Machiavelic ethical model

There is a new approach that is called the Machiavelic ethical model, which is an extreme and particular version of the consequentialist ethical model. It is inspired by the work of Niccolò Machiavelli . It is curious how a term Machiavellianism has emerged from a thinker that the Spanish Royal Academy of Language defined as “a way of proceeding with cunning, duplicity and perfidy”. Machiavelli has not had much good press, but the Machiavelic ethical method is more common than it seems.

Machiavelli’s best-known motto is the end justifies the means but this attribution is not entirely accurate because the phrase does not appear in any of his works. However, in The Prince , he states:”(…) and in the actions of all men, and especially of princes, which it is not prudent to challenge, one judges by the result. For that reason, let a prince have the credit of conquering and holding his state, the means will always be considered honest”. (Machiavelli, The Prince, XVIII).

The Machiavelic ethical model affirms, as a fundamental rule, the desire for success and the ends chosen are more important than the means. However, that does not mean that behaviour must automatically be immoral. The Prince is a treatise on human nature, from which we can learn that the prince if he wants to achieve success, must be duplicitous and cover his tracks.

This may involve an apparent adherence to values, but ultimately being pragmatic. In one of the best-known passages, Machiavelli asks “in what way a prince must keep his word” and offers an answer that is in his line: “a wise lord cannot, nor ought be to, keep faith when such observance may be turned against him, and when the reasons that caused him to pledge it exist no longer. If men were entirely good this precept would not hold, but because they are bad, and will not keep faith with you, you are not bound to observe it with them. Nor will there ever be waiting to a prince legitimate reasons to excuse nonobservance” (Machiavelli, The Prince, XVIII).

From the deontological ethical model, it could be argued that promises should always be kept and the truth always told. If we analyse the scenario according to Machiavelli, there are three circumstances that make it advisable not to keep a promise: a) The consequences of the promise have changed over time; b) The reasons for the promise no longer exist; c) The other person will not keep their word with you. The second reason is the strongest and could be invoked if the reasons for the promise really no longer exist. The first should have been adequately foreseen and for the third, many people will honour their promises.

There are several interpretations of Machiavelli. The Machiavelic version of Machiavelli sees Machiavelli as a diabolical, immoral, anti-Christian author who justifies any action to achieve his goals. The republican version of Machiavelli states that he was a patriot, that he wanted to defend the State above all and that he considered that the Prince should have civil and political virtues and not religious ones.

For this reason, some consider him to be the founder of Political Science, because he considers that politics has its own rules distinct from ethics and religion.

From a strategic point of view, Machiavelli offers interesting readings, doubts and reflections. For example, we find this interesting advice for strategists: “It is necessary to be a fox to discover the snares and a lion to terrify the wolves” (Machiavelli,The Prince, XVIII). But perhaps the key element in strategy is how to act in the face of someone Machiavelic.The first and most difficult task will be to identify him because, as Aranguren states, “the first thing to do is to identify him.  a self-confessed Machiavellianism would be annulled as such: to be effective it has to be hypocritical and pay tribute to virtue” (Aranguren, José LuisÉtica y Política)

The strategist must be vigilant and, for example, establish mechanisms for impartial verification of the different operations. Someone seeking success, feigning conformity, does not keep their word. Strategies must be developed to prevent such situations. Machiavelli points out that if we learn from the qualities of the fox and the lion, we can get closer to success.

Francisco de Vitoria, on just war

One of the prominent figures in the Spanish Renaissance was Francisco de Vitoria (1483-1546). He was a Spanish Dominican, renewer of Theology and promoter of the Salamanca School of Natural Law. He is considered the founder of the science of International Law and the notion of human rights. One of the most relevant political philosophers of the 20th century, John Rawls, in his book entitled Law of Peoples and the Idea of Public Reason revisited quotes De Vitoria and, from a liberal conception, adheres to his just war theory. 

Precisely Francisco de Vitoria addresses this classic theme in his essay entitled ” Sobre el derecho de Guerra”/ On the law of war when he asks: “What can be the reason and cause of a just war?” We will address this question below, based on this author, from the perspective of Minerva Strategy Blog.

De Vitoria’s first approach to answering this question states that “diversity of religion is not sufficient cause for a just war.” And he justifies himself with that “even if the faith has been announced to the barbarians with sufficient signs of probability and they have not wanted to accept it, it is not, for that reason, lawful to persecute them with war and strip them of their goods” (Francisco de Vitoria, Sobre los indios, II.15).

Francisco de Vitoria was a professor at the University of Salamanca and his lectures, or relections, on various topics of interest have come down to us to this day. Specifically, the full title of the one dedicated to the notion of just war is entitled: ” Sobre el derecho de guerra de los españoles sobre los bárbaros”/On the law of war of the Spaniards over the barbarians. Contrary to what the black legend on the Spanish colonisation of Latin America claims, the School of Salamanca laid the foundations for human rights and the rules of International Law. And, as has been seen, De Vitoria did not justify war for diversity of religion.  

Another issue addressed by Francisco de Vitoria is that “it is not a just cause of a war to intend to expand dominions” and he argues: “this proposition is too evident to need to be demonstrated. For otherwise there would always be just cause for any of the belligerent wars, and so all would be innocent” (Francisco de Vitoria, Sobre el derecho de guerra, III.11).

The history of mankind contains many examples of rulers who have had expansionist policies beyond their borders.  The results of these offensive wars are part of History and memory. This would not be a justified strategy under current International Law, nor as a cost/benefit analysis in the medium and long term.

Francisco de Vitoria continues “neither is it just cause of a war to the prince’s own glory nor any other particular profit of the prince” and he states that “this proposition is also evident, for the prince must order to the common good of the Republic, both war and peace, and he cannot invest public funds in his own glory, in his own profit, much less expose his subjects to danger. The difference between the legitimate king and a tyrant lies in that the tyrant orders the government to his own interest and profit, while the king orders it to the public good, as Aristotle says” (Francisco de Vitoria, Sobre el derecho de guerra, III.12).

If the ruler wages war for his private benefit, he becomes a tyrant, as Aristotle argued in his work Politics. There the Stagirite philosopher proposed a classic typology of forms of government, where he distinguishes those leaders who promote the common good in their government actions -monarchy, aristocracy, politeia– and those who act for their own benefit or that of their own group -tyranny, oligarchy, democracy-. It is interesting because issues of accountability have been identified ever since the first book written on Political Science, which deals especially with issues of classical democracy in the polis of Athens.

The affirmative answer to the question posed by De Vitoria is the following: “the only just cause for waging war is the injury received” and he affirms that “in addition, offensive war is made to avenge an injury and to reprimand the enemies, as has already been said. But there can be no revenge where there has not preceded an injury and a fault. Therefore the conclusion is evident” (Francisco de Vitoria, Sobre el derecho de guerra, III.13).

Here we get to the heart of Francisco de Vitoria’s argument: defensive war, self-defence, is justified. Bobbio affirms: “it is lawful to repel violence with violence.” The Italian author asks himself: “But does the strategy of atomic war still allow us to maintain the distinction between offensive and defensive war?” (Norberto Bobbio, El problema de la guerra y las vías de la paz). De Vitoria did not speak of preventive wars, but in the answer to Bobbio it is worth analising whether a preventive war is justified in the face of a relevant threat. Situations of strategic funanbulism in scenarios of nuclear deterrence are placed in this risk analysis.

Francisco de Vitoria adds: “an injury of any gravity is not enough to make war”. He clarifies that “this proposition is proved because it is not even lawful to impose such serious penalties as death, exile or confiscation of goods on one’s own subjects for any fault. Now, since all the things that are done in war are grave and even atrocious, such as slaughter, arson, devastation, it is not lawful to punish with war those who have committed slight offences, since the measure of punishment must be in accordance with the gravity of the crime” (Francisco de Vitoria, Sobre el derecho de guerra, III.14).

The key to self-defence is proportionality. Thomas Aquinas already defended it by “moderating the defence according to the needs of the threatened security” (Thomas Aquinas, Suma Theologica, II-II, q. 64,a. 7, c). It is in that passage of the Theological Summa, where the theory of the double effect is formulated: an act has two effects, one intentional -preserving life- and another not, which would be incidental -the death of the aggressor-. The key for Thomas Aquinas is that the act be proportionate to its end.

An application of the doctrine of double effect is proposed by Rawls, when he states that civilian casualties are prohibited except insofar as they are the indirect and unintended result of a legitimate attack against a military target (Rawls, Law of Peoples and the Idea of Public Reason revisited).

The just war theory in Francisco de Vitoria is a classic in the reflection on public affairs. As a good classic, it allows more current re-readings and, as Italo Calvino said, it can be conceived as a talisman, a compass on which to orient oneself when approaching the territories of peace and war.

Kissinger, the global negotiator

From John F. Kennedy until recently, every U.S. president has sought the counsel of Henry Kissinger (1923-2023), along with CEOs and political leaders from around the world. His views on foreign policy, State affairs, and world order have been much discussed. However, his remarkable world record as a negotiator has largely gone unnoticed, leading James K. Sebenius, Nicholas Burns and Robert H. Mnookin to author the book Kissinger, the Negotiator. Lessons from Dealmaking at the Highest Level. Sebenius is a professor with the Harvard Negotiation Project and wrote the book 3-d Negotiation: Powerful Tools to Change the Game in Your Most Important Deals.

Some negotiators prefer strategy and the big picture, whilst others focus on the emotion and empathy, and specific points. Few combine both positions. Sebenius et al. examine Kissinger’s uniquely developed ability to focus on a broader perspective. They characterise his approach as strategic, realistic, prone to change the game, and agile in multi-party situations.

Many people believe that negotiation is simply bargaining; it is not unlike a bazaar, where one person makes an extremely high offer and the counterpart keeps offering the same. Concessions are made gradually with the goal of bringing the parties to a final agreement. Kissinger characterised and criticised this standard approach to negotiation early in his career and later this was reflected in his negotiations: There is no point in moderating offers if the agreement is normally between two starting positions. Effective negotiation would propose a much more radical starting point than one is willing to accept. The more outrageous the initial offer, the clearer the idea of what one “really” wants to be considered a compromise.

Kissinger advised convincing the other side of one’s own underlying objectives and interests rather than exaggerating tactics. He argued that failure to do so hinders effective negotiation. In general negotiations, Kissinger expressed, “I made a considerable effort to leave no doubt of our fundamental approach. Only romantics think they can prevail in a negotiation by trickery: only pedants believe in the advantage of obfuscation. In a society of sovereign states, an agreement will only hold if all parties consider it in their interest. They must have  a sense of participation in the result. The art of diplomacy is not to outsmart the other side, but to convince it either of  common interest or of penalties if an impasse continues”. He continued “The wise diplomat understands that he cannot afford to trick his opponent; in the long run a reputation for reliability and fairness is an important assets. The same negotiators meet over and over again: their ability to deal with one another is undermined if a diplomat acquires a reputation of evasion or duplicity”. 

It is evident that the realist in Henry Kissinger values actions and results rather than words: “Statesmen value the steadiness and reliability in a partner, not the restless quest for even-new magic formulas”.  This brings us closer to a virtuous model, to maintain stable relationships over time, based on trust and reputation, than the Machiavellian model of short-term results.

Analysing the negotiations in which Kissinger was involved, the best contribution to more than 130 meetings between China and the United States in Warsaw was when an ambiguous and elegant formula that both parties could live with was achieved. This enabled the United States and China to cooperate on many other relevant issues. The crucial sentence is as follows:

“The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either sides of the Taiwan Straits maintain that there is but one China. The United States Government does not challenge that position.”

Just words? Hardly. There have been countless examples of such creatively ambiguous formulations of Kissinger negotiations. The common denominator is always face-saving formulations, but they result in both sides declaring victory and being able to move forward from previous deadlocks.

In some cases, however, no word of the agreement may be too costly to pronounce or formalise in writing. These are tacit agreements. However, the constructively proposed agreement may be unacceptable if enforced.  

These tacit agreements, in general, can be useful when there is a group of stakeholders, or a powerful audience, internal or external, that opposes a formal agreement and can impose costs on a negotiator who agrees to them.  Without many of the possible costs, a tacit agreement can be based on the desired content, irrespective of its form.

Constructive ambiguity and tacit agreements have a privileged place in the tactical toolkit of Kissinger, the global negotiator.

Strategic funambulism

US President John F. Kennedy declared a naval blockade of Cuba on 22 October 1962 after a week of internal deliberations. The Soviet Union could have reacted to this action, raising the risk of a nuclear conflict to critical levels, which Kennedy considered this to have a one-third to one-half chance of occurring. After days of tension, declarations, and clandestine talks, Khrushchev opted to avoid direct confrontation by withdrawing the missiles from Cuba and returning them to the Soviet Union. This was in exchange for a US promise to withdraw its missiles from Turkey in the near future. Khrushchev opted to withdraw after considering the possibility of a nuclear catastrophe.

Dixit and Nalebuff, in their works Thinking Strategically and The Art of Strategy examine this historical event and the idea of strategic funambulism. This tactic is based on deliberately creating a sufficiently intolerable risk to the opponent to induce him to eliminate it by yielding. This technique requires skilful use of credibility and proper risk management, but it can also be a very effective strategy for achieving pre-set goals. 

The classic example of strategic funambulism has been the Cold War and the use of nuclear deterrence. To prevent the Soviet Union from initiating a conventional attack on Europe or the United States, it is necessary to expose it to the possibility of an escalating conflict and a nuclear exchange. The Soviet Union would move more slowly if the risk of pursuing such a course increased. The United States and the Soviet Union would likely offer each other concessions despite the increased risk.

The increased likelihood of a conventional conflict escalating should be exactly offset by the decreased likelihood of initiating a conventional conflict. If Khrushchev had considered the level of risk unacceptable, the use of strategic funambulism would have been successful. It would have allowed Kennedy to choose a more significant threat that was big enough to be effective but small enough to be credible.

Like any other strategic move, it aims to alter the opponent’s expectations to influence his actions. In reality, strategic funambulism is a type of qualified threat. To use this tactic successfully, it is necessary to understand its distinctive characteristics.

Dixit and Nalebuff ask: First, why not threaten the opponent with the certainty of a terrible outcome rather than with the slightest risk of it happening? Second, how does one determine whether the risk materialised? Third, what is the appropriate level of risk?

Strategic funambulism is the tactic of pushing an adversary to the brink of catastrophe to push him back. This is an extreme application of the Silver Rule: do unto others as you would have them do unto you. The subject finally gives in to his tactic because he does not want to provoke a disaster that is in his hands.

This strategic funambulism has a familiar ring to the chicken dilemma. In game theory, the chicken dilemma arises with two drivers on the same road, heading in opposite directions at high speed towards the same point. Each driver knows his car’s reaction time and turning radius, which are assumed to be identical for the two competitors. Each must decide when it is time to back down. This decision must be made without regard to the other driver’s decision, as it is irrevocable. The quick decision of one opponent cannot affect the other.

This chicken dilemma is based on a framework with increasing risk and an interdependent outcome of the other player’s decisions concerning one’s own choices. If both fail to change their attitude, this rising risk can lead, in the worst case scenario, to a collision of the two vehicles, with fatal consequences.

Strategic funambulism seems to be an initially more cautious approach, which considers all possible scenarios and selects the one with the least risk. In games of chicken, the outcome is uncertain and depends on how the other driver performs compared to the driver in question. The crucial question is: who is the first to back down?

Imagine a fragile agreement of 7 parties, with disparate and even conflicting interests and idiosyncrasies, with another negotiator holding a position of power – which depends on maintaining this fragile agreement. This would combine strategic funambulism – and the parties’ risk management – with the salami technique. With the threat that the agreement will end, one side obtains a concession, with each slice it cuts, no matter how small, having the capacity to be the last drop of water. The key to making this kind of threat credible is that neither side knows exactly where the dividing line lies.

Strategic funambulism involves not only creating a risk but also carefully keeping the level of that risk under control. Reaching this conclusion does not imply accepting the situation and accepting the risk of nuclear war. To reduce the risk, it is necessary to address the problem at a more elementary level, i.e., change the game.

All Individuals are philosophers, but do they all employ strategy?

Each of us is a philosopher. This may well come as a surprise and is an unusual statement to make because people rarely discuss Philosophy only at surface level.

It is important to differentiate between academic Philosophy and Philosophy as a way of life. Generally, the first is considered a complicated realm reserved for specialists. While the second asserts that “everyone is a philosopher.” The key in Philosophy consists in the question “Why?” Curiosity constitutes typical philosophical attitude and helps to understand concepts. Almost everyone has this interest. Every individual has their own truth, which is a compass for living one’s life.

Now, however, comes the second aspect: are we all strategists? Typically, associating strategy with human behaviour carries negative ethical implications. This, however, becomes considerably more complex on closer inspection. Strategy refers to the appropriate alignment between means and ends. Strategos commanded the military forces inside the polis of ancient Greece. The initial definition of strategy is a military concept and has evolved from game theory into corporate or political strategy.

Determining objectives using a strategy entails formulating a plan that elucidates the interdependence of actions among the specified components and references to situations of cooperation and/or conflict. The History of Ideas contains corporate, political, and personal insights pertinent to the study of strategy. We hope that these concepts will be further developed. Welcome to Minerva Strategy Blog!