helped lay the foundations of French power in Europe. The text also highlights the influence of Richelieu, who promoted his career, as well as the underlying themes of political realism and pragmatism reminiscent of Machiavelli. The author announces that this will be followed by an edition by María Blanco (La política del disimulo), which provides the historical context for the work.

Strategic lessons are drawn from these quotations: speak with caution and avoid over-confidence, as rumours can destroy one’s reputation; feign modesty, kindness and equanimity to gain esteem; exercise responsibilities with moderation and a spirit of public service; and avoid intervening in polarised disputes if one cannot prove one is in the right. In one’s dealings with others, it is recommended not to make promises lightly, to be difficult to deceive and to remain consistent, although the commentator notes that it may be wise to rectify one’s course. To avoid hatred, he advises acting with grace in the face of dismissal and not harbouring grudges. Finally, he suggests listening, reflecting, allowing time to resolve complex matters and not meddling in other people’s problems—advice that is also applicable outside the realm of politics.

Keywords: deception, strategy, Machiavellianism, prudence, pretence

We continue with the series dedicated to handbooks. This time it is dedicated to Breviary for politicians, published in 1684, attributed to Cardinal Mazarin, or someone close to him. Jules Mazarin was born in Pescina, Italy, in 1602 and died in Vincennes, France, in 1661. He was an Italian cardinal, without being ordained a priest, in the service of the French monarchy who exercised power in the early years of the reign of Louis XIV. He was a politician, diplomat, military officer, and adviser to Louis XIV, and he was responsible – as Prime Minister – for laying the foundations for making France a great European power.

For those interested in politics and strategy, and somewhat mythomaniacal, it is noteworthy that the historical figure who supported and turned Cardinal Mazarin into a statesman was the famous Cardinal Richelieu, whom he replaced in office. Both are presumed to be clever and astute, as well as efficient and reasonable in leading government. Machiavelli‘s pragmatic approach and political realism influence this Breviary for politicians.

The following is a commentary on passages from Cardinal Mazarin’s Breviary for politicians in the style of Estrategia Minerva Blog. It is worth noting that it follows the edition of this work by María Blanco entitled La política del disimulo. Cómo descubrir las artimañas del poder con Mazarino (2024), of Editorial Rosamerón, which includes the essay of the editor.

Gaining esteem and fame 

“Never forget that anyone is liable to spread rumours about you if you have behaved – or spoken – too freely or rudely in his presence. In this matter, do not trust servants or pages. People look at an isolated incident to generalise; they take advantage of it to spread your bad reputation” (Cardenal Mazarino, 2024, 69). 

It is excellent advice to be cautious when speaking and be wary of who might be listening. Rumour-mongers/moral lordscan use past confidences to destroy your image. Your public reputation may be based on a hoax a thousand times repeated. According to the Spanish Royal Academy of Language, a hoax is “false news propagated for some purpose”. It is better to be prudent and leave hoaxes and rumours to others.

“Feign modesty, candour, kindness and perfect equanimity. Be grateful, congratulate, show yourself available, even to those who have done nothing to deserve it” (Cardenal Mazarino,2024, 71).

If you ever have a responsibility, exercising it with moderation, equanimity, and a willingness to serve the public is essential. Your character must adapt to the circumstances and cultivate, in addition to prudence, the Aristotelian virtues of temperance, justice and courage.

“Refrain from intervening in discussions where opposing points of view clash unless you are absolutely sure you are right and can prove it” (Cardenal Mazarino, 2024, 73). 

There are two pernicious tendencies: civil war/factionalism that seeks to divide society into irreconcilable camps and want-to-be-right-about-everything. If one is in a position of authority, it is crucial to make dissent and unity compatible.

Gaining each other’s favour 

“Avoid easy promises and granting too many permissions. Be difficult to deceive and circumspect in giving your opinion. But once given, do not change it” (Cardenal Mazarino,2024, 74).

The ideal is to become reliable, credible, and a source of legitimacy. This is a departure from the Machiavellian approach, where the prince would always find an excuse not to keep his word. I disagree with Mazarin that one should never change one’s mind. In some situations, it is wise to rectify.

Avoid hatred 

“If you are relieved of your duties at any time, publicly express your satisfaction, even your gratitude to those who have given you back the peace and quiet to which you aspired so much. Find the most convincing arguments for those listening to you: in this way, you will avoid adding sarcasm to disgrace” (Cardenal Mazarino, 2024, 89).

It is relevant in this life to do things with elegance and fair play, even if it is not fashionable or in style. If your public responsibilities end, it is good to look to the future and not to hold grudges from the past. There should be an art and science for resigning and leaving office, which should include, in addition to good manners, always avoiding criticism, especially of superiors, and easing the way for those to come.

Acquiring wisdom 

“In most circumstances, it is better to stand still, to listen to the advice of another and to ponder it long and hard. Do not overestimate the extent of either your words or your actions, and do not take up matters that are useless to you now or later. Do not meddle in other people’s affairs”  (Cardenal Mazarino, 2024, 97).  

A Spanish politician had responsibilities at different levels of public administration. He made his strategy for handling issues, especially the most complex ones, famous, and his secret was to let time pass. As incredible as it may seem, many issues have been found to be solved in this way before being considered again. 

Another great piece of advice is not to interfere in other people’s affairs because there is a very Latin tendency to solve other people’s lives based on one’s own prejudices and stereotypes. 

From the Baroque period, based on the experience of some of the most powerful politicians of the time, Cardinal Mazarin advises, in summary: to be prudent in speaking and not to trust who might be listening; to feign modesty, kindness and equanimity; to exercise any responsibility with moderation and a desire for public service; and to refrain from intervening in discussions with opposing points of view unless one is sure of being right and can prove it. Finally, he recommends listening to the advice of others, meditating long and hard, and not meddling in other people’s affairs.

The best reading that can be made of Mazarin’s approach is that it may be suitable for politics as well as for other areas of life.

References

Cardenal Mazarino (2024), “Breviario para políticos” in Blanco, María, La política de disimulo. Cómo descubrir las artimañas del poder con Mazarino, España: Rosamerón, trans. Alberto Torrego.

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Why are there no nuclear wars?

Oscar Pérez de la Fuente

Carlos III University of Madrid

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3708-846X

Abstract

This article examines why nuclear wars have not occurred by drawing on Thomas Schelling’s strategic thought as interpreted by Robert Ayson. It argues that the nuclear age is best understood through the concepts of stability and the balance of deterrence, which together explain why nuclear-armed states are strongly discouraged from initiating conflict. The core claim is that deterrence works when the expected costs of aggression exceed its possible gains, especially under conditions where both sides retain the capacity to retaliate after an attack. In this context, mutual fear of retaliation functions as a stabilizing mechanism, since any first strike would likely provoke a devastating counterattack and generate unacceptable losses for all parties. The article also stresses that nuclear equilibrium is fragile and depends on preventing surprise attacks, misperceptions, and accidental escalation. By linking Schelling’s approach to broader strategic reasoning, the paper shows that the avoidance of nuclear war is not simply a matter of good fortune, but the result of a structure of incentives and disincentives shaped by credible deterrence. It concludes that negotiation and arms control remain essential complements to strategic stability.

Keywords: diplomacy, deterrence, prisoner’s dilemma, equilibrium, stability, positions

It is not a frequently asked question, and we certainly hope they never happen, but you have not asked yourselves why nuclear wars have not happened? The answer to this disturbing question can be found in Robert Ayson’s book, Thomas Schelling and the Nuclear Age (2004), which explains the ideas of Thomas Schelling, winner of the 2005 Nobel Prize in Economics, who has made significant contributions to the world of strategy and international relations.

In several of his works, Schelling analyses the issue of nuclear armament from the perspective of strategy. His approach is to make international relations, especially military decisions, eminently strategic territory. Lessons can be learned from his contributions for other strategy development and success areas.

According to Schelling, the key concepts to explain the nuclear age are stability and balance of deterrence (Ayson, 2004, 72). The strategy must be aimed at seeking stability between the parties. This is achieved by the balance of deterrence, which is based on two elements: a) a situation in which the disincentives outweigh the incentives for both sides to initiate war; b) it is “stable” when it is reasonably secure against shocks, alarms and disturbances.

Therefore, initiating conflict must be discouraged and unexpected events, such as a surprise attack, must be prevented. Schelling’s lesson in the nuclear age is that the respective incentives and disincentives condition stability.

In his explanation of nuclear strategy, Ayson alludes to Brodie’s work, which provides the key: “Precisely because there is no defence against the atomic bomb, any party, possessing atomic weapons, threatened with attack, has the ability to impose heavy costs on the attacker” (Ayson, 2004, 1997, 58).

The state of equilibrium is produced by ‘mutual fear of retaliation’. The costs of all kinds involved in the use of nuclear weapons discourage an attack for fear of a response, in the form of a counterattack, from the other side.

Equilibrium occurs because both sides have disincentives to initiate an attack, and the costs of taking one on by the other side are very high. Special care must be taken to avoid surprise attacks and unexpected situations that can change the equilibrium.

It can be argued that the equilibrium in the nuclear age has aspects that resemble the prisoner’s dilemma. Thus, betrayals by the players have a very high cost for both sides because there is a response rule in the form of a nuclear counterattack. As Poundstone explains, nuclear war would be a case of simultaneous and mutual bombing. As early as 1945, Senator Brien McMahon said: “If there is a nuclear Pearl Harbor, there will not be a jury of statesmen left to study the case” (Poundstone, 1995, 215).

Schelling’s approach focuses on the role of stability and negotiation in the nuclear age. We could draw some conclusions from his approach: the best strategy is the one that seeks stability, which is guaranteed if the disincentives to conflict are greater than the incentives; the balance of deterrence is produced by fear of retaliation by the other side, which comes at significant cost; the best alternative to an endless arms race is negotiation.

In other words, stability is ensured by the parties’ disincentives to conflict and fear of retaliation, which entails high costs. By discouraging conflict, equilibrium is achieved.

References

Ayson, Robert (2004), Thomas Schelling and the Nuclear Age. Strategy as a Social Science, New York, London: Routledge.

Poundstone, William (1995), El dilema del prisionero,. John Von Neumann, la teoría de juegos y la bomba,  Madrid: Alianza, trad. Daniel Manzanarez Fourcade. (original title: The Prisoner’s Dilemma. John Von Neumann, game theory and Puzzle of  the bomb).

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The strategy of conflict

Oscar Pérez de la Fuente

Carlos III University of Madrid

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3708-846X

Abstract

This article examines Thomas Schelling’s The Strategy of Conflict as a landmark contribution to the analysis of international relations, negotiation, and strategic behaviour. Published in 1960, the book introduced an innovative use of game theory to explain situations in which adversaries are neither locked in absolute opposition nor united by complete cooperation, but instead operate under conditions of mutual dependence. The text highlights Schelling’s distinction between pure conflict, pure cooperation, and mixed conflict-cooperation scenarios, arguing that most human interactions belong to the third category. In such contexts, rational actors seek outcomes that protect their interests while taking account of the choices and expectations of others. Special attention is given to Schelling’s redefinition of strategy as the exploitation of potential force rather than its direct application, a perspective that underpins his influential theory of deterrence. The article also stresses the broader relevance of his framework beyond military affairs, showing its usefulness for politics, business, and everyday decision-making. Ultimately, Schelling’s concept of interdependent decision theory offers a powerful lens for understanding conflict as a negotiable and strategically managed social relationship.

Keywords: diplomacy, detrrence, game theory, interests, positions

In 1960, the economist Thomas Schelling published his work The Strategy of Conflict with a hitherto unusual approach that opened new horizons. His approach was a new analysis of international relations and other areas, applying game theory methods, a part of Economics that carries out simulations of simple games with two or more participants based on the theory of rational choice.

One of the most interesting points of the book is the conceptual material it leaves  to the reader, which allows for multiple applications. Thus, it describes three types of scenarios: pure conflict, pure cooperation, and conflict/cooperation.

Situations of pure conflict would occur if the interests of the antagonists were completely opposed, only “in the case of war, but of a war tending to the total extermination of the enemy.” Situations of pure cooperation are presented as curious exercises in coordination without communication between the parties. For example, where would you meet someone in Madrid – or London or New York- who has received the same instruction, with whom you cannot communicate. Or imagine that you will win 100 euros if you write down on a piece of paper the way to share it out that matches the other party, where communication is impossible.

Schelling’s message is that most scenarios between human beings are ones of cooperation and conflict where there is a common interest and mutual dependence between the parties. Conflict management is sought with mutually acceptable solutions for mutual interests. Hence, the author concludes that most conflict situations are negotiationable scenarios.

The change brought about by this book is its new approach to strategy as applied to international relations and military issues. Thus, strategy does not refer to “the efficient application of force, but to the exploitation of potential force”. This means that the role of armies has an eminently strategic, rather than a purely combative, significance. On another level, this means that victory does not lie in the hand-to-hand combat of the respective forces, but rather in the expectations of the parties and the possibility of respective influence.

From this perspective, Schelling devotes his attention to the notion of “deterrence” as an important element of international relations. He states that an important distinction must be made here between the application of force and the threat of force. Deterrence relates to the exploitation of potential force. Its purpose is to persuade a potential enemy that it is in its own interest to avoid certain courses of action.

The conclusion is that it is not the use of military force, but the threat – serious and credible – of the use of force that would deter the other side from acting. Here would be the paradox that this theory of deterrence is “a theory of the skillful non-use of military force, for which something more than purely military ingenuity is needed”. That is the way to develop strategy as an art and science and to transform some views on international relations and the role of armies. But it would also have applications in business, politics and even everyday life.

In a passage from his book, Schelling offers a definition of strategy based on several elements:

a) it presupposes the existence of a conflict; b) but assumes a common interest of both adversaries; c) it assumes a rational mode of behaviour; d) it focuses on the fact that what appears to each participant as the best course of action depends on what the other does; e) “strategic behaviour” attempts to influence the other’s decisions by acting on their expectations of how the other’s behaviour relates to their own (Schelling, 1980).

How to manage conflict? It seems that this is something we must all deal with in the various spheres of life. In The Strategy of Conflict, Schelling offers a view that was innovative for its time, constructing an analytical framework, based on game theory, to deal with international relations, and at one point he proposes various names for this theory, such as precarious association theory or incomplete antagonism theory.  Perhaps the most successful one is what he called interdependent decision theory. This is the key to the strategy of conflict.

References

Schelling, Thomas (1980), The Strategy of Conflict, Cambridge, Mass. London: Harvard University.