Category: Strategy

Posted on

Breviary for politicians

We continue with the series dedicated to handbooks. This time it is dedicated to Breviary for politicians, published in 1684, attributed to Cardinal Mazarin, or someone close to him. Jules Mazarin was born in Pescina, Italy, in 1602 and died in Vincennes, France, in 1661. He was an Italian cardinal, without being ordained a priest, in the service of the French monarchy who exercised power in the early years of the reign of Louis XIV. He was a politician, diplomat, military officer, and adviser to Louis XIV, and he was responsible – as Prime Minister – for laying the foundations for making France a great European power.

For those interested in politics and strategy, and somewhat mythomaniacal, it is noteworthy that the historical figure who supported and turned Cardinal Mazarin into a statesman was the famous Cardinal Richelieu, whom he replaced in office. Both are presumed to be clever and astute, as well as efficient and reasonable in leading government. Machiavelli‘s pragmatic approach and political realism influence this Breviary for politicians.

The following is a commentary on passages from Cardinal Mazarin’s Breviary for politicians in the style of Estrategia Minerva Blog. It is worth noting that it follows the edition of this work by María Blanco entitled La política del disimulo. Cómo descubrir las artimañas del poder con Mazarino, of Editorial Rosamerón, which includes the essay of the editor.

Gaining esteem and fame 

“Never forget that anyone is liable to spread rumours about you if you have behaved – or spoken – too freely or rudely in his presence. In this matter, do not trust servants or pages. People look at an isolated incident to generalise; they take advantage of it to spread your bad reputation” (Cardenal Mazarino, Breviario para políticos). 

It is excellent advice to be cautious when speaking and be wary of who might be listening. Rumour-mongers/moral lordscan use past confidences to destroy your image. Your public reputation may be based on a hoax a thousand times repeated. According to the Spanish Royal Academy of Language, a hoax is “false news propagated for some purpose”. It is better to be prudent and leave hoaxes and rumours to others.

“Feign modesty, candour, kindness and perfect equanimity. Be grateful, congratulate, show yourself available, even to those who have done nothing to deserve it” (Cardenal Mazarino, Breviario para políticos). 

If you ever have a responsibility, exercising it with moderation, equanimity, and a willingness to serve the public is essential. Your character must adapt to the circumstances and cultivate, in addition to prudence, the Aristotelian virtues of temperance, justice and courage.

“Refrain from intervening in discussions where opposing points of view clash unless you are absolutely sure you are right and can prove it” (Cardenal Mazarino, Breviario para políticos).  

There are two pernicious tendencies: civil war/factionalism that seeks to divide society into irreconcilable camps and want-to-be-right-about-everything. If one is in a position of authority, it is crucial to make dissent and unity compatible.

Gaining each other’s favour 

“Avoid easy promises and granting too many permissions. Be difficult to deceive and circumspect in giving your opinion. But once given, do not change it” (Cardenal Mazarino, Breviario para políticos).

The ideal is to become reliable, credible, and a source of legitimacy. This is a departure from the Machiavellian approach, where the prince would always find an excuse not to keep his word. I disagree with Mazarin that one should never change one’s mind. In some situations, it is wise to rectify.

Avoid hatred 

“If you are relieved of your duties at any time, publicly express your satisfaction, even your gratitude to those who have given you back the peace and quiet to which you aspired so much. Find the most convincing arguments for those listening to you: in this way, you will avoid adding sarcasm to disgrace” (Cardenal Mazarino, Breviario para políticos).

It is relevant in this life to do things with elegance and fair play, even if it is not fashionable or in style. If your public responsibilities end, it is good to look to the future and not to hold grudges from the past. There should be an art and science for resigning and leaving office, which should include, in addition to good manners, always avoiding criticism, especially of superiors, and easing the way for those to come.

Acquiring wisdom 

“In most circumstances, it is better to stand still, to listen to the advice of another and to ponder it long and hard. Do not overestimate the extent of either your words or your actions, and do not take up matters that are useless to you now or later. Do not meddle in other people’s affairs” (Cardenal Mazarino, Breviario para políticos).  

A Spanish politician had responsibilities at different levels of public administration. He made his strategy for handling issues, especially the most complex ones, famous, and his secret was to let time pass. As incredible as it may seem, many issues have been found to be solved in this way before being considered again. 

Another great piece of advice is not to interfere in other people’s affairs because there is a very Latin tendency to solve other people’s lives based on one’s own prejudices and stereotypes. 

From the Baroque period, based on the experience of some of the most powerful politicians of the time, Cardinal Mazarin advises, in summary: to be prudent in speaking and not to trust who might be listening; to feign modesty, kindness and equanimity; to exercise any responsibility with moderation and a desire for public service; and to refrain from intervening in discussions with opposing points of view unless one is sure of being right and can prove it. Finally, he recommends listening to the advice of others, meditating long and hard, and not meddling in other people’s affairs.

The best reading that can be made of Mazarin’s approach is that it may be suitable for politics as well as for other areas of life.

Posted on

Why are there no nuclear wars?

It is not a frequently asked question, and we certainly hope they never happen, but you have not asked yourselves why nuclear wars have not happened? The answer to this disturbing question can be found in Robert Ayson’s book, Thomas Schelling and the Nuclear Age, which explains the ideas of Thomas Schelling, winner of the 2005 Nobel Prize in Economics, who has made significant contributions to the world of strategy and international relations.

In several of his works, Schelling analyses the issue of nuclear armament from the perspective of strategy. His approach is to make international relations, especially military decisions, eminently strategic territory. Lessons can be learned from his contributions for other strategy development and success areas.

According to Schelling, the key concepts to explain the nuclear age are stability and balance of deterrence. The strategy must be aimed at seeking stability between the parties. This is achieved by the balance of deterrence, which is based on two elements: a) a situation in which the disincentives outweigh the incentives for both sides to initiate war; b) it is “stable” when it is reasonably secure against shocks, alarms and disturbances.

Therefore, initiating conflict must be discouraged and unexpected events, such as a surprise attack, must be prevented. Schelling’s lesson in the nuclear age is that the respective incentives and disincentives condition stability.

In his explanation of nuclear strategy, Ayson alludes to Brodie’s work, which provides the key: “Precisely because there is no defence against the atomic bomb, any party, possessing atomic weapons, threatened with attack, has the ability to impose heavy costs on the attacker”.

The state of equilibrium is produced by ‘mutual fear of retaliation’. The costs of all kinds involved in the use of nuclear weapons discourage an attack for fear of a response, in the form of a counterattack, from the other side.

Equilibrium occurs because both sides have disincentives to initiate an attack, and the costs of taking one on by the other side are very high. Special care must be taken to avoid surprise attacks and unexpected situations that can change the equilibrium.

It can be argued that the equilibrium in the nuclear age has aspects that resemble the prisoner’s dilemma. Thus, betrayals by the players have a very high cost for both sides because there is a response rule in the form of a nuclear counterattack. As Poundstone explains, nuclear war would be a case of simultaneous and mutual bombing. As early as 1945, Senator Brien McMahon said: “If there is a nuclear Pearl Harbor, there will not be a jury of statesmen left to study the case” (Poundstone, The Prisoner’s Dilemma).

Schelling’s approach focuses on the role of stability and negotiation in the nuclear age. We could draw some conclusions from his approach: the best strategy is the one that seeks stability, which is guaranteed if the disincentives to conflict are greater than the incentives; the balance of deterrence is produced by fear of retaliation by the other side, which comes at significant cost; the best alternative to an endless arms race is negotiation.

In other words, stability is ensured by the parties’ disincentives to conflict and fear of retaliation, which entails high costs. By discouraging conflict, equilibrium is achieved.

Posted on

The strategy of conflict

In 1960, the economist Thomas Schelling published his work The Strategy of Conflict with a hitherto unusual approach that opened new horizons. His approach was a new analysis of international relations and other areas, applying game theory methods, a part of Economics that carries out simulations of simple games with two or more participants based on the theory of rational choice.

One of the most interesting points of the book is the conceptual material it leaves  to the reader, which allows for multiple applications. Thus, it describes three types of scenarios: pure conflict, pure cooperation, and conflict/cooperation.

Situations of pure conflict would occur if the interests of the antagonists were completely opposed, only “in the case of war, but of a war tending to the total extermination of the enemy.” Situations of pure cooperation are presented as curious exercises in coordination without communication between the parties. For example, where would you meet someone in Madrid – or London or New York- who has received the same instruction, with whom you cannot communicate. Or imagine that you will win 100 euros if you write down on a piece of paper the way to share it out that matches the other party, where communication is impossible.

Schelling’s message is that most scenarios between human beings are ones of cooperation and conflict where there is a common interest and mutual dependence between the parties. Conflict management is sought with mutually acceptable solutions for mutual interests. Hence, the author concludes that most conflict situations are negotiationable scenarios.

The change brought about by this book is its new approach to strategy as applied to international relations and military issues. Thus, strategy does not refer to “the efficient application of force, but to the exploitation of potential force”. This means that the role of armies has an eminently strategic, rather than a purely combative, significance. On another level, this means that victory does not lie in the hand-to-hand combat of the respective forces, but rather in the expectations of the parties and the possibility of respective influence.

From this perspective, Schelling devotes his attention to the notion of “deterrence” as an important element of international relations. He states that an important distinction must be made here between the application of force and the threat of force. Deterrence relates to the exploitation of potential force. Its purpose is to persuade a potential enemy that it is in its own interest to avoid certain courses of action.

The conclusion is that it is not the use of military force, but the threat – serious and credible – of the use of force that would deter the other side from acting. Here would be the paradox that this theory of deterrence is “a theory of the skillful non-use of military force, for which something more than purely military ingenuity is needed”. That is the way to develop strategy as an art and science and to transform some views on international relations and the role of armies. But it would also have applications in business, politics and even everyday life.

In a passage from his book, Schelling offers a definition of strategy based on several elements:

a) it presupposes the existence of a conflict; b) but assumes a common interest of both adversaries; c) it assumes a rational mode of behaviour; d) it focuses on the fact that what appears to each participant as the best course of action depends on what the other does; e) “strategic behaviour” attempts to influence the other’s decisions by acting on their expectations of how the other’s behaviour relates to their own (Thomas Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict).

How to manage conflict? It seems that this is something we must all deal with in the various spheres of life. In The Strategy of Conflict, Schelling offers a view that was innovative for its time, constructing an analytical framework, based on game theory, to deal with international relations, and at one point he proposes various names for this theory, such as precarious association theory or incomplete antagonism theory.  Perhaps the most successful one is what he called interdependent decision theory. This is the key to the strategy of conflict.

Posted on

The perfect politician’s handbook

With this post, we will start a series dedicated to handbooks as a reason to reflect on the practical dimensions in specific fields.  One of the meanings of the word “handbook” in the Spanish Royal Academy of Language is “book in which the most substantial aspects of a subject are summarised.” We begin with the Handbook of the perfect politician.

José de Cora Paradela, born in Lugo in 1951, is a prominent Spanish writer and journalist. Throughout his career, he has worked in various media, including news agencies, newspapers, magazines, radio, cinema and television.  In 1991, José de Cora published the book Manual del perfecto político (Handbook of the Perfect Politician) in the editorial Espasa Calpe, in which he discusses on current affairs with humour and Galician irony with more general elements of reflection. Some fragments of this book will be commented below in the style of Minerva Strategy. 

On how to choose subordinates

“If you have the possibility to do so, every time you accept a new collaborator into your circle of work, you are facing one of the most important decisions of your life. That is why it is advisable not to make a mistake because just as a correct choice can be a victory in advance, a wrong one would be tantamount to a defeat beforehand” (José de Cora, Manual del perfecto político). 

The best advice for building a team is to surround yourself with the best people, even if they are better than the boss, but always with loyalty as a virtue. Teams must be based on quality and must be loyal to values and people as a condition for participating in public affairs.

How intelligence is not essential 

“Political practice has such a mixture of components that it would be utterly stupid to think that the most intelligent man is also best placed for its exercise. Undocumented people, mules, and even oligophrenics have occupied the highest political offices without demerit: in the same way that wise and enlightened people have committed so many atrocities that they would claim to be the work of inferior beings” (José de Cora, Manual del perfecto político). 

There are different modes of political intelligence. In the History of Ideas, Plato’s Philosopher King is often contrasted with Erasmus of Rotterdam’s virtues of the good Christian prince, with the hypocrisy, shrewdness, and fortitude promoted by Machiavelli. In public life, politicians who can show emotional intelligence towards citizens are often distinguished from those whose maxim of action is to stay in power. 

On how to be subtle

“The dosage of subtlety, knowing when it should be used in a stream or distributed in an eyedropper, is, dear prince, a teaching reserved for experience. It alone will inform you of the qulaities that adorn you in this section; for subtlety, like stature, is received without our intervention, and only by a complicated operation is it possible to modify the quantity of the one and the length of the other.” (José de Cora, Manual del perfecto político).

We disagree with José de Cora here.  On the one hand, subtlety is commendable for any public servant and should also be for politicians. It is not necessary to offend; it is better to take care of manners and make people think about the underlying issues. Moreover, and more importantly, subtlety can be learned; it is not innate. It is a virtue of rhetoric that can be acquired and for which it is necessary to be trained. 

On how to abbreviate

“Baltasar Gracián’s teachings against long-winded approaches and in favour of brevity in expositions are gold-plated for a politician with aspirations. The sentences that outlive an author and those that are most successful in influencing public opinion must be short and concentrated, like black coffee” (José de Cora, Manual del perfecto político). 

It used to be said that there were two types of speeches: long speeches and good speeches. Nowadays, with social networks, we are committed to brevity, to the headline, and to summarising our thoughts in 140 characters. Politicians enter into this dynamic and hold press conferences, where journalists “fish” for headlines. Brevity, perhaps, yes, but let’s give space for calm reflection, deliberation, fruitful exchange of opinions, persuading and being persuaded, in short… a public opinion.  

On how to provoke

“One of the aspects of Evita Perón’s personality that most attracted the attention of foreign politicians who knew her, was her taste for provoking and scandalising the interlocutor of the moment, with no other aim than her personal satisfaction at seeing the surprised faces that her outbursts caused” (José de Cora, Manual del perfecto político). 

One might ask here: to provoke, what for? If the only aim is to attract attention, it would seem to be another form of manipulation. If the provocation has a positive objective and promotes a “free and uninhibited” debate on a given topic, usually far from the spotlight, it could be justified in that case.  

On how to take criticism 

“If you have decided to dive into the waters of public administration, you should bear in mind something as elementary as water for the fish, no matter how well you do it, no matter how many quintals of intelligence distinguish you from the rest of the administrators, no matter how many successes decorate your management, there will always be people who criticise it, who do not feel identified with your way of proceeding and who will criticise you, apart of course from your natural political enemies, those who sit with you in Parliament”. (José de Cora, Manual del perfecto político).

A distinction is usually made between destructive criticism -based on negative attacks, often including personal ones- and constructive criticism -where proposals for improvement are made. The latter are the most interesting, and the former tend to contribute little. 

Politicians tend to distinguish between political adversaries and party colleagues, and relations with the latter are much more difficult. Something which, at the time of the Spanish Transition, was summed up by the politician Pío Cabanillas when he said: “Hit the deck, our men are coming!

On how to behave in the face of dismissal 

“The politician who comes to occupy a public office, such as the one that awaits you if nothing stands in your way, must know how to conjugate these three verbs: resign, dismiss, or leave, because inexorably one of them will put an end to your direct contact with power” (José de Cora, Manual del perfecto político). 

When a politician leaves public office, their phone stops ringing. All those who congratulated them on their appointment evaporated, and only a few close friends communicated with them. It is a good opportunity to read Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, where he distinguishes between friends by affinity and by interest.

On how to maintain greatness in the face of defeat 

“If you have decided to embark on the tortuous path of politics, you should know from the outset that there is no such thing as failure, unless you abandon this activity through force majeure or of your own free will. As long as you are in politics, politics itself will protect you from any doubt as to whether you are a winner or a loser. You always succeed because “being” is synonymous with “winning”. Being in politics is enough” (José de Cora, Manual del perfecto político).

We do not like this approach here by José de Cora.  Unfortunately, there seems to be an abundance of politicians whose only goal is to stay in power and politicians whose only work experience is in politics. A society must be able to find mechanisms to elect the best people to positions of public responsibility. It is a good general principle that these responsibilities should be temporarily limited. It is good to be able to walk away from public affairs, to exercise good accountability, and to be rewarded or punished for governance.

Posted on

Prisoners of a dilemma

Albert Tucker, a distinguished Princeton mathematician, was invited to give a lecture in 1950 at Stanford University. There, he first posed this dilemma:

“Two men, accused of jointly breaking the law, have been confined by the police in separate rooms. Each is told that:

1- If one of them confesses guilty, but the other does not, the first will receive a reward, … and the second will be punished.

2. If both confess, both will be punished.

At the same time, each has good reason to believe that:

3.- If neither confesses, both will go free.”

Although there was earlier work by Flood and Dresher on the subject, Tucker was the first to christen it the prisoner’s dilemma. The implications of this dilemma are manifold in politics, international relations, economics and even everyday life. The story of how it came about and some of its applications are recorded in the book The Prisoner’s Dilemma by William Poundstone.

In a dilemma, it is often the case that whatever the solution, it involves a loss, a sense of remorse or regret. The prisoner’s dilemma is problematic because it defies common sense, says Poundstone. I will discuss the options and implications of the dilemma below.

There are two options for the two players: cooperate or betray. If player A confesses, he chooses to betray his partner. There are two possibilities: a) that the other player B does the same, then the final result is bad, and both are punished; b) that the other player B does not confess, chooses to cooperate, and then the result is very good for player A -he is rewarded- and bad for player B -he is punished-.

Suppose player A chooses to cooperate and does not confess. There are two possibilities: c) the other player B does the same, then the end result is good – both go free; d) the other player B chooses to betray his partner and chooses to confess, then the result is bad for player A – he is punished – and very good for player B – he is rewarded.

It is one of the most famous strategy games in which the interdependence of the players is vital. Whatever player A does, the final outcome depends on what player B does and vice versa. There is an incentive to betray the other player, but if they both follow that incentive and betray, the outcome is bad for both players. If both cooperate, the result is good, but it is challenging to obtain this outcome because of the incentive to betray and the impossibility of communicating.

Some consider that the prisoner’s dilemma has no solution. Others have pointed to the fact that it varies whether the game is played once or more than once. If played once, there is a solid incentive to betray as long as the other party does not do the same. This cannot be guaranteed and is, therefore, a dilemma.

What is most interesting is whether the prisoner’s dilemma must be played repeatedly. Then, it is how one has come to justify the need for the pact, the agreement between the players. This has been a way of justifying the existence of legal norms that guarantee that agreements will be fulfilled.

In Hobbes‘ State of Nature, there was natural liberty but great insecurity; the law of the strongest ruled. Although there could be cooperative behaviour, there was an incentive to betrayal. This leads to a social pact that guarantees peace and security, ensuring the players cooperate and not betray each other.

In a case where it is discovered that the treasurer of a political party, for many years, has 50 million euros in accounts in Switzerland, there would be a prisoner’s dilemma at some point in this case. At some point in this case, a prisoner’s dilemma scheme would emerge: both parties would have a better outcome if they did not confess and settle, but there is an incentive for betrayal.

The prisoner’s dilemma shows that pacts or agreements must promote cooperative environments. If these do not exist, there is an incentive to betray, which does not guarantee the best outcome because of the interdependence of the moves. If both betray, the outcome is terrible. If both cooperate, the result is good. If one cooperates and the other betrays, the outcome is bad for the former and very good for the latter.

There are many readings and applications of the prisoner’s dilemma. One is that cooperation, in the long run, is best guaranteed by a pact or agreement. It justifies the need for agreements that foster cooperative frameworks.

Posted on

Machiavelic ethical model

There is a new approach that is called the Machiavelic ethical model, which is an extreme and particular version of the consequentialist ethical model. It is inspired by the work of Niccolò Machiavelli . It is curious how a term Machiavellianism has emerged from a thinker that the Spanish Royal Academy of Language defined as “a way of proceeding with cunning, duplicity and perfidy”. Machiavelli has not had much good press, but the Machiavelic ethical method is more common than it seems.

Machiavelli’s best-known motto is the end justifies the means but this attribution is not entirely accurate because the phrase does not appear in any of his works. However, in The Prince , he states:”(…) and in the actions of all men, and especially of princes, which it is not prudent to challenge, one judges by the result. For that reason, let a prince have the credit of conquering and holding his state, the means will always be considered honest”. (Machiavelli, The Prince, XVIII).

The Machiavelic ethical model affirms, as a fundamental rule, the desire for success and the ends chosen are more important than the means. However, that does not mean that behaviour must automatically be immoral. The Prince is a treatise on human nature, from which we can learn that the prince if he wants to achieve success, must be duplicitous and cover his tracks.

This may involve an apparent adherence to values, but ultimately being pragmatic. In one of the best-known passages, Machiavelli asks “in what way a prince must keep his word” and offers an answer that is in his line: “a wise lord cannot, nor ought be to, keep faith when such observance may be turned against him, and when the reasons that caused him to pledge it exist no longer. If men were entirely good this precept would not hold, but because they are bad, and will not keep faith with you, you are not bound to observe it with them. Nor will there ever be waiting to a prince legitimate reasons to excuse nonobservance” (Machiavelli, The Prince, XVIII).

From the deontological ethical model, it could be argued that promises should always be kept and the truth always told. If we analyse the scenario according to Machiavelli, there are three circumstances that make it advisable not to keep a promise: a) The consequences of the promise have changed over time; b) The reasons for the promise no longer exist; c) The other person will not keep their word with you. The second reason is the strongest and could be invoked if the reasons for the promise really no longer exist. The first should have been adequately foreseen and for the third, many people will honour their promises.

There are several interpretations of Machiavelli. The Machiavelic version of Machiavelli sees Machiavelli as a diabolical, immoral, anti-Christian author who justifies any action to achieve his goals. The republican version of Machiavelli states that he was a patriot, that he wanted to defend the State above all and that he considered that the Prince should have civil and political virtues and not religious ones.

For this reason, some consider him to be the founder of Political Science, because he considers that politics has its own rules distinct from ethics and religion.

From a strategic point of view, Machiavelli offers interesting readings, doubts and reflections. For example, we find this interesting advice for strategists: “It is necessary to be a fox to discover the snares and a lion to terrify the wolves” (Machiavelli,The Prince, XVIII). But perhaps the key element in strategy is how to act in the face of someone Machiavelic.The first and most difficult task will be to identify him because, as Aranguren states, “the first thing to do is to identify him.  a self-confessed Machiavellianism would be annulled as such: to be effective it has to be hypocritical and pay tribute to virtue” (Aranguren, José Luis, Ética y Política)

The strategist must be vigilant and, for example, establish mechanisms for impartial verification of the different operations. Someone seeking success, feigning conformity, does not keep their word. Strategies must be developed to prevent such situations. Machiavelli points out that if we learn from the qualities of the fox and the lion, we can get closer to success.

Posted on

Francisco de Vitoria, on just war

One of the prominent figures in the Spanish Renaissance was Francisco de Vitoria (1483-1546). He was a Spanish Dominican, renewer of Theology and promoter of the Salamanca School of Natural Law. He is considered the founder of the science of International Law and the notion of human rights. One of the most relevant political philosophers of the 20th century, John Rawls, in his book entitled Law of Peoples and the Idea of Public Reason revisited quotes De Vitoria and, from a liberal conception, adheres to his just war theory. 

Precisely Francisco de Vitoria addresses this classic theme in his essay entitled ” Sobre el derecho de Guerra”/ On the law of war when he asks: “What can be the reason and cause of a just war?” We will address this question below, based on this author, from the perspective of Minerva Strategy Blog.

De Vitoria’s first approach to answering this question states that “diversity of religion is not sufficient cause for a just war.” And he justifies himself with that “even if the faith has been announced to the barbarians with sufficient signs of probability and they have not wanted to accept it, it is not, for that reason, lawful to persecute them with war and strip them of their goods” (Francisco de Vitoria, Sobre los indios, II.15).

Francisco de Vitoria was a professor at the University of Salamanca and his lectures, or relections, on various topics of interest have come down to us to this day. Specifically, the full title of the one dedicated to the notion of just war is entitled: ” Sobre el derecho de guerra de los españoles sobre los bárbaros”/On the law of war of the Spaniards over the barbarians. Contrary to what the black legend on the Spanish colonisation of Latin America claims, the School of Salamanca laid the foundations for human rights and the rules of International Law. And, as has been seen, De Vitoria did not justify war for diversity of religion.  

Another issue addressed by Francisco de Vitoria is that “it is not a just cause of a war to intend to expand dominions” and he argues: “this proposition is too evident to need to be demonstrated. For otherwise there would always be just cause for any of the belligerent wars, and so all would be innocent” (Francisco de Vitoria, Sobre el derecho de guerra, III.11).

The history of mankind contains many examples of rulers who have had expansionist policies beyond their borders.  The results of these offensive wars are part of History and memory. This would not be a justified strategy under current International Law, nor as a cost/benefit analysis in the medium and long term.

Francisco de Vitoria continues “neither is it just cause of a war to the prince’s own glory nor any other particular profit of the prince” and he states that “this proposition is also evident, for the prince must order to the common good of the Republic, both war and peace, and he cannot invest public funds in his own glory, in his own profit, much less expose his subjects to danger. The difference between the legitimate king and a tyrant lies in that the tyrant orders the government to his own interest and profit, while the king orders it to the public good, as Aristotle says” (Francisco de Vitoria, Sobre el derecho de guerra, III.12).

If the ruler wages war for his private benefit, he becomes a tyrant, as Aristotle argued in his work Politics. There the Stagirite philosopher proposed a classic typology of forms of government, where he distinguishes those leaders who promote the common good in their government actions -monarchy, aristocracy, politeia– and those who act for their own benefit or that of their own group -tyranny, oligarchy, democracy-. It is interesting because issues of accountability have been identified ever since the first book written on Political Science, which deals especially with issues of classical democracy in the polis of Athens.

The affirmative answer to the question posed by De Vitoria is the following: “the only just cause for waging war is the injury received” and he affirms that “in addition, offensive war is made to avenge an injury and to reprimand the enemies, as has already been said. But there can be no revenge where there has not preceded an injury and a fault. Therefore the conclusion is evident” (Francisco de Vitoria, Sobre el derecho de guerra, III.13).

Here we get to the heart of Francisco de Vitoria’s argument: defensive war, self-defence, is justified. Bobbio affirms: “it is lawful to repel violence with violence.” The Italian author asks himself: “But does the strategy of atomic war still allow us to maintain the distinction between offensive and defensive war?” (Norberto Bobbio, El problema de la guerra y las vías de la paz). De Vitoria did not speak of preventive wars, but in the answer to Bobbio it is worth analising whether a preventive war is justified in the face of a relevant threat. Situations of strategic funanbulism in scenarios of nuclear deterrence are placed in this risk analysis.

Francisco de Vitoria adds: “an injury of any gravity is not enough to make war”. He clarifies that “this proposition is proved because it is not even lawful to impose such serious penalties as death, exile or confiscation of goods on one’s own subjects for any fault. Now, since all the things that are done in war are grave and even atrocious, such as slaughter, arson, devastation, it is not lawful to punish with war those who have committed slight offences, since the measure of punishment must be in accordance with the gravity of the crime” (Francisco de Vitoria, Sobre el derecho de guerra, III.14).

The key to self-defence is proportionality. Thomas Aquinas already defended it by “moderating the defence according to the needs of the threatened security” (Thomas Aquinas, Suma Theologica, II-II, q. 64,a. 7, c). It is in that passage of the Theological Summa, where the theory of the double effect is formulated: an act has two effects, one intentional -preserving life- and another not, which would be incidental -the death of the aggressor-. The key for Thomas Aquinas is that the act be proportionate to its end.

An application of the doctrine of double effect is proposed by Rawls, when he states that civilian casualties are prohibited except insofar as they are the indirect and unintended result of a legitimate attack against a military target (Rawls, Law of Peoples and the Idea of Public Reason revisited).

The just war theory in Francisco de Vitoria is a classic in the reflection on public affairs. As a good classic, it allows more current re-readings and, as Italo Calvino said, it can be conceived as a talisman, a compass on which to orient oneself when approaching the territories of peace and war.

Posted on

Kissinger, the global negotiator

From John F. Kennedy until recently, every U.S. president has sought the counsel of Henry Kissinger (1923-2023), along with CEOs and political leaders from around the world. His views on foreign policy, State affairs, and world order have been much discussed. However, his remarkable world record as a negotiator has largely gone unnoticed, leading James K. Sebenius, Nicholas Burns and Robert H. Mnookin to author the book Kissinger, the Negotiator. Lessons from Dealmaking at the Highest Level. Sebenius is a professor with the Harvard Negotiation Project and wrote the book 3-d Negotiation: Powerful Tools to Change the Game in Your Most Important Deals.

Some negotiators prefer strategy and the big picture, whilst others focus on the emotion and empathy, and specific points. Few combine both positions. Sebenius et al. examine Kissinger’s uniquely developed ability to focus on a broader perspective. They characterise his approach as strategic, realistic, prone to change the game, and agile in multi-party situations.

Many people believe that negotiation is simply bargaining; it is not unlike a bazaar, where one person makes an extremely high offer and the counterpart keeps offering the same. Concessions are made gradually with the goal of bringing the parties to a final agreement. Kissinger characterised and criticised this standard approach to negotiation early in his career and later this was reflected in his negotiations: There is no point in moderating offers if the agreement is normally between two starting positions. Effective negotiation would propose a much more radical starting point than one is willing to accept. The more outrageous the initial offer, the clearer the idea of what one “really” wants to be considered a compromise.

Kissinger advised convincing the other side of one’s own underlying objectives and interests rather than exaggerating tactics. He argued that failure to do so hinders effective negotiation. In general negotiations, Kissinger expressed, “I made a considerable effort to leave no doubt of our fundamental approach. Only romantics think they can prevail in a negotiation by trickery: only pedants believe in the advantage of obfuscation. In a society of sovereign states, an agreement will only hold if all parties consider it in their interest. They must have  a sense of participation in the result. The art of diplomacy is not to outsmart the other side, but to convince it either of  common interest or of penalties if an impasse continues”. He continued “The wise diplomat understands that he cannot afford to trick his opponent; in the long run a reputation for reliability and fairness is an important assets. The same negotiators meet over and over again: their ability to deal with one another is undermined if a diplomat acquires a reputation of evasion or duplicity”. 

It is evident that the realist in Henry Kissinger values actions and results rather than words: “Statesmen value the steadiness and reliability in a partner, not the restless quest for even-new magic formulas”.  This brings us closer to a virtuous model, to maintain stable relationships over time, based on trust and reputation, than the Machiavellian model of short-term results.

Analysing the negotiations in which Kissinger was involved, the best contribution to more than 130 meetings between China and the United States in Warsaw was when an ambiguous and elegant formula that both parties could live with was achieved. This enabled the United States and China to cooperate on many other relevant issues. The crucial sentence is as follows:

“The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either sides of the Taiwan Straits maintain that there is but one China. The United States Government does not challenge that position.”

Just words? Hardly. There have been countless examples of such creatively ambiguous formulations of Kissinger negotiations. The common denominator is always face-saving formulations, but they result in both sides declaring victory and being able to move forward from previous deadlocks.

In some cases, however, no word of the agreement may be too costly to pronounce or formalise in writing. These are tacit agreements. However, the constructively proposed agreement may be unacceptable if enforced.  

These tacit agreements, in general, can be useful when there is a group of stakeholders, or a powerful audience, internal or external, that opposes a formal agreement and can impose costs on a negotiator who agrees to them.  Without many of the possible costs, a tacit agreement can be based on the desired content, irrespective of its form.

Constructive ambiguity and tacit agreements have a privileged place in the tactical toolkit of Kissinger, the global negotiator.

Posted on

Strategic funambulism

US President John F. Kennedy declared a naval blockade of Cuba on 22 October 1962 after a week of internal deliberations. The Soviet Union could have reacted to this action, raising the risk of a nuclear conflict to critical levels, which Kennedy considered this to have a one-third to one-half chance of occurring. After days of tension, declarations, and clandestine talks, Khrushchev opted to avoid direct confrontation by withdrawing the missiles from Cuba and returning them to the Soviet Union. This was in exchange for a US promise to withdraw its missiles from Turkey in the near future. Khrushchev opted to withdraw after considering the possibility of a nuclear catastrophe.

Dixit and Nalebuff, in their works Thinking Strategically and The Art of Strategy examine this historical event and the idea of strategic funambulism. This tactic is based on deliberately creating a sufficiently intolerable risk to the opponent to induce him to eliminate it by yielding. This technique requires skilful use of credibility and proper risk management, but it can also be a very effective strategy for achieving pre-set goals. 

The classic example of strategic funambulism has been the Cold War and the use of nuclear deterrence. To prevent the Soviet Union from initiating a conventional attack on Europe or the United States, it is necessary to expose it to the possibility of an escalating conflict and a nuclear exchange. The Soviet Union would move more slowly if the risk of pursuing such a course increased. The United States and the Soviet Union would likely offer each other concessions despite the increased risk.

The increased likelihood of a conventional conflict escalating should be exactly offset by the decreased likelihood of initiating a conventional conflict. If Khrushchev had considered the level of risk unacceptable, the use of strategic funambulism would have been successful. It would have allowed Kennedy to choose a more significant threat that was big enough to be effective but small enough to be credible.

Like any other strategic move, it aims to alter the opponent’s expectations to influence his actions. In reality, strategic funambulism is a type of qualified threat. To use this tactic successfully, it is necessary to understand its distinctive characteristics.

Dixit and Nalebuff ask: First, why not threaten the opponent with the certainty of a terrible outcome rather than with the slightest risk of it happening? Second, how does one determine whether the risk materialised? Third, what is the appropriate level of risk?

Strategic funambulism is the tactic of pushing an adversary to the brink of catastrophe to push him back. This is an extreme application of the Silver Rule: do unto others as you would have them do unto you. The subject finally gives in to his tactic because he does not want to provoke a disaster that is in his hands.

This strategic funambulism has a familiar ring to the chicken dilemma. In game theory, the chicken dilemma arises with two drivers on the same road, heading in opposite directions at high speed towards the same point. Each driver knows his car’s reaction time and turning radius, which are assumed to be identical for the two competitors. Each must decide when it is time to back down. This decision must be made without regard to the other driver’s decision, as it is irrevocable. The quick decision of one opponent cannot affect the other.

This chicken dilemma is based on a framework with increasing risk and an interdependent outcome of the other player’s decisions concerning one’s own choices. If both fail to change their attitude, this rising risk can lead, in the worst case scenario, to a collision of the two vehicles, with fatal consequences.

Strategic funambulism seems to be an initially more cautious approach, which considers all possible scenarios and selects the one with the least risk. In games of chicken, the outcome is uncertain and depends on how the other driver performs compared to the driver in question. The crucial question is: who is the first to back down?

Imagine a fragile agreement of 7 parties, with disparate and even conflicting interests and idiosyncrasies, with another negotiator holding a position of power – which depends on maintaining this fragile agreement. This would combine strategic funambulism – and the parties’ risk management – with the salami technique. With the threat that the agreement will end, one side obtains a concession, with each slice it cuts, no matter how small, having the capacity to be the last drop of water. The key to making this kind of threat credible is that neither side knows exactly where the dividing line lies.

Strategic funambulism involves not only creating a risk but also carefully keeping the level of that risk under control. Reaching this conclusion does not imply accepting the situation and accepting the risk of nuclear war. To reduce the risk, it is necessary to address the problem at a more elementary level, i.e., change the game.

Posted on

All Individuals are philosophers, but do they all employ strategy?

Each of us is a philosopher. This may well come as a surprise and is an unusual statement to make because people rarely discuss Philosophy only at surface level.

It is important to differentiate between academic Philosophy and Philosophy as a way of life. Generally, the first is considered a complicated realm reserved for specialists. While the second asserts that “everyone is a philosopher.” The key in Philosophy consists in the question “Why?” Curiosity constitutes typical philosophical attitude and helps to understand concepts. Almost everyone has this interest. Every individual has their own truth, which is a compass for living one’s life.

Now, however, comes the second aspect: are we all strategists? Typically, associating strategy with human behaviour carries negative ethical implications. This, however, becomes considerably more complex on closer inspection. Strategy refers to the appropriate alignment between means and ends. Strategos commanded the military forces inside the polis of ancient Greece. The initial definition of strategy is a military concept and has evolved from game theory into corporate or political strategy.

Determining objectives using a strategy entails formulating a plan that elucidates the interdependence of actions among the specified components and references to situations of cooperation and/or conflict. The History of Ideas contains corporate, political, and personal insights pertinent to the study of strategy. We hope that these concepts will be further developed. Welcome to Minerva Strategy Blog!